JUDGMENT
M.L. Agrawal, C.J.
1. In this application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the question that fall for our consideration is as to whether the nature of dispute between parties could be said to be a dispute “touching the business of co-operative society” within the meaning of Section 68(1) of the Orissa Co-oprative Societies Act, 1962 (shortly stated, ‘the Act’).
After sating facts, quoting the sections of the Act.
2. Their The question raised before us is no longer res Integra and has fallen for decision in several cases before various High Courts inclding, our own. The earlier decisions in point of time which were cited are (1) AIR 1969 S. C. 1320, (Deccan Merchants Co-op, Bank Ltd. v. M/S. Dalichand Jugra Jam and others) and (2) AIR 1970 S. C. 245 Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Ors. v. Addl. industrial Tribunal, A.P. & Ors.).
3. In trie first case (AIR 1969 S. C. 1320) before the Supreme Court. the main point was whether the dispute could be related by the Registrar for arbitration under Sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the Maharastra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. It was contended that the dispute which related to title and recovery of possession of the premies., by eviction of the occupiers was not within the purview of Section 91 of the Mahastra. Act. and that the reference by the Registrar was, therefore, incompetent The Suprerne Court observed:
“…We can hardly imagine that it was the intention of the Legislature to deprive tenants in buildings owned by co-operative tive societies of the benefits given by the Rent Act. it seems :to us that the Act was passed, in the main,, to shorten litigation lessen its costs and to provide a summary procedure for the determination of the disputes relating to the internal management of the societies. But under the Rent Act a different social objective is intended to be achieved and for achieving that social objective it is necessary that a dispute between the land- lord and the tenant should be dealt with by the Courts set up under the Rent Act and in accordance with the special provisions of the Rent Act. This social objective does not impinge on the objective underlying the Act. It seems to us that the two Acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act, should apply…”.
4. In Co-operative Central Bank’s case (AIR 1970 S. C. 245), a dispute having arisen between certain Co-operative Central Banks in the State of Andhra Pradesh and their workmen, a reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal. An objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground that Under Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, the dispute was to be referred for decision to the Registrar. The Tribunal and the High Court rejected the objection of the Banks to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court following their earlier dictum in Deccan Merchant’s case (supra) said :
“One other limitation on the word ‘dispute’ may also be placed and that is that the word ‘dispute’ covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee…”
and held:
“…we must proceed on the basis that Section 61 of the Act requires reference of a dispute to the Registrar only if the dispute is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee, and further the dispute between the co-operative society and the employee touches the business of the society in the sense explained by this Court in that case”.
The Court further held :
“…it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of the society…”
5. Following the above decisions and the principles enunciated in these two decisions and also referring to some other authorities of different High Courts, a Bench of this Court in the case of the workmen of the (Orissa Police Co-operative Syndicate v. The State of Orissa & Ors). [53 (1982) CLT 279] categorically laid down that an industrial dispute does not come within the purview of the disputes contemplated by Section 68 of the Act.
6. Although in view pf the above decisions which clinch the issue it does not appear very much necessary to refer to any other decision, since some other authorities were also cited and the matter is of frequent occurrence, I would refer to some of them.
Kailasm, J. (as he then was) in the case of (Kasturbanagar Co. op. House Construction Society v. K. Soundararajan and another). (AIR 1963 Madras 67), dealing with an analogous provision of the Madras Act held that the provision of the Co-operative Societies Act was limited and related only to such dispute touching the business and arising between the society and its servant. And a claim for retrenchment compensation by a retrenched employee of the society is no doubt a dispute between the society and its servant, but at the same time it is not a dispute touching the business of the registered society, Industrial disputes, such as, retrenchment compensation, gratuity, etc., are not contemplated within the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. Such disputes are governed by the Industrial Disputes Act which provide a special- machinery to decide them.
Similar is the view expressed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of (Bihar State Co-op. Marketing Union Ltd. v. The Registrar, Co-op Societies, Bihar and another). (AIR 1974 Patna 77), to which I was also a party. Dealing with the Bihar and Orissa Co- operative Societies Act, 1935, containing almost parallel provisions, it was held that dispute in relation to the service conditions of the servant employed by a society could not be held to be a dispute touching the business of the society. This decision was followed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of (Umakanta Pal and Ors. v. Banchhanidhi Swain and another), 1985(I) OLR 598 (1986 Lab. I.C. 288).
7. From the above discussion. I would hold that the expression ‘business’ has not been used as understood in common parlance. It has been used rather in a narrow sense and is referable to actual trading and business activities by the society. Sub-section (1) of Section 68 Itself provides a key for this view where some disputes, such as, ‘dispute regarding the disciplinary action taken by a society or its committee against a paid servant of the society and any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of an apex society’ will not be covered under the pale of Section 68.
The nature of the dispute between the petitioner and the opposite party is one based on the award of the Industrial Tribunal relating to the petitioners service matters, i e., his reinstatement, payment of his wages, etc., and it cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the society. Rather, the award has come into existence only on account of the disciplinary action taken by the society against the petitioner which has already been exempted from the purview of arbitration under Sub-section (1) of Section 68. It has, therefore, to be resolved under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act itself. A dispute of this nature, i. e., between a Co-operative Society and its own workmen, cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of a Co-operative Society as it does not relate to the actual business of the society and thus is not capable of being resolved by the Registrar.
8. No decision taking a contrary view was cited on behalf of the opposiae parties, nor any submission was made which could detract me from following the principle enunciated in the above decisions and take a different view in the matter.
9. From the above discussion, the inevitable result that follows is that the writ application must succeed. It is accordingly allowed and the order of the Labour Court in Annexure-1 is hereby quashed. It is held that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner’s application in question and decide the same on merits.
The matter, therefore, has to go back to opp. party No. 2 for disposal.of the petitioner’s application on merits in accordance with law.
Since the petitioner has suffered long on account of the wrong attitude taken by opp. party No. 2 in spite of authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court and various other High Courts, I award costs to the petitioner.
Hearing fee is, however, assessed at Rs. 250/- (Rupees two hundred fifty) only.
K.P. Mohapatra, J.
I agree.