JUDGMENT
I.A. Ansari, J.
1. Can an Industrial Tribunal, while adjudicating upon a reference, order the employer to give financial benefits to a class of its employees on the ground that such financial benefits are being availed of by another class of employees, though, according to the decision of the Apex Court, the policies, whereunder the financial benefits are being made available, do not apply to any of the classes of the employees, whose cases have been considered by the Industrial. Tribunal is the moot question, which this writ petition raises.
2. The management of the Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation”) Cachar Paper Mill, District, Hailakandi, has sought for a writ of Cetiorari to set aside the award, dated 19.12.1998, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Silchar Assam, in Reference Case No. 5 of 1996.
3. In a nutshell, the facts and various stages, which have led to this writ petition may be set forth as follows :
(i) The Board of Directors of the Corporation vide its letter dated 31.10.1994 (Annexure-A) agreed, on 30.9.1994, to the proposal for granting North Eastern Allowance (hereinafter referred to “NE Allowance”) @ 10% of basic pay subject to the maximum of Rs. 500 per month to those of their employees, who have All India Transfer Liability. Thereafter, by letter, dated 17.2.1995 (Annexure-B) the Department of Heavy Industry, Ministry of Industry, Government of India, approved the grant of NE Allowance to the employees of the Corporation. By a letter, dated 23.7.1993 (Annexure-C) addressed to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Corporation, the Department concerned clarified that the NE Allowance would be permissible only to those employees, who satisfied the conditions, namely, that they had All India Transfer Liability and those employees, who did not have All India Transfer Liability, would be given Special Compensatory (remote locality) Allowance. It was also mentioned in this letter that the concept of All India Transfer Liability stood clarified in the office memorandum No. 2001/3/83-E/IV, dated 20.4.1987, issued by the Ministry of Finance Government of India. According to the office memorandum, dated 20.4.1987, aforementioned, the purpose of sanctioning Special (Duty) Allowance, which is NE Allowance in the case of the Corporation, the All India Transfer Liability of the members of any service/cadre encumbrance of any post/group of posts has to be determined by applying test of recruitment zones, promotion zones, etc., that is, whether recruitment of the service/cadre/post has been made on All India basis or whether promotion is also done on the basis of all India zone of promotion based on common seniority for the service/cadre/post as a whole. Mere clause in the appointment letter as done in the case of almost all posts in the Central Secretariat, etc., to the effect that the person concerned is liable to transfer or to be transferred anywhere in India do not make him eligible for grant of special duty allowance.
(ii) After introduction of the NE Allowance and Special Compensatory (Remote Locality) Allowance, an industrial dispute was raised by respondent Nos. 2 to 5. This dispute led to the reference Case No. 5 of 1996 aforementioned, the reference being worded as follows :
(a) Whether the employees of the Cacbar Paper Mills, PO Panchgram, who have All India Transfer Liability and are residents of this area, are entitled to get North East Allowance at the rate of 10% of their basic pay as per Government of India’s letter No. 8/44/90-PF VII dated 17.2.1995 ?
(b) If not, what relief the employees are entitled to ?
(iii) The writ petitioner resisted the reference by filing their written statement, their case being, briefly stated, thus : The Government of India, Ministry of Industry, Department of Heavy Industry by letter, dated 17.2.1995, aforementioned, approved payment of NE Allowance @ 10% of the basic pay subject to the limitation of Rs. 500 per month in respect of such employees who carry All India Transfer Liability and payment of special (remote locality) allowance in the range of Rs. 20 to Rs. 100 for those, who do not carry All India Transfer Liability. The approval was conveyed by the Government of India taking into account the rules applicable in this behalf and the financial conditions of the company to bear the additional burden arising out of the sanction of the aforesaid allowance. The workman did not agree to accept the payment of special compensatory allowance as approved by the Government primarily on the plea that the workman of the mills also carry all India Transfer liability inasmuch as their service conditions provide for such transfer. The matter was, again, referred back to the Government of India for review and the Government vide their letter dated 23.7.1996, clarified the expression “employees carrying All India Transfer Liability”, to mean that this allowance would apply only to such employees, who had been selected on all India selection basis and were being promoted on all India seniority basis. In respect of the workmen of the Corporation, it was clarified that even though their letters of appointment or standing orders may provide for their transfer, they are not, in fact, transferred. That apart, their employment is localised and confined to a particular Mills and they do not, therefore, fulfil the test of all India Transfer Liability.
(iv) The respondent Nos. 2 to 5 also filed their written statement, their case being, in brief, thus : The workmen were liable to be transferred form one establishment, section or Job to any other establishment anywhere in India. This apart, the transfer liability clause is incorporated in their appointment letters, whereby it is made clear that the service of the workmen shall be liable to transfer to any office of the Corporation/ project or its subsidiary units, wherever it may situate in any part of India and as such, they too carry All India Transfer Liability and are thus entitled to NE Allowance.
(v) During the progress of the reference before the learned Tribunal, it was brought to the notice of the learned “Tribunal that in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. S. Vijay Kumar and Ors., reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 649, the Apex Court had considered the concept and ambit of the NE Allowance in the context of All India Transfer Liability and held that this allowance would be granted to persons having all All India Transfer Liability, when they were posted to any station in the NE Region and, hence, the allowance were not payable to the employees, who were residents of the NE Region, though they may have All India Transfer Liability.
(vi) In the above back drop, the learned Tribunal was required to adjudicate upon and decide the reference. Having noticed the decision in S. Vijay Kumar (supra), the learned Tribunal held as follows :
“In the instant case it appears from the evidence of workmen witness No. 3 Shri Birendra Kumar Singh that senior officers above supervisors are receiving NE Allowance irrespective of permanent residents. He also stated those Executive who have permanent residents in Cachar they are also getting NE Allowance. The management could not rebut this evidence and I am of the opinion that the management paid NE Allowance to the Executives who have permanent resident in Cachar. In other words the Management are not working as per direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court if that be so, I find no reason why management cannot give NE Allowance to the. workmen categories. In view of the activities of the Management as they encouraged the Executive cadres by paying N E Allowance who are permanent residents of Cachar also, I desire that the management will also pay N E Allowance to the workmen categories and thus remove the discrepancy from the Executive Officers and the workmen to maintain peace in the industry and this is done for the ends of justice”
(vii) The finding of the learned Tribunal reached to the effect that since the NE allowance was being availed of by the executive cadre of the Corporation, there was no reason as to why the Management should refuse to allow the workmen to avail such allowance is, now, under challenge, in the present writ petition as an error apparent on the face of the record on the ground that the illegal financial benefits derived by a class of employees cannot be made available by a judicial order to another class of the employees, who too are not entitled to such financial benefits.
4. I have heard Mr. M. Hazarika, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, and Mr. B.C. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents No. 2, 4 and 5. I have also heard Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3.
5. It has/been submitted, on behalf of the petitioner, that the learned Tribunal wholly overlooked the office memorandum, dated 20.4.1987, aforementioned, which defined All India Transfer Liability nor has the learned Tribunal taken into account the letter, dated 23.4.1996 (Annexure-C) which contains special instructions regarding grant of the NE Allowance as well as the special compensatory allowance. Though the letters of appointments of the workmen of the Corporation mention, points out Mr. Hazarika, that they are liable to be transferred to any place in India and though as per Certified Standing Orders, the workmen have All India Transfer Liability, these factors cannot, in the face of special nature of the NE allowance, contends Mrs. Hazarika, be made available to those employees of the Corporation, who are residents of the NE Region.
6. Mrs. Hazarika has pointed out that on the basis of the law laid down in S Vijay Kumar (supra), there can be no room for doubt that the NE allowance can be made available to only those persons, who come to the NE Region, on transfer, from other parts of the country and that no resident of N E Region can avail this allowance. It is also pointed out by Mrs. Hazarika that this allowance, as the Hon’ble Supreme’ Court noticed in S Vijay Kumar (supra), was meant to attract person from outside the NE Region to come to, and work in, the NE Region. It is further pointed out by Mrs. Hazarika that in the Office Memorandum dated 20.4.1987, aforementioned, the Department concerned made it clear that this allowance would not be made available merely because of the existence of a clause in the appointment letter mentioning that the appointee will have All India Transfer Liability. This discrimination is not, according to Mrs. Hazarika, unlawful discrimination inasmuch as the allowance provides some extra benefits to non-locals transferred to the NE Region with a view to maintaining efficient working of the Corporation. This is, submits Mrs. Hazarika, the position of law on the subject as has been clarified in the Reserve Bank of India v. Reserve Bank of India Staff Officers Association and others, reported in (1991) 4 SCC 132.
7. When the NE Allowance, submits Mrs. Hazarika, could not be made available to any of the employees of the Corporation, who are residents of the NE Region, the learned Tribunal could not have, according to Mrs. Hazarika, made such allowances available to the workmen of the Corporation on the ground that the management has allowed the executive cadre of their employees to draw such allowance. Two wrongs cannot, pleads Mrs. Hazarika, made one right.
8. Since the decision of the learned Tribunal is, submits Mrs. Hazarika, contrary to the position of law as laid down in S. Vijay Kumar (supra) as well as in the Reserve Bank of India (supra) the award needs to be set aside as an error apparent on the fact of the record.
9. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. B. C. Das has submitted that the learned Tribunal, vide the impugned award, has removed the discrepancy that existed between the executive cadre and the workmen serving in the Corporation in the NE Region and this has been done, points out Mr. B. C. Das, to maintain, as indicated by the award, industrial peace. Such an . approach on the part of the learned Tribunal, submits Mr. B. C. Das, is not incorrect inasmuch as the Apex Court in Roshan Deen v. Preetilal, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 100 has laid down that even where justice is the by-product of an erroneous interpretation of law, High Court ought not to wipe out such justice in the name of correcting the error of law.
10. By the impugned award, contends Mr. Das, justice has been done and hence, the award, so given, does not, submits Mr. Das, call for interference. Support for this submission is sought to be derived by Mr. Das from the decisions in J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, AIR 1964 SC 737, Air India Statutory Corporation and Ors. v. United Labour Union and Ors., (1997) 9 SCC 377, Mis. Agra Electric Supply Company Ltd, v. Workmen reported in, (1983) 1 SCC 436 and T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440.
11. Lending support to the submissions made by Mr. B.C. Das, Mr. Dasgupta has pointed out that an Industrial Tribunal, while adjudicating upon a reference, has to keep itself confined, in accordance with Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the reference made to it and cannot traverse beyond the reference. In the case at hand, points out Mr. Dasgupta, the only issue, which had been raised before the learned Tribunal was whether the workmen concerned were entitled to receive any allowance as per Government of India letter, dated 17.2.1995, aforementioned and, hence the learned Tribunal could not have entered into the discussion of the contents of the Government of India’s letter, dated 20.4.1987, aforementioned. To this extent, submits Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Tribunal did err, but corrected itself by granting the N E allowance to the workmen ignoring the Government of India’s letter, dated 20.4.1987, and this finding of the learned Tribunal is, according to Mr. Dasgupta, valid, for, the management cannot discriminate between two classes of its employees and when the management had made available the allowance, in question, to the executive cadre of their employees, there was no reason why it could not be compelled to make similar allowance available to their workmen. The approach of the learned Tribunal may be faculty, but the ultimate decision is, according to Mr. Dasgupta, correct and valid and the same may not be interfered with.
12. Repelling the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, Mrs. Hazarika has contended that a writ of certiorari is issued not only when a judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunal acts without jurisdiction, but also when it acts in ignorance and/or disregard of the provisions of law. In the case at hand, reiterates Mrs. Hazarika, the learned Tribunal has passed the impugned award in flagrant disregard of the decision of the Apex Court in S. Vijay Kumar (supra). When the Supreme Court declares a law, submits Mrs. Hazarika, it is binding not only on those, who are parties to the case before the Apex Court, but also on those, who are governed by the law laid down by the Apex Court. Any deviation, if permitted, will be, contends Mrs. Hazarika, contrary to the settled position of law as has been clarified by the Apex Court in U P Pollution Control Board and Ors. v. Kanoria Industrial Tribunal Ltd. and Anr., (2001) 2 SCC 549.
13. It is also submitted by Mrs. Hazarika that the impugned direction by the learned Tribunal is in total violation of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dr. Rajiv Sarwl, (1999) 9 SCC 240, wherein the Apex Court has held that the proper course is to interpret the Rule and apply the same and relaxation cannot be read into a provision, where there is none and that one wrong decision cannot become a precedent for others.
14. Mrs. Hazarika has also contended that when the reference is so worded that the Tribunal finds that before reaching an effective decision on the issue raised by the reference, decision has to be given on an incidental issue, the Tribunal is bound to decide such incidental issue. In the case at hand, points out Mrs. Hazarika, since workman were entitled to the NE Allowance and this decision depended on the decision on the question as to whether the workmen had All India Transfer Liability, the learned Tribunal was bound to decide the question, so raised, and by deciding this question, the learned Tribunal did not err at all. Where the learned Tribunal erred was, according to Mrs. Hazarika its ultimate decision on the issue raised under the reference.
15. Reliance has been placed by Mrs. Hazarika, in support of her above submissions, on the decision, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 695 (M. D. A. P. Sate Road Transport Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal Ramkote, Hyderabad and Ors), (2001) 2 SCC 87 (J. K. Synthetics v. Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra and Ors.) and 1988 Supp (SCC) 768 (Calcutta Port Shramik Union v. Calcutta Transport Association and Ors.).
16. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the materials on record, what attracts my eyes, most prominently, is that the reference, which was made to the learned Tribunal, warranted the learned Tribunal to determine whether the workmen, who have All India Transfer Liability and are residents of NE Region, were entitled to the NE Allowance as per the Government of India, letter dated 17.2.1995, aforementioned.
17. In view of the fact that the policy letter on the basis of which the workmen had demanded the NE Allowance had used the expression “All India Transfer Liability”, it was incumbent on the part of the learned Tribunal to determine as to what the “All India Transfer Liability” would means. Since it was the letter, dated 20.4.1987, aforementioned, which had clarified as to what the expression “All India Transfer Liability” would mean, the learned Tribunal was bound to consider this letter as a condition precedent before embarking upon the discussion on the question as to whether the workmen, in question, were entitled to the allowances claimed. When for taking a decision on a reference, the Tribunal or Labour Court is required to decide some issue as a condition, precedent, the decision on such an issue, which forms condition precedent for decision of the reference, cannot be said to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or Labour Court, as the case may be. Reliance, therefore, placed by Mrs. Hazarika on MD, AP State Road “Transport Corporation (supra) is not misplaced inasmuch as the Apex Court has made it clear in this case that when the reference is so worded as to cover the conditions of service, the Tribunal is competent to look the conditions of services as a whole. Similarly, in J. K. Synthetics (supra), which Mrs. Hazarika relies upon, the Apex Court has clarified that while considering the reference as to whether retrenchment was bona fide, it was essential for the Tribunal to decide if the closure of the Industry was bona fide. To the same effect is the indication given by the Apex Court in Calcutta Port Shramik Union (supra), wherein it has been reiterated that incidental question may have to be decided by the Tribunal before giving a decision on the issue under reference.
18. I have, therefore, no reservation in holding that the learned Tribunal was wholly justified in taking into consideration the policy letter, dated 20.7.1987, aforementioned before deciding the question as to whether the employees were entitled to the allowances, which they had sought for.
19. Now, coming to the question as to whether the learned Tribunal committed any error in awarding the allowances to the employees concerned, it is of utmost importance to note that there is no dispute before me that the NE allowance in terms of the policy letter, dated, 20.4.1987, has been held by the Apex Court to be applicable only to those persons, who have All India Transfer Liability and come to the NE Region on posting and that this policy cannot be applied to the class of persons, who are residents of NE Region.
20. In the face of the above decision, it cannot be questioned as to whether All India Transfer Liability, in the context of the NE Allowance, will apply to the workmen, who are the residents of NE Region or “not nor was it contended, I notice, even before the learned Tribunal that the decision in S. Vijay Kumar (supra) did not cover, or was not applicable to, the case of the workmen. The learned Tribunal also, it clearly transpires from the impugned award, having been confronted with the situation that the workmen concerned do not fall within the ambit of the definition of the expression “All India Transfer Liability” has not held nor could it have legally held that the NE Allowance under the letter, dated 17.2.1995, aforementioned can be made available to the workmen, who are residents of NE Region. What the learned Tribunal has held is to the effect that since the allowance has been made available by the management to the employees of the executive cadre similar financial benefits should have been made available to the workmen for maintaining industrial peace. Can this approach of the learned Tribunal be held to be correct? The answer to this vital question has been succinctly given by the Apex Court in Chandigarh Administration (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held that the mere fact that an authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated cannot be a ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea discrimination if the order in favour of other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case. Nothing that the High Courts in exercise of their writ jurisdiction have been passing orders, as has been done by the learned Tribunal in the present case, to remove discrimination and thereby asking the authorities concerned to repeat the illegality, the Apex Court has expressed is anxiety on such approach and has laid down the position of law in Chandigarh Administration (supra) in the following words :
“8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal I unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat the illegality over again and again. The illegal/ unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law-indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders, in accordance with law – but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/ order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners’ case is similar to the other persons’ case. But then why examine another person’s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person’s case, which other person is not before the case not is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course – barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order of action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises).”
(Emphasis is added)
21. Coupled with the above, it is also worth noticing that in the case of U.P Pollution Control Board (supra) the Supreme Court has clearly held that when it declares a law, its judgment would be binding on all and not only on those, who are parties before the Court, for, to do so, in the words of the Apex Court, is to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution.
22. In the face of the law laid down in V P Pollution Control Board (supra), there can be no escape from the conclusion that the decision of the Apex Court in S. Vijay Kumar (supra) binding and govern the case of the workmen of the Corporation and since NE Allowance cannot, according to the Apex Court, be made available to the residents of NE Region, the learned Tribunal could not have, in the face of the law so clearly laid down in Chandigarh Administration (supra), directed the petitioner to act contrary to the relevant policy decision and make available such allowance to the workmen merely on the ground that the Corporation’s employees, who fall under the executive category, were availing such allowances. In short, when the workmen were not entitled to the allowance, the question of giving them such allowance with the idea of removing discrimination in the name of maintaining industrial peace could not have arisen at all.
23. It is also of immense importance to note that the said Corporation is under the administrative control of the Department of Heavy Industry and the policy of the Government are binding on the said Corporation. Since the employees were claiming allowances under a policy of the Government of India, they could not have demanded the advantages of such a policy ignoring the conditions under which the policy could have been applied.
24. With regard to the above, the may also be noted that according to the decision in Dr. Rajiv Sarwal (supra), the relaxation cannot be read into a provision, where the mandate of rules are otherwise. Hence, an exception, which was wrongly made by the said Corporation in favour of their employees of the executive category, could not have been directed to be repeated in the case of workmen too. Such a direction would invite perpetuation of a wrong. Mrs. Hazarika is, therefore, not wrong when she contends that two wrongs cannot make one right.
25. Coming to the decision in Roshan Deen (supra), relied upon by Mr. B. C. Das, it needs to be noted that there is no doubt that the Apex Court has held in this case that even where justice is the by product of an erroneous interpretation of law, High Court ought not to wipe out such justice in the same of correcting the error of law. This case was a case of its own peculiar nature and in the case, the legislative protections conferred on an injured workman and the decision of the Apex Court in United Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 581 had been ignored by the High Court in the name of correcting an erroneous view of law. The Apex Court was, therefore, constrained to remark, “he sidelined the legislative mandate and by passed the binding decision and proceeded to overturn the correct decision rendered by the Commissioner.”
26. The present one is not such a case, where the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Roshan Deen case (supra) requires giving of the NE Allowances to the workmen ; rather, the law laid down by the Apex Court, in the light of the decision in S. Vijay Kumar (supra) is otherwise.
27. In the case of M/s J. K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. (supra) relied upon by Mr. Das, the Apex Court has broadly discussed the concept of social justice in the realm of industrial law. In this regard, the Apex Court has held that industrial disputes are settled by industrial adjudication on principles of fair play and justice. I notice nothing in this decision to show that in the name of doing social justice, courts are required to ignore the law laid down by the Apex Court and set at naught thereby the law declared by the Apex Court.
28. Similarly, in the case of Air India Statutory Corpn. (supra), the Apex Court has held that social justice and equality are complementary to each other so that both should maintain their vitality and that the Rule of law is a potent instrument of social justice to bring about equality in results. It is to my mind, Cannot be disputed that while doing justice or while making two groups of persons stand on the same footing, the law does not permit a Tribunal to act contrary to the law, which the Apex Court lays down.
29. The law laid down in M/s Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (supra), which Mr. Das relied upon, does not apply to the facts of the present case and I do not see that this decision in any way helps the case of the respondents, particularly, in the face of the law clearly laid down by the Apex Court in S. Vijay Kumar (supra) and Reserve Bank of India (supra).
30. Far from what Mr. Das has endeavoured to canvas, the Apex Court in the case of T.C. Basappa (supra) has, I notice, laid down that writ of certiorari is generally granted, when a Court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and that an error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari, but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law.
31. In view of the fact that the learned Tribunal has passed the impugned award in disregard of the law laid down by the Apex Court in S. Vijay Kumar (supra) in the name of removing discrimination and maintaining industrial peace, it is an error apparent on the face of the record and this Court is duty bound to correct this error by issuing a writ of certiorari.
32. The fall out of the above discussions is that this writ petition must succeed and the impugned award must be set aside.
33. In the result, and for the reasons discussed above, the writ petition succeeds. The impugned award shall accordingly stand set aside and quashed. No order as to costs.