PETITIONER: HARI CHARAN KURMI AND JOGIA HAJAM Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/1964 BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA CITATION: 1964 AIR 1184 1964 SCR (6) 623 CITATOR INFO : R 1977 SC1579 (25) R 1987 SC 955 (10) ACT: Evidence Act-Confession of co-accused-Not "evidence" within the meaning of s. 3 Evidence Act-Not substantive evidence against coaccused-Can be used only to give assurance to conclusion of guilt based on other evidence--Sections 30 and 133 Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872). ss. 3, 30, 133. HEADNOTE: The appellants along with four others were tried and convicted by the Sessions Judge for the offences of dacoity and murder and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. On appeal the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence. Pending that appeal it issued a rule for enhancement of the sentence, and finally the rule was made absolute and they were ordered to be hanged. The appellants thereupon filed the present appeals by special leave granted by this Court, The main point raised before this Court was that the High Court misconceived the ambit and scope of the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash v. State of Punjab [1959] S.C.R. 121 and that the High Court committed an error in law in treating the confession made by the co-accused as substantive evidence against the appellants. Held: (i) Though a confession mentioned in s. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act is not evidence as defined by s. 3 of the _Act, it is an element which may be taken into consideration by the criminal courts and in that sense, it may be described as evidence in a non-technical way. But in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person, it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion ,with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is per- missible to turn to the confession in order to lend assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952] S.C.R. 526, Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chukerbutty, [1911] I.L.R. 38 Cal. 559. In re: Perivsswami Moopan, [1913] I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75 and Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, [1949] 76 I.A. 147, followed. (ii) The distinction between evidence of an accomplice under s. 133 and confession tinder s. 33 Evidence Act is that the former is evidence under s. 3 and the court may treat it as substantive evidence and seek corroboration in other evidence but the latter is not evidence under S. 3, and the court should first start from other evidence and then find assurance in the confessional statement for conviction. 624 (iii) The High Court was in error in taking the view that the decision in Ram Prakash's case was intended to strike a dissenting note from the well-established principles in regard to the admissibility and the effect of confessional statement made by accused persons. Ram Prakash v. State of Punjab [1959] S.C.R. 1219, explained. (iv) On examining the evidence in the present case on the above principles it is found that there is no sufficient evidence to prove the prosecution case. JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 208
and 209 of 1963.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 17, 1963, of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeals
Nos. 554 and 556 of 1961.
T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants.
D. P. Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.
February 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and
Jogia Hajam were charged along with four other persons with
having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of
the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening
the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in
the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of
the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti
Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan Jaiswal. The names of
the four other accused persons are; Ram Bachan Ram, Joginder
Singh, Ram Surat Choudhury and Achheylal Choudhury. The
learned Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur, who tried the case,
found all the six accused persons guilty of the offence
charged. He accordingly convicted them of the said offence
and sentenced them to suffer improvements for life.
This order of conviction and sentence was challenged by the
said six accused persons by preferring appeals before ,the
Patna High Court. The High Court has held that the
625
learned trial Judge was right in convicting five of the six
appellants because, in its opinion, the evidence led by the
prosecution proved the charge against them beyond reasonable
doubt. In regard to Joginder Singh, however, the High Court
was not inclined to agree with the conclusion of the trial
Judge and gave the benefit of doubt to him. Pending the
hearing of’ these appeals, a rule for the enhancement of
sentence was issued by the High Court against all the
appellants. This rule has been discharged in regard to
Joginder Singh who has been acquitted, as well as Ram Bachan
Ram, Ram Surat Choudhury and Achheylal Choudhury, and the’
sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on them by ‘he
trial Judge has been confirmed. In regard to the two
appellants, however, the High Court took the view that the
ends of justice required that the sentence of imprisonment
for life imposed on them should be enhanced to that of
death. Accordingly, the rule against them was made absolute
and ;they have been ordered to be hanged. It is against
this order of conviction and sentence that the present
appeals have been brought before us by special leave; and
the short question of law which has been raised before us by
Mr. Tatachari is that the High Court has erred in law in
treating the confession made by the co-accused Ram Surat
Choudhury as substantive evidence against them. This course
adopted by the High Court in dealing with the case of the
appellants on the basis of the confession made by the co-
accused person is, it is urged, inconsistent with the
consensus of judicial opinion in regard to the true scope
and effect of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act
(hereinafter called ‘the Act’).
These appeals were argued before a Division Bench of three
learned Judges of this Court and it was brought to the
notice of the said Bench that in dealing with the case of
the appellants in the light of the confession made by a co-
accused person, the High Court had relied on the
observations made by this Court in Ram Prakash v. The State
of Punjab.(1) Since these observations, prima facie,
supported the view taken by the Patna High Court, the Divi-
sion Bench thought it necessary to refer this matter to a
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 1291.
134-159 S.C.-40.
626
larger Bench in order that the correctness of the said
observations may be examined. That is how these appears
have come, before a Constitution Bench.,
The facts leading to the prosecution of the appellants lie
within a narrow compass, and so far as the point which falls
to be considered in the present appeals is concerned, there
is no dispute in respect of the said facts. Deokinandan
Jaiswal is a fairly wealthy businessman and lives in village
Dumarbana within the police station of Bairgania in the
district of Muzaffarpur. He has a house of his own.
Achheylal and Ram Bachan served under him as minims.
Jogender Sinch was Jaiswal’s sepoy and Ram Surat was his
personal servant. The appellants are the co-villagers of
Jogender Singh who was one of the accused persons. It
appears that on the 24th March, 1960, Jaiswal had received
Rs. 15,000 in currency notes from his partner Nathan Mary in
the presence of his minims Achheylal and Ram Bachan; in
fact, as the said amount was handed over to Jaiswal in the
form of different currency notes, Ram Bachan and Achheylal
were asked by him to count the said amount. The said amount
was then put in different bundles by Jaiswal and to it was
added another amount of Rs. 2,000 which he took out from his
iron safe. The two bundles were then put together in a
bigger bundle and to it was attached a slip containing his
signature and date. According to Jaiswal, he handed over
the amount of Rs. 17,000 thus put in two bundles to his wife
Damyanti Devi, and in her turn, she put the said bundles
into the iron safe which had been kept at the first floor of
the house in the room adjoining the bed-room. About this
time, some functions were organised by the Bharat Sevak
Samaj in the village and Jaiswal was the convener in regard
to the said functions. Naturally, he had to attend to the
delegates who had come to the village for the said
functions. During the days of these functions, Jaiswal used
to return home by about 10 P.m., but on the night of the
24th March, 1960, the function went on late, and so, Jaiswal
slept at the Dharamshala where the function took ‘Place and
did not return home. That is how Damvanti Devi was left
alone in the house on the first floor and her only companion
was her
627
child Mina about 3 1/2 years old. Apparently, Damyanti Devi
retired to her bed-room with her little child and on the
ground floor were sleeping three of the accused persons,
Achheylal, Ram Bachan and Jogender Singh Ram Surat was on
leave, so that out of the four servants employed by Jaiswal,
three were sleeping on the premises. Batahu, the cook of
the family, was sleeping in a verandah attched to the motor
garage.
Next day Batahu was awakened by Achheylal who reported to
him that the door of the hall was open. Thereupon Achheylal
and this witness went on the first floor and found that
Damyanti Devi was lying dead in a pool of blood. There were
cut injuries in her neck which had presumably caused severe
bleeding. The little girl Mina was fast asleep. The
bundles of currency notes had been removed by the miscreants
who had committed the murder of Damyanti Devi. Thereupon,
word was sent to Jaiswal and on his return to the house,
steps were taken to report to the police station about the
commission of the offence; and that set the investigation
machinery into operation. As a result of the investigation,
the six accused persons were out up for their trial for the
offence under s. 396 I.P.C. That, in brief, is the nature of
the prosecution case.
The prosecution sought to prove its case against the six
accused persons by relying on the confessions made by three
of them, the recovery of the stolen property and discovery
of bloodstained clothes in respect of the two appellants.
There is no direct evidence to show how, when, and by whom
the offence was committed. Besides the confessions,, the
evidence on which the prosecution relies is circumstantial
and it is on this evidence that the case has been tried in
the courts below. For our purpose in the present appeals it
is unnecessary to refer to the details set out by the
confessional statements in regard to the commission of the
offence rind the part played by each one of the accused
persons.
Ram Surat, Achheylal and Ram Bachan made confessions and it
has been held by the High Court as well as the Jearned
Sessions Judge that the charge against them is
628
proved. With the correctness or propriety of the conviction
of these accused persons we are not concerned in the present
appeals. The only point to which reference must be made at
this stage is that there is a concurrent finding of the
courts below (that the confession made by Ram Surat is
voluntary and true. In fact, both the courts did not feel
any hesitation in taking the said confession into account
against Ram Surat who made the said confession and con-
victing him on the said confession read in the light of
other evidence adduced against him. The charge against the
two appellants has been sought to be proved by the
prosecution by the statements contained in the confession
made by the three accused persons and certain other
discoveries, such as blood-stained clothes with both of them
and stains of blood in the house of the appellant
Haricharan. We will presently refer to this evidence. The
High Court took the view that having regard to the decision
of this Court in the case of Ram Prakash(1), it was open to
the High Court to consider the evidence supplied by the
confessional statements made by the co-accused persons and
enquire whether the said evidence received corroboration
from any other evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Approaching the question from this point of view, the High
Court came to the conclusion that the blood stains on the
clothes found with both the appellants and blood stains
found in the house of the appellant Haricharan afforded
sufficient corroboration to the confession of Ram Surat, and
so, it has confirmed the conviction of the two appellants
under s. 396 I.P.C.
The High Court then considered the question about the
sentence which should be imposed on the two appellants. It
appeared from the confession of Ram Surat as well as the
confessional statements of Achheylal and Ram Bacban that the
two appellants had played a major part in the commission of
the offence. In fact, the injuries which proved fatal are
alleged by all the 3 accused persons who confessed to have
been caused by the two appellants. It is in the light of
these statements that the High Court was persuaded to en-
hance the sentence imposed by the trial Judge against the
appellants and it has directed that instead of imprisonment
for life, the sentence of death ought to be imposed on
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 1219.
629
them. That is how the only question which calls for our
decision in the present appeals is the approach adopted by
the High Court justified by the provisions of s. 30 of the
Act as it has been consistently interpreted by judicial
decisions for more than half a century ?
Before we address ourselves to this question of law, we may
briefly indicate the nature of the other evidence on which
the prosecution relies against the appellants. The
appellants were arrested the next day after the commission
of the offence on the report made by Jaiswal that he sus-
pected that the murder of his wife had been committed by his
four employees and their accomplices, the two appellants
before us. On the 26th March, 1960, at about 3.30 P.m. the
investigation officer visited the lane between the southern
wall of Jaiswal’s godown and the northern wall of the east-
facing room of the appellant Haricharan and found some blood
stains in the lane and on the walls of the grain godown.
Later, a shirt bearing blood stains was also found. Pieces
of earth containing blood stains and the shirt were
subsequently sent to the Chemical Analyser. The origin of
the blood found on the pieces of earth sent to the Chemical
Analyser could not be determined by him, but the stains of
blood on the shirt which was seized from the person of the
appellant Haricharan were found to have traces of human
blood. Similarly, the nails of Haricharan’s hands showed
traces of blood and they were got cut by a barber and sent
to the Chemical Analyser. The report shows that these blood
stains were too small for serological test. The High Court
thought that “the presence of human blood on the shirt which
Haricharan was wearing, his nails and at several places
beginning from the lane leading to his house and on so many
materials kept in his house is a factor” which had to be
taken into account. These discoveries were made about 8
A.M. following the night of the murder.
In regard to the appellant Jogia, a red-coloured check
gamcha which bore blood-like stains was recovered from the
top of the earthern granary in his house at about 6 A.M. On
27th March, 1960. This gamcha was sent to the Chemical
Analyser and it is reported to bear stains of human blood It
may be added that when the house of Jogia was searched on
the 26th March, 1960 this gaamcha was not found as
630
we have just indicated, the judgment of the High Court shows
that it took the view that the confessional statement by the
co-accused persons of the appellants, particularly Ram Surat
was corroborated by the discovery of blood stains and that
justified the conviction of the appellants under s. 396 of
the Indian Panel Code.
The question about the part which a confession made by a co-
accused person can play in a criminal trial, has to be
determined in the light of the provisions of s. 30 of the
Act. Section 30 provides that when more persons than one
are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a
confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and
some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take
into consideration such confession as against such other
person as well as against the person who makes such
confession. The basis on which this provision is found is
that if a person makes a confession implicating himself,
that may suggest that the maker of the confession is
speaking the truth. Normally, if a statement made by an
accused person is found to be voluntary and it amounts to ‘a
confession in the sense that it implicates the maker, it is
not likely that the maker would implicate himself untrue,
and so, s. 30 provides that such a confession may be taken
into consideration even against a co-accused who is being
tried along with the maker of the confession. There is no
doubt that a confession made voluntarily by an accused
person can be used against the maker of the confession,
though as a matter of prudence criminal courts generally
require some corroboration to the said confession
Particularly if it has been retracted. With that aspect of
the problem. however, we are not concerned in the present
appeals. When s. 30 provides that the confession of a co-
accused may be taken into consideration, what exactly is the
scope and effect of such taking into consideration, is
precisely the problem which has been raised in the present
appeals. It is clear that the confession mentioned in s. 30
is not evidence under s. 3 of the Act. Sec. 3 defines
“evidence” as meaning and including-
(1) all statements’ which the Court permits
or requires to be made before it by witnesses,
in relation to matters of fact under inquiry;
such statements are called oral evidence;
631
(2) all documents produced for the
inspection of the Court; Such documents are
called documentary evidence.
Technically construed. this definition will not apply to a
confession. Part (1) of the definition refers to oral
statements which the court permits or requires to be made
before it; and clearly, a confession made by an accused
person is not such a statement. it is not made or permitted
to be made before the court that tries the criminal case.
Part (2) of the definition refers to documents produced for
the inspection of the court; and a confession cannot be said
to fall even under this part. Even so, s. 30 provides that
a confession may be taken into consideration not only
against its maker, but also against a co-accused person;
that is to say, though such a confession may not be evidence
as strictly defined by s. 3 of the Act, it is an element
which may be taken into consideration by the criminal court
and in that sense, it may be described as evidence in a non-
technical way. But it is significant that like other
evidence which is produced before the Court, it is not
obligatory on the court to take the confession into account.
When evidence as defined by the Act is produced before the
Court, it is the duty of the Court to consider that
evidence. What weight should be attached to such evidence,
is a matter in the discretion of the Court. But a Court
cannot say in respect of such evidence that it will just not
take that evidence into account. Such an approach can,
however, be adopted by the Court in dealing with a
confession, because s. 30 merely enables the Court to take
the confession into account.
As we have already indicated. this question has been
considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it
has been consistently held that a confession cannot be
treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a
co-accused person. in dealing with a criminal case where the
prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person
against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt
is to consider the other evidence against such an accused
person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory
and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may
sustain the charge framed against the said accused person,
the court turns to the confession with a view to assure
itself that
632
the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other
evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins
in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbuttv(1) a confession can
only be used to “lend assurance to other evidence against a
co-accused”. In In re. Peryaswami Noopan,(2) Reilly J.
observed that the provision of s. 30 goes not further than
this : “where there is evidence against the co-accused
sufficient, if,. believed, to support his conviction, then
the kind of confession described in s. 30 may be thrown into
the scale as an additional reason for believing that
evidence.” In Bhuboni Sahu v. King(1) the Privy Council has
expressed the same view. Sir. John Beaumont who spoke for
the Board observed that a confession of a co-accused is
obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed
come within the definition of “evidence” contained in s. 3
of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on
oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be
tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of
evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not
subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however,
provides that the Court may take the confession into
consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on
which the court may act; but the section does not say that
the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be
other evidence. The confession is only one element in the
consideration of all the facts proved in the case, it can be
put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence.” It
would be noticed that as a result of the provisions
contained in s. 30, the confession has no doubt to be
regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because
whatever is considered by the court is evidence;
circumstances which are considered by the court as well as
probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense.
Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that
generic sense because of the provisions of s. 30, the fact
remains that it is not evidence as defined by s. 3 of the
Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case
against an accused person, the court cannot start with the
confession of a co-accused person; it must
(1) (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 559 at p. 588.
(2) (1913) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75 at p. 77.
(3) (1949) 76 I.A. 147 at p. 155.
633
begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and
after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality
and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to
turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the
conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to
reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is
the effect of the provisions contained in s. 30. The same
view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh(1) where the decision of the Privy
Council in Bhuboni Sahu’s(2) case has been cited with
approval.In appreciating the full effect of the provisions
contained ,in s. 30, it may be useful to refer to the
position of the evidence given by an accomplice under s. 133
of the Act. Section 133 provides that an accomplice shall
be a competent witness against an accused person; and that
conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Illustration
(b) to s. 114 of the Act brings out the legal position that
an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is
corroborated in material particulars. Reading these two
provisions together, it follows that though an accomplice is
a competent witness, prudence requires that his evidence
should not be acted upon unless it is materially
corroborated; and that is the effect of judicial decisions
dealing with this point. The point of significance is that
when the Court deals with the evidence by an accomplice, the
Court may treat the said evidence as substantive evidence
and enquire whether it is materially corroborated or not.
The testimony of the accomplice is evidence under s. 3 of
the Act and has to be dealt with as such. It is no doubt
evidence of a tainted character and’ as such, is very weak;
but, nevertheless, it is evidence and may be acted upon,
subject to the requirement which has now become virtually a
part of the law that it is corroborated in material
particulars.
The statements contained in the confessions of the co-
accused persons stand on a different footing. In cases
where such confessions are relied upon by the prosecution
against an accused person, the Court cannot begin with the
examination of the said statements. The stage to consider
(1) [19521 S.C.R. 526.
(2) (1949) 76 I.A. 147 at p. 155.
634
the said confessional statements arrives only after the
other evidence is considered and found to be satisfactory.
The difference in the approach which the Court has to adopt
in dealing with these two types of evidence is thus clear,
well-understood and well-established. It, however, appears
that in Ram Prakash’s case(1), some observations have been
made which do not seem to recognize the distinction between
the evidence of an accomplice and the statements contained
in the confession made by an accused person. “An exa-
mination of the reported decisions of the various High
Courts in India,” said Imam J., who spoke for the Court in
that case, “indicates that the preponderance of opinion is
in favour of the view that the retracted confession of an
accused person may be taken into consideration against a co-
accused by virtue of the provisions of s. 30 of the Act, its
value was ,extremely weak and there could be no conviction
without the fullest and strongest corroboration on material
particulars.” The last portion of this observation has been
interpreted by the High Court in the present case as
supporting the view that like the evidence of an accomplice,
a ,confessional statement of a co-accused person can be
acted upon if it is corroborated in material particulars.
In our opinion, the context in which the said observation
was made by this Court shows that this Court did not intend
to lay down any such proposition. In fact, the other
evidence against the appellant Ram Prakash was of such a
strong character tnat this Court agreed with the conclusion
of the High Court and held that the said evidence was
satisfactory and in that connection, the confessional
statement of the coaccused person was considered. We are,
therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in
this case in taking the view that the decision in Ram
Prakash’s(1) case was intended to strike a discordant note
from the well-established principles in regard to the
admissibility and the effect of confessional statements made
by co-accused persons.
Considering the evidence from this point of view, we must
first decide whether the evidence other than the confes-
sional statements of the co-accused persons, particularly
Ram Surat, on whose confession the High Court has substan-
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 1219.
635
tially relied, is satisfactory and tends to prove the
prosecution case. It is only if the said evidence is
satisfactory and is treated as sufficient by us to hold the
charge proved against the two appellants, that an occasion
may arise to seek for an assurance for our conclusion from
the said confession. Thus considered, there can be no doubt
that the evidence about the discovery of blood stains on
which the prosecution relies is entirely insufficient to
justify the prosecution charge against both the appellants.
In our opinion, it is impossible to accede to the argument
urged before us by Mr. Singh that the said evidence can be
said to prove the prosecution case. In fact, the judgment
of the High Court shows that it made a finding against the
appellants substantially because it thought that the
confessions of the co-accused persons could be first
considered and the rest of the evidence could be treated as
corroborating the said confessions. We are, therefore,
satisfied that the High Court was not right in confirming
the conviction of the two appellants under s. 396 ,of the
Indian Penal Code.
It is true that the confession made by Ram Surat is a
detailed statement and it attributes to the two appellants a
major part in the commission of the offence. It is also
true that the said confession has been found to be
voluntary, and true so far as the part played by Ram Surat
himself is concerned, and so, it is not unlikely that the
confessional statement in regard to the part played by the
two appellants may also be true; and in that sense, the
reading of the said confession may raise a serious suspicion
against the accused. But it is precisely in such cases that
the true legal approach must be adopted and suspicion.
however grave, must not be allowed to take the place of
proof. As we have already indicated, it, has been a
recognised principle of the administration of criminal law
in this country for over half a century that the confession
of a co-accused person cannot be treated as substantive
evidence and can be pressed into service only when the court
is inclined to’ accept other evidence and feels the
necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its con-
clusion deducible, from the said evidence. In criminal
trials, there is no scope for applying the principle of
moral conviction or grave suspicion. In criminal cases
where the other evidence adduced against an accused person
is wholly
636
unsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely on the con-
fession of a co-accused person, the presumption of innocence
which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence assists the
accused person and compels the Court to render the verdict
that the charge is not proved against him, and so, he is
entitled to the benefit of doubt. That is precisely what
has happened in these appeals.
In the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of
conviction and sentence passed against the two appellants
Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam are set aside and the
accused are ordered to be acquitted.
Appeals allowed.