1. This is a plaintiff’s appeal. He brought the suit out of which it has arisen, on foot of a promissory note executed on 13th August 1923, by the respondent. The suit was decreed by the Court of first instance and was dismissed by the lower appellate Court. The ground for the dismissal by the lower appellate Court was that the execution of the document by the respondent who is a ward of the Court, was prohibited by Section 37, Court of Wards Act, being Act 4 of 1912.
2. It appears that the respondent’s estate was taken over by the Court of Wards for management, at the respondent’s own request made under Section 10, United Provinces Court of Wards Act. Under Section 37, same Act,
A ward shall not be competent… to enter into any contract which may involve him in pecuniary liability.
3. The Court of first instance found on the basis of certain copies of khataunis and khewats, that the respondent was still recorded as in possession of certain sir lands and that his name was recorded in certain khewats. It came to the conclusion that the respondent was in spite of his property being under the management of the Court of Wards, in possession of certain property as a private owner and that, therefore, Section 37, United Provinces, Court of Wards Act had no application, at least, to the extent of the private property. The lower appellate Court did not enter into the question as to whether it was a fact that the respondent was in possession of some property on his own account. It held that the respondent was a ward within the meaning of Section 3 and Section 37 of the Act and the prohibition applied with full force.
4. In Section 3, a ward is defined, inter alia,
as proprietor in regard to whose property a declaration has been made under Section 10.
5. The notification referred to by the lower appellate Court shows that with respect to the respondent’s property, a notification was published under Section 10, Court of Wards Act. It is pointed that in the earlier portion of the definition of a “ward,” the phrase, “property or any part of property” has been used, while with regard to the later portion of the definition, similar words have not been used. It is argued that for a proprietor, with regard to whose property a declaration has been made under Section 10, to be a ward, it must be proved that his entire property has been taken over by the Court of Wards. This argument implies an addition of the words, “the whole of” between the words “to” and “whose” in the definition of the word “ward” in Section 3. There is no justification for any such addition. If we read Section 10, Court of Wards Act, we shall find no room for the supposition that the Court of Wards would take over only a portion of the property of a person who makes an application under that section, The presumption therefore is that the low contemplated the taking over of the entire property and, in this view, there was no necessity for adding the words “or a portion of the property” after the word “property” in the third and fourth lines of the definition of the word “ward.” The respondent was, therefore, a “ward” within the meaning of Section 37 of the Act and the judgment of the Court below must be regarded as right.
6. We have examined the judgment of the Court of first instance. We find that on the evidence before it the Court below was not justified in holding that certain portions of the property of the respondent was exempted from the, superintendence of the Court of Wards. The sir lands of a proprietor whose property has been taken over by the Court of Wards for management is often left with him for cultivation. It would be much better that the proprietor himself should be allowed to cultivate his own sir lands than letting the same out to tenants. If it was sought to prove that a portion of the property has been intentionally left out of the superintendence of the Court of Wards, that fact should have been definitely established. Thus, either on facts or on law, there is no justification for interference with the decree of the lower appellate Court and we dismiss this appeal under Order 41, Rule 11, Civil P.C.