ORDER
C.M. Nayar, J.
 1. This petition is directed against the respondents for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the impugned Award No. 1958 dated March 16, 1967 of village Malikpur Kohi and/or for declaring the
same wholly wrongful, illegal, ultra vires, void and without jurisdiction, inoperative and unenforceable. The copy of the Award has been filed as Annexure A to the writ petition.
 2. The respondents acquired large tracts of land including the land of the petitioner vide Notification No. F. 4(98)/64-L&H issued under Section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) on January 23, 1965 and subsequent declaration under Section 6 vide notification No. F. 4(98)/64-L&H dated September 6, 1996. The Land Acquisition Collector on March 16, 1967 rendered his Award but did not award any com-
pensation for factory building lying constructed on the land of the petitioner. The relevant portions relating to the structures are referred to in the Award and read as follows:
“STRUCTURES
There are pucca structures in field No.1612, 1615 and part of field No. 1616. The factory on this land was erected before the date of notification u/s. 4. The claimant has claimed compensa tion of Rs. 20,000/- for the factory. The structures of the factory requires valuation to be done by the Assistant Engineer (Valuation). The land under the factory is being acquired through this award. A supplementary award will be given regarding the structures on the land after the valuation of the structures. Some claimants have also claimed compensation for their ‘Hauz’ of Kharia Mitti. These are very temporary structures of pieces of stones, taken from the land. No compensation is from the land. No compensation is assessed for the same. There are few Juggis in field No. 1525 and 1526 which are unauthorised and temporary. These can be removed by the occupants and no compensation is assessed for these Jhugees. Two three claimants have also claimed ompensation for Bundh, but at the site there are no bundle except daula (raised boundary of field by means of earth) for which no compensation is assessed.”
 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the above basis has sought to argue that since no compensation was awarded for the structures and the matter was left open the Award was not in conformity with the provisions of Section 11 of the Act inasmuch as the Award has determined the compensation for the land only and the amount of compensation regarding the superstructures which was standing on such land was left to be decided separately. It is contended that the acquisition proceedings would, therefore, lapse insofar as it relates to the portion of the acquired land on which the superstructures and trees were standing on the date the award was made. The controversy which arises in this petition is concluded by the judgments of Supreme Court reported as Mohanji & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Others JT 1995(8) S.C. 599 and State of Punjab and Others Vs. Sharan Pal Singh and
Others . The earlier judgment is referred to and relied upon in the second judgment as delivered by the Bench of that Court. The relevant passages which will indicate the facts and the findings as stated by the Court are paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6. The same reproduced as under :
 “3. The appellant State Government issued notices under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
on 1.6.1982 and 17.8.1983 respectively to acquire certain lands. ubsequently, an award was passed by the Land isition Officer n 25.3.1985. The respondents challenged the award contending that the award was not in conformity with Section 11 of the Act inasmuch as the award has determined the compensation for the land only and the amount of compensation regarding the superstructures and trees that were standing on such lands was left to be decided separately. The appellant herein (respondent before the High Court) in its written statement took a stand in the following terms:
“The award is complete with respect of the land. It was specifically mentioned therein that for the structures and trees the award will be announced separately, because the assessment for he structures and trees standing thereon had not been received from the respective departments.”
 4. However, the High Court has accepted the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents herein (petitioners before the High
Court) and held as follows:
“The Land Acquisition Collector made the award on 25.3.1985 relating to the land and not for the erstructures and trees standing thereon. The award rendered by the Land Acquisition Collector was no the one envisaged under Section 11 of the Act. The same envisages the award for the Unit, namely, the land, buildings and superstructure and standing crops and trees thereon. The acquisition proceedings would lapse insofar as the award relates to that portion of the acquired land on which the superstructures and trees were standing on the date the award has been made.”
Aggrieved by the above orders of the High Court the present appeals are filed.
5. An identical issue came up before this Court in Mohanji Vs. State of U.P. wherein it was held on 4.8.1995 as follows:
“A perusal of the award dated 23.9.1986 leaves no doubt that the compensation awarded therein is for the entire land measuring 0.99 acres bearing Plot No.1311 belonging to the appellants which was acquired in the proceeding. It also appears from the award that the valuation report which had been sought from the public Works Department had not been received and, therefore, the Land Acquisition Officer contemplated determination of compensation for the building in addition to the compensation awarded for the entire land being made on a subsequent date after the expiry of the specified period of two years under Section 11 of the Act. The question is whether in these circumstances it can be said that no award had been made under Section 11 of the Act in the roceeding to result in lapse of the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land?
 It is no doubt true that the entire award which is contemplated under Section 11 of the Act by virtue of the prescription in
Section 11-A has to be made within the period of two years failing which the entire proceeding shall lapse. The question is whether it can be said in the present case that no award has been made under Section 11 of the Act in this proceeding ? In our view it cannot be said that no award under Section 11 has been made for the land acquired. Admittedly, compensation has been deter mined in the award so made for the entire area of 0.99 acre. In view of the fact that no piecemeal award by making a subsequent award after the expiry of the period of two years is contemplated in law, the award dated 23.9.1986 must be construed as the whole award made under Section 11 awarding compensation for the entire
area of 0.99 acre with no compensation awarded for the building. The appellants, therefore, had the right to claim compensation for the building by seeking a reference under Section 18 of the Act treating the award as one in which compensation had been determined and awarded only for the entire land measuring 0.99 acre but no compensation was awarded for the building therein. The appellants had the remedy to claim compensation for the building in accordance with law treating the award made as not awarding any compensation for the building. That is, however, a different matter and it does not require any further consideration in this context. It is sufficient to say that the award
dated 23.9.1986 made within the period specified in Section 11-A
of the Act must be construed as an award under Section 11 in the proceedings for acquisition of the appellants’ land bearing Plot No.1311 having a total area of 0.99 acre. The contention that the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land has lapsed by virtue of Section 11-A cannot, therefore, be accepted.”
6. The ratio as extracted above squarely applies to the facts of this case. Accordingly, we hold that the impugned award dated 25.3.1985 within the period specified in Section 11-A of the Act must be construed as an award under Section 11 in the proceedings for the acquisition of the lands in question and the contentions to the contrary cannot be sustained. However, we leave open the rights of the respondents to claim compensation for the buildings/trees in accordance with law treating the award already made as one not awarding any compensation for the buildings/trees.”
4. There is no dispute that even in the present case the Award dated March 16, 1967 was made within the statutory period as specified in Section 11-A of the Act and must be construed as an Award under Section 11. In view of the above settled law, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to substantiate the arguments that in case no Award is made in respect of the superstructures the acquisition proceedings will lapse. The present petition is, therefore, devoid of merit. The same is dismissed and Rule is discharged. However, on the basis of the law as laid down by the judgment reported as State of Punjab and Others Vs. Sharan Pal Singh and Others (supra) it is left open to the petitioner to claim compensation for the buildings/structures in accordance with law treating the Award as one not awarding any compensation for such buildings and superstructures. There will be no order as to costs.