JUDGMENT
Viney Mittal, J.
1. The present revision petition has been filed by Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (hereinafter referred to as the Marketing Board) by raising a challenge to the judgment dated November 17, 1986 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani and also the judgment dated March 21, 1986 passed by the Senior Sub Judge, Bhiwani. The learned Senior Sub Judge, Bhiwani had rejected the objection petition filed by the petitioner Board and consequently, award dated June 25, 1984 was ordered to be made the rule of the Court. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the objector Board.
2. The facts which emerge from the record show that the contractor Sat Narain had been awarded the contract of construction and there was a dispute between the parties and according to the clause of the agreement, the same was referred for adjudication to an Arbitrator.
3. After giving due opportunity to the parties to produce the relevant evidence, the Arbitrator gave an award in favour of the contractor and he was held entitled to an amount of Rs. 75,024.83 with a further stipulation that if the payment was not made within 30 days from the date of passing of the award, then the contractor would also be entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
4. When the contractor filed an application for making the aforesaid award rule of the Court, objections were raised by the Marketing Board. It was claimed that the Arbitrator had not given proper opportunities to the Board to lead evidence and further that the award was rendered after the expiry of a period of 4 months. An objection was also raised to the effect that the contractor was not registered under Section 69 of the Partnership Act and as such was not entitled to claim any amount. All the objections were rejected by the trial Judge. Consequently, the award was ordered to be made the rule of the Court.
5. The Marketing Board filed an appeal against the judgment of the trial Court. The Appellate Court also noticed that since no objection had ever been raised by the Board before the Arbitrator and the parties had been appearing before the Arbitrator and participating in the proceedings, therefore, it was not open to the Board later on to raise the aforesaid objection. It was also noticed by the learned Additional District Judge that the objection with regard to the non registration of the contractor firm was not pressed. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Marketing Board was also dismissed.
6. I have heard Shri Ravi Kapur, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri Sanjay Bansal, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case.
7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before this Court.
8. Firstly, it has been argued that the award rendered by the Arbitrator was beyond the period of limitation and as such the same could not have been made the rule of the Court, The learned Counsel has also argued that since no extension of the period to render the award had been sought from the court of competent jurisdiction, therefore, the Arbitrator could not have rendered the award after the expiry of a period of four months. Secondly, it has been argued by the learned Counsel that the Arbitrator had been appointed by designation, inasmuch as the Superintending Engineer of the Marketing Board was to be the Arbitrator but Shri. D.P. Gupta, Arbitrator, who was holding the post of Superintending Engineer had proceeded on a long earned leave and, therefore, he could not have acted as an Arbitrator.
9. I have duly considered the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner but find no merit in the same.
10. With regard to first contention raised by the learned Counsel, I find that even if it be taken that the Arbitrator had rendered the award after the expiry of the period of four months, still it is not in dispute that the parties had been appearing before him and participating in the arbitration proceedings without raising any objection. In any case, a court of competent jurisdiction could have exercised the power to enlarge the period enabling the Arbitrator to pronounce the award.
11. In almost in identical circumstances, this Court in the case of State of Haryana and Anr. v. Krishan Chand , has held that when the parties were taking part in proceedings before the Arbitrator willingly and without raising any protest, then the subsequent objection raised by one of them when the award was pronounced against him, was totally deprecable. However, this Court relying upon the various judgments of the Apex Court had extended the period even after the award had been pronounced.
12. The law laid down by this Court in Krishan Chand’s case (supra) is fully attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case.
13. In these circumstances, while rejecting the objection raised by the petitioner Marketing Board, I extend the period and hold that the award pronounced by the Arbitrator is to be treated as having been pronounced legally and validly.
14. With regard to the second objection, it is also apparent that no such plea was ever raised by the petitioner Marketing Board before the trial Court or even before the Appellate Court. Now at the revisional stage, the aforesaid plea, which is essentially a plea based on facts, cannot be raised.
15. No other point has been urged.
16. Consequently, I do not find any merit in the present revision petition and the same is dismissed.