JUDGMENT
Satish Kumar Mittal, J.
1. Hakam Singh, petitioner, has filed this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned award dated 5.11.1986 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Union Territory Chandigarh, vide which the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner was decided against him and it was held that he voluntarily abandoned the service of the Chandigarh Transport Undertaking, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the respondent Management’), who was left with no other alternative but to terminate his service.
2. The petitioner was working as a Driver with the respondent Management. He applied for earned leave from 8.12.1977 to 14.12.1977 on account of stomach pain. The leave was sanctioned and he was supposed to join his duties on 15.12.1977. However, he neither joined his duties after the expiry of leave period nor he sent any application for extension of leave. Thereafter, the respondent Management sent information at his address given in the application through a telegram requiring him to join his duties at once. However, the petitioner was not found available at the address mentioned. Thereafter, notice was published in the daily English news paper ‘The Tribune’ dated 13.1.1978. But in spite of the publication of the said notice, the petitioner did not join his duties. Therefore, the respondent Management terminated his services on 28.1.1978. Against his termination order, the petitipner preferred an appeal to the Home Secretary, which was dismissed on 23.3.1979. Thereafter, the petitioner remained silent for about six years. On 28.2.1985, he served a demand notice on the respondent Management, as a result of which an industrial dispute was referred to the Labour Court to the effect as to whether the services of the petitioner were terminated illegally by the respondent management, if so, to what effect and to what relief he is entitled to?
3. Before the Labour Court, the respondent Management established from the statement of MW.1 Mukhtiar Singh that no application from the petitioner was received for extension of leave after expiry of sanctioned leave on 14.12.1977. Copy of this notice sent to the petitioner for joining the duty was also produced as Ex.M2. Copy of the notice published in ‘The Tribune’ was also produced as Ex.M4. On the other hand, the petitioner took the plea that he had sent one application to the respondent Management for extension of leave vide registered letter but he did not produce on record any postal receipt showing that he had sent any medical certificate or application for extension of leave period. The Labour Court rejected the plea taken by the petitioner as he did not lead any evidence to establish his plea. On the other hand, the stand taken by the respondent Management was accepted and the termination of the petitioner was held to be justified. The learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, in this regard held as under:-
“4. …In the case in hand, the workman proceeded on 7 days leave from 8th December, 1977 to 14th December, 1977. He was to resume his duties on 15th December, 1977. However, he did not resume his duties on 15th December, 1977. He even did not send any application for extension of leave. A telegram was sent to him by the management requiring him to resume his duties immediately. However, no reply was received and workman did not resume duties. Thereafter notice was published in the news paper again requiring him to resume duties. However, he did not care to do so. His services were terminated on 28th January, 1978. He did not take any action immediately. The workman did not serve demand notice on the management when his services were terminated. Rather he served demand notice on the management on 28th February, 1985 after a lapse of 7 years. Workman preferred an appeal to the Home Secretary in September, 1978 that too after a delay of 9 months of termination of his service. His appeal was dismissed in March, 1979. No reasonable explanation is coming forth as to why demand notice was not served by the workman immediately when his services were terminated or at worst when his appeal was dismissed. All these circumstances are a pointer to the fact that workman remained absent from duties with intention to relinquish his job and to abandon the same completely and finally. The workman remained silent for even long years after termination of his services and six years after dismissal of his appeal for which no reasonable explanation is forth coming. This delay itself is pointer to the fact that workman has voluntarily abandoned service with an intention not to resume the same.”
4. While assailing the aforesaid award, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner was a nullity because of violation of rule of natural justice, as no enquiry was held before terminating the services of the petitioner. Learned counsel further submitted that for terminating the services of the petitioner even on the ground of voluntary abandonment of the services, it was incumbent upon the respondent Management to hold an enquiry. If the services of the petitioner were terminated without holding an enquiry, it was not only violative of principles of natural justice, but also contrary to the provisions of Section 25 (F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it was not necessary for the respondent Management to hold an enquiry as before terminating the services of the petitioner, notices were issued to him providing him opportunity to explain his position and to join his duties but in spite of those notices, the petitioner did not come forward. In such circumstances, the respondent Management has rightly treated the petitioner to have voluntarily abandoned the service and it was not mandatory for it to hold a department enquiry. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association and Anr., (2000)5 Supreme Court Cases 65 and Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sakattar Singh, (2001)1 Supreme Court Cases 214.
6. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties and perusing the record of the case. I am of the opinion that there is no merit in the instant writ petition. In the instant case, it has been established on record by evidence before the Labour Court that the petitioner remained absent from duty without getting further extension of leave and without making any such application. Before terminating the services of the petitioner on the ground of voluntary abandonment of the service, the respondent Management issued notice to him and also published notice in the daily news paper. In spite of that the petitioner did not come to resume his duties. These facts go a long way to establish that the petitioner was not serious for the job and he had not cared to assume his duties immediately after the expiry of leave period or in spite of the notice sent by the respondent Management. In the instant case the principle of natural justice was fully satisfied before terminating the services of the petitioner. The requirements of natural justice are: (1) a workman should know the nature of the complaint or accusation; (2) an opportunity to state his case; and (3) the management should act in good faith which means that the action of the management should be fair, reasonable and just. All these three criteria have been fully met in the instant case. The respondent Management has clearly established-before the Labour Court that it has adopted a clear, reasonable and just procedure. Notice was duly issued to the petitioner and when he did not respond, again notice was duly published in the news paper. In spite of that, the petitioner did not respondent and resume his duties. In these circumstances, it was not necessary to hold a domestic enquiry against the petitioner. In the similar circumstances, the Apex Court in Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association and Anr., (supra) has held as under:
“17. It is no point laying stress on the principles of natural justice without understanding their scope or real meaning. There are two essential elements of natural justice which are: (a) no man shall be judge in his own causes; and (b) no man shall be condemned, either civilly or criminally, without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge made against him. In course of time by various judicial pronouncements these two principles of natural justice have been expanded, e.g., a party must have due notice when the tribunal will proceed; the tribunal should not act on irrelevant evidence or shut out relevant evidence: if the tribunal consists of several members they all must sit together at all times; the tribunal should act independently and should not be biased against any party: its action should be based on good faith and order (sic) and should act in a just, fair and reasonable manner. These in fact are the extensions or refinements of the main principles of natural justice stated above.
18. The Bank has followed the requirements of Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. It rightly held that Dayananda has voluntarily retired from the service of the Bank. Under these circumstances it was not necessary for the Bank to hold any inquiry before passing the order. An inquiry would have been necessary if Dayananda had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the Bank or contended that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the Bank. Nothing of the like has happened here. Assuming for a moment that inquiry was necessitated, evidence led before the Tribunal clearly showed that notice was given to Dayananda and it is he who defaulted and offered no explanation of his absence from duty and did not report for duty within 30 days of the notice as required in Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement.”
7. However, in Punjab & Singh Bank v. Sakattar Singh (supra), the Apex Court hss held that if the workman had submitted an explanation regarding his unauthorised absence or placed any material before the Court that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join duty, only in that situation holding of domestic inquiry against the workman is necessary but not otherwise. In that case, the workman was given an opportunity by issuing notice to join duty within a stipulated time or explain his position to the satisfaction of the management that he has no intention of not joining duty, But when no response was given to the Management then it will be presumed that the workman does not require the job any more and will stand retired from service. It was held in that case that by doing so, no punishment for misconduct was awarded but only by noticing the realities of the situation resulting from long absence of an employee from work, services of the workman were terminated. It was observed by the Apex Court that the principles of natural justice cannot be examined in vaccum without reference to the fact-situation arising in a particular case.
8. In the instant case, the petitioner could not establish any thing before the Labour Court that he was not permitted to join his duty or he had submitted any application for extension of leave. After more than one year, he filed appeal against his termination order. And after more than six years of his termination, he raised the industrial dispute. In these circumstances, there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that termination of the services of the petitioner is illegal because no domestic inquiry was held before terminating his services.
9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in the instant writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.