Delhi High Court High Court

Harish Chander Kalia vs Sat Pal Oberoi on 13 January, 1988

Delhi High Court
Harish Chander Kalia vs Sat Pal Oberoi on 13 January, 1988
Equivalent citations: 1988 (14) DRJ 218
Author: P Babri
Bench: P Bahri


JUDGMENT

P.K. Babri, J.

(1) The landlord has filed this civil revision under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) challenging the order dated 31st October, 1986 of Shri A.K.Garg, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, by which he had dismissed the eviction petition brought by the petitioner on the ground of bonafide requirement of residence covered by Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act.

(2) In respect of some of the essential ingredients which go to constitute this particular ground of bonafide requirement i.e. that the landlord is the owner of the premises in question and that the premises in question had been let out for residential purpose, the findings have been given by the Controller in favor of the landlord and those findings are not challenged. before me by the learned counsel for the tenant.

(3) The case set up by the landlord, in brief, is that he is aged about 73 years while his wife is aged about 69 years and both are having certain ailments and they have no male issue and are presently residing in the house in question and it is the need of the landlord that their married daughters with their families should live with them to look after their parents who are not keeping good health. Admittedly, both the daughters of the petitioner are married and are living separately with their families of their husbands. It was also pleaded that the landlord was in possession of accommodation comprising of two rooms, a store, a kitchen, a bath and verandah on the first floor and a room, a store and a kitchen on the ground floor of this house and the said accommodation was stated to be not reasonably suitable for the residence of the petitioner and his family members dependent upon him, rather his married daughters and their children, who are required to live with. the petitioner to look after the petitioner and the petitioner’s wife.

(4) The Additional Rent Controller, however, came to the conclusion that it is not proved that any of the daughters of the petitioner has any inclination to live with the petitioner and if there has been any such desire of the daughters to live with the petitioner, they would have shifted to the house in question and would have started living with the petitioner and the petitioner’s wife in order to look after them in their old ages. The Additional Rent Controller thus gave the finding that the ground of bonafide requirement for residence is not made out and the accommodation already with the petitioner and the petitioner’s wife in the house in question is more than reasonably suitable for their needs.

(5) At the outset, I may mention that this very landlord had brought an eviction petition on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence against another tenant who was living on the ground floor and he succeeded in getting his eviction in the year 1981 and surprisingly that accommodation has not been utilised for residence of the petitioner’s married daughters. Under Section 19(2) of the Act, a landlord who obtains an eviction order on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence is legally bound to use the said accommodation for residential purposes at least within the period specified. The landlord in the present case has not utilised the said accommodation for residential purposes. It is not disputed that the said accommodation was also got vacated on the same ground as now set up in the. eviction petition. Counsel for the petitioner points out that certain goods belonging to the married daughter of the petitioner have been kept in the accommodation got vacated from another tenant and so it should be inferred that the said accommodation is being used for the purposes of residence. I find no force in this contention because under Section 19(2) of the Act the landlord is bound to occupy the accommodation got vacated and the word. occupation’ would not connote merely using the premises for purposes of storing the goods. The said word ‘occupation’ has to be read in consonance with the purpose for which the premises are got vacated and that purpose obviously is for using the premises for residence. These provisions were construed by this Court in Shahastrapal Sharma v. Ho Ram & Another, 1973 Rcr 195, and it was held that the words ‘are not occupied by the landlord’ in Section 19(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, must, therefore, mean are not occupied by the landlord as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held’. It was held that the occupation has to be for the same purpose for which the premises were got vacated. So, the lack of bonafide is apparent in the present case when landlord after getting the other premises vacated on the ground to bonafide requirement as residence in the year 1981 has failed to use the said premises for the purpose of residence for all these years.

(6) The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the married daughters of the petitioner have somewhat higher social status and they need some comfortable accommodation for their residence and till the room in possession of the tenant is got vacated it would not be comfortable for either of the married daughters to shift in the house in question. It is true that the married daughters of the petitioner are having some higher social status but in the peculiar facts set up by the landlord in the present case the married daughters have to obviously make some sacrifice with regard to their comforts in order to shift to the house in question for fulfillling their hon’ble desire of looking after their aged ailing parents. Even if one room now in possession of the respondent-tenant is made available to the petitioner, either of the married daughters would not be obviously getting any reasonably sufficient accommodation according to their social status. Hence, the Additional Rent Controller was right in drawing an adverse inference against the petitioner regarding his bonafide requirement for more accommodation inasmuch as neither of the married daughters of the petitioner had cared to shift their residence to the house in question to look after their ailing and aged parents. Counsel for the petitioner has cited S.K. Sen v. Kunwarani Chandra Kunwar, , in which general principle has been laid down that the owner/landlord is the best judge of his requirement and as long as the need of the landlord is not fanciful or mala fide, the Court should not substitute its own opinion. There is no doubt about this principle. However, in the present case, keeping in view the facts and circumstances, it is quite clear that neither of the married daughters of the petitioner is keen to shift to the house in question to look after the petitioner and the petitioner’s wife. AW3 Dr. (Mrs.) Madhu Sharma is having two young children. She is working as Lecturer in Kalindi College and she has stated that accommodation in the house in question is not sufficient for five members to live therein. It is surprising that it is not made clear whether both the married daughters of the petitioner arc to shift to the house in question or one of them. If both the married daughters with their families are to shift in the house in question, obviously even if the tenanted room is vacated by the respondent the house cannot accommodate all these family members of these two married daughters. It is because of this reason perhaps AW3 did not make any categorical statement on oath that she with her husband and children are desirous of shifting to the house in question. It is only AW5 Mrs. Pratibha Parashar, the other married daughter of the petitioner, who deposed that she and her husband are ready and willing to live with the petitioner. She had come out with the explanation for not shifting to the house in question presently that the tenant’s wife is of quarrelsome nature. But significantly enough the landlord who appeared as AW4 had not mentioned any such facts. No such fact was even pleaded that the tenant’s wife is of quarrelsome nature and because of that reason the petitioner’s daughter is not shifting to the house in question. This explanation given by AW5 on the face of it appears to be afterthought and has been coined only in the cross-examination for the first time in order to come out with some reason for not shifting to the house in question for all these years when it is sought to be made out that her ailing and aged parents need to be looked after by her urgently.

(7) Counsel for the petitioner has, however, vehemently argued that there rs not an iota of evidence present on the record to show that the landlord is actuated by any malafide intention in seeking the eviction of the respondent and thus, it must be held that the claim of the landlord for additional accommodation is bonafide. The bonafide requirement of a particular landlord is to be assessed keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It is not always that any positive evidence could be brought on record by the tenant to prove that the ground of eviction set up by the landlord is actuated by malafide. In the present case, I agree with the finding of the Additional Rent Controller that the petitioner has failed to prove that he bonafide requires more accommodation for residence and that the petitioner’s married daughters are desirous of living with the petitioner.

(8) Hence, I find no merit in this civil revision which I hereby dismiss with costs.