JUDGMENT
Dilip Gupta, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the tenant for setting aside the order dated 21.08.2007 by which the Prescribed Authority allowed the application filed by the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ”Act’). The petitioner has also sought the quashing of the judgement and order dated 31.01.2008 by which the appeal filed by the tenant under Section 22 of the Act for setting aside the aforesaid order was dismissed.
2. The records of the writ petition indicate that the landlord had filed the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute on the ground that the same was bona fide required by the landlord for establishing a chamber for his son who was engaged in the profession of law. It was stated that the landlord was practising in the Civil Court for the last 39 years and his sole son Shri Ved Prakash Kesharwani had also started law practice in the year 1996; that the landlord had a very small residential portion in which it was not possible to establish another independent chamber for his son and that the landlord would suffer greater hardship in case the application was rejected. During the pendency of the application, the tenant moved an application before the Prescribed Authority of appointment of an Advocate Commissioner for inspection of the house of the landlord to determine the extent of accommodation available with him as the case taken up by the tenant was that the landlord had two independent chambers in the residential house and so did not require the premises in dispute. The Advocate Commissioner submitted a report that there was only one chamber on the ground floor of the house where the landlord was residing. The tenant filed objections and the report was accepted subject to evidence being led. The tenants thereafter filed the map sanctioned by the Authority in which both the ground floor and top floor were shown for commercial purposes.
3. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application filed by the landlord holding that premises in dispute were bona fide required by the landlord for establishing the chamber for his son and that the landlord would suffer greater hardship in the event the application was rejected. A finding was also recorded that in the residential house of the landlord there was only one chamber on the ground floor. The tenant filed an appeal which was dismissed.
4. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Counsel appearing for the respondent landlord.
5. The contention advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises in dispute. Elaborating his submission, learned Counsel submitted that the Advocate Commissioner submitted a wrong report that there was only one chamber on the ground floor in the residential premises of the landlord when, in fact, there was one more chamber on the first floor. Learned Counsel submitted that the tenant had filed the map sanctioned by the Authority in which the premises were shown for commercial use and, therefore, the first floor of the house was also being used for the chamber. This contention cannot be accepted. The Advocate Commissioner submitted a detailed report mentioning therein that only one room on the ground floor was being used as a chamber This report was accepted subject to evidence and even according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner the only evidence that was filed by him in support of this plea was the map sanctioned by the Authority. This map cannot determine whether two rooms were being used as chambers in the residential house or only one room on the ground floor was used as a chamber. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Alok Brothers (Tea), Pvt. Ltd. Kanpur v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur – Nagar and Ors. 1989 (2) ARC 99 and Amar Nath Tandon v. G.K. Bhargava and Ors. 1987 (1) ARC 297 in support of his contention that the objection filed by him to the report submitted by the Advocate commissioner should have been considered. In the present case the objection have been considered but it has been found that the tenant could not substantiate that two rooms were being as chambers. These decisions do not, therefore, help the petitioner. In such circumstances, when there was no clinching evidence to establish that two rooms were used as chambers, the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority that only room on the ground floor was being used as a chamber and that the landlord bona fide required the premises for his son for his chamber cannot be said to be perverse.
6. The Supreme Court has time and again explained what bona fide need is. In Siddalingamma and Anr. v. Mamtha Shenoy , the supreme Court pointed out:
Rent Controls Legislation generally leans in favour of tenant, it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accommodation which treats the landlord with some sympathy. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta this Court has held that a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere, honest desire in contra-distinction with a mere pretext for evicting ythe tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing himself in the place of the landlord is, whether in the given facts proved by material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere honest? If the answer be in the positive the need is bona fide. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself dwell into lesser premises so as to protect the tenant’s continued occupation in tenancy premises….
7. The Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , also observed:
…When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.
8. In Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.R’s and Ors. the supreme Court observed:
Moreover, Section 11 (1) (h) of the Act uses the words ”reasonable requirement’ which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term ”need’ or ”requirement’ should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word ”requirement’ and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need.
9. This Court in Sardar Kulwant Singh v. VIth Additional district Judge, Saharanpur and Anr. 2007 (66) ALR 498 has observed that the need of the landlord to establish a lawyers’ chamber is bona fide. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the son of the landlord was practicing in the District Court from the year 1996. The application was filed under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act on 10.10.2002. It has also been found that the existing residential premises of the landlord where he was residing and doing his practice was not sufficient for opening another chamber. This is a finding of fact and no submission was advanced to assail this finding. Even otherwise, the need to establish a separate independent chamber for the son in such circumstances is bona fide. The Supreme Court in Munni Lal and Ors. v. the Prescribed Authority and Ors. observed that while examining the findings of bona fide need and comparative hardship of landlord and tenant, it is not for the High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority.
10. In such circumstances, the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
11. There is, therefore, no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed.