JUDGMENT
B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. The instant writ petition has been Tiled for quashing the adverse remarks/strictures against the petitioner by the learned Additional District Judge, Raisinghnagar on 30.11.1995 contained in Annexure. 7 to this petition.
2. The factual gamut of the case, as revealed by the record is that the services of the petitioner, a teacher in English language, were transferred from Senior Higher Secondary School, Raisinghnagar to Dabri on 17.6.1995, and in pursuance of said order he stood relieved on 1.7.1995. Petitioner filed suit No. 37/1995 before the Civil Judge cum Judicial Magistrate Raisinghnagar for injunction against the transfer order. In that suit, the interim relief staying the operation of the transfer order was granted on 13.9.1995. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the defendant therein preferred Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 32/1995 before the learned Additional District Judge. Raisinghnagar (respondent No. 2). In the said appeal, the grounds taken by the appellant-defendant revealed that the Civil Court did not possess jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the transfer order and, thus, the order dated 13.9.1995 was without jurisdiction. The present petitioner sought time to file reply in the said appeal and it stood adjourned for 30.11.1995. In the meanwhile petitioner moved an application before the learned Civil Judge, Raisingnnagar to withdraw his suit with liberty to file a fresh suit, if need be arisen, and the said suit was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 29.11.1995. The appeal came for hearing on 30.11.1995 before the appellate Court (respondent No. 2) wherein the appellate Court passed a detailed order which is contained in Annexure 6. By the said order after taking note of the fact that the suit had already been dismissed as withdrawn the respondent No. 2 dismissed the appeal and further held that as the matter was out-side the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge (respondent No. 3), the order dated 13.9.1995 was bad and as a consequence the same was quashed.
3. The matter could have ended here but respondent No. 2 delivered a full-fledged judgment (Annexure. 7) on merit regarding the maintainability of the suit before the respondent No. 3. In absence of the petitioner and without asking any explanation from respondent No. 3. Appellate Court after dealing with the case on merit, came to the conclusion that the suit was not maintainable for want of jurisdiction and, therefore, there was no occasion for the respondent No. 3 to entertain the said suit or pass any interim order therein. The Appellate Court, also, took a note of the suit filed by the petitioner earlier in the Court of the Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar and further observed that on earlier dale the present petitioner had sought time to file reply in the appeal, but he did not file the reply in the appeal rather withdrew the suit pending before the respondent No. 3 passed strictures against the petitioner as well as the learned Civil Judge, respondent No. 3 to the effect that they were in collusion and the respondent No. 3 issued the temporary injunction without having jurisdiction and when the petitioner realised that he would not be able to succeed in appeal, he withdrew his suit pending before the respondent No. 3 on 29.11.1995 in a very dramatic way and that was not a stage for the learned Civil Judge to pass the order of dismissal as withdrawn. It was further observed that the Civil Judge was competent to permit the withdrawal of the suit but the withdrawal of the original suit was contrary to law. Thus, the order passed by the respondent No. 3 was stinking and smelling collusion between the petitioner and the Trial Judge and when the appeal was pending before the appellate Court, the suit could not have been permitted to be withdrawn and, thus, the interim order dated 13.9.1995 was liable to be quashed and he further passed the order that because of the withdrawal of the main suit, the interim order dated 13.9.1995 had become meaningless. In spite of it, the appeal was accepted and the interim order dated 13.9.1995 was quashed.
4. The petitioner has preferred this petition only for quashing the adverse remarks made against him.
5. Heard Mr. R.K. Singhal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Basti Chand Bhansali, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. N.L. Joshi, learned Counsel For the respondent No. 3.
6. Mr. R.K. Singhal has submitted that as the main suit had been withdrawn on 29.11.1995 and this fact had been brought to the notice of the learned Appellate Court by the appellant/defendant therein, thus, there was no occasion for the appellate Court to pass strictures and the adverse remarks made by him are unwarranted and uncalled-for. Petitioner did not appear before the appellate Court as after the withdrawal of the suit, nothing survived to be determined by the appellate Court. Mr. N.L. Joshi, learned Counsel appearing for the learned Civil Judge (respondent No. 3) has submitted that earlier the Civil Court had jurisdiction to deal with the service matters transfer order but the said jurisdiction was withdrawn by issuing a Notification dated 25.2.1995 and the communication of the said notification was made to the Courts in March, 1995. The impugned transfer order was passed on 17.6.1995 but the learned Civil Judge was for the first time, given the copy of the said Notification dated 25.2.1995 on 11.3.1996. However, when respondent No. 3 came to know that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and the present petitioner filed an application to permit him to withdraw it, he dismissed the suit as withdrawn. Thus, in this fact-situation, there was no occasion for the learned Appellate Court to pass such adverse remarks. The respondent No. 3 has also, placed certain documents on record before this Court wherein he has stated that the said adverse remarks had been passed by the Appellate Court knowingly and purposely for extraneous consideration and it was a case where the appellate Court could have set-aside the order being without jurisdiction but there was no need of making such adverse remarks. It may be pertinent to mention here that the Trial Court (respondent No. 3) did not file any petition for quashing the adverse remarks against him. However, it is stated that he has moved a representation to this Court on its administrative side.
7. The issue of necessity and propriety of passing the adverse remarks was considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mohammed Naim , wherein the Court dealt with the limitations in making such remarks and observed that the same can be made only in the following circumstances:
(1) where a party, whose conduct in question was before the Court had an opportunity of explaining or defending himself;
(2) where there was evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks;
(3) where it was necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof to refer to that conduct; and
(4) the observations must be judicial in nature.
8. The said lest had consistently been applied by the I Hon’ble Apex Court in all subsequent case. It is necessary that in expressing their opinion, Judges and the Court must be guided by consideration of justice, lair-play and restraints. The judicial pronouncement must be judicial in nature and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.
9. In Gulab Chand v. Kudi Lal and Ors. , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had held that while striking the balance of probabilities, the Court must keep in mind the presumption of honesty or innocence.
10. In Niranjan Patnayak v. Shashi Bhusan Kar and Anr. , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has relied upon the judgment in Mohammed Naim (supra) and observed as under:
It is, therefore, settled law that harsh dispersing remarks are not be made against the persons and authority whose conduct comes into consideration before the Courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert that conduct.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also taken the same view in R.K. Laxmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan and Shivaji Rao Nilangekar Patil v. Mahesh Madhav Gosain. . Same view had been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Panchanand Banerjee v. Upendranath Bhatachariyaji AIR 1927 All. 193.
12. In S.K. Viswambaran v. E. Koya Kunju and Ors. , the Supreme Court relied upon the judgment in Mohammed Naim (supra) and observed that the adverse remarks should not be made lightly as it is a matter of serious nature and it affects the character and professional competence and integrity of the officer, against whom such remarks had been made.
13. In Dr. Dilip Kumar Deka v. State of Assam , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that “it cannot be gain-said that the nature of remarks the learned Judge has made, has cast a serious aspersion on the appellants affecting their character and reputation and may, ultimately affect their career also. Condemnation of the appellants without giving them an opportunity of being hear, was a complete negation of the fundamental principles of natural justice.”
14. In Jagram v. Hans Raj Midha , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the remarks should not be unwarranted, unnecessary or irrelevant or of such a nature which can be characterised as generalisation or of a sweeping nature.
15. In Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar , the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered this issue and observed as under:
Whenever any such intolerable error is detected by or pointed out to a superior Court, it is functionally required to correct that error and may, here and there, in an appropriate case, and in a manner befitting, maintaining the dignity of the Court and independence of judiciary, convey its message in its judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellow but clear, and result-orienting, but rarely as a rebuke. Sharp reaction of the kind exhibited in the afore-extraction is not in keeping with institutional functioning. The premise that a Judge committed a mistake or an error beyond the limits of tolerance, is no ground to inflict condemnation on the Judge-Subordinate, unless there existed something else and for exceptional grounds.
16. If the instant case is examined in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the eases referred to above, this Court may reach a conclusion that the inference and assumption of varieties of facts and circumstances, on which the learned Appellate Court has founded its conclusion afford no direct or positive support for the conclusion reached. However it is evident from the impugned appellate order (Annexure. 7) that the petitioner had earlier filed a suit bearing No. 22/1995, before the learned Additional Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar, which was dismissed on 19.4.1995 and in that situation, the only option left to the petitioner was to approach the appellate forum against that order. Petitioner filed another suit before the learned Civil Judge. Raisinghnagar and while filing the said suit in Raisinghnagar, petitioner did not disclose the fact of filing a suit earlier in Sri Ganganagar at all which is evident from the plaint contained in Annexure. 1, not this fact has been disclosed by the petitioner in the instant writ petition. If the earlier suit had been dismissed by the competent Court at Sri Ganganagar, the second suit was not maintainable. The appellate Court has specifically dealt with the earlier suit giving its particulars and order passed therein, but petitioner has chosen to remain silent on this issue. No explanation has been furnished as under what circumstances the second suit was filed in another Court of the same jurisdiction and how it was maintainable. The silence of the petitioner speaks on this issue and speaks in volumes and leaves no room for doubt that petitioner suppressed the material facts before the Trial Court as well as before this Court.
17. In Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A.T. Gwalior and Ors. and Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Development Authority , the Apex Court has held that filing the successive petition before a Court amounts to sheer abuse of process of the Court and is against the public policy. In Kacher Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. . the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, after placing reliance on its earlier judgment in L.S. Tripathi v. Danaras Hindu University, 1993(1) UPLBEC 448; and Saheb Lal v. Assistant Registrar, B.H.U., 1995 (1) UFLBEC 37, held that successive writ petition was not maintainable.
18. Similarly, in Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti and Ors. 1997 (1) SCC 534. the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken the same view and held that (he second writ petition was not maintainable as the principle of constructive res judicata would apply.
19. It is settled law that when a person approaches the Court of equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, he should approach the Court not only with clean hands but with clean mind, clean heart and with clean objectives. (Vide Ramjas Foundation and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. ; G. Narainswami Reddy v. Government of Karnataka and Ors. ; and K.R. Sriniwas v. R.M. Premchand and Ors. ). The Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith and prevent the law from crafty evasions. Courts, must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good (Vide State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Prabhu ; and Andhra State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re: Rolling Mills, ).
20. In Dr. B.K. Subbarao v. Mr. K. Prasaran and Ors. , the Apex Court has observed as under:
No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions.
21. Thus, the petitioner has not only abused the process of the Court but suppression of material facts by him tantamounts to playing fraud upon the Courts as he succeeded in obtaining the interim order in a suit which was definitely not maintainable and such a crafty litigant cannot be heard complaining against the Court of Law that the remarks made by the Court were unwarranted and uncalled for or were not necessary to determine the controversy involved in the case.
22. In the result, the writ petition fails and accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs. 1000/- (one thousand only). The costs is to be recovered by the learned District Judge. Sri Ganganagar as a decree of that Court and deposit it in the Account of the Rajasthan Legal Services Authority, Jaipur. A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar for compliance.