PETITIONER: HOTA VENKATA SURYA SIVARAMA SASTRY Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/04/1961 BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS MUDHOLKAR, J.R. CITATION: 1967 AIR 71 1962 SCR (2) 535 ACT: Abolition of Estates-Enactment providing for State taking over estates by notification-Part of estate outside the operation of enactment -Legislation extending its operation- Notifications in respect of estate, each part separately- Legality -,Madras Scheduled Areas Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Regulation, 1951 (Regulation 4 of 1951), S. 2-Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras 26 of 1948), ss. 1(4), 3, 25. HEADNOTE: The areas in question which were parts of two estates belonging to the appellants, called Gangole A and Gangole C, were situated in what was known as the Godavari Agency tract which was governed by the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874. By s. 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, no Act of the Provincial Legislature was applicable to certain areas in which the Godavari Agency was included, unless the Governor by public 536 notification so directed. The Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, was enacted in 1948, and on August 15, 1950, the Government of Madras issued a notification under s. 1(4) Of the Act by which, among other estates, Gangole A and Gangole C in their entirety were purported to be taken over, specifying September 7, 195o, as the date on which the vesting was to take place. But as no action as contemplated by s. 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, had been taken to render the Madras Act of 1948 applicable to the Godavari Agency tract, only parts of the Gangole estates were within the operation of that Act, while there were portions of the estates which were outside its purview and operation. When this legal situation was noticed another notification was issued on September 5, 1950, by which the areas in question were excluded from the scope of the notification dated August 15, 1950. In exercise of the power under para 5(2) Of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, Madras Regulation IV of 1951 was passed on September 8, 1951 by which, inter alia, the Act Of 1948 was made applicable to the areas in which the two Gangole estates were situate with retrospective effect from April 19, 1949. On January 14, 1953, the Government of Madras issued a notification vesting those portions of the Gangole estates to which the Act Of 1948 was extended. The appellants challenged the legality of the notification on the ground that the various provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, showed that the Act contemplated the taking over of estates as a unit and not in parts, while what the Government had done in the present case was to deal with the two estates of Gangole A and Gangole C as if each one of them were really two estates, one that which lay in the Godavari Agency tract and the other outside that area, and had issued notifications in respect of these units separately. Held, that the first notification dated August 15, 1950, as modified by that dated September 5, 1950, was valid and effective in law to vest the portion of the estate to which it related in the State Government. Held further, that the notification dated January 14, 1953, was equally valid. The action taken by the Government in issuing the said notification was in conformity with the scheme of the Act of 1948 that the entirety of the estate should be taken over. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 646 and 647
of 1960.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated
January 28, 1958, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ
Appeals Nos. 149 and 150 of 1957.
537
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. Satyanarayana, for the
appellants.
A. Ranganatham Chetty, S. V. P. Venkatappayya Sastri and
T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1961. April 28. The Judgment of the Court was A delivered
by
AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals are by special leave of this
Court and arise out of orders of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh dismissing two writ petitions filed before it by the
respective appellants in the
two appeals.
On January 14, 1953, the Government of Madras issued a
notification reading, to quote only the material words, “in
exercise of the powers conferred by s. 1(4) of the Madras
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948
(Madras Act XXVI of 1948), read with s. 2 of the Madras
Scheduled Areas Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Regulation, 1951:
“The Governor of Madras hereby appoints the
4th of February 1953, as the date on which the
provisions of the said Act shall come into
force in the Estates in the Scheduled Areas of
the West Godavari District which are specified
in the schedule below:-”
and the schedule set out inter alia:
“1. Agency Area of Gangole ‘A’ Estate,
consisting of 2
3. Agency Area of Gangole’C’ Estate,
consisting of…. ”
It is the legality of this notification that is impugned by
the two appellants who are the proprietors respectively of
Gangole ‘A’ and Gangole ‘C’ estates. The two writ petitions
by the appellants which were numbered respectively 28 and 29
of 1953 were dismissed by the learned Single-Judge of the
Andhra High Court and appeals under the Letters Patent filed
against this common judgment were also dismissed by the
learned Judges of that Court. An application for the grant
of a certificate was also dismissed but this
538
Court having granted special leave to the appellants, the’
matter is now before us.
The Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act, 1948, to which we shall refer as the Abolition Act, was
a piece of legislation of the State enacted to effect reform
in land tenures and landholding by the elimination of
intermediaries. In line with similar legislation in the
rest of the country, the interests of intermediaries-of
three categories-the estates of Zamindars, of undertenure
holders and of Inamdars were enabled to be vested in
Government on the publication of a notification to that
effect, compensation being provided for such taking over.
The entire legal difficulties in the case of the Gangole ‘A’
and IC’ estates which were admittedly Zamindaris arise out
of the fact that a small portion of each of them is situated
in what is known as the Godavari Agency tract. This Agency
area was originally included as part of the Scheduled
District of the Madras Presidency under the Scheduled
Districts Act XIV of 1874.
When the Godavari Agency was governed by the Scheduled
Districts Act, 1874, the Madras Legislature enacted the
Madras Estates Land Act (Act 1 of 1908), which was in force
from July 1, 1908. This enactment regulated the rights of,
inter alia, the proprietors of zamindari estates and the
ryots and tenants who cultivated the lands included in the
estates. Though, some argument was raised in the High
Court, disputing the operation of the Estates Land Act to
the Godavari Agency tracts, it has not been repeated before
us. That Act on its terms applied to the entire Presidency
of Madras and in view of a catena of decisions of the Madras
High Court starting from the judgment of Muthuswami Iyer, J.
in Chakrapani v. Varahalamma (1), on the construction of s.
4 of the Scheduled Districts Act XIV of 1874, the contention
was hardly tenable and was therefore properly abandoned.
The position therefore was that the entirety of the lands
and villages forming Gangole ‘A’ and IC’ were governed by
the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
(1) (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 227.
539
and were “estates” within the meaning of that enactment. In
this situation the Government of India Act, 1935, came into
force on April 1, 1937. Under its provisions the Godavari
Agency was included in the territory classified as
“partially excluded areas” under s. 91 of the Act. The laws
applicable to the “partially excluded areas” and their
administration was governed by s. 92 which enacted:
“92(1) The executive authority of a Province
extends to excluded and partially excluded
areas therein, but, notwithstanding anything
in this Act, no Act of the Federal Legislature
or of the Provincial Legislature, shall apply
to an excluded area or a partially excluded
area, unless the Governor by public
notification so directs; and the Governor in
giving such direction with respect to any Act
may direct that the Act shall in its
application to the area, or to any specified
part thereof, have effect subject to such
exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit.
(2) The Governor may make regulations for
the peace and good government of any area in
a Province which is for the time being an
excluded area, or a partially excluded area,
and any regulations so made may repeal or
amend any Act of the Federal Legislature or of
the Provincial Legislature, or any existing
Indian law, which is for the time being
applicable to the area in question.
Regulations made under this sub-section shall
be submitted forthwith to the Governor-General
and until assented to by him in his discretion
shall have no effect, and the provisions of
this Part of this Act with respect to the
power of His Majesty to disallow Acts shall
apply in relation to any such regulations
assented to by the Governor-General as they
apply in relation to Acts of a Provincial
Legislature assented to by him.
(3) The Governor shall, as respects any area
in a Province which is for the time being an
excluded area, exercise his functions in his
discretion.”
We shall be pointing out a little later, the interconnection
between the Estates Land Act, 1908 and
540
the Abolition Act, but for the present narrative it is
sufficient to state that when the Abolition Act was enacted
in 1948, it could not of its own force, apply to the
‘partially excluded areas’ and no action as contemplated by
s. 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was taken to
render that Act applicable to that area. The result was
that only a part of Gangole ‘A’ and ‘C’ were within the
operation of the Abolition Act, while there were portions of
each of the estates which were outside its purview and
operation.
This legal situation was however not noticed and under the
wrong impression that the Abolition Act was in operation in
the Godavari Agency also, the Government of Madras issued on
August 15, 1950, a notification under s. 1(4) of the
Abolition Act by which, among other estates, the entirety of
Gangole estate ‘A’ and Gangole estate ‘C’ were purported to
be taken over, and specifying September 7, 1950, as the date
on which the vesting was to take place. Before the latter
date, however, the error was noticed and in consequence
another notification was issued on the 5th of September by
which the villages and hamlets lying in the “partially
excluded areas” of Gangole estate ‘A’ and Gangole estate IC’
were excluded from the scope of the notification dated
August 15,1950. Thereafter the question of the extension of
the Abolition Act to the “partially excluded areas” was
taken on hand. By that date, it would be seen, the Consti-
tution had come into force and the law applicable to areas
like the Godavari Agency was provided for by Art. 244 read
with the Sch. V to the Constitution. Art. 244(1) enacted:
“The provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall
apply to the administration and control of the
Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any
State other than the State of Assam.”
As regards the law applicable to the Scheduled Areas, the
relevant provision is that contained in paragraph 5 of that
Schedule of which the material portions are:
“5. Law applicable to Scheduled Areas-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this
Constitution, the Governor may by public
notification
541
direct that any particular Act of Parliament
or of the Legislature of the State shall riot
apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof
in the State or shall apply to a Scheduled
Area or any part thereof in the State subject
to such exceptions and modifications as he may
specify in the notification and any direction
given under this sub-paragraph may be given so
as to have retrospective effect.
(2) The Governor may make regulations for
the peace and good government of any area in
a State which is for the time being a
Scheduled Area.
(3) In making any such regulation as is
referred to in subparagraph (2) of this
paragraph, the Governor may repeal or amend
any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of
the State or any existing law which is for the
time being applicable to the area in
question.”
In exercise of the power under paragraph 5(2) of the Fifth
Schedule, Madras Regulation IV of 1951 was passed on
September 8, 1951. The territorial extent of its operation
extended to certain areas specified in the Schedule, which
included the areas in the Godavari district in which the two
Gangole estates were situate and by its operative provisions
the Abolition Act together with the amendments effected to
it, were made applicable to these areas with retrospective
effect from April 19, 1949. The Abolition Act having thus
been extended to that part of the Gangole ‘A’ and Gangole
‘C’ estates which lay within “the Scheduled area” the
Government of Madras issued the impugned notification
vesting those portions of the estate to which the Act was
extended by Regulation IV of 1951. As stated earlier, it is
the validity of this last notification and the vesting
effected thereunder of those portions of Gangole ‘A’ and
Gangole ‘C’ which lay within the Scheduled area that is
alone challenged in the appeals before us.
The notification was impugned on several grounds, all of
which were rejected by the High Court. Several 69
542
of them have been put forward before us, though not all of
them with equal emphasis. Before however adverting to them
it might be convenient to set out the relevant statutory
provisions which bear upon the points urged. The long title
of the Abolition Act states:
“Whereas it is expedient to provide for the
repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the
acquisition of the rights of landholders not
permanently settled and certain other estates
in the Province of Madras
“……… It is hereby enacted as follows:”
Section 1(3) defining the extent of its application runs:
“It applies to all estates as defined in
section 3, clause (2), of the Madras Estates
Land Act, 1908, except inam villages which
became estates by virtue of the Madras Estates
Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.”
Section 2 which is the definition section provides by sub-s.
(1):
“(1) All expressions defined in the Estates
Land Act shall have the same respective
meanings as in that Act with the
modifications, if any, made by this Act.”
and sub-s. (3) provides:
“(3) ‘estate’ means a zamindari or an under-
tenure or an inam estate.”
and sub-s. (4) of this section defines
‘Estates Land Act’ to mean “the Madras Estates
Land Act, 1908.”
Having regard to these provisions it is
necessary to refer to the terms of the Estates
Land Act to which one is directed by s. 1(2)
of the Abolition Act. Section 3 (2) of the
Estates Land Act defines “an estate” as
meaning:
“3 (2)(a) any permanently-settled estate or
temporarily-settled zamindari,
(b) any portion of such permanently-settled
estate or temporarily-settled zamindari which
is separately registered in the office of the
Collector;
(c)
(d)
(e)
543
We shall now proceed to deal with the several points raised,
though except one all the others do not merit any serious
consideration and have been properly rejected by the High
Court. The first point urged was that the Polavaram
zamindari the parent estate from which the Gangole estate
was, by successive sub-divisions, separated-was not “a
permanently settled estate” because the’ Madras Permanent-
Settlement Regulation XXV of 1802 was excluded from its
application to Scheduled districts by the Laws Local Extent
Act, 1874. In our opinion, the High Court has rightly
rejected this contention, because even if the Madras
Permanent-Settlement Regulation did not apply, there could
be no dispute that the Polavaram zamindari was “a
permanently settled estate”, because its peishcush was fixed
and from the kabuliyat which was executed by the proprietor
it is clear that it conforms to the pattern of the sanads
and kabuliyats issued under the Madras Permanent-Settlement
Regulation.
Though before the High Court it was urged that on the issue
of the notification on August 15, 1950, under s. 1(4) of the
Abolition Act the power of the State Government was
exhausted and that they were thereafter incompetent to issue
any further notification under the same Act, this contention
which entirely lacks substance was not seriously urged.
It was next contended that Regulation IV of 1951 was invalid
as having outstepped the limits of the legislation permitted
by paragraphs 5(1) and (2) of the Fifth Schedule to the
Constitution. It was said that if the Governor desired to
enact a law with retrospective effect it must be a law
fashioned by himself, but that if he applied to the
Scheduled areas a law already in force in the State, he
could not do so with retrospective effect. Reduced to
simple terms, the contention merely amounts to this that the
Governor should have repeated in this Regulation the terms
of the Abolition Act but that if he referred merely to the
title of the Act he could not give retrospective effect to
its provisions over the area to which it was being applied.
It is obvious that this contention was correctly negatived
by the High Court.
544
We shall now proceed to deal with the only point put forward
by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri which, we have said, merits serious
consideration, though it must be said that it was not
presented in the same form before the learned Judges of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The, argument was as follows:
The Madras Estates Land Act of 1908, admittedly applied to
the entire estate of Gangole-including that portion of the
estate which was in the Scheduled area which, in the
phraseology employed by the Government of India Act, was “a
partially excluded area.” Gangole ‘A’, Gangole ‘B’and
Gangole’C’ had been subdivided and had been separately
registered. Each one of them was therefore a unit-each one
was itself “an estate” within s. 3(2)(b) of the Estates Land
Act, 1908, being “a portion of a permanently-settled
estate …………….. which is separately registered in
the office of the Collector.” The Abolition Act contemplates
the taking over of “estates” as a unit and not in parts.
The entire scheme of the Abolition Act is based upon this
principle which would be upset if it were held that the
Government in issuing notifications under s. 1(4) of the
Abolition Act could take over portions merely of such units.
When a notification is issued under s. 1(4) its legal
consequences are set out in s. 3 which reads:
“With effect on and from the notified date and
save as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act (the saving does not cover anything
material for the present purpose)-
(a)
(b) the entire estate (including all
communal lands; porambokes; other non-ryoti
lands; ) shall stand transferred to the
Government and vest in them, free of all
encumbrances…….”
The provisions of the Act determining the amount of
compensation are related to the sum payable in respect of
the entirety of the estate, for ss. 24 and 25 enact:
“24. The compensation payable in respect of
an estate shall be determined in accordance
with the following provisions.”
545
“25. The compensation shall be determined for
the estate as a whole, and not separately for
each of the interests therein.”
The mode of computation of the compensation amount for which
provision is made in ss. 27 to 30 all proceed on the basis
that it is the entire estate that is taken over and not a
portion merely of the estate. All these, taken together,
would point to the scheme of the Act contemplating the
entire estate being taken over. On that scheme he urged
that it would not be possible to work out the compensation
payable for separate portions of an estate, for instance for
one village out of the several which might be comprised in
an estate, The claims by the proprietor against the
Government for compensation, as well as the determination of
disputes inter se between claimants to the compensation
amount, he pointed out, all proceed on the basis that the
entire estate as a unit was taken over by notification under
s. 1(4).
On these premises Mr. Viswanatha Sastri submitted that what
the Government had done in the present case was to deal with
the two estates of Gangole ‘A’ and Gangole ‘C’ each of which
was a unit, as if each one of them were really two estates-
one that which lay in the Agency tract, and the other
outside that area-and had issued notifications in respect of
these units piece-meat which was not contemplated and
therefore not permitted under the Abolition Act. He further
pointed out that if the original notification dated August
15, 1950, stood without the “denotification” effected by the
notification dated September 5, 1950, there might be a valid
vesting by reason of the retrospective operation of
Regulation IV of 1951. Similarly if the impugned
notification of 1953, had. included not merely that portion
of the estate of Gangole ‘A’ and Gangole ‘C’ which were
within the Scheduled areas but the entirety of the two
estates, that notification would not have been open to chal-
lenge. But the point urged was that it was only by the
combined operation of (1) the notification dated August 15,
1956, as modified by that dated September 5, 1950, and (2)
the notification dated January 14,
546
1953, that the entirety of the two “estates” was taken over
and that this rendered the second notification invalid
because it had taken over only a portion of the estate.
Learned Counsel, no doubt, conceded that the taking over of
those portions of Gangole ‘A’ and Gangole ‘C’ which were
within the operation of the Abolition Act before its
extension to the Scheduled areas not having been challenged,
he would not be entitled to any relief in respect of the
portion of the estate covered by the first notification, but
his argument was that would not preclude him from disputing
the validity of the last notification vesting those portions
of the two estates which were within the Scheduled areas in
the State.
We shall now proceed to consider the tenability of these
submissions. We might premise the discussion by observing
that learned Counsel is right in his submission that the
Abolition Act does not contemplate or make provision for the
taking over of particular portions only of estates and that
if the-State Government having power to take over the
entirety of an estate chose, however, to exclude certain
portions of it from the operation of a vesting notification
and took over only defined portions of an estate, this could
be open to serious challenge on the ground that it was not
contemplated by the scheme of the enactment. But the
acceptance of this principle does not, in our opinion,
compel us to answer the question pro. pounded by the learned
Counsel for the appellants in his favour.
To start with, it might be pointed out that it looks
somewhat anomalous that learned Counsel who strongly urges
that the scheme of the Act contemplates the taking over only
of the entirety of an estate and not of a portion thereof,
should resist a taking over which, if effective, would
result in the entire estate vesting in the Government and
the compensation being determined according to the rules
laid down by the Act, whereas it is the invalidation of the
impugned notification that would result in a partial or
piece-meal taking over, to the disadvantage of the
proprietors to which learned Counsel very properly drew our
attention.
547
As already pointed out learned Counsel’s submission was that
not merely the notification dated -January 14, 1953, but
also the earlier one dated August 15, 1950 (as modified by
the one dated September 5, 1950) was invalid as providing
for vesting of parts only of an “estate” and not of it as a
unit. It would also follow that if the first notification
dated August 15, 1950, was valid, the impugned notification
which by its operation effected the vesting of the entirety
of the estate in the State could not be open to challenge as
violating the principle invoked by learned Counsel.
We are necessarily therefore driven to consider the validity
of the first notification dated August 15, 1950, in dealing
with the validity of the impugned notification of January
14, 1953. In considering this matter it is necessary to
recall some of the provisions of the Abolition Act. Section
2(3) defines “an estate” as meaning, inter alia, a
“zamindari estate”. No doubt, as stated already, where the
Abolition Act operates over the whole of “a zamindari
estate”, it does not contemplate the Government taking over
a portion only of such “estate”. But in saying this it
should not be assumed that if in respect of a single estate
two notifications were issued, say on the same date which
together vested the entirety of the “estate” in the State
under s. 3, either notification or both together would be
invalid or ineffective. The reason for this must obviously
be that the intention of the Government was to take over the
entire estate-though it was being given effect to by the
issue of two notifications. That would not obviously be the
same thing as the Government having the liberty to pick and
choose certain of the villages or certain portions of an
estate leaving out others. If the Abolition Act as enacted
does not ‘extend to the entirety of an “estate” as defined
in the Estates Land Act but only to a portion thereof, the
question would be whether that portion of “the estate” which
is within the operation of the Act is “an estate” within the
meaning of the Act or not. On this matter there are two
views possible: (1) that having regard to the Abolition Act
referring to and as it were incorporating the provisions of
the
548
Madras Estates Land Act, the “estates” to which the
Abolition Act could apply are only those which being
“Estates” within the Estates Land Act, are also wholly
within the operation of the Abolition Act. In other words,
even if a few acres of an “estate” as defined in the Estates
Land Act were outside the operation of the Abolition Act, it
would not be an “estate” which could be taken over. (2) The
other view attributing a crucial value to the policy and
purpose underlying the legislation, viz., a reform of land
tenures and landholding by the elimination of intermediaries
to treat any land held on the tenures specified and within
the territorial operation of the Act as falling within the
category of “estates” liable to be taken over and vested in
Government. We consider that the latter view is to be
preferred as being in accord with the intention of the law
and as subserving its purposes. In this connection it
cannot be overlooked that the entire argument of learned
Counsel is built up on the definitions of an “estate” in s.
2 of the Abolition Act (read with s. 1(3) of that Act), and
that the definitions contained there could be applied on the
terms of the opening words of that section only “unless
there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.” The
position could possibly be better explained in these terms:
Assume that Regulation IV of 1951 was not enacted. Could
the State Government take over that portion of the “estate”
which was within the operation of the Abolition Act or does
the definition of “an estate” and the reference s. 1(3) to
s. 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908 preclude the
State from taking over that portion because the Act does not
extend to the entirety of the “estate”? It appears to us
that this question is capable of being answered only in one
way, viz., that the definition of “an estate” in the
Abolition Act must be limited to that portion of an “estate”
which is within the operation of the Act. Any other
construction would mean that if that Act did not apply to a
few square yards in an estate, it ceases to be an “estate”
governed by the Act, which, in our opinion, would be plainly
contrary to the intention of the enactment as
547
As already pointed out learned Counsel’s submission was that
not merely the notification dated -January 14, 1953, but
also the earlier one dated August 15, 1950 (as modified by
the one dated September 5, 1950) was invalid as providing
for vesting of parts only of an “estate” and not of it as a
unit. It would also follow that if the first notification
dated August 15, 1950, was valid, the impugned notification
which by its operation effected the vesting of the entirety
of the estate in the State could not be open to challenge as
violating the principle invoked by learned Counsel.
We are necessarily therefore driven to consider the validity
of the first notification dated August 15, 1950, in dealing
with the validity of the impugned notification of January
14, 1953. In considering this matter it is necessary to
recall some of the provisions of the Abolition Act. Section
2(3) defines “an estate” as meaning, inter alia, a
“zamindari estate”. No doubt, as stated already, where the
Abolition Act operates over the whole of “a zamindari
estate”, it does not contemplate the Government taking over
a portion only of such “estate”. But in saying this it
should not be assumed that if in respect of a single estate
two notifications were issued, say on the same date which
together vested the entirety of the “estate” in the State
under s. 3, either notification or both together would be
invalid or ineffective. The reason for this must obviously
be that the intention of the Government was to take over the
entire estate-though it was being given effect to by the
issue of two notifications. That would not obviously be the
same thing as the Government having the liberty to pick and
choose certain of the villages or certain portions of an
estate leaving out others. If the Abolition Act as enacted
does not extend to the entirety of an “estate” as defined in
the Estates Land Act but only to a portion thereof, the
question would be whether that portion of “the estate” which
is within the operation of the Act is “an estate” within the
meaning of the Act or not. On this matter there are two
views possible: (1) that having regard to the Abolition Act
referring to and as it were incorporating the provisions of
the
548
Madras Estates Land Act, the “estates” to which the
Abolition Act could apply are only those which being
“Estates” within the Estates Land Act, are also wholly
within the operation of the Abolition Act. In other words,
even if a few acres of an “estate” as defined in the Estates
Land Act were outside the operation of the Abolition Act, it
would not be an “estate” which could be taken over. (2) The
other view attributing a crucial value to the policy and
purpose underlying the legislation, viz., a reform of land
tenures and landholding by the elimination of intermediaries
to treat any land held on the tenures specified and within
the territorial operation of the Act as falling within the
category of “estates” liable to be taken over and vested in
Government. We consider that the latter view is to be
preferred as being in accord with the intention of the law
and as subserving its purposes. In this connection it
cannot be overlooked that the entire argument of learned
Counsel is built up on the definitions of an “estate” in s.
2 of the Abolition Act (read with s. 1(3) of that Act), and
that the definitions contained there could be applied on the
terms of the opening words of that section only ” unless
there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.” The
position could possibly be better explained in these terms:
Assume that Regulation IV of 1951 was not enacted. Could
the State Government take over that portion of the “estate”
which was within the operation of the Abolition Act or does
the definition of “an estate” and the reference s. 1(3) to
s. 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908 preclude the
State from taking over that portion because the Act does not
extend to the entirety of the “estate”? It appears to us
that this question is capable of being answered only in one
way, viz., that the definition of “an estate” in the
Abolition Act must-be limited to that portion of an “estate”
which is within the operation of the Act. Any other
construction would mean that if that Act did not apply to a
few square yards in an estate, it ceases to be an “estate”
governed by the Act, which, in our opinion, would be plainly
contrary to the intention of the enactment as
549
gathered from its preamble and operative provisions. Let us
suppose that instead of the problem created by a portion of
the estate being in a Scheduled area and therefore though
within the State outside the normal legislative power of the
State Legislature, a permanently settled estate had by
reason of say the State’s Reorganisation, fell both within
the territory of the Madras and the Andhra States, with the
result that the taking over under the Abolition Act could be
operative only in regard to that portion within the State of
Madras. Could it then be contended that the portion of the
estate within the State of Madras did not fall within the
definition of an estate and so could not be taken over by
notification under s. 1(4) of the Act. Indeed, the answer
of the learned Counsel for the appellants to such a question
was that it could be taken over but for the reason that in
such a case the portions outside the State territory could
not be an ” estate” within the Madras Estates Land Act at
all and that in consequence the inter-relation between the
unit constituting the estate under the Estates Land Act and
the concept of an “estate” under the Abolition Act was not
disrupted. But this, however, hardly suffices as a complete
answer, for even after a portion of the “estate” becoming
situated in a State other than Madras the State might still
be governed by the “Madras Estates Land Act”, though applied
as the law of tile new State. What is relevant in the
illustration is that along with the concept of the unit con-
stituting the “estate” being taken over, there is also
underlying it, another principle, viz., that it is
sufficient if the entirety of the estate over which the
State Legislature has competence is taken over. In such a
taking over the difficulty suggested by learned Counsel in
working out the scheme of the Act, would not arise because
the portion taken over will constitute the estate and the
compensation for that unit will be worked out on the basis
laid down in s. 24 and those following. The other portions
of the estate which are beyond the territorial operation of
the enactment would continue to remain unaffected, so that
the State
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550
Government could not be in a position to take them over.
We accordingly, consider that the first notification dated
August 15, 1950, apart from its being binding and not open
to challenge in these proceedings by the appellants, is
valid and effective in law to vest the portion to which it
related in the State Government. We then have Regulation IV
of 1951 which brought the other portion of the estate to
which the Abolition Act did not originally extend within the
operation of that enactment. If, after this change in the
law, the Government did not take over the rest of the
estate, it would be open to the objection that the State
Government had artificially split up the estate into two
parts and had taken over or rather retained in its
possession one part, and that notwithstanding that the Act
posited the unit constituting an estate being taken over,
had departed from that principle. The impugned notification
therefore far from being invalid, was necessary to be issued
in order to satisfy the very principle which learned Counsel
for the appellants submits-as the one underlying the scheme
of the Abolition Act.
We therefore hold that the challenge to the validity of the
impugned notification dated January 14, 1953, should be
repelled. We have thus reached the same conclusion as the
learned Judges of the High Court, though by a different line
of reasoning.
The appeals fail and are dismissed with cost–one set.
Appeals dismissed.
551