High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

I.J. Gandhi vs The Estate Officer And Ors. on 31 March, 2000

Punjab-Haryana High Court
I.J. Gandhi vs The Estate Officer And Ors. on 31 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: (2000) 125 PLR 756
Author: G Singhvi
Bench: G Singhvi, I Singh


ORDER

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1. In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has made the following substantive prayers:-

“i) summon complete record of the case, issue writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing orders Annexure P.4 and orders passed by District Judge, Chandigarh P.4.

ii) issue writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents (Chandigarh Administration) (Estate Officer) to consider the application filed by the petitioner Annexures P.1 in view of notification issued by Chandigarh Administration in Gazette dated 22.1.1993.”

2. The facts necessary for deciding the case are that S.C.F. No. 74, Sector 47-D, Chandigarh was sold by the Chandigarh Administration to the petitioner for restaurant purposes. However, after raising the building he leased it out to Punjab State Cooperative Bank Limited. The Assistant Estate Officer (exercising the powers of the Estate Officer), Union Territory, Chandigarh initiated proceedings under Section 8A of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (for short, ‘the 1952 Act’) for resumption of the site on the ground that the petitioner had violated the conditions of sale. Notices for resumption were severed upon him and Manager of the Punjab State Cooperative Bank Limited and they were given opportunity to produce evidence and of being heard in person on 23.7.1992, 23.9.1992 and 15.10.1992. After considering the submissions made by the general power of attorney of the petitioner and the representative of the Bank, the Assistant Estate Officer passed order dated 15.10.1992 for resumption of the site and forfeiture of 10% of the total premium. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer (exercising the powers of Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1971 Act’) initiated proceedings against the petitioner and the Punjab State Cooperative Bank Limited for their ejectment and vide order Annexure P.3 dated 29.3.1993, he directed their ejectment. The appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of eviction filed by the petitioner against the order of eviction was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Chandigarh.

3. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order of eviction and the judgment of the appellate authority on the ground that he was not given reasonable opportunity of hearing and the authorities concerned did not apply mind to the record of the case. He has also urged that the extreme step of resuming the site should not have been taken by the administration simply because he had changed the user of the site. In support of the last mentioned plea, he has relied on the decision of the Full Bench in Ram Puri v. Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh and Ors., (1982) 84 P.L.R. 388 (F.B.).

4. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 an objection has been raised to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has failed to avail the alternative remedies available to him under Section 10 of the 1952 Act. Respondent No. 1 has justified the resumption of the site sold to the petitioner on the ground that he was found guilty of having violated the conditions of sale. According to the said respondent, the conditions incorporated in the letter of sale were binding on the petitioner and, therefore, the action taken for resumption of the site on the allegation of violation of the conditions relating to use of the site is justified. The order of eviction passed under the 1971 Act has been justified on the premise that it is the logical necessary concomitant of the order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer.

5. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No. 3, it has been averred that the petitioner had let out the premises to the Bank without disclosing the fact that the site had been sold to him for restaurant purposes.

6. Shri G.S. Bhatia argued that even though the petitioner did not challenge the order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer, in view of the notification dated 22.1.1993 issued by the Chandigarh Administration under Section 4 of the 1952 Act, a direction may be issued to respondent No. 1 to consider the petitioner’s request for regularising the misuse of the site. He submitted that the his client is prepared to pay the prescribed charges and, therefore; there should be no difficulty in regularising the change of use of the site. On the other hand, Shri Nipun Mittal argued that the petitioner’s failure to seek invalidation of the order of resumption should be treated as sufficient for dismissal of the writ petition. He further submitted that the Court should not show any indulgence to a person like the petitioner who is guilty of violating the salutary provisions relating to the planned development of the city.

7. We have thoughtfully considered the respective submissions. The sale of building and commercial sites in Chandigarh is regulated by the provisions of the 1952 Act and the Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’). Section 8A of the 1952 Act which contains the provision for resumption and Rule 9 of the Rules which regulate the use of site or building read as under:-

“8-A. Resumption and forfeiture for breach of conditions of transfer- (1) If any transferee has failed to pay the consideration money or any instalment thereof an account of the sale of any site or building or both, under Section 3 or has committed a breach of any other conditions of such sale, the Estate Officer may, by notice in writing, call upon the transferee to show cause why an order of resumption of the site or building, or both, as the case may be, and forfeiture of the whole or any part of the money, if any, paid in respect thereof which in no case shall exceed ten per cent of the total amount of the consideration money, interest and other dues payable in respect of the sale of the site or building or both should not be made.

(2) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the transferee in pursuance of a notice under Sub-section (1) and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable, opportunity of being heard in the matter, the Estate Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, make an order resuming the site or building or both, as the case may be, so sold and directing the forfeiture as provided in Sub-section (1), of the whole or any part of the money paid in respect of such sale.

XXX XXX XXX

9. Use of Site or Building. [Section 22(2)(c)]. The transferee shall not use the site or building for a purpose other than that for which it has been sold to him. In the case of commercial or industrial sites and commercial or industrial buildings the transferee shall not carry on any trade or employ any industry other than that specified by the Estate Officer.

(2) Instead of specifying any particular trade or industry, the Estate Officer may specify that the transferee shall not carry on any trade or employ any industry other than General Trade, Semi Industrial Trade or Special Trade.

(3) The expression “General Trade”, “Semi-Industrial Trade” and “Special Trade” shall mean one or more of the trades, respectively mentioned in Parts A, B and C of the Schedule annexed to these rules and shall include any other trade which is not so mentioned provided that such other trade is similar to and carried on in the same fashion as mentioned in the respective part of the Schedule.”

8. A perusal of the provisions quoted above shows that the transferee of the site or building is not entitled to use it for the purpose other than that for which it was sold. In other words, the transferee is obliged to use the site for that very purpose for which it has been sold to him. In the case of commercial or industrial sites and commercial or industrial buildings, the transferee is prohibited from carrying on any trade or employ any industry other than that specified by the Estate Officer. The Schedule annexed with the Rules gives the details of what is included in “General Trade”, “Semi-Industrial Trade” and “Special Trade”. Part-A of the Schedule refers to “General Trade”, Part-B refers to “Semi-Industrial Trade: and Part-C makes a reference to “Special Trade”. They include any other trade which is not so mentioned in the Schedule provided that it is similar to and carried on in the same fashion as mentioned in the respective part of the Schedule. The restaurants fall in the category of “Special Trade” under Part C of the Schedule. The business in banking is not stipulated in any of the three parts of the Schedule, but in view of the language of Rule 9(3), the principle of ejusdem generis has to be applied for interpreting the various entries in the Schedule and if we do so, there is no escape from the conclusion that the banking would not fall in the category of “Special Trade” under Part 3 of the Schedule.

9. Admittedly, the lands and buildings are transferred subject to the conditions enumerated in the 1952 Act and the Rules and/or the letter of allotment and any one who violates those conditions makes himself/herself liable to be proceeded against under Section 8A of the 1952 Act. This is precisely what was done by the Assistant Estate Officer when he found that the petitioner had misused the site which was sold to him for restaurant purposes. The petitioner has not controverted the allegation of misuse of site. Therefore, we hold that the order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer does not suffer from any legal error justifying interference by this Court.

10. We are further of the opinion that the order passed under Section 5 of the 1971 Act cannot be invalidated because the basic of order for resumption of the site has not been challenged in the petition. It seems that the petitioner has deliberately omitted to challenge the order of resumption because he knew that such prayer would be rejected by the Court on the ground of his failure to avail the Statutory alternative remedies of appeal or revision under Section 10 of the 1952 Act. In any case, by issuing a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we cannot directly or indirectly tamper with the finality attached to the order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer.

11. In view of the above conclusion, we may have dismissed the petition but we refrain from doing so because.

(i) C.W.P. No. 11727 of 1993 filed by the petitioner’s tenant, i.e., Punjab State Co-operative Bank Limited was disposed of by this Court on 29.9.1998 with the following directions:

“(a) within two weeks from today, the petitioner shall file a written undertaking before the Assistant Estate Officer, exercising the powers of the Estate Officer, Union Territory, Chandigarh to vacate the misuse on or before September 29, 1999 and that it will not misuse the premises in future.

(b) In case the petitioner furnishes the required undertaking, the orders of resumption as well as ejectment and the judgment of the learned District Judge, Chandigarh, shall become inoperative, else the writ petition shall be deemed to have been dismissed and all the impugned orders shall stand revived automatically and respondents shall then be free to secure possession of the property in accordance with law and the petitioner shall not be entitled to claim compensation for damages, if any, suffered by it.”

(ii) the provisions contained in the notification, dated 22.1.1993 do provide for change of trade subject to the fulfilment of the conditions enumerated in para 2 of the said notification and, therefore, it will be appropriate to give liberty to the petitioner to make an application to the Chandigarh Administration for consideration of his request in terms of para 4 of the said notification.

12. Hence, we dispose of the writ petition in the following manner:

i) if the building has been vacated by the Bank in terms of the undertaking given on its behalf before the Court in C.W.P. No. 11727 of 1993, then the order of resumption shall be treated as inoperative;

ii) the petitioner may apply for change of trade in terms of the notification dated 22.1.1993. If his request is granted, then he may change the trade, else he shall continue to use the premises for restaurant purposes; and

iii) if the Bank has failed to act in accordance with the undertaking given before the Court or the petitioner’s application for change of trade is dismissed, then the resumption of the site shall stand revived automatically.