ORDER
G. Sankaran, Sr. Vice-President
1. The common issue involved in these two appeals is whether “Lauryl alcohol” imported by the appellants, was classifiable under heading No. 15.08/13 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, as claimed by the appellants or under Heading No. 29.01/45(1) of the Schedule as claimed by the Revenue. Both the lower authorities found against the appellants. The claims of the appellants on the basis of the classification claimed by them for refund of the excess customs duty recovered were also dismissed by the lower authorities.
2. We have heard Shri S.R. Tamhane, Consultant, for the appellants and Shri C.V. Durghayya, D.R., for the respondent.
3. Shri Tahrnane, pointed out that the issue in these appeals stood concluded in favour of the appellants by the Tribunal’s decision in the case of Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Hico Products Ltd. (the present appellants themselves) reported in 1984 (18) E.L.T. 645. This decision has been followed in subsequent decisions of the Tribunal in the case of Roussel Pharmaceuticals (I) Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (Order No. C. 654/1985, dated 13-9-1985 and Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Dailchi Karkaria Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Hico Products Ltd. and 4 Others (Order Nos. 591-597/87-C dated 13-8-1987). Shri Durghayya conceded that the issue stood concluded by the above decisions but said that he would like to reiterate the submissions for the Revenue as urged in the previous appeals heard by the Tribunal.
4. As stated by Shri Tamhane and Shri Durghayya, the issue in these two appeals stands already concluded by the decisions referred to earlier. It was held by the Tribunal that Lauryl alcohol, among other fatty alcohols, was appropriately classifiable under Heading No. 15.08/13 of the Schedule and was eligible for exemption from payment of additional duty of customs in terms of Customs Notification No. 48/79, dated 1-3-1979. Following the aforesaid decisions, we allow the present appeals with consequential relief to the appellants which shall be granted to them within 3 months from the date of receipt of this order.
5. Before parting with the case, we must refer to what, in our opinion, is a disturbing trend which has been noticed from time to time and which cannot but be deprecated. This is exemplified in the present cases. The Assistant Collector in his order dated 7-8-1985/5-2-1986 records as follows :-
“As this Custom House has yet to decide on the acceptance of Appellate decisions or CEGAT Orders regarding assessment of fatty alcohols of any purity under Chapter 15, the ratio of these decisions cannot be applied. The assessment already made under Chapter 29 is treated as in order. The claims are not tenable and no refund is due.”
The Collector (Appeals) in his order dated 2-3-1987 has also chosen to ignore the CEGAT decisions and has confirmed the Assistant Collector’s order.
6. In the above context, we must state that unless the orders of the CEGAT are stayed, or reversed, by a superior forum, the decisions cannot be ignored or brushed aside by quasi-judicial authorities in the department. The Collector (Appeals), in his order, has noted that the department had gone to the Supreme Court for stay of the Tribunal’s order in the case of Roussel Pharmaceuticals (I) Ltd. (supra). He does not, however, record that a stay had been granted by the Supreme Court. We must note also that the departmental representative did not state before us either that the Supreme Court had stayed the order of this Tribunal or that the order had been reversed.
7. That quasi-judicial authorities in the department cannot ignore or brush aside this Tribunal’s decisions is a self evident proposition. And, it is not as if the Assistant Collector and the Collector (Appeals), in the present cases, have even attempted to distinguish the facts of the present cases from those of the cases decided by the Tribunal and come to a finding that those decisions are not applicable to the facts of the present cases. Reading the orders of the lower authorities we do not see that any new arguments or points which were not considered by this Tribunal in its previous decisions were placed before them.
8. In the above context, the following passage which occurs in the Madras High Court judgment in Sree Rajendra Mills Ltd- v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Salem, 1971, Volume 28 STC 483 is very apposite :-
“We consider that in the hierarchy of authorities set up under the Act, the Tribunal is superior to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who is bound by the orders of the Tribunal. The orders of the Tribunal will be as effective as the orders of this court so far as their binding character on the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is concerned. Merely because a tax case has been filed by the department, it does not mean it acts as a kind of stay of operation of the order of the Tribunal. So long as that order of the Tribunal is not set aside, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is bound to give effect to it, and if he fails to do it and by-passes it on the ground that the department has filed an appeal, it will be really a contempt of the Tribunal’s order. In the circumstances, therefore, we should think that the-Appellate Assistant Commissioner will, as he is bound to, follow the Tribunal’s view. It is, of course, open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to take his own view on the facts, but, so far as the law propounded by the Tribunal is concerned, it is binding and it should be applied by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the facts before him.”
9. The above observations made in the context of the binding effect of the decisions of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, equally apply with respect to the decisions of this Tribunal.
10. In a later judgment, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Koduru Venkata Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer and R.D.O., Kavali, (1987) 67 STC 424 has held as follows :-
“When the matter came up before our learned brother Kodandaramayya, J., he felt a doubt whether, having regard to the fact that the judgment of the Full Bench is the subject-matter of an appeal before the Supreme Court and the operation of the said judgment is suspended, the dicta laid down by the Full Bench would be binding on this Court and has to be followed, and referred the matter to the Bench. We are of the view that when a judgment of the High Court is the subject-matter of an appeal and the said judgment is suspended, the only effect of such suspension is that that judgment cannot be executed or implemented. But so long as the Full Bench judgment stands, the dicta laid down therein are binding on all Courts including the Single Judges and Division Benches of this Court. The dicta laid down therein cannot be ignored unless the Court after hearing a particular case doubts the correctness of the dicta and thinks it appropriate that it should be reconsidered.”
11. More recently, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had this to say with regard to the binding nature of its judgment on the Tribunals functioning within its jurisdiction :-
“Whenever a decision of this court is found to be unacceptable to the authorities below, the simplest course to follow is to carry the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court by following the necessary statutory procedure and seek suspension of the order appealed against. If the Supreme Court suspends the operation of the judgment or order appealed against, it is dear that the authorities in the State are under no legal obligation to follow the judgment so suspended fill the matter is decided by the Supreme Court. What is really happening is that without following the above course, the authorities are lightheartedly declining to follow the judgments of this court on the ground that either an appeal was filed or steps are being taken to file an appeal.” [See State of Andhra Pradesh v. Commercial Tax Officer and Anr. -1988 (Vol. 63) Company Cases 273].
12. Again, the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Singh and Sons Engineering Works and Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. -1977 STC (Vol. 39) 424 rejected the contention that since its judgment was under appeal before the Supreme Court, it could not be said that there was any final enunciation of law on the question involved. The Court held :-
‘The mere fact that the decision of this court is under appeal does not make it any less binding on courts, tribunals and other authorities within this State until it (that decision) is reversed by the Supreme Court.”
13. The above cited pronouncements are equally applicable to the decisions of this Tribunal insofar as their binding effect on the quasi-judicial authorities functioning within its jurisdiction are concerned.
14. We do hope that we will not have any further occasion to revert to, and expatiate on, the theme.