Allahabad High Court High Court

Hashim Ali Khan vs The District Magistrate, … on 3 September, 1991

Allahabad High Court
Hashim Ali Khan vs The District Magistrate, … on 3 September, 1991
Equivalent citations: AIR 1992 All 286
Bench: P Gupta


ORDER

1. By this petition the petitioner, Hashim Ali Khan, has prayed for quashing of the show cause notice dated 21-1-1982 (Annexure ‘2’ to the writ petition), passed by the District Magistrate, Azamgarh, by which the petitioner’s arm licence No, 5295/Part II for his Double Barrel Gun No. 69494 was suspended and he was called upon to show cause also by 24-2-1982. Instead of showing any cause to the aforesaid notice, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel were heard at length and the record of the case was perused. The only submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that under the Arms Act there is no provision for suspending the arms licence pending enquiry regarding cancellation/suspension of the licence. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Raghuvir Sahai v. The District Magistrate, Jhansi 1986 AWC 1074 : (1986 All LJ 1442) this case it was held :–

“If the District Magistrate was on the material that had been palced before him satisfied that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or public safety to revoke or suspend the petitioners’ licenses for any specified period, it was open to him to pass such an order straightway. However, if he

chose to suspend the licences only pending an enquiry and before being fully satisfied on the material brought on he record it was necessary to revoke or suspend the license in order to secure public peace and safety, he would certainly have no jurisdiction to suspend the petitioners’ licenses pending such an enquiry”.

3. Relying on a Full Bench decision of five Judge in the case of Kailash Nath v. State of U. P. 1985 AWC 493 : (AIR 1985 All 291 (FB), it was argued on behalf of the State that the licensing authority can for the furtherance of his immediate remedial action exercise the incidental power of suspending the licence during the period of enquiry.

4. The precise question for determination in this case is whether there is power to suspend an arms licence pending enquiry into its cancellation or suspension?

5. In a Full Bench decision consisting of three Judges in the case of Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of U. P. 1984 AWC 145 : (AIR 1986 All 142 (FB) it was held at page 149 :–

“Having regard to the scheme and purpose of the provisions contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the Act and the nature of the enquiry that a licensing authority is to make before directing revocation/suspension of an arms licence, it has no power to suspend the arms licence pending enquiry into its cancellation/-suspension”.

6. The aforesaid decision came up for consideration of a larger Bench consisting of five Judges in the case of Kailash Nath (supra). In this case also precisely the same question was for consideration of the Bench. Hon’ble M.N. Shukla, C.J., as he then was, observed :–

“The laid down in paragraph 16 in Chhanga Prasad Sahu’s case (supra) extracted in the earlier part of this judgment must be suplemented by the further observations that after taking the provisional action of immediate revocation of the licence the licensing authority must issue notice to the licence holder giving him an opportunity to file objections against the preliminary order

and after hearing him proceed to pass the final order which may either affirm or revoke the provisional order. In other words, it is incumbent upon the licensing authority to refrain from attaching finality to the order of cancellation until the aggrieved petitioner has been heard by such authority and his objections have been adjudicated. The licensing authority can also for the furtherance of his immediate remedial action exercise the incidental power of directing the licence holder to surrender his licence until the objections have been decided. It follows that in the event of the pbjections being allowed the licence as well as the fire arm must be restroed to the licence holder. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra) the Supreme Court in its final order did not set aside the impugned order of impounding the passport, instead it merely allowed the petitioner to make a representation and issued direction that the representation should be dealt with expeditiously by the Passport Authority”.

7. From the decision of the Full Bench in the above case it becomes absolutely clear that audi alteram partem rule of natural justice does not, in all cases, oblige the authority to give an opportunity of hearing to the concerned party before arriving at a decision adverse to it. If the exigencies and practical necessities of the case so require the rule would stand satisfied even if a post-decisional hearing remedial in aim is given.

8. It may be mentioned that the law laid down by the Division Bench in Raghuvir Sahai’s case (supra) was not agreed to by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Awadhesh Kumar Misra v. District Magistrate, Karipur Nagar 1988 (14) ALR 37 : (1988 All LJ 363). It was held by this Division Bench that power of suspension is a necessary concomitant of power of cancellation for effective control and regulation. It was observed –

“It was necessary and expedient that the licencing authority should be clothed with power to suspend a licence when it detects or finds it to be in the interest of law and order. Otherwise, a licence holder can commit breach of the terms and conditions of his

licence with impunity, without any check or control. What appeal to us to be following from S. 17(3) of the Arms Act the power of suspension is a necessary adjunct to the power to grant a licence.”

On this reason it was held that the District Magistrate can out right cancel a licence and call upon the licence-holder to surrender the arm obtained under it. The authorities can give a notice to a licence-holder for showing cause against the cancellation already ordered.

9. It may be worth nothing that the Division Bench decision in the case of Raghuvir Sahai (supra) on which the reliance was place by the learned counsel for the petitioner was overruled by another Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Balram Singh v. State of U.P. 1989 ALJ 23 : (1990 Cri LJ 409). The Full Bench observed that the power of the licensing authority to suspend the arms licence for the entire period during which the proceedings for its revocation is going on before him is implicit. The power of suspension is a necessary concomitant of power of revocation for effective control and regulation as also for security of public peace or public safety.

10. From the aforesaid decisions it is now settled that the licensing authority has power to suspend an arms licence pending enquiry into its cancellation or suspension provided a post-decisional opportunity of hearing is given to the arms licence-holder.

11. In the instant case where while suspending the arms licence of the petitioner he was also afforded a post-decisional opportunity of hearing, I think the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice stands satisfied. The petitioner can still avail the opportunity of showing that the impugned order directing suspension of the licence during the enquiry was not justified and deserves to be set aside. In the event of his objections being allowed, the natural consequence will be that his licence for the fire arms shall stood restored.

12. In view of the above discussions, the petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. However, if the petitioner ap-

proaches the District Magistrate, Azamgarh, he shall afford him an opportunity of showing that the impugned order directing supsension of his licence was not justified and deserves to be set aside. In case the petitioner makes such an application within a period of three weeks from the date of this order, the District Magistrate, Azamgarh, must, after hearing him, disposed of his application in accordance with law within three weeks from the date of receipt of such application. Under the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.

13. Petition dismissed.