PETITIONER: HARSOOKDAS BALKISSENDAS Vs. RESPONDENT: THE FIRST LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT08/04/1975 BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CITATION: 1975 AIR 1097 1975 SCR 79 1975 SCC (2) 256 ACT: Land Acquisition Act, s. 49(2)-Scope of. HEADNOTE: Section 49(2) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that if in the case of any claim under s. 23(1), thirdly, by a person interested, on account of the severing of the land to be acquired from his other land the appropriate Government is of the opinion that the claim is unreasonable and excessive, it may, at any time before the Collector,, has made his award, order the acquisition of the whole of the land of which the land first sought to be acquired forms a part. A part of a large area of land belonging to the appellant was sought to be acquired by the State. The appellant put forward a claim on account of damage caused by severance, under s. 23(1) thirdly. The claim was held to be un- reasonable and excessive, by the Government. Sanction for the acquisition of the entire land of the appellant having been approved, a further portion of the land was acquired. The appellant contended: (1) that s. 49(2) applies only to land with buildings, that the land acquired was a vacant land with no house or buildings; (2) that he made the claim for compensation under third and fourth clauses of s. 23 of the Act and therefore s. 49(2) had no application; and (3) that the acquisition of. a portion of the land was not for public purpose as there was no further declaration of public purpose and the acquisition was therefore invalid. Dismissing the appeal, HELD :(1) (a) Land is defined in s. 3(a) of the Act to include benefits to arise out of land, things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Therefore, land contemplated in s. 49(2) of the Act may be land or land or land including building or part of a building. [81B-C] (b) The contention that if there is vacant land, s. 49(2) of the Act has no application is not only a misreading of the decision of the Court in State of Bihar v. Kundan Singh [1964] 3 S. C. R. 382 but also the relevant Section. [81 D]. In the instant case the contention of the appellant that it was vacant land was also contrary to facts. The material on record shows that there were certain structures on the land. [80 H]. (2) If a claim under the third clause of s. 23(1) of the Act is made the requirement of s. 49(2) of the Act is satisfied. Addition of a claim under the fourth clause of s. 23(1) of the Act makes no difference. [82 B]. (3) (a) Sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 49 of the Act indicate that the acquisition for public purpose need not be stated. Section 49(3) of the Act specifically provides that no fresh declaration under ss. 6 to 10 of the Act shall be necessary. Section 49(2) of the Act implies public purpose inasmuch as the compensation for acquisition is payable out If the public land. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are excluded because of proposal by owner, in case of further acquisition under s. 49(1) of, the Act and proposal by Government for further acquisition in a case under s. 49(2) of the Act. All that is necessary is that in one case the owner of the land and in the other the Government must act under s. 49(1) and 49(2) of the Act, respectively before the award is made. The public purpose is to prevent people from making exaggerated claims. Section 49(2) of the Act is subsidiary to public purpose. The acquisition is in aid of that purpose. [83 A-C]. (b) Section 49 (2) of the Act does not require that the opinion shall be formed after hearing the person concerned. [83 D]. 80 JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 558 of 1970
From the Judgment and Order dated 26th May, 1965 of the
Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 260 of
1973.
L. M. Singhvi, O. C. Mathur, D. N. Mishra and J. B.
Dadachanji for the appellant.
Niren De, Attorney General of India, D. N. Mukherjee, G. S.
Chatterjee, and Sukumar Basu for respondents Nos. 1 and 4.
Niren De, Attorney General of India, S. K. Dholakia and R.
C. Bhatia for respondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RAY, C. J.-This appeal by certificate raises the question as
to whether section 49(2) of the Land Acquisition Act
hereinafter referred to as the Act has any application to
the acquisition of the land in question.
The premises in question are 2 Gariahat Road now known as 2
Raja Subodh Mullick Road, Calcutta. The total area is
approximately 23 bighas. The appellant alleges that there
are no houses or buildings. The Land Acquisition Collector
found certain structures occupied by certain persons and
other structures and a compound wall and the major portion
of the land to be vacant. There is a; big tank covering
over 3 bighas of the land. The appellant alleges that the
land is highly developed and is ideal for building site.
The Land Acquisition Collector found the major portion of
the land undeveloped and below road level and to become
waterlogged during rainy season. The appellant denies these
allegations.
Out of the total area the State in 1959 acquired 1 bigha, 13
chattack, 43 sq. feet for the State Transport. The
appellant claimed Rs. 3,50,000 inter alia for severance of
the land acquired. In the month of September, 1962 the
Government communicated to the appellant that the Government
agreed that the claim put forward by the appellant under the
clause “thirdly of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act”
is unreasonable and excessive.
The sanction of the Governor was therefor accorded to the
acquisition of the entire premises 2, Gariahat Road,
Calcutta under section 49(2) of the Act. Between the months
of February and September, 1960 notices were issued to
acquire a further area of 7 bighas, 4 cottahs, 9 chittacks
and 10 sq. feet. The premises were acquired. An award was
made.
The principal contention of the appellant is that section
49(2) of the Act has no application in the case of
acquisition of vacant land. The appellant contends that the
land acquired in the present case was vacant. The State
contended to the contrary. The materials on record support
the contention of the State. The appellant submits that
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section 49(2) of the Act applies only where land with
building is taken. Section 49(2) of the Act is as follows
“If, in the case of any claim under section
23, sub-section (1), thirdly, by a person
interested, on account of the severing of the
land to be acquired from his other land, the
appropriate Government is of opinion that the
claim is unreasonable and excessive, it may,
at any time before the Collector has made his
award, order the acquisition of the whole of
the land of which the land first sought to be
acquired forms a part.”
Land is defined in section 3(a) of the Act to include
benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the
earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the
earth. Therefore, land contemplated in section 49(2) of the
Act may be land or land including building or part of a
building.
Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of this
Court in State of Bihar v. Kundan Singh & Anr. [1964] 3
S.C.R. 382 and extracted the observation at page 394 of the
Report that section 49(2) of the Act contemplates cases
where land is acquired and it is shown to form part of a
house. In short, the contention of the appellant is that if
there is vacant land section 49(2) of the Act has no
application. This is not only misreading the decision but
also the relevant section.
In Kundan Singh’s case (supra) the question for
consideration was whether the desire of the owner for the
acquisition of the entire house under section 49 (1) of the
Act should be expressed before the award is made. In Kundan
Singh’s case (supra) the State acquired a plot of land which
consisted of the main house and an outhouse with an open
space. The owner of the property was not satisfied with the
award. The owner contended that other lands and buildings
contiguous to the land and building acquired which all
belonged to the owner had not been acquired. As a result of
partial acquisition the owner alleged loss. The ruling of
this Court is that such plea under section 49 of the Act
cannot be considered in an enquiry under section 18 of the
Act. Section 49(1) of the Act shows that if the owner has
any objection to the acquisition of a part of his house it
is open to him to withdraw or modify his objection before an
award is made under section II of the Act. If an objection
under section 49(1) of the Act is taken by the owner and the
Collector decides to accept the objection then the Collector
acquires the whole of the house. If the Collector does not
accept the claim the matter is judicially determined under
the second proviso to section 49(1) of the Act.
Section 49(2) of the Act states that where on account of the
severing of the land to be acquired from his other land, the
person interested prefers a claim under the third clause
under section 23(1) of. the Act and the Government is of
opinion that the claim is unrea-
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sonable or excessive, the Collector may, at any time before
the award is made, order the acquisition of the land.
The appellant submits that the appellant made the claim for
compensation under the third and fourth clauses of section
23(1) of the Act, and, therefore, section 49(2) of the Act
has no application. In one of the letters of the appellant
dated 25 February, 1960 it is stated that the area of 7
bighas, 4 cottahs, 9 chittaks and 10 sq. feet of from land
has been acquired for the purpose of over-bridge at Gariahat
Road level crossing including the entire frontage of the
said premises as a result of which the remaining portion of
the land measuring about 16 bighas of land will be land
locked causing heavy damages, severance and injurious
affectation. In the writ petition the appellant claimed
damages only in respect of severance. Section 23(1) clause
three of the Act speaks of damage sustained by the person
interested at the time of the Collector’s taking possession
of the land by reason of severance of such land from the
other land of the owner. Clause four of section 23(1) of
the Act speaks of claim for damage sustained by the person
interested at the time of the Collector’s taking possession
of the land by reason of the acquisition including affecting
his other property, movable or immovable, in any other
manner, or his earnings. Therefore, if a claim under the
third clause of section 23(1) of the Act is made the
requirement of section 49(2) of the Act is satisfied.
Addition of a claim under the fourth clause of section 23(1)
of the Act makes no difference.
In the present case, the land was not completely vacant.
Even if there is vacant land section 49(2) of the Act will
be attracted by reason of definition of land. To accede to
the contention on behalf of the appellant that section 49(2)
speaks only of acquisition of land along with a building and
not to the case of acquisition of vacant land is to rob the
meaning of land under section 49 (2) of the Act and the
content of section 49(2) of the Act. Section 49(2) of the
Act applies to cases of acquisition of vacant land along
with structures.
The object of section 49(1) of the Act is to give to the
owner the option whether he would like part to be acquired.
The Government cannot take the other part under section
49(1) of the Act unless the owner says so. Section 49(2) of
the Act has nothing to do with section 49(1) of the Act.
Section 49(2) of the Act gives the option to the Government
only where the claim under the third clause of section 23(1)
of the Act is excessive. Reference to the third clause of
section 23(1) of the Act makes it clear that the claim under
the third clause of section 23(1) is for severance. The
Government in such a case of acquisition of the remaining
portion of the land under section 49(2) of the Act saves the
public exchequer money which otherwise will be the subject
matter of a claim for severance.
Counsel on behalf of the appellant contended that the
acquisition of the remaining land was not for a public
purpose and was, therefore, invalid. It was said that there
should have been a fresh declaration of public purpose
after. the proposed acquisition of the remaining
83
portion of the land. This contention is unacceptable. Sub-
sections (2) and (3) of section 49 of the Act indicate that
the acquisition for public purpose need not be stated.
Section 49(3) of the Act specifically provides that no fresh
declaration under sections 6 to 10 of the Act shall be
necessary. Section 49(2) of the Act implies public purpose
inasmuch as the compensation for acquisition is payable out
of the public fund. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are
excluded because of proposal by owner in case of further
acquisition under section 49(1) of the Act and proposal by
Government for further acquisition in a case under section
49(2) of the Act. All that is necessary is that in one case
the owner of the land and in the other the Government must
act under sections 49(1) and 49(2) of the Act respectively
before the award is made. The public purpose is to prevent
people from making exaggerated claims. Section 49(2) of the
Act is subsidiary to public purpose. ‘The acquisition is
for public purpose. Tile subsequent acquisition is in aid
of that purpose.
Counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted that he was
entitled to be heard before the order was made under section
49(2) of the Act. This submission is unacceptable. Section
49(2) of the Act does not require that the opinion shall be
formed after hearing the person concerned.
For these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In
view of the fact ,hat the High Court directed each party to
pay and bear its own cost, there will be no order as to
costs.
P.B.R. Appeal
dismissed.
84