ORDER
Bhuvaneshwar Prasad, J.
1. This is an application Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called ‘the Code’). It is directed against the order dated 25-7-1989 passed by the learned VIIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram, in Sessions Trial No. 24 of 1988/11 of 1989 refusing to discharge the petitioners for the offence Under Sections 307 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.
2. It appears that opposite party No. 2 had lodged a fardbeyan on 31-8-1987 before the S.I. of police, Sasaram P.S., on the basis of which Sasaram P.S. Case No. 453 of 1987 under Sections 341, 324 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code was instituted. In this case, it was alleged that petitioner No. 3 had assaulted the father of the informant with fists on his nose. It was further alleged that petitioner No. 2 had aimed a knife blow at the father of the informant hitting him on the wrist of the left hand. The police after investigations submitted charge sheet Under Sections 341, 323, 324, 307/34 of the Penal Code. The learned Magistrate on receiving the charge-sheet and the case diary took cognizance of the offence Under Sections 341, 323, 324 and 307 of the Penal Code by his order dated 6-10-1987. This he did without applying his judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of this case. Thereafter, the case was committed to the court of Session and was ultimately transferred to the Court of VIIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtasand was numbered as Sessions Trial No. 24 of 1988/11 of 1989.
3. Before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, petitioners filed a petition on 24-7-1989 praying therein to discharge them so far as the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was concerned, since there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against them for the said offence. However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, by the order dated 25-7-1989 was pleased to frame charge against the petitioner also under Section 307 of the Penal Code which amounted to rejection of the prayer of the petitioners for their discharge under this section. The petitioners have contended that in this impugned order dated 25-7-1989 the learned trial Court had not discussed any evidence, circumstances or materials which led him to form an opinion that there was a ground for presuming that the accused persons have committed an offence also under Section 307 of the Penal Code which was exclusively triable by the Court of Session. It is well settled that it was incumbent on the Court concerned to pass a speaking order giving reasons for passing it so that the superior Court may be in a position to scrutinise the correctness and legality of the same in accordance with law. Since the same has not been done, the impugned order is perfunctory, vague, vitiated and on this score alone, the order passed by the learned trial Court is fit to be quashed. Hence this application has been filed for quashing the order dated 25-7-1989 and for the discharge of the petitioners of the charge under Section 307 of the Penal Code.
4. After filing of this application, notice to opposite party No. 2 was ordered to be issued to show cause as to why this application should not be admitted and, if possible, disposed of at the admission stage itself, as will appear from the order of this Court dated 19-8-1989. Also further proceeding before the learned Courts below was ordered to be stayed for two months.
5. Opposite party No. 2 had appeared on 27-9-1989 and had filed a petition for vacating the order of stay dated 19-8-1989. A supplementary affidavit has also been filed on the following day to correct the date of the order of stay which was passed on 19-8-1989, though it has wrongly been mentioned in the petition as 29-8-1989. In this petition, it has been stated that the charge-sheet has been submitted also under Section 307/34 of the Penal Code. The Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate I/C by his order dated 6-10-1987 after perusing charge-sheet, record of the case and the documents as mentioned in Section 173 of the Code came to the conclusion that prima facie a case also under Section 307/34, Penal Code, was made out against the petitioners. He, accordingly, took cognizance of the offence by his order dated 6-10-1987. Further by the order dated 15-12-1987, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram after hearing both the parties and after considering the documents referred to under Section 173 of the Code came to the conclusion that a case also under Section 307/34 of the Penal Code was made out. As such by the order of this date he committed the case to the Court of Session, inasmuch as, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code is execlusively triable by the said Court. It has been pointed out that the petitioners who are accused before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, did not move against the order of commitment dated 15-12-1987, though this order was passed in their presence. However on 24-7-1989 they filed a petition before the learned trial Court that no offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was made out. Both the parties were heard on this petition on 25-7-1989 with respect to the charges to be framed against the petitioners. After hearing the parties and on consideration of the record of the case as also the documents submitted therewith, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was of the opinion that there was ground for presuming that the accused persons had committed an offence also under Section 307 of the Penal Code exclusively triable by the Court of Session. He, accordingly, framed the charge against the petitioners under Sections 307/ 34, 307/ 323 and 323 of the Penal Code, against the accused persons. Already 8 (eight) P.Ws. have been examined in this case. On 5-5-1989 the two remaining official witnesses, namely, medical officer and the Investigating Officer were present in the Court for their evidence. They, however, could not be examined on account of the order of stay passed by this Court. This fact was concealed by the petitioner at the time of filing of this application and obtaining the order of stay. Also the petitioners had concealed the fact that petitioner No. 3 had assaulted the father of the informant with an iron rod on his head and that petitioner No. 2 has given him various knife blows causing him five incised injuries and therefore, clearly a case under Section 307 of the Penal Code was made out.
6. It was further contended that Section 228 of the Code does not direct that the Court should pass formal order giving the reasons for framing of the charge. The impugned order is perfectly valid, legal and does not warrant an interference by this Court in exercise of powers vested in it under Section 482 of the Code. On these ground it was contended that the stay order dated 19-8-1989 be vacated.
7. From the certified copy of the order sheet of the Court of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, it appears that on 24-7-1989, the petitioners had filed a petition before him to the effect that no case under Section 307 of the Penal Code was made out against them. On the following day this petition was moved and the parties were heard. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after hearing the parties has passed the following order :–
“Heard the submission of the learned Advocate for the accused and the learned A.P.P. on charge matter and considered the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, I am of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused persons have committed offences which are exclusively triable by this Court.
Hence, charge under Section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code is framed against all the four accused persons. …”
It was further observed in this order :–
“that the charge under Section 307/323 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against the petitioner No. 2 and the charge under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against petitioner No. 4.”
8. On behalf of the petitioners it has seriously been contended that it was incumbent on the learned trial Court to record his reasons for framing of the charge against the petitioners. Since he has failed to do so, the impugned order is not in terms of Section 228 of the Code, and is therefore, liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has seriously contended before me that, as required by law, it was incumbent on the learned Additional Sessions Judge to record his reasons for framing of charge against the petitioners and his reasons for not discharging them for the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code, as prayed for, in the petition dated 22-7-1989 filed before the learned Courts below. On behalf of the opposite party No. 2, these contentions have been seriously challenged. It has been submitted that in the impugned order, sufficient reasons have been assigned by the learned trial Court for framing the charge against the petitioners under various sections mentioned in it. As such the requirement of law has already been fulfilled. It has further been contended that as a matter of fact it is only when an order of discharge is to be passed by the Court that the formal reasons have to be recorded. When, however, the Court proceeds to frame the charge against the accused persons and refuses to discharge them, no formal order spelling out the reasons for the same is necessary.
9. Before taking up for consideration the submissions of the parties on this point, I will firstly like to refer to Sections 227 and 228 of the Code.
These sections occurred in Chapter XVIII of the Code under the caption, “TRIAL BEFORE A COURT OF SESSION, Section 227 lays down as follows :–
“227. Discharge:– If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.”
Section 228 runs as follows :–
“228. Framing of Charge:– (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which–
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate and, thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate, shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.
10. On behalf of respondent No. 2, it has seriously been contended that the working of these sections make it clear that while in the case of discharge under Section 227 of the Code, it is necessary for the Judge to record his reasons for so doing; there is no such parallel provision in Section 228 of the Code, according to which it is obligatory on the part of the Judge to record his reasons for so doing. This submissions has been made on his behalf on a point of law, though he has clearly submitted that in the present case, in the impugned order sufficient reasons have been assigned by the Judge for proceeding to frame the charge against the accused.
11. As against it, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the case of ‘State of Karnataka v. L. Muni Swami, AIR 1977 SC 1489 equivalent to 1977 Cri LJ 1125. In particular, my attention has been drawn to paragraph No. 7 of this judgment in which Mr. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, who spoke for the Court after quoting Section 227 of the Code has observed as follows :–
“This section is contained in Chapter XVIII called ‘trial before a Court of Session’. It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior Court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case.”
It may be mentioned here that this was a case in which the learned Sessions Judge had discharged three of the accused under Section 227 of the Code after recording the reasons for doing so.
12. So far as the case against the remaining accused was concerned, the learned Judge observed that :–
“There was some material to hold that they have something to do with the instant case which occurred on 6-12-1979 in the I.T.I. Colony, Bangalore.”
The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, adjourned the case for framing specific charges as made out from the materials on record against the rest of the accused persons. Two revision petitions by the rest of the accused were filed against this order which were allowed by the High Court on the ground that there was no ground for proceeding against them. The High Court, accordingly, quashed the proceeding in regard to them against which the appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court were filed.
13. Referring to that portion of the paragraph No. 7 in this judgment as quoted above, it has been submitted by the learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2 that it suffers from some infirmity. In particular, my attention has been drawn to the distinction between Sections 227 and 228 quoted above, according to which while for passing an order under Section 227 it was mandatory for the Judge to record his reasons for so doing, there is no such mandatory provision in Section 228 of the Code. It has been submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment had quoted Section 227 of the Code in extenso. Undoubtedly, in Section 227 of the Code there is a provision which requires the Court to record the reasons for discharging the accused. There is no such provision in Section 228 of the Code. The learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has submitted that in this view of the matter, the observation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that,
“The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior Court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.”
Can at best apply to a case under Section 227 only. It has been pointed out that the expression “provision” mentioned by the Hon’ble Supreme Court obviously refers to the provisions for recording the reasons as mentioned in Section 227 of the Code. It has also been pointed out that preceding this observation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had taken into consideration the provision of Section 227 of the Code only and not the provision of Section 228 of the Code. As a matter of fact, it was submitted that there is no such provision in Section 228 of the Code. On this basis it has been submitted that the framers of law did not intend that for passing the order under Section 228 of the Code, the Judge has to record a formal order giving out reasons for framing of the charge.
14. In this connection, it has been pointed out that the well established principle of interpretation of a statute is that, ordinarily natural meaning of the expressions used in a particular section has to be given when the language of the section is clear. Nothing is required to be imported therein. It is only in the case of ambiguity or vagueness that the same is required to be interpreted by the Courts. If the expressions are clear and unambiguous, the natural and grammatical meaning has to be given. Nothing should be imported in a section which is not there. In the present case it has been submitted by the learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2 that since in Section 228 of the Code there is no such parallel provision for recording the reasons as can be found in Section 227 of the Code, a Judge was not required to record any such reason in his order framing the charge.
15. As against it, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that while passing any judicial order, it is incumbent upon the Court to assign reasons for the same so as to enable the appellate or revisional Court to examine the correctness thereof. The learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2 has agreed that in principle every judicial order should be founded on some reason. He has, however, submitted that for this purpose, no formal order need be passed while exercising the power given to the Judge under Section 228 of the Code, though, while passing of the order of discharge under Section 227 of the Code, the Judge is obliged under the provision of this section to record his reasons for doing so. The very fact that the legislature had made a departure on this point so far as Section 228 of the Code is concerned shows the legislative intent, namely, that while at the time of passing the order under Section 227 of the Code it is mandatory for the Judge to record his reasons for so doing, there is no such mandatory requirement while passing the order under Section 228 of the Code. It was, therefore, his submission that if the Judge came to the conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he need not record a formal order in this regard and the reference to the provision in paragraph 7 of this judgment is obviously the provision as contained in Section 227 of the Code making it mandatory for the Judge to record the reasons for discharging the accused since obviously under Section 228 of the Code there is no such parallel provision.
16. In view, however, of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case as quoted above, it is not for me to enter into the merits of these submissions made by the learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2. The law laid down by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. It will naturally follow that while exercising the power under Section 228 of the Code also the Judge has to record his reasons for framing the charge against the accused.
17. On behalf of opposite party No. 2, my attention has been drawn to the order dated 25-7-89 whose portions have been quoted above. It has been submitted that the learned Sessions Judge had heard the parties on the point of framing of the charge and considered the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith. Since the charge-sheet was submitted also under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, on perusal of those documents, the learned Judge proceeded to frame the charge under Section 307/34 of the Penal Code against the petitioners. Hence, according, to the learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2, there is no illegality committed by the learned Judge. I have perused this order and I find that on the perusal of the charge-sheet and other connected papers, the learned Court came to the conclusion that there were grounds for presuming that the accused persons had committed an offence also under Section 307 which was exclusively triable by the Court of Session. He, accordingly, proceeded to frame the charge against the petitioners. Under this circumstance, I think that the requirements of law as laid down in the case of State of Karnataka (1977 Cri LJ 1125) (SC) (Supra) appear to have been satisfied and on this ground this order cannot be quashed.
18. In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of Union of India v. Prafullah Kumar, 1979 Cri LJ 154 : (AIR 1979 SC 366). In this case the police submitted charge sheet before the Special Judge for the prosecution of respondent No. 1 for the various offences mentioned in Section 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120 B of the Penal Code. The learned Special Judge, Puri after having gone through the charge-sheet and statements made by the witnesses before the police as also other documents came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient ground for framing the charge against the respondents. He accordingly discharged them under Section 227 of the Code for which he had given cogent reasons for passing the order of discharge. Union of India went to the High Court in revision against the order of the Special Judge refusing to frame the charge, but the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant and maintained the order of discharge passed by the Special Judge. Against this order the appellant moved the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this case it was held that (Para 10)
“the Judge while considering the question for framing of the charges under Section 227 of the Code has undoubted power to shift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.”
It was further observed that,
“Where the materials placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully, justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. Also it was pointed out that in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code, the Judge, who is a senior and experienced Court, cannot act merely as a post-office or mouth piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probability of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on.”
This, however, will not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the matter as if he was conducting the trial.
19. In this case reliance was placed on the case of the State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 : (1977 Cri LJ 1606). In particular paragraph No. 2 of the said judgment was quoted in extenso wherein it has been laid down that,
“Strong suspicion against the accused if the matter remains in the region of suspicion cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.”
20. In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of “Dr. Dattatraya Narayan Samant v. The State of Maharashtra, 1982 Cri LJ 1025 (Bom). This is a single Judge decision of Bombay High Court. In this case also reliance has been placed on the case of ‘Union of India (1979 Cri LJ 154) (SC) (Supra) and the State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977 Cri LJ 1606) (SC) (Supra). It has been held that (at p. 1030 of Cri LJ).
“If there is a strong suspicion existing at the initial stage which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.”
21. In this connection, a reference may also be made to the case of Superintendent and Legal Remembrancer and Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 : (1979 Cri LJ 1390). It has been pointed out in this decision that (Para 18),
“At the stage of framing of the charges the prosecution evidence does not commence and the Magistrate has, therefore, to consider the question of framing of charge on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the Investigating Officer.”
“At this stage even a very strong suspicion founded upon the materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form an opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of the charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.”
22. From the detailed discussions made above and also on the basis of the case law as discussed above, it is manifestly clear that there is no merit in this application and therefore, it is not a fit case for admission. It is, accordingly, rejected.