JUDGMENT
Milap Chandra Jain, J.
1. These appeals have been filed by the plaintiffs against the similar judgments of the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur dated March 7, 1987 by which he allowed the appeals and set aside the similar judgments of the learned Munsif, Udaipur (South) dated September 14, 1984, dismissing the suits for declaration. The facts and law involved in both the cases are similar. As such both these appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment. The facts may be summarised thus.
2. The appellants were if the employment of the respondents as Conductors in their buses. Flying Squads of the respondents checked the buses in which the appellants were conductors and found that they had taken fare from certain number of passengers but had not issued tickets to them. Necessary enquiries were held against them under Rajasthan Roadways Workers and Workshops Employees Standing Orders, 1965 (hereinafter to be called the Standing Orders). The Administrative Officer, Divisional Office, Udaipur was appointed as the Enquirying Officer in both the enquiries. He sent his enquiry-reports to the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed orders terminating the appellants’ services. The appellants filed suits in the court of the Munsif, Udaipur (South) for declaration that the said dismissal orders are void and they still continue in serves with the allegations that the domestic enquiries held against them were illegal, principles of natural justice were not observed, charge-sheets were vague, reasonable opportunity to produce defence evidence was not given, the copies of the enquiry reports were not furnished and they were not heard before the dismissal orders were passed. The defendants admitted in their written statements that the plaintiffs were in their employment as Conuctors, enquiries were held against them and they have been dismissed from the service. They further averred that there was no provision in the standing orders for the supply of the copy of the enquiry report and giving opportunity of hearing before passing order of penalty. It was also averred that the enquiries have been conducted in accordance with the standing orders, Civil court has not jurisdiction to entertain and try such suits and the Industrial Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in such matters. After framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties, the trial court held that the plaintiffs were not given opportunity to produce their evidence, termination orders are illegal and accordingly decreed the suits. On appeals, the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur reversed the findings and allowed the appeals as said above.
3. The appeal No. 22/87 was admitted on March 12, 1987 and the following substantial questions of law were framed:
1. Whether the dismissal order which is alleged to be not a speaking order by itself is valid in law when the same has been made without furnishing the delinquent a copy of the Enquiry Officer’s report?
2. Whether an order of punishment made on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer is invalid if the same has been made without furnishing a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer so as to enable the delinquent to make his submissions about the report of the Enquiry Officer?
4. The appeal No. 23/87 was admitted on March 13, 1987 and the following substantial questions of law were framed:
1. Whether the dismissal order which is alleged to be not a speaking order is valid in law specially when it has been made without furnishing the delinquent with the copy of the Enquiry Officer’s report?
2. Whether the order made by placing reliance on the past record without disclosing the same in the notice can be legally made the basis of imposing the punishment on the delinquent?
5. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants that admittedly copies of the enquiry reports were not furnished to the plaintiff-appellants before the termination orders were passed against them, on this ground alone the termination orders stood vitiated and the learned appellate court was not justified to hold that the termination orders were valid. He relied upon Union of India v. Mohd. Ramjan Khan . He further contended that these termination orders are not speaking orders and on this ground also they are bad. He relied upon State of Rajasthan v. Amolak Chand Sanghi 1982 W.L.N. 633 para 18 and Ram Singh Ralhorre v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation 1986 (1) Judicial Surveyor 219. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that in the case of the appellant Motilal the Disciplinary Authority took into consideration his past record without giving him an opportunity of hearing on this point. This also vitiated the termination order passed against him. He relied upon Phool Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1980 W.L.N. (U.C.) 311 para 10.
6. In reply, it has been contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India do not apply to the employees of the respondents. He placed reliance on Prafulla Kumar Sen v. Calcutta State Transport Corporation . He further contended that copy of the enquiry report was filed along with the written statement in each case and both the plaintiffs have failed to show as to how they were prejudiced by the non-supply of a copy of the enquiry report. He also contended that the Standing Orders do not provide for the supply of a copy of the enquiry report and as such the same was not supplied to the plaintiff-appellants.
7. In reply to the aforesaid contentions of the learned Counsel for the defendant-respondents, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants contended that the non-observance of the rules of natural justice is itself prejudicial and proof of prejudice is not necessary. He relied upon S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and ‘Lucas on Justice’ pages 6, 7 & 11.
8. It may be mentioned here that the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain such suits has already been decided in plaintiff-appellants’ favour, relying upon Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. K.S. Wadke and Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana order sheet dated April 3, 1991. Reference of Rahtas Industries v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union , Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur , U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Moinuddin and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Kalu Ram 1987 (U.C.) 657 (D.B.) may also be made here.
9. Admittedly, in both the cases the enquiry was held by the Enquirying Officer, his reports were sent to the Disciplinary Authority, their copies were not provided to the plaintiffs and the termination orders were passed on the basis of these reports. It has been observed in Union of India v. Mohd. Rantjan Khan , as follows:
This Court in Mazharal Islam Hashmi v. State of U.P. pointed out:
Every person must know what he is to meet and he must have opportunity of meeting that case. The legislature, however, can exclude operation of these principles expressly or implicitly. But in the absence of any such exclusion, the principle of natural justice will have to be proved.
10. Admittedly, there is no provision in the Standing Orders that a copy of the enquiry report will not be provided to the delinquent employee.
11. It has further been observed in para No. 15 as under:
We, therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the enquiry report along with recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The Forty Second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position.
12. Para No. 18 runs as under:
We make it clear that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter.
13. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan , it has been observed as under:
In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The nonobservance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced.
These observations have been quoted with approval in the famous case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation .
14. It is also not in dispute that the termination orders are not speaking orders. They do not contain any reason. It has been observed in State of Rajasthan v. Amolak Chand Sanghi 1982 W.L.N. 633 (D.B.) at page 642 para 18, as follows:
It follows from the rules referred to above as well as the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court the Disciplinary Authority before imposing any one of the penalties specified in r. 14 of the Rules should record reasons in support of it so that the Courts may be able to examine its correctness. No reasons what so ever have been given by the Government in support of the order Ex. 5. The explanation of the petitioner has also not been considered. There does not appear to be any application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority to the record and enquiry report. The order Ex. 5 dated September 17, 1965 is not in accordance with Rules 14 and 16 (9) of the Rules. We agree with the learned Counsel for the respondent that in the absence of any reasons having been recorded, the order Ex. 5 dated September 17, 1965 is vitiated.
15. In view of these facts and authoratative observations, it can well be said that the termination orders passed against the plaintiff-appellants are invalid and illegal. They cannot be sustained. The learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur had no justification to hold them as valid and legal. Accordingly, both the questions of the second appeal No. 22/87 and question No. 1 of the Second Appeal No. 23/87 are decided against the defendant respondents.
Question No. 2 of Appeal No. 23/87
16. It is not in dispute that the past record of the plaintiff-appellant Motilal was duly taken into consideration while passing the termination order against him without giving opportunity of hearing to him on this point. The above quoted observations made in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and approved in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation , equally apply on this point also. It has been observed in Phool Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1980 W.L.N. (U.C.) 311 at page 316 para 10, as follows:
In the present case, neither in the original charge-sheet, nor in the show cause notice, that was served after the submission of the report of the Enquiry officer is there any reference to the past record of the petitioner. Shri Mridual has submitted that if the petitioner had been afforded an opportunity to submit his explanation with regard to his past conduct and the punishments imposed on him in the years 1976 and 1977 respectively, he would have been able to point out that two of the punishments imposed on the petitioner had been set aside in appeal and that the only punishment which remained was one which was imposed upon the petitioner for delaying the preparation of the record and was only a minor punishment. The petitioner has suffered serious prejudice as a result of the Disciplinary Authority, having passed the order for removal the petitioner from service, after taking into consideration the past record of the petitioner, without affording to the petitioner any opportunity of making his submissions with regard to the same. The order dated September 23, 1977 has thus been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed.
This question is also decided in favour of the plaintiff-appellant Motilal.
17. It may also be mentioned here that the termination orders passed against other Conductors by the respondent No. 1 and its authorities under the similar facts and circumstances have been set aside by the Jaipur Bench in Second Appeal No. 72/84 Chiitar Singh v. R.S.R.T.C. and Ors. decided on March 21, 1991 and Civil Second Appeal No. 162/84 Ramesh Chandra Tailor v. R.S.R.T.C. and Anr. decided on April 10, 1991.
18. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff-appellants were subsequently convicted and sentenced under Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Service (Prevention of Ticketless Travel) Act, 1975 on the same facts on which charge-sheet were issued to them and impugned termination orders were, passed. As such it would not be desirable to direct the respondents not to pass fresh orders in accordance with law, keeping in view the following observations got. In Union of India v. Ramjan Khan A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 471 at page 477 paga 19:
We would clarify that this decision may not preclude the disciplinary authority from revising the proceeding and continuing with it in accordance with law from the stage of supply of the enquiry report in cases where dismissal or removal was the punishment.
19. Consequently, both the appeals are allowed with costs. The judgments and decrees of the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur dated March 7, 1987 are set aside and the judgments and decrees of the learned Munsif, Udaipur (South) dated September 14, 1984 are restored.
20. This judgment will not preclude the Disciplinary Authority from revising the proceedings and continuing with them in accordance with law, keeping in view the aforesaid observations.