JUDGMENT
V.K. Khanna, J.
1. According to the petitioner, he is a tenureholder and had sown crops of ground nut, Jwar, Jau, Wheat Gram and maze over his land. In order to facilitate the sale of agricultural produce the petitioner has taken on rent House No. 580 Main Road, Babina Cantt. district Jhansi on 29-7-1991 a first information report was lodged by the respondent No. 2 and according to the petitioner foodgrains belonging to him were seized. In respect of the seized foodgrains the Additional District Magistrate, Jhansi has passed an order dated 12-8-1991 which is contained in Annexure “8” to the writ petition. The seized commodities have been ordered to be auctioned on 12-8-1991 under Section 6-A(2) of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter described as the “Act”). It is this order passed under Section 6-A(2) of the Act which has been challenged in this writ petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has first urged that the entire seizure proceedings are bad inasmuch as the petitioner has not committed any contravention of any order issued under Section 3/7 of the Act. We are, however, of the opinion that at the time of the passing of the order under Section 6-A(2) of the Act, the Competent Authority has not to go into the question regarding the validity of the criminal proceedings which have been launched against the petitioner. The only limited purpose for the exercise of the power under Section 6-A(2) of the Act is to pass appropriate orders in case the seized commodity is subject to speedy and natural decay or it is otherwise expedient in the public interest so to do. The argument raised, therefore, has no force.
3. It has then been urged that the order under Section 6-A(2) of the Act has been passed without any opportunity to the petitioner. So far as this Court is concerned this precise question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jai Jagdamba Trading Company v. State of U.P., 1986 EFR 461 : (AIR 1986 All 336) where it has been held that in a case under Section 6-A(2) the Legislature has not provided any right to any person for being heard and the opportunity of hearing was expressly excluded.
4. Looking to the nature of the power and the circumstances under which the power under Section 6-A(2) of the Act can be exercised, we are also of the opinion of the Legislature intentionally did not place the authority under a mandate to pass an order only after affording opportunity to the concerned person. The reason was obvious. The power could be exercised only in two circumstances. The first circumstance being that the essential commodity was subject to speedy and natural decay. In case the essential commodity is of such a nature that it would lose its existence for the purposes of consumption in case it was not disposed of at an early date, the authority was rightly directed to get the essential commodity auctioned or sold through a fair price shop in case there was a controlled price fixed by the Central or the State Government. So far as the seized commodity in question is concerned, there cannot be any doubt that the essential commodities are not meant for hoarding but are meant for sale to the general public for consumption either at a price which is prevailing in the open market or in case there is a controlled price then at that price through the fair price shops. Ample safeguards have been provided to see that the price of the essential commodity is realized and the commodity is not allowed to deteriorate in its quality. In the case of bona fide exercise of this power, which we are bound to presume unless shown otherwise, the auction of the seized property in case it is subject to speedy and natural dacay would serve the purpose of the owner inasmuch as by no stretch of imagination it could fetch better price after deterioration. The best price which could be fetched for such an essential commodity which has been seized would be at a stage when it had not deteriorated in quality.
5. The other circumstance in which the power under Section 6-A(2) can be exercised is when it is otherwise expedient in the public interest so to do. The seized commodity is an essential commodity and, in our opinion, if the authority comes to the conclusion that it is in public interest that the seized commodity should be made available to the public at large, the immediate auction of the seized commodity would go to serve the public interest and there can be cases where for fulfilling the needs of the general public in respect of the essential commodity the exercise of this power may be necessary by the competent authority immediately after the seizure. We are thus in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court in the case of Jai Jagdamba Trading Company (AIR 1986 All 336) (supra), and we are of the opinion that the petitioner was not entitled to any opportunity before the passing of the impugned order under Section 6-A(2) of the Act.
6. The next question which arises for determination in this case is whether the commodity is subject to speedy and natural decay. The commodity seized are 194 bags Moongfali, 22 bags of wheat, 9 bags Jawar and 12 bags Jau. The reason given in the impugned order is that there is a possibility of deterioration of these seized commodities if they are not kept with care with which they are kept either by the shop-keepers or by the house holders is liable to speedy and natural dacay specially in this rainy season. On the material which has been placed before us, therefore, we cannot say that the finding recorded under the impugned order is either perverse or is arbitrary. Moreover, we are of the opinion that the essential commodities which have been seized ought to become available to the general public for consumption and it is even otherwise in public interest that the seized essential commodities should have been auctioned.
7. In the end it has been ordered that the petitioner has moved an application under Section 6E of the Essential Commodities Act for release of the seized commodity and before passing of the order under Section 6-A(2) the respondent No. 1 should have passed orders on the petitioner’s application under Section 6E of the Act. Section 6E of the Act only creates bar on jurisdiction in certain cases and does not confer power of release either on the Collector independently of Section 6-A or on the State Government independently of Section 6C of the Act. The total powers which have to be exercised by the Collector have been given under Section 6-A and the powers of the State Government have been enumerated under Section 6C. We are thus of the opinion that there is no question of exercise of any powers under Section 6E of the Act before exercising the powers under Section 6-A(2) of the Act. The entire scheme of the Act, however, suggests that in case the essential commodity seized is subject to speedy and natural decay or is otherwise expedient in the public interest to sell it, the power will be exercised at the first instance otherwise the whole purpose of conferment of the power will be lost.
8. No other point has been pressed before us.
For the reasons stated above the present writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.