High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

Haryana Seeds Development … vs The Presiding Officer on 15 July, 2009

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Haryana Seeds Development … vs The Presiding Officer on 15 July, 2009
     IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                       CHANDIGARH


                                Civil Writ Petition No.3618 of 1997
                                Date of decision:15.07.2009


Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Limited             ...Petitioner

                               versus

The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ambala             ...Respondents
and another.



CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.KANNAN


Present:     Mr. Vishal Gupta, Advocate, for the petitioner

             Mr.Shireesh Gupta, Advocate, for respondent No.2.
                        ---

1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment ?

2. To be referred to the reporters or not ?

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the digest ?

K.Kannan, J.(Oral)

1. The award impugned is a direction by the Labour

Court regarding justification for termination of services, when the

Labour Court held that the workman was entitled to be reinstated in

service with back wages and continuity of service.

2. The Haryana Seeds Development Corporation, a

public body, which is the employer, challenges the award of the Labour

Court on four grounds: Firstly, the workman had previously applied to

the High Court for a similar relief questioning the very same order of

termination and the writ petition had been dismissed as belated.

An application for review was also dismissed. After the dismissal of the
Civil Writ Petition No.3618 of 1997 -2-

case by the High Court, it should be understood that the decision was on

merits and a petition before the Labour Court was, therefore, barred by

res judicata. Secondly, even before the Labour Court, the reference had

been made nearly five years after the initial order of termination and

therefore, the claim was belated and the Labour Court could not have

entertained and granted no relief. Thirdly, the claimant did not fulfil the

status as a workman within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial

Disputes Act. He was Seeds Development Assistant and was not a

workman and therefore, he could not have any remedy under the

Industrial Disputes Act. The fourth point that was argued was that the

engagement was in ad hoc post and the services being terminable without

assigning reasons, had in fact been terminated on the ground that the

services were no longer required. According to him, even the initial

engagement was not as per law and the appointment being violative of

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the workman did not have a right

to regularization.

3. As regards the plea that the claim is barred by res

judicata, the Labour Court had dealt with the objection by reference to a

Full Bench ruling of this Court in Teja Singh Versus Union Territory-

1981(1) SLR 274. The same issue has been dealt in a different fashion

in the judgment of another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Versus Neelam-

2005 (2) RSJ 439, that dealt with an action by a writ petition before

the High Court seeking for issuance of writ of mandamus directing
Civil Writ Petition No.3618 of 1997 -3-

reinstatement. Though the petition was filed within a period of three

years from the date when the cause of action arose, ultimately the

workman had the writ petition dismissed as withdrawn and sought an

adjudication before the Labour Court on a reference which was

undertaken seven years after the order of termination. There had been

two objections by the management: firstly, the petition before the Labour

Court was barred by res judicata; and secondly, the claim has belated.

The Labour Court had found the claim to be barred and the High Court

set aside that finding. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, stated that

although the principle of res judicata could not be applied even the

principle of abandonment provided under Order 23 Rule 1 which lays

down a rule of public policy shall not applicable to a case of this nature.

It pointed out that a writ petition which could have been dismissed even

on the ground of alternative remedy which was more efficacious, without

going into the disputed questions of fact cannot operate to bar remedy by

approaching the Labour Court. What the Hon’ble Supreme Court said

with reference to Order 23 Rule 1 CPC shall apply as well for an

adjudication rendered not on merits but by a dismissal on the ground of

laches.

4. What was possible for a writ Court to apply as a

ground of dismissal may not still be relevant in a case before the Labour

Court where a greater latitude discretion is available and the Labour

Court had exercised its discretion in admitting the claim. The decision of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above is also an authority for

the proposition that if a discretion is exercised in a particular fashion by
Civil Writ Petition No.3618 of 1997 -4-

taking note of the relevant factors, the High Court shall not interfere in

the matter of such discretionary exercise. Therefore, I reject the

contention, that there is a bar of limitation or that the claimed is belated.

5. Even as regards the contention that the workman did

not fulfil his status as such, it has to be pointed out that no effort had

been made by the management to take a specific plea as regards the

status. The sweeping statement that the petition was not maintainable

was sought to be urged as a point that was broad enough to accommodate

a defence that the workman did not have such a status. The pointed

attention of the Labour Court or the party could not have been brought to

bear upon the conduct of parties to direct appropriate evidence in that

regard. Even so, it shall be always the workman who claimed the status

as a workman to establish his status as such and in view of contentions

so raised disputing the status of the workman, the counsel for the

respondent points out to the documentary evidence that had been

produced along with the written statement. It is seen that the job profile

of the workman is stated to be the allocation of various vegetables seeds

of different sizes to be packed as shown in the statement (R-2/1, dated

21.10.1985). The other communications also refers only to the date for

packing the vegetables seeds. Evidently the nature of activity that had

been assigned to the petitioner was purely manual that fell within the

definition of workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

I therefore also reject the contention that the petition before the Labour

Court was not maintainable.

Civil Writ Petition No.3618 of 1997 -5-

6. The last contention that requires a focus is whether the

workman established the termination to be unlawful and whether he was

entitled to reinstatement. The justification to the removal as proffered in

the objection before the Labour Court was with reference to the

appointment order that stipulated as follows:-

“Sh.Jai Narain S/o Sh. Ram Chander is offered an
appointment as S.P.A. on adhoc basis in the pay scale of
Rs.600-1100/- w.e.f. the date he takes over as such and
posted at H.S.D.C., Tohana.

It is made clear to him that his appointment is purely
on adhoc basis as stop gap arrangement till a regular
candidate from employment exchange or Govt. is available,
and terminable at any time without any notice and reason.”

7. The learned counsel appearing for the workman states

that it contemplated that he could be displaced only by a regular

candidate sponsored through Employment Exchange or Government.

According to him, the post was never advertised nor any regular

candidate was appointed and therefore, he was entitled to be continued in

the same post. It was his further contention that the order of termination

that was effected on 26.11.1986, did not state anywhere that the

contingency by appointment of a regular candidate from Employment

Exchange or Government had come into effect and that the termination

was effected only on such contingency. The learned counsel for the

workman also assails the termination order made without setting out any

reason to be invalid. The learned counsel for the respondent also seeks to

place reliance on a judgment of this Court as regards another workman in

the same cadre who obtained the same relief in CWP No.1561 of 1989
Civil Writ Petition No.3618 of 1997 -6-

where this Court by reference to judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court

in Executive Engineer CPWD, Indore Versus Madhukar Purshottam

Kolharkar and another-(2002) 9 Supreme Court Cases 622, held that

even if a workman had been engaged on daily wages on purely

temporary basis and that his service could be terminated any time, the

appointment could not be taken as one falling with the exception

mentioned under Section 2 (oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. I also

held that without specific orders by prescribing the period of

appointment it shall not be permissible to invoke the provisions of

Section 2 (oo)(bb). After the decision of this Court mentioned above,

there has been a paradigm shift in the judicial approach following the

decision of the Consitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State

of Karnataka Versus Uma Devi-(2006) 4 SCC 1, that dealt with the case

of public employment. The Bench held that mere length of service shall

not determine whether a person is entitled to regularization or not. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that back door entry is anathema to the

constitutional scheme enshrined through Articles 14 and 16 and

appointments made without reference to recruitment rules would be

illegal. The Haryana Seeds Development Corporation is a public body

and it shall not be possible for the persons to be engaged in service on ad

hoc basis on stop gap arrangement, pending regular appointments. The

very tenor of language applied in the appointment orders spells out its

illegality as well. In the dispensation that has come about through

pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and several decisions that

followed it, it shall not be possible to follow what was laid down in the
Civil Writ Petition No.3618 of 1997 -7-

decision of this Court referred to above. I respectfully disagree with

a view expressed in Executive Engineer CPWD case (supra) in view of

the subsequent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

Constitutional Bench.

9. Admittedly, the workman had been employed for 240

days before the date of termination and the termination was effected

without any previous notice as required under Section 25-F of the

Industrial Disputes Act. The statutory non-compliance enables a

workman to claim compensation for the termination that has entailed.

The workman has completed two years of service and in my view,

compensation of Rs.25,000/- shall meet the justice. It is brought to my

attention by the learned counsel appearing for the workman that the order

of the Labour Court was given effect to and he was reinstated in service

by express orders of this Court as an interim measure. By the very nature

of things, an order that is passed interim, shall subscribe to the final

dispensation and the workman cannot obtain any privilege for

continuation in employment. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed in

the manner indicated above. No costs.

(K.KANNAN)
JUDGE
15.07.2009
sanjeev