High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

Har Sukh vs Lakshmi Chand on 3 March, 2009

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Har Sukh vs Lakshmi Chand on 3 March, 2009
RSA No. 4068 of 2002                   1

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                     AT CHANDIGARH

                          RSA No. 4068 of 2002
                          Decided on :03-03-2009

Har Sukh
                                                      ....Appellant

                   VERSUS

Lakshmi Chand
                                                      ....Respondent

CORAM:- HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHESH GROVER

Present:- Mr. Amit Jain, Advocate for the appellant

Mr. Sanjay Vij, Advocate for the respondent

MAHESH GROVER, J

This is plaintiff’s second appeal directed against the judgements

of the learned Trial Court dated 13.1.2001 and that of the First Appellate

Court dated 28.8.2002.

The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction

seeking to restrain the respondent from raising any construction on the

disputed property by alleging that the land is joint between all the co-sharers

which has not been partitioned and that the respondent cannot raise any

construction to the detriment of other co-sharers.

The respondent who was on notice denied all the allegations

and pleaded that there was oral partition between the parties and the land

had been purchased from Gopi, who was the original vendor and who in

turn was in the settled possession of his property.

The parties went to trial on the following issues:-

1. Whether the plaintiff is co-owner of the suit property and the
RSA No. 4068 of 2002 2

suit land has not been partitioned so far ? OPP.

1(A) If issue no.1 is proved, whether the plaintiff is entitled to

the relief of permanent injunction? OPP.

2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present

form?OPD.

3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit

by his own act and conduct? OPD.

4. Whether the suit is bad on account of non-joining of

necessary parties?OPD.

5. Relief.

On appraisal of the evidence before them, both the Courts came

to the conclusion that the respondent was in settled possession of his share

which he has purchased from Gopi and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-

appellant.

In Regular Second Appeal, learned counsel for the appellant

has based his contentions broadly on the averments that he made in the

plaint to contend that the respondent being a co-sharer cannot raise any

construction to his detriment.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has

referred to the statement of the plaintiff himself recorded during the course

of proceedings wherein he has admitted the factum of construction having

been raised before the filing of the suit and also referred to his admission

that Gopi the vendor from whom the interest was derived by the respondent

was in settled possession of land which he has sold and that all co-sharers

are cultivating their exclusive shares.

On the strength of this, learned counsel for the respondent
RSA No. 4068 of 2002 3

contended that once settled possession is proved then the respondent was

very well within his rights to raise construction and it was raised prior to the

filing of the suit. Reliance was placed on decisions of this Court in cases

titled as ‘Bachan Singh versus Swaran Singh’ 2000(3) CCC 2 (P&H) and

‘M/s A.G.Enterprises versus State of Punjab and others’ 2007(4) PLR 522.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused

the impugned judgments.

In this case, testimony of PW2, the plaintiff-appellant is

relevant who himself has candidly admitted the possession of the

respondent to be exclusive. Not only this, he has admitted that the

possession of vendor Gopi was exclusive and was in lieu of the land which

was given by Gopi to him and subsequently sold to the respondent. He

admitted that he was cultivating some other land exclusively implying

thereby a partition based on the conduct of the parties and reflecting

exclusive possession of each of the parties.

In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel

for the appellant necessarily has to be repelled and it is to be held that the

findings of both the Courts below can neither be termed to be perverse nor

erroneous so as to warrant any interference in regular second appeal. No

substantial question of law has been shown to have arisen in the present

appeal and the same being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed.

March 3, 2009                                   (Mahesh Grover)
rekha                                              Judge