High Court Madras High Court

I. T. Uday Kumar vs The District Collector on 5 October, 2007

Madras High Court
I. T. Uday Kumar vs The District Collector on 5 October, 2007
       

  

  

 
 
        IN  THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

                    DATED : 05.10.2007
                            
                          CORAM
                            
     THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE  F.M. IBRAHIM KALIFULLA
                           and
          THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
                            
     W.P. Nos.8618 of 2006 and 4950, 8624 & 8625 of 2007 ,
     W.P.M.P. Nos.9583 of 2006 in W.P. No.8618 of 2006 ,
     M.P. No.1 of 2007 in W.P. No.8624 of 2007 ,
     M.P. No.1 of 2007 in W.P. No.8625 of 2007 
     And
     M.P. Nos.1 to 5 of 2007 in W.P. No.4950 of 2007



I. T. Uday Kumar               			..Petitioner in WP.8618/2006


        Vs.


1.  The District Collector
    Chennai District
    Singaravelar Maligai
    Rajaji Salai
    Chennai 1.

2.  The Tahsildar
    Mambalam Guindy Taluk
    K.K. Nagar
    Chennai 18.

3.  Pandia Raja Raja 
         Sri Maana Veera Vazha Naden Trust
    Rep. by Hereditary Managing Trustee 
    M.V.V.N. Arumuga Pandian.  			..Respondents in WP.8618/2006

    ( R3 impleaded as per the order
      dated  02.11.2006  by KSAJ in
      W.P.M.P. No.11455 of 2006  in
      Writ Petition No.8618 of 2006 )


II. Ravichandran            			..Petitioner in WP.4950/2007


           Vs.


1.  The Secretary
    Housing & Urban Development Department
    Government of Tamil Nadu
    Fort. St. George
    Chennai 9.

2.  The Secretary
    Public Works Department
    Fort St. George
    Chennai 9.

3.  The Secretary
    Health Department
    Fort St. George
    Chennai 9.

4.  The Managing Director
    Tamil Nadu Housing Board
    No.493
    Anna Salai
    Nandanam
    Chennai-35.

5.  The Commissioner
    Corporation of Chennai
    Rippon Buildings
    Chennai.

6.  The Member Secretary
    CMDA
    Thalamuthu Natrajan Maaligai
    Egmore
    Chennai 8.

7.  The Spl. Commissioner and 
           Commissioner of Land Administration
    Chepauk
    Chennai-5.

8.  The Collector
    Chennai Collectorate
    M.Singaravelar Maaligai
    Chennai 1.

9.  The District Revenue Officer
    Chennai District
    Chennai 1.

10. The Tahsildar
    Mambalam~Guindy Taluk
    Taluk Office
    Bharathidasan Colony
    K.K. Nagar
    Chennai 78.

11. T.Uday Kumar

12. A.B.Parthiban

13. A.Chidambaram

14. Archana Shekar

15. A.Kaliswamy

16. B.Sriram

17. Balamurugan Vaiyapuri Krishnan

18. D.Manjula

19. Dinesh Chandran

20. G.Kalaiarasi

21. K.R.Sreepriyan

22. Karthik R. Kalpat

23. M.Mani

24. M.R.Venkatesan

25. M.Shanmugha Sundaram

26. Manikandan Jagadeesan

27. Mujibur Rahiman

28. Nihas Eliasu Kunju

29. P. Babu

30. P.Giridhar

31. P.Kannan

32. P.Muthaiyan

33. P.Narayanaswami

34. P.R.Periyannan

35. P.Sasikumar

36. P.Soundaramourthy

37. P.Venkat Ramana Sarvanam

38. R. Krishna

39. R. Muthaiah

40. R. Ramesh

41. R.Sathish Kumar

42. R.Sridharan

43. R.Vivek  Kalyan

44. Ramamoorthy Sethukumar

45. Ravi Chandran

46. S. Anantha Babu

47. S. Ezhilarasan

48. S.Gopalan Srinivasan

49. S.Karthikeyan

50. S.Ramkumar

51. S.Srikanth

52. S.Subramanian

53. S.Thiruambalam

54. Sharmila Chokkalingam

55. Sivagami Venkatachalam

56. Srinivasu Nimmu

57. Sriram, N.C.

58. Subhadra Padmanaban

59. U.Anto Judes paul Raj

60. V.Sabari Prasad

61. V.Varadharajan

62. Vasanthakumar Murali

63. Vetri Vinayak

64. Vinod Venkatesan        			..Respondents in WP.4950/2007


     ( R12 to 64  impleaded   as  per suo motu
       order  dated 24.07.2007  by FMIKJ & STJ
       in W.P. Nos.4950, 8624 and 8625 of 2007 )




III. 1.T.Udayakumar            			..Petitioner in WP.8624/2007

IV. 2.Mr.Kimraj Sakariya          		..Petitioner in WP.8625/2007


             Vs.


1.  The Spl. Commissioner and
         Commissioner of Land Administration
    Chepuak
    Chennai 5.

2.  The District Revenue Officer
    Chennai District
    Chennai 1.

3.  The Tahsildar
    Guindy Mambalam Taluk
    K.K. Nagar
    Chennai 78.

4.  The Managing Director
    Tamil Nadu Housing Board
    Nandanam
    Chennai 35.

5.  Mr.M.V.V.N.Arumuga Pandian
 
6.  Mr.T.Chitrarasu

7.  Tmt.N.Saraswathy

8.  Tmt.Vijayalakshmi

9.  T.Nedunchezian

10. V.Tamilselvi

11. A.B.Parthiban

12. A.Chidambaram

13. Archana Shekar

14. A.Kaliswamy

15. B.Sriram

16. Balamurugan Vaiyapuri Krishnan

17. D.Manjula

18. Dinesh Chandran

19. G.Kalaiarasi

20. K.R.Sreepriyan

21. Karthik R. Kalpat

22. M.Mani

23. M.R.Venkatesan

24. M.Shanmugha Sundaram

25. Manikandan Jagadeesan

26. Mujibur Rahiman

27. Nihas Eliasu Kunju

28. P. Babu

29. P.Giridhar

30. P.Kannan

31. P.Muthaiyan

32. P.Narayanaswami

33. P.R.Periyannan

34. P.Sasikumar

35. P.Soundaramourthy

36. P.Venkat Ramana Sarvanam

37. R. Krishna

38. R. Muthaiah

39. R. Ramesh

40. R.Sathish Kumar

41. R.Sridharan

42. R.Vivek  Kalyan

43. Ramamoorthy Sethukumar

44. Ravi Chandran

45. S. Anantha Babu

46. S. Ezhilarasan

47. S.Gopalan Srinivasan

48. S.Karthikeyan

49. S.Ramkumar

50. S.Srikanth

51. S.Subramanian

52. S.Thiruambalam

53. Sharmila Chokkalingam

54. Sivagami Venkatachalam

55. Srinivasu Nimmu

56. Sriram, N.C.

57. Subhadra Padmanaban

58. U.Anto Judes paul Raj

59. V.Sabari Prasad

60. V.Varadharajan

61. Vasanthakumar Murali

62. Vetri Vinayak

63. Vinod Venkatesan                		..Respondents in WP.8624 & 8625/2007

	( R11 to R63 impleaded as per suo motu 
	  order dated 24.7.2007 by FMIKJ & STJ  
 	  in W.P. No.4950, 8624 & 8625 of 2007 )





Prayer in W.P.No.8618 of 2006:

           Writ  Petition filed under the Article 226  of
the  Constitution of India to issue a Writ of  Certiorari
calling  for  the  records of the impugned order   issued
by    the    second   respondent   in   her   proceedings
A1/3223/2004/2004, dated 24.3.2006 and quash the same.


Prayer in W.P.No.4950 of 2007:

           Writ petition filed  under the Article 226  of
the  Constitution  of India  to issue a Writ of  Mandamus
directing the respondents 1 to 4 hereinto clear, maintain
and  construct  a General Hospital  in the site earmarked
for  Government Peripheral Hospital in T.S.No.14 of Block
No.129, Kodambakkam Village,  Mambalam-Guindy Taluk.

Prayer in W.P.Nos.8624 and 8625 of 2007:

           Writ petitions filed under the Article 226  of
the  Constitution of India to issue  a Writ of Certiorari
calling  for  the records   of the  1st   respondent   in
proceedings   D.Dis.K4/23586/06,  dated   28.2.2007   and
quash the same.



For petitioner in W.P. No.4950 of 2007  :  

	: 	Mr.A.L.Somayaji, Senior Counsel, for  Mr.M.S.Ramesh

For petitioner in W.P. No.8624  of 2007 :  

	:	Mr.R.Krishnamurthy, Senior Counsel, for 
                M/s.Anand  Abdul and Vinodh Associates

For petitioner in W.P. No.8625 of 2007 :  

	:	Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, Senior Counsel for 
		M/s. Anand Abdul and Vinodh Associates.

For Respondents No.15 & 17 to 45 in W.P. No.4950 of 2007 :   

	:	Mr.R.Muthukumarasamy, Senior Counsel for Mr.S.Jensenan

For Respondent No.11 in W.P. No.4950 of 2007 :    

	:	Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan, Senior counsel for 
		M/s.Anand Abdul and Vinodh Associates.

For  Respondents No.1 to 3 in W.P. Nos.8624 and 8625 of 2007 and 4950 of 2007 :

	:	Mr.R.Viduthalai, Advocate General for 
		Mr.M.Dhandapani, Spl. Govt. Pleader (W).

For Respondents No.48 & 51 :  

	:	Mr.G.Masilamani, Senior Counsel for Mr. Manikandan.

For Respondent No.16 : 

	:	Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, Senior Counsel for Mr.S.K.Sathish.

For Respondent No.4 : 

	:	Mr.R.Viduthalai, Advocate General for M/s.R.Girirajan, T.N.H.B.

For Respondent No.5 : 

	:	M/s.V.Bharathidasan (WP.4950/2007 for Corporation of chennai)

For Respondent No.5 : 

	:	Mr.Javier Fliex (WP.8624/2007)

For Respondent No.6 : 

	:	M/s.V. Ayyadurai

For Respondent No.48 : 

	: 	M/s.P.Raja

For Respondent No.58 and 59 in WP.8624 and 4950 of 2007 :  

	:	M/s. Auxilla Peter
     
For Respondent No.53 :  
	
	:	Mr.Manoharan

For Respondent Nos.46 and 49 :  

	:	M/s.T.Meikandan




                         COMMON ORDER


F.M. IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.

W.P.No.8618 of 2006 has been filed by the

petitioner therein seeking to challenge the order of

the second respondent therein, namely, Tahsildar,

Mambalam-Guindy Taluk. As per the said order, the

Writ Petitioner was directed not to proceed with any

constructions in an extent of 90 cents situated in

S.No.297/1 since an enquiry as regards the issuance

of patta was pending.

2. W.P.No.4950 of 2007 is a Public Interest

Litigation and the petitioner therein seeks for the

issuance of Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents

1 to 4 in that writ petition to clear, maintain and

construct a General Hospital in the site earmarked

for Peripheral Hospital in T.S.No.14 of Block No.29

Kodambakkam Village, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk. The

T.S.No.14 referred to therein corresponds to the

original S.No.297/1.

3. W.P.Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2006 have been

preferred by the petitioners therein challenging the

order of the first respondent therein, namely, the

Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land

Administration, dated 28.2.2007 in Proceedings

D.Dis.K4/23586/06 in and by which the order of District

Revenue Officer (hereinafter referred to as D.R.O.),

Chennai, dated 15.6.2006 was confirmed. The D.R.O.,

Chennai had cancelled the patta issued in favour of

Thiru. Nedunchezian, Chitrarasu and three others vide

S.D.No.44/04-05, dated 10.6.2004 as well as in favour

of M/s.Metro Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd., in its

order vide TR.No.199/05-06, dated 5.5.2005 and

restored the same in the name of the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board with immediate effect.

4. The above referred to pattas, which were

cancelled and which were restored in the name of Tamil

Nadu Housing Board were related to the property

situated in S.No.297/1 with reference to which the

petitioner in W.P.No.4950 of 2007 has come forward with

the public interest litigation.

5. As the issue concerns the property relating to

S.No.297/1 and the rights of the parties, which would

need detailed discussion based on the allegations and

counter allegations contained in W.P.No.4950 of 2007,

the status of the parties would be referred to as

arrayed in the said writ petition. Respondents 12 to 64

were suo motu impleaded as party respondents by an

order, dated 24.7.2007.

6. In order to appreciate the controversy involved

in these writ petitions, a brief history has to be

narrated:

7. An extent of land measuring 5.90 acres in

S.No.297/1 of Kodambakkam Village, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk

belonged to one Mr.Velu Mudaliar, who settled the same

in favour of his wife Mrs.Rajalakshmi Ammal. By

G.O.Ms.No.4729, dated 25.10.1961, the Government of

Tamil Nadu acquired the aforesaid 5.90 acres of land

for development of schemes formulated by the Tamil

Nadu Housing Board. Pursuant to the above said

notification, an award came to be passed on 31.7.1964 in

Award No.14/64 and the possession of entire extent of

5.90 acres was also taken and vested with the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board. Subsequently, on 31.10.1973, by

G.O.Ms.No.1031, an extent of 0.95 acres in S.No.297/2 was

excluded from the land acquisition proceedings in

exercise of the powers conferred under Section 48(1) of

the Land Acquisition Act. By virtue of such exclusion,

the acquisition was restricted to 4.95 acres. Further,

while the acquired land was retained in S.No.297/1, the

excluded extent of 0.95 acres was sub-divided and shown

under S.No.297/2. After exclusion, a revised award also

came to be passed in Award No.5/74, dated 4.1.1975.

8. The Tamil Nadu Housing Board utilised the extent

of 4.95 acres in S.No.297/1 for construction of flats,

named as Bharathi Dasan Colony and handed over 120

grounds and 0550 Sq.ft. of land meant for

construction of Government Peripheral Hospitals to

P.W.D. on 8.4.1981. The area of 120 grounds and 0550

Sq.ft. would cover an extent of 1.97 acres. While,

the Tamil Nadu Housing Board along with P.W.D. was

proceeding after the acquisition to fulfil the purpose

of such acquisition, namely, for construction of

Housing Board flats, Peripheral Hospital and other

allied activities, it appeared that the erstwhile

owner Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal executed a Power of

Attorney, dated 28.7.1988, which was registered as

document No.143/4 on the file of the Sub Registrar’s

Office Guduvancheri, in favour of one Mr.C.Mohan, for

the purpose of seeking allotment of the acquired lands

in her favour under the ex-owner category. But by a

subsequent deed, dated 28.4.1989, she cancelled the

Power of Attorney, dated 28.7.1988 and the cancellation

deed was also registered as document No.101/1988 on

the file of the Sub Registrar’s Officer, Guduvancheri.

Nevertheless, the said Thiru.C.Mohan, in his capacity as

Power Agent, stated to have executed three sale deeds on

15.3.1996, which were registered as document Nos.1416,

1413 and 1415 of 1996 in favour of one Tmt.

P.Vijayalakshmi, Thiru. Thulasidas and Tmt.N. Saraswathi

and each of the sale deeds conveyed 30 cents of land

in S.No.297/1.

9. Subsequently, there was a communication, dated

19.1.2001 purported to have been issued by the Executive

Engineer of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board stating that

the Housing Board had no objection for Tmt. Rajalakshmi

Ammal to continue to enjoy her ownership in respect

of 0.90 acres of land in S.No.297/1. Later, on

10.6.2004, patta was granted in favour of Thiru.

Neduncheziyan and Chitrarasu, who are sons of

V.Thulasidas, and three others in S.D.No.44/04-05

apparently based on the purported letter, dated

19.1.2001, which was stated to have been issued by the

Executive Engineer of Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

Thereafter, by a subsequent sale deed, dated 1.12.2004,

the purchasers of the document, dated 15.3.1996, namely,

Tmt. N.Saraswathi and four others sold the 0.90 acres

of land to M/s. Metro Steel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd.,

(hereinafter referred to as MSRMP Ltd.), the 11th

respondent herein and one Thiru. Ramamoorthy Saravana

Kumar.

10. Later on, by a registered sale deed, M/s.Metro

Streel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd., represented by its

Director Mr.Mahendra Kumar Jain conveyed its 1/3rd share

in favour of one Mr.Khimraj Sakariya, petitioner in

W.P.No.8625/2007. The other 1/3rd shareholder, namely,

Mr. Ramamoorthy Saravanakumar was stated to have

conveyed his share in favour of the wife of the 11th

respondent (i.e.) Mrs.U. Bhuvaneswari.

11. By a joint patta in C.A.No.450/05-06, dated

9.5.2005, the patta, dated 10.6.2004 was stated to have

been transferred and issued in the name of M/s.Metro

Steel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd., and Mr.Ramamurthy

Saravanakumar.

12. One Mr.M.V.V.N. Arumuga Pandian also claimed

certain rights in respect of the land situated in

S.No.297/1 and had filed a number of suits and writ

petitions questioning the rights of the 11th respondent

and also moved the District Revenue Officer, the 9th

respondent herein, for the cancellation of the patta,

dated 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005 which were issued in the

name of Tmt. Saraswathy and others and later in favour

of Ms.Metro Steel Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd. and others.

13. In the meanwhile, the 11th respondent approached

the 6th respondent C.M.D.A. for reclassification of

the 0.90 acres of land situated in S.No.297/1 from

institutional zone to residential zone. The 6th

respondent issued a notification dated 14.7.2005

calling for objections. The C.M.D.A., subsequently,

published a notification, dated 9.11.2005 in the

Government Gazette reclassifying the said land from

“institutional zone” to “residential zone”. Thereafter,

the 11th respondent issued an advertisement on

13.11.2005 in the newspapers for launching a Housing

Project to provide for residential flats.

14. It is stated that pursuant to the said

advertisement 54 flats were sold out. Thereafter, it

is claimed that necessary plan was also sanctioned by

the 6th respondent C.M.D.A. on 20.6.2006 for

construction of the flats in the said S.No.297/1.

15. At that point of time, the 10th respondent,

Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk issued a notice, dated

24.3.2006 directing the 11th respondent not to proceed

with the constructions since the issue relating to

cancellation of patta, dated 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005

was pending consideration.

16. Challenging the same, the 11th respondent

filed W.P.No.8618 of 2006 and pending disposal of the

writ petition obtained an order of interim stay of the

notice issued by the 10th respondent, dated

24.3.2006.

17. The Corporation of Chennai, the 5th respondent

was also stated to have accorded sanction to the

building plan submitted by the 11th respondent in its

order dated 5.4.2006. The 11th respondent is stated

to have commenced construction of flats on 10.5.2006

and completed the same.

18. It is in the above stated background, the 9th

respondent passed orders on 15.6.2006 cancelling the

patta issued on 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005, which came to be

confirmed by the 7th respondent, the Special

Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, in

his order, dated 28.2.2007.

19. At that point of time the public interest

litigation came to be filed in W.P.No.4950 of 2007.

While ordering notice to the 11th respondent on

13.2.2007, an order of interim injunction restraining

the 11th respondent from proceeding with the

construction was also made in the said writ petition.

Subsequently, at the instance of the 11th respondent, by

order, dated 20.2.2007 the Division Bench, permitted

him to continue the construction, at the same time,

however, made it clear that no third party should be

inducted and possession should not be parted. Thereafter,

challenging the orders of the 7th and 9th respondents

cancelling the joint patta, dated 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005,

W.P.Nos. 8624 and 8625 of 2006 were filed, which along

with W.P.No.8618 of 2006 were also tagged along with

W.P.No.4950 of 2007. When the above writ petitions

were taken up for hearing on 24.7.2007, it was

brought to the notice of this Court about the sale of

the residential flats to 54 persons and therefore, suo

motu orders were passed impleading them as party

respondents in the above writ petitions. They were

accordingly, impleaded as respondents 12 to 64 in

W.P.No.4950 of 2007 and as respondents 11 to 63 in

W.P.Nos.8624 and 8625 of 2007. After notice to the

newly impleaded respondents, different counsel entered

appearance on their behalf.

20. That apart, one Thiru.M.V.V.N. Arumuga Pandian

at whose instance the 9th respondent D.R.O. passed

his order, dated 15.6.2006 cancelling the joint patta,

dated 10.6.2004 and 9.5.2005 came forward with an

application to get himself impleaded in W.P.No.4950 of

2007. Since it was a public interest litigation, he

was also permitted to make his say as an interloper.

Moreover, he has already been arrayed as 5th

respondent in W.P.Nos.8624 and 8625 of 2007 and he was

also heard.

21. In these writ petitions, the Pro Bono Publico

would contend that the land which was acquired by the

State Government to be used for a public purpose

of construction of Peripheral Hospital as part of

Housing Board Scheme and possession was vested with

the State Government and the Housing Board no one, much

less, the 11th respondent or respondents 12 to 64 can

be permitted to claim ownership of the land and

allowed to grab the Government land and make personal

gain out of it by putting up construction in the form of

residential flats. It is, therefore, claimed on the one

hand that such an illegality should not be allowed to

be perpetrated and therefore, the land, should be

restored by directing the Government to construct

Peripheral Hospital as originally scheduled at the

time of acquisition. On the other hand, the 11th

respondent would contend that he was a bona fide

purchaser having regard to the valid sale deeds executed

in his favour, as well as, the proceedings issued by

the State Government, C.M.D.A., and Urban Land Ceiling

authorities and certain orders of this Court confirming

such proceedings and based on the above valid

proceedings, he had promoted the land by investing

several crores of rupees which had also resulted in the

respondents 12 to 64 to make huge investments for the

construction of the residential flats, equity demands the

protection of the rights of the 11th respondent by

permitting him to retain the properties along with the

respondents 12 to 64. Supporting the stand of the

11th respondent, respondents 12 to 64 also contended

that they were all bona fide purchasers of the

respective flats by borrowing heavy amounts from Banks

and financial institutions and since the petitioner in

the public interest litigation as well as the 5th

respondent Arumuga Pandian in W.P.Nos.8624 and 8625 of

2007 were not bona fide in their approach in

questioning the rights of the 11th respondent and

through him the respondents 12 to 64, the public

interest litigation should be rejected and it should

be left to the decision of the State Government to

decide as to in what other equitable manner the rights

can be safeguarded.

22. As against the above, on behalf of the State

Government, it is contended that since, after the

acquisition in the year 1964, as well as after the

modified award in the year 1975 the possession of the

land in S.No.297/1 in an extent of 4.95 acres was

validly acquired and vested with the State and later

continue to remain with the Housing Board unless there

had been a valid reconveyance ordered under the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, no one, much

less, the respondent 11 and other respondents 12 to 64

can claim any equitable right based on their illegal

encroachment of the land in question. Therefore, the

State Government would contend that there is no scope

for any equity to be considered in favour of

respondents 11 to 64 and that it is the obligation of

the State Government to fulfil the purport and intent

of the acquisition by restoring the land and put the

same into the use for which it was originally intended.

23. On behalf of the Pro Bono Publico,

Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel addressed his

arguments. The learned Senior Counsel in his submissions

contended that a rank fraud was played by several

parties either at the instance of the original owner

Rajalakshmi Ammal or the subsequent purchasers in

order to make it appear as though an extent of 0.90

acres in S.NO.297/1 was withdrawn from the original

acquisition and in that pursuit, the process of this

Court was also abused to certain extent and in such

circumstances, having regard to the decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221

(A.V. Papayya Sastry and Others Vs. Govt. of A.P. and

Others) JT 2000 SC 218 (M/s. Prestige Lights Ltd. Vs.

State Bank of India) and AIR 1996 SC 253 (Dr.G.N.

Khajuria and others Vs. Delhi Development Authority and

others) there can be no consideration on equity in

favour of respondents 11 to 64.

24. The learned Senior Counsel brought to our

notice, the recitals in the sale deed, dated 15.3.1996

said to have been executed by the Power Agent

Mr.C.Mohan on behalf of Rajalakshmi Ammal, which when

compared with her own stand as stated in her reply

notice, dated 31.3.1998 to one of the parties, with

copies marked to various other parties including some of

the respondents herein, were wholly inconsistent and the

above documents would show how a calculated fraud was

played to grab the Government land for making a

personal gain.

25. According to the learned Senior Counsel when the

said parent documents did not establish any valid title

to the subject land covered by S.No.297/1, the 11th

respondent, who seeks to claim title by way of a

purchase effected on 1.12.2004, cannot be heard to say

that he was a bona fide purchaser and now claim

equitable relief on that basis. The learned Senior

Counsel could also brought to our notice various other

discrepancies in different documents to demonstrate how

the bona fide claim and equitable rights claimed by

respondents 11 to 64 cannot be considered.

26. As against the above submissions, M/s.

R.Krishnamurthy and T.R. Rajagopalan, the learned

Senior Counsel appearing for the 11th respondent and M/s.

G.Masilamani, T.V.Ramanujam and R.Muthukumarasamy, the

learned Senior Counsel appearing for the various

respondents, who were purchasers of the individual

flats, namely, the respondents 12 to 64 would contend

that since at the time of purchase by the 11th

respondent on 1.12.2004 along with others, there were

certain documents issued by the Urban Land Ceiling

Authorities as well as by an authority in the rank of

Deputy Secretary which confirm to very large extent that

the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal continue to retain

ownership in respect of the subject land and with

reference to those Government documents, even as on date,

as there is no dispute as to its existence, it will

have to be held that the 11th respondent was a bona

fide purchaser. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore,

contended that in spite of such valid Government

documents, if anyone wanted to question either such

valid documents or the ownership rights of the 11th

respondent as well as respondents 12 to 64, they should

approach the appropriate Civil Court and not this Court

by way of a public interest litigation.

27. The learned Senior Counsel would contend that

the various Government proceedings, in particular, the

orders of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities as well as

the letter of the Deputy Secretary were all documents

which persuaded the 11th respondent to believe the

lawful ownership of the original owner and applying the

doctrine of “Promissory Estoppel” the State Government

is bound to protect the rights of the 11th respondent

as well as the subsequent purchasers of the individual

flats, namely, the respondents 12 to 64 and their

possession cannot be interfered with.

28. Reliance was placed upon the decisions reported

in (2001) 6 SCC 512 ( Kewal Chand Mimani (D) by Lrs. Vs.

S.K.Sen and others), (2005) 3 SCC 91 (R & M Trust Vs.

Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others), AIR

1979 SC 621 (M/s.Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.,

Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others), (1996) II SCC

501 (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs.

Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd., and

Others), (1997) 2 SCC 627 (C.Padma and Others Vs. Dy.

Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu and others),

1998 (1) MLJ 314 (The Senior Superintendent of Post

Offices, Coimbatore Division Vs. The Coimbatore Diocese

Society represented by its Procurator, Coimbatore and

others), (1985) 4 SCC 369 (Union of India Vs. Godfrey

Philips India Ltd.), (2004) 6 SCC 465 (State of Punjab

Vs. Nestle India Ltd., and another) and (2007) 5 MLJ 436

(SC)-(Amey Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Another

Vs. Public Concern for Governance Trust and Others).

29. At the outset, we wish to deal with the public

interest litigation in the first instance as the

disposal of the said writ petition would in effect

find a solution for the disposal of the other writ

petitions. In the public interest litigation, the issue

that looms large is as to “whether the so called

ownership rights claimed by the 11th respondent and

through him the other respondents 12 to 64 should

prevail or the status of the subject property as the

Government land should be maintained and the

consequential directions to be issued.” In order to

ascertain the stand of the State Government that the

subject land is the property of the State, the

relevant documents which are to be examined are as

under:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
S.NO DATE PARTICULARS AVAILABLE AT
WHICH VOL.&
PAGE
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 31.7.196 Award NO.14/1964. VI – 1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
2 31.10.19 G.O.Ms.No.1031, Housing. II – 1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
3 4/1/75 Copy of the revised Award VI – 15
No.5/74.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
4 13.3.198 Order, dated 13.3.1981 of the V – 17
Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu
in CROP No.145 of 1976 for
disbursement of the
compensation payable in respect
of the land acquired under
award No.5/1974, dated
4.1.1975
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
5 28.7.198 General Power of Attorney VII – 1
executed by V. Rajalakshmi
Ammal in favour of C.Mohan.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
6 28.4.198 Copy of cancellation of VII – 8
General Power of Attorney by
Rajalakshmi, dated 28.7.1988.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
7 31.10.19 Order in W.P.No.1172 of 1985, VII – 14
in the Writ Petition filed by
Velu Mudaliar and Rajalakshmi.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
8 24.3.199 Notice issued by the II – 256
Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy
Taluk to the 11th
Respondent.(Impugned order in
W.P. No.8618 of 2006)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9 31.3.199 Reply by Rajalakshmi to the VII – 20
legal notice issued by
Vilvijayan and Anandakumar,
dated 20.2.1998.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
10 14.1.200 Copy of the letter purported I – 4
to have been issued by the
Executive Engineer and
Administrative Officer,
K.K.Nagar Division of Tamil
Nadu Housing Board.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
11 19.5.200 Proceedings of the Tahsildar, VI – 25
Mambalam-Guindy Taluk.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
12 8/6/04 Letter of the D.R.O. to the VI – 30
Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy
Taluk.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
13 8/6/04 Reply by the Tahsildar, VI – 30
Mambalam-Guindy Taluk to
D.R.O., Chennai.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
14 Extracts from the Town Survey VI – 64
Register in respect of the
property situated in
S.No.297/1 containing the
original entry in the name of
Tamil Nadu Housing Board and
the change of such entry dated
10.6.2004 in favour of
T.Neduncheziyan, and others
and subsequent change made by
proceedings, dated 5.5.2005 in
favour of M/s.Metro Steel
Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. and
others
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
15 29.3.200 Notice issued by the DRO to VI – 48
M.V.V.N. Arumuga Pandian,
Neduncheziyan, Chitrarasu,
Thulasidas, Saraswathy and
C.Vijayalakshmi for hearing to
be held on 31.3.2006 at 3.00 p.m.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
16 28.4.200 Copy of the letter issued by II – 270
the Deputy Secretary to
Thiru.MVVN. Arumuga Pandian,
dated 28.4.2006
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
17 15.6.200 Order of the District Revenue I – 16
Officer, Chennai District.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
18 22.6.200 Copy of the hearing notice II – 272
issued by the Special
Commissioner and Commissioner
of Administration.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
19 30.6.200 Copy of the letter issued by I – 6
the Assistant Secretary (LA) to
Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
20 28.7.200 Letter issued by the Tamil I – 26
Nadu Housing Board to MVVN.

Arumuga Pandian furnishing the
land usage details of
S.No.297/1 of Kodambakkam
Village, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
21 12/12/06 Proceedings of the Special I – 26
Commissioner and Commissioner
of Land Administration,
granting stay of the order of
the DRO, dated 15.6.2006 and
also posting the main revision
for hearing on 21.1.2007 at
11.00 a.m.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
22 1/2/07 Copy of the hearing notice II – 272
issued by the Special
Commissioner and Commissioner
of Land Administration,
posting the hearing.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
23 23.2.200 Letter from the Managing VI – 64
Director, Tamil Nadu Housing
Board to the Special
Commissioner and Commissioner
of Land Administration, dated
23.2.2007
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
24 28.2.200 Copy of the Order of the VI – 66
Special Commissioner and
Commissioner of Land
Administration confirming the
order of the D.R.O., dated
15.6.2006
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

30. When we peruse the above documents, we find that

the starting point is the award No.14 of 1964 dated

31.7.1964. In the said award, acquisition of 16.05

acres, which were lying in different survey numbers

including S.No.297 which covered 5.90 acres, was made.

The said property then stood in the name of S.Velu

Mudaliar. Subsequently, in G.O.Ms.No.1031, Housing,

dated 31.10.1973, the extent of 0.95 acres was

withdrawn from the acquisition and in the Schedule to

the said G.O., the boundaries were specifically

mentioned. In fact, by virtue of the withdrawal made

in the said G.O., S.No.297 was sub-divided as 297/1 and

2. The acquired land, namely, the 4.95 acres was

stated to have situated in S.No.297/1. The left out

land, namely, the 0.95 acres situated in the sub-

divided S.No.297/2 standing in the name S.Velu Mudaliar

and Rajammal surrounded on the North by 297/1 East by

S.No.294, South by 298 and West by S.Nos.300 and 299.

31. In the revised award No.5/74, dated 4.1.1975,

the extent of acquired land in S.No.297/1 has been

specifically mentioned as 4.95 acres. In the revised

award, one other land situated in S.No.340/2 in an

extent of 0.18 acres has also been mentioned. In

fact, in the descriptive part of the award the extent

of 4.95 acres in S.No.297/1 and 0.18 acres in

S.No.340/2 and the total extent of 5.13 acres has

been clearly mentioned.

32. The above referred to documents, therefore, make

it clear that while original acquisition was in the

composite S.No.297 for the total extent of 5.90 acres,

after the exemption granted in G.O.Ms.1031, dated

31.10.1973, the acquired land got reduced to 4.95

acres, which fell in S.No.297/1, whereas the exempted

extent of 0.95 acres fell in S.No.297/2. With reference

to the above statement of facts, there could not have

been any dispute at all by anyone.

33. In fact, after the above said acquisition, the

original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal aspired for the

allotment of plots in her favour from the Housing

Board under the ex-owner category. With that view, she

executed a Power of Attorney, dated 28.7.1988 in favour

of one Thiru.C.Mohan, s/o. Late V.L.Chellappa.

34. A perusal of the said Power of Attorney disclose

that the purport of the power was to correspond and

negotiate with the Housing Board or with the other

appropriate authorities to get the allotment of the land

or flats under ex-owners category scheme by virtue of

the acquisition. However, by a document, dated

28.4.1989, the said Rajalakshmi Ammal, wife of Velu

Mudaliar cancelled the Power of Attorney, dated

28.7.1988, which was registered as document No.101 of

1989 in the Office of the Sub Registrar, Guduvancheri.

35. The recitals of the said document disclose that

the Power Agent was indulging in dishonest and illegal

activities and therefore, she did not want to

continue the power granted in favour of her agent,

namely, Thiru. C.Mohan. Prior to the execution of the

power, the said Rajalakshmi Ammal along with her

husband Velu Mudaliar had filed a writ petition in

W.P.No.1172 of 1985 seeking for the issuance of a Writ

of Mandamus to direct the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to

allot necessary flats under the ex-owner category

scheme framed under Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu State

Housing Board Act, 1961.

36. A perusal of the said order disclose that the

very same prayer was earlier rejected by the Housing

Board, by order, dated 21.9.1984. Further, after the

initial acquisition made under award No.14 of 1964, the

exclusion of 0.90 acres itself came to be made in

G.O.Ms.No.1031, dated 31.10.1973. On finding that the

said lands were not in the possession of the original

owners Rajalakshmi Ammal and Velu Mudaliar and since

they have laid out those plots and sold them to 17

persons, ultimately, this Court declined the prayer

of the original owners for the allotment of necessary

plots under the ex-owner category scheme. Thereafter,

the original owner Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal sent a reply

to legal notice, dated 20.2.1998 issued on behalf of

M/s. Vilvijayan and C. Anandakumar. The reply of Tmt.

Rajalakshmiammal was dated 31.3.1998. Some of the

statements contained in the reply are very relevant

for our present purpose which requires extraction and

reads as under:

“A perusal of the contention of
the notice under reference will reveal
that a rank one forgery committed by
certain vested interested persons who
conspired among themselves in order to
swallow the Government property, which was
acquired by the Government in 1963 itself
for the development of the area as
Kodambakkam Pudur neighbourhood scheme and
taken over possession also from the
erstwhile land owners late S. Velu Mudaliar
and a portion of the extent of land
excluded from the said acquisition in
G.O.Ms.No.1031, Housing, dt.31.10.1973,
which was under the occupation of the
encroachers, had also been conveyed in
their favour by the erstwhile landowners by
means of registered sale deeds.
……………………………In any
stretch of even imagination neither the
erstwhile landowner late Velu Mudaliar
nor Tmt. Rajalakshmi would not have joined
as party in the alleged sale agreement
because the said piece of land in Survey
No.297(Part) was acquired by the
Government along with a larger extent of
other properties belonging to them in 1963
itself. The statement of your clients
that they have put up compound wall
around the suit property together with an
asbestos sheet shed and a thatched shed
therein is curious and self servient as
it is a fertile imagine one for setting
up of a case in their favour, because the
said alleged property has been under the
effective possession and enjoyment of
Government.

…………….The said Velu
Mudaliar died on 7.4.1988. After his
death so far as C.Mohan is concerned,
he was a power of Attorney Agent for
Tmt.Rajalakshmi for getting allotment of
land from the Government under ex-owner
category towards the lands measuring
more than 5.95 acres of land acquired by
Government and the said Power of Attorney
was given in 1988 and the same was also
cancelled by means a registered deed in
1989 as he misused the power and could
not get the said allotment and the Power
of Attorney was given only to approach
the concerned authorities to get eligible
extent of ex-owner category land from the
Government. The said Mohan might have
created some incrimination documents
without authority. Which will not in any
way bind the said Tmt. Rajalakshmi as the
same would not have executed by her.

…………………She is not in any
way concerned with the said suit since
the property involved is a Government
property and she is not having any
manner of right interested and title over
the same. ”

(Emphasis added)

37. A copy of the said reply was also marked to

the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, and the Chief

Engineer, P.W.D. and certain others.

38. The above referred to documents cumulatively go

to show that after the initial acquisition and the

subsequent modified award made in 1975, the original

owner Rajalakshmi herself had reconciled to the

position that she had no rights in respect of the lands
to an extent of 4.95 acres in S.No.297/1 and that the

said land absolutely belonged to the State Government and

the Housing Board and if at all any mischief had been

played with reference to the said land it could have

been done by others including her one time power agent

Thiru.C.Mohan.

39. In fact a specific allegation with reference to

the said power agent was to the effect that he might

have created some incriminating documents without

authority and that she was not bound by any such

document.

40. That apart, a perusal of the proceedings of the

Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy Taluk, dated 19.5.2004, as

well as the connected letters of the D.R.O., dated

8.6.2004, and the Tahsildar also dated 8.6.2004, and the

extract from the Town Survey Register of Kodambakkam,

dated 16.7.2007, makes it clear that after the

acquisition of the subject land situated in S.No.297/1

in an extent of 0.90 acres it stood transferred in the

name of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and continue to

remain in the said name till it was transferred in the

name of M/s.T. Neduncheziyan, T.Chitrarasu, V. Thulasi

Doss, N. Saraswathy and Tmt. Vijayalakshmi on 10.6.2004.

For effecting the said transfer, the proceedings referred

to were the Tamil Nadu Housing Board letter, dated

19.1.2001 and the proceedings of the Assistant

Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, dated 31.5.2004, the

exercise of making the transfer in the name of the above

referred to persons appeared to have been made based on

their application, dated 19.5.2004.

41. In this context, one other set of documents to

be referred to are three sale deeds in document

Nos.1416, 1413, and 1415 of 1996, dated 15.3.1996.

These documents by way of sale deed were said to have

been executed by Thiru. C.Mohan in his capacity as

power agent of Tmt. V.Rajalakshmi Ammal in favour of

C.Vijayalakshmi, V. Thulasidoss and Mrs.N. Saraswathy.

As one of the purchasers Thulasidoss was stated to have

subsequently expired, his sons Neduncheziyan,

Chitrarasu, and his daughter V.Tamilselvi joined along

with Vijayalakshmi and Saraswathy, the so-called

purchasers, who applied for the transfer of patta in

their name in their application, dated 19.5.2004.

42. Apparently, the execution of the three sale

deeds, dated 15.3.1996 appeared to have been the

starting point for the attempted change in the status

and character of the subject land situated in

S.No.297/1 in an extent of 0.90 acres. Under the above

referred to three sale deeds an extent of 0.30 acres

each in S.No.297/1 were sought to be transferred in

favour of the purchasers. Therefore, when by virtue of

the land acquisition proceedings culminating in the

award No.5/1974, dated 4.1.1975, the entire extent of

4.95 acres including the extent of 0.90 acres was

acquired and possession was vested with the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board, no one including the erstwhile owner

could have had any hold over the said land for

transferring the same in favour of any one, much less,

the above referred to subsequent purchasers. In fact,

a copy of the reply notice of the original owner

Rajalakshmiammal herself, dated 31.3.1998 makes it amply

clear that even as of the year 1998, she had in an

unambiguous terms made it clear that the subject land

absolutely belonged to the Government and the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board.

43. Once that was the legal status of the subject

land having regard to the documents which prevailed

as on that date which position continue to remain even

as on date and the same was also duly acknowledged by

the original owner herself there was very little scope

for anybody else to meddle with the ownership of the

said lands by creating any document in favour of anybody

else much less the so-called purchasers under the sale

deeds, dated 15.3.1996 through the power agent

Thiru.C.Mohan.

44. As against the above referred to definite

position as regards the ownership of the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board/State over the subject lands, when we

examine the various other materials relied upon by the

11th respondent, we find some of those documents had been

issued at the instance of certain other Government

machineries. The genuineness of such documents have to

be necessarily put to deeper scrutiny as such

documents did not appear to have been issued in the

normal course of the business transaction of the

departments concerned.

45. We will presently refer to the various

instances concerned with those documents which would

fortify our conclusions and impressions which we gained

to the effect that those documents lack genuineness. As

far as the right claimed by the 11th respondent is

concerned, after the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996,

executed in favour of Saraswathy, Vijayalakshmi and

Thulasidoss, the 11th respondent claimed title based on

the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004, executed by Saraswathy

and four others, through, their power agent M/s. TVS

Finance and Services Ltd., in favour of Metro Steel

Rolling Mill Pvt. Ltd., T. Udayakumar and Mr.Ramamurthy

Saravanakumar. Subsequently, M/s.Metro Steel Rolling Mill

Pvt. Ltd., transferred its 1/3rd right in favour of

Khimraj Sakariya by a sale deed, dated 19.10.2005.

Similarly, Mr.Ramamurthy Sarvanakumar conveyed his 1/3

right in the subject property in favour of V.

Bhuvaneshwari w/o. the 11th respondent by a sale deed,

dated 28.9.2006. Presently, the 11th respondent

along with Khimraj Sakariya as well as his wife

Bhuvaneshwari claim ownership and the 11th respondent was

stated to have promoted the property under the banner

of “Land Mark Constructions.”

46. As stated earlier, having regard to the very

firm stand of the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal in

her reply notice dated 31.3.1998 as well as the

cancellation of the power in the deed, dated 28.4.1989

cancelling the power of attorney, dated 28.7.1988 in

favour of Thiru.C.Mohan, the very execution of the sale

deeds, dated 15.3.1996, themselves had no validity in

law.

47. In fact on a perusal of the sale deeds, dated

15.3.1996, we find that it contains a statement that

the purchasers mentioned therein were already in

possession of the schedule property as the vendor

having delivered the vacant possession several years

before.

48. It is quite amazing to note how the property

which was already in the possession of the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board as from the year 1964 and 1975 as

categorically admitted by the so-called vendor herself

in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 the said lands could

have remained in the possession of the purchasers of the

sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 from any period prior to the

said date.

49. In this context, it will be relevant to

mention the averment contained in the counter affidavit

filed by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board in W.P.No.4950 of

2007. In the said counter affidavit, it has been

categorically stated that the entire site meant for

construction for Peripheral Hospital in an extent of

120 grounds 0550 Sq.ft. was handed over to P.W.D. on

28.6.1976 as per letter No.G/II/(3)87387/73, dated

22.5.1976 and on 8.4.1981 as per reference in KKN Dn.

Letter No. E1/ 87387/73, dated 16.2.1981 and letter

No.KKNS/4758/79, dated 20.3.1981 etc. Therefore, the

above referred to communications of the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board for whom the acquisition was made

considered along with the fact that in the revenue

records the necessary name transfer, namely, that the

name of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board having been

incorporated it was abundantly made clear that the

subject land was in the physical and legal possession

of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board after the acquisition

and that the land meant for the construction of

Government Peripheral Hospital from the acquired lands

was duly entrusted with P.W.D. for carrying out the

necessary construction. Therefore, as against the above

documents, which emanated from the office of the

revenue Authorities and the Housing Board authorities

coupled along with the stand of the original owner

herself in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 making it

clear that the Housing Board and the Government were

in absolute possession of the subject land, the sale

deeds, dated 15.3.1996 in stating that the very same

lands were in the possession of the original owner was

nothing but a blatant lie.

50. Above all, the further statement contained in

the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996, that the purchasers

were in possession of the said land long prior to the

execution of the said sale deed can only be considered

as a statement made without any scruples with a view to

play a fraud on the State Government and the Tamil

Nadu Housing Board. When such a conclusion based on the

consideration of the above referred to documents is

inevitable as regards the transaction made in the sale

deeds, dated 15.3.1996, it will have to be held that

any subsequent transaction based on the said sale deeds

will also be absolutely invalid in law and no

credence can be attached to any of the subsequent

transactions based on the above referred to sale deeds.

51. In the said light, when the stand of the 11th

respondent that he was the bona fide purchaser is

considered, here again, we do not find even a

semblance of genuineness in the said claim. In this

context, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

11th respondent as well as other learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the respondents 12 to 64 wanted to place

heavy reliance upon the proceedings emanated from the

Office of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities and the

Office of the Deputy Secretary to Government.

52. In the first place, when we consider the stand

of the 11th respondent based on the sale deed, dated

1.12.2004, it will be worthwhile to refer to certain

recitals and particulars contained in the said sale

deed. Unlike, the earlier sale deed, dated 15.3.1996,

where there is no reference to the prior title

except a deed of settlement, dated 6.12.1967 in favour

of Rajalakshmiammal, in the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004

for the first time, we find reference to the ownership

in respect of the entire 5.90 acres in S.No.297 as

originally owned by one Mr.K. Shanmugasundara

Mudaliar. He is stated to have bequeathed the property

in favour of his wife Mrs. Sowbhagyammal in his last

registered will, dated 16.10.1927 registered as

document No.92/1927 in the Office of the Sub Registrar,

West Madras. After the ownership of Mrs.Sowbhagyammal,

it is stated that since she had no issues, the

property reverted to the brothers of Shanmugasundara

Mudaliar, namely, Sivanandan Mudaliar, Sivalingam

Mudaliar, and Somasundara Mudaliar. Thereafter, there

was a civil suit in O.S.No.43/51 on the file of the

Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu, in which a

compromise was entered on 28.2.1953 pursuant to which

the property came to be possessed by Somasundara

Mudaliar and Velu Mudaliar. Subsequently, there was a

partition between Somasundara Mudaliar and Velu Mudaliar

on 3.3.1954 by way of a registered document No.527/54

in the Office of the Sub Registrar, Saidapet. It is based

on the said partition deed, Velu Mudaliar was stated to

have owned the property, who in turn executed the

settlement deed, dated 6.12.1967 registered as document

No.3490/67 in the Office of the Sub Registrar, T. Nagar

in favour of his wife Rajalakshmi Ammal.

53. Apart from tracing the above title, there

were two other references in the sale deed, dated

1.12.2004. There was also a reference to award No.14/64,

dated 31.7.1964 and the subsequent G.O.Ms.No.1031,

dated 31.10.1973 in and by which exemption of 0.95

acres was made from the acquisition. There is one

other reference in the said sale deed which reads as

under:-

“Whereas the Tamil Nadu Housing Board
subsequently acquired an extent of only
4.05 acres out of 5.90 acres in S.No.297
of Kodambakkam Village in award No. 5/74,
dated 4.1.1974 and due to encroachment
an extent of 0.90 acres, i.e., A, B and C
Schedule mentioned property was also
excluded from the revised award No.5/74
ad it remain in possession of Mrs. V.
Rajalakshmi Ammal.”

54. The above referred to recitals in the said

document are not supported by either the award

No.5/74, dated 4.1.1974 or by the statement of the

original owner Mrs. Rajalakshmiammal herself. In

fact, the extent mentioned as 4.05 acres in the said

paragraph is quite misleading. When we refer to the award

No.5/74, dated 4.1.1975, we find that the extent

mentioned therein is 4.95 acres in S.No.297. The xerox

copy of the said document, dated 1.12.2004 disclose

that the same had been signed by the authorised

signatory of Power Agent M/s.TVS Finance & Services

Ltd., as well as the three purchasers mentioned in that

document. The sale consideration was a total sum of

Rs.3,05,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores and Five Lakhs

only).

55. It is quite shocking to note that such a

valuable consideration running to more than rupees three

crores was paid by the 11th respondent and others

without even verifying the correctness of the statement

that the extent was only 4.05 acres or 4.95 acres in

the award No.5/74. It is not known whether due

verification was made by the 11th respondent and the

other purchasers as to the veracity of the statement

contained in the said paragraph. When award No.5/74

clearly mentions the extent of land as 4.95 acres, we

can only state that the mentioning of the said extent

in the said award as 4.05 acres was nothing but a

deliberate mis-statement made either to satisfy the

vendor or the purchaser or as directed by either of

them. Certainly, we are unable to comprehend the

intention or the purpose for which such a deliberate

mis-statement was made in the sale deed with reference

to the extent of the land in as much as the extent of

the land was the crucial aspect in the said sale deed as

otherwise, no valid title would pass on to the

purchaser. Therefore, we are constrained to comment

upon the lack of truthfulness as regards the said

recitals. Apart from the mis-statement about the extent

of land, one other statement mentioning that an extent of

0.90 acres in the schedule A, B and C properties was

excluded in the award No.5/74, dated 4.1.1975 due to

the encroachment, which is also not a true one or

correct statement.

56. In fact on a reading of the order, dated

31.10.1991, in W.P.No.1172/1985, the only encroachment

noted was in S.No.297/2, and because of the said

encroachment, it was stated that G.O.Ms.No.1031

Housing, dated 31.10.1973 came to be made excluding

those lands. There was a specific reference in the

said order to the effect that those excluded lands were

not in the possession of the original owner since she

had laid out those lands as plots and sold them to

17 persons.

57. Except the above reference contained in the

said proceedings, in no other proceedings or was there

any other document which has been placed before us to

show that there was any noted encroachment by anyone

much less, the purchasers in the sale deeds, dated

15.3.1996 or any one claiming through them. Thereafter,

the said recital as regards the 0.90 cents in Award

No.5/74 was another deliberate incorrect and false

statement made with a view to play a fraud against the

State as well as the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to grab

their lands.

58. From the above discussion, we can safely

conclude that neither based on sale deeds, dated

15.3.1996, nor the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004 any

person, much less, the 11th respondent and the other so-

called purchasers derived any valid title in respect

of the 0.90 acres falling under S.No.297/1. On the other

hand, the said lands, as already stated by us continue

to be owned and in the possession of the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board right from the date of the award No.5/74,

dated 4.1.1975 and there was no scope for any one to

claim possession other than the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board.

59. The other materials relied upon to claim

possession and consequential ownership are the

proceedings of the Urban Land Ceiling authorities. As

far as the said claim is concerned, the initial

document is the notification, dated 7.2.1996 under the

provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and

Regulation) Act, 1978. The extent mentioned therein is

0.36.50 in S.No.297/1C part. The notification also

states that it was owned by Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal. As

per the notification, the said land deemed to have

acquired by the State Government on and from 1.3.96 by

virtue of Section 11(1) of the 1978 Act.

60. With reference to the said notification,

significantly there was no proceedings initiated at

the instance of Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal, at any point of

time, prior to the filing of the Writ Petition in

W.P.No.20552 of 2003. The said writ petition came to be

filed in the year 2003 contending that since the 1978

Act had been repealed and since the petitioner

continue to remain in possession, the impugned

acquisition under the 1978 Act stood abated. It is

true that the said writ petition came to be ordered on

19.12.2003 in favour of the petitioner based on a

communication, produced by the learned Special

Government Pleader, which was said to have been issued

by one Thiru. R.M.Rajendran, Assistant Commissioner,

Urban Land Tax, dated 15.12.2003 confirming that the

physical possession of the land continue to remain with

the land owner.

61. The writ petition was filed by none other than

the Rajalakshmi herself. In the first place, it is

quite shocking to note that Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal,

who had taken a firm stand in her reply notice, dated

31.3.1998 which also contains her signature that no part

of the land in S.No.297/1 remain in her possession but

on the other hand, entirety of the said land had

already been possessed by the State Government and the

Tamil Nadu Housing Board can come forward with the

statement in that writ petition that she continue to

remain in possession for the purpose of defeating the

notification, dated 7.2.1996 issued under the

provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1978.

62. Having regard to our earlier conclusion, based

on the reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 by Rajalakshmi

Ammal herself read along with various other

proceedings that after the acquisition in award No.5/74

no part of the land in S.No.297/1 was in her

possession, it will have to be held that the said

claim made by her in W.P.No.20552/2003 was totally a

false one. Merely because the order came to be passed

in the said writ petition based on a representation

made by the learned Special Government Pleader based

on a communication issued by the Assistant Commissioner

of Urban Land Tax, it cannot be concluded that the

order by itself establish the possession of the

erstwhile land owner as of 2003. In fact the revenue

records, namely, Town Survey Register extract of which

has been placed before us, which was dated 16.7.2007

disclose that only on 10.6.2004, the transfer came to

be effected in the name of T.Nedunchezian and four

others and prior to the said date the lands in

S.No.297/1 stood only in the name of the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board. The said extract from the Town Survey

Register is part of the set of documents furnished by

the office of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities.

63. In this connection, the set of documents filed

on behalf of the 11th respondent as contained in Vol.5

disclose that the contents contained therein were of

slippery in nature. There is a communication, dated

5.9.1996, from the Special Deputy Collector(LA), Tamil

Nadu Housing Board Schemes, Madras-35, addressed to the

Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board. In the last

part of that letter a recommendation has been made that

the claim of Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal for exclusion of 0.90

acres in S.No.297/1 deserve consideration.

64. It will have to be stated that the Special

Deputy Collector(LA) of Tamil Nadu Housing Board Schemes

had no authority to make such a recommendation. Along

with the said letter, a rough sketch has been prepared

to make it appear as though the subject land was left

out. There were certain other sketches prepared in the

Office of the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax,

Kunrathur making it appear as though the S.No.297/1 was

further sub-divided as S.Nos. 297/1A, 297/1B and 297/1C.

For making such a reference to the various sub

divisions, there was no supporting revenue records.

There was one other communication, dated 31.5.2004 which

came to be issued after the order of this Court, dated

19.12.2003 passed in W.P.No.20552 of 2003. The said

letter was addressed by the very same R.M.Rajendran,

Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, who is stated to

have instructed the learned Special Government Pleader

in writing to make a statement in W.P.No.20552 of 2003

that possession continue to remain with Tmt.

Rajalakshmi Ammal, the petitioner in that writ petition.

By this communication, dated 31.5.2004 addressed to the

Tahsildar, the Assistant Commissioner, wanted the

Tahsildar to carry out necessary changes in the Taluk

and Village accounts in the name of Rajalakshmi Ammal

and report compliance so as to enable him to send a

report to the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of

Land Reforms.

65. The land delivery receipt is also found in

Vol.V to state that the land was handed over by the

Urban Land Tax Authorities to the Revenue Inspector of

Mambalam-Guindy Taluk. Thereafter, the very same

R.M.Rajendran, the Assistant Commissioner, in his

communication addressed to the Special Commissioner and

Commissioner (ULC & ULT), dated 8.4.2004, reported that

the order of this Court, dated 19.12.2003 in

W.P.No.20552 of 2003 can be accepted based on a legal

opinion.

66. Having regard to the discussions with reference

to the above documents, we hold that none of the

statements contained in the above referred to documents

contained in Vol.5 were supported by any legally

acceptable basic revenue records to hold that there

was any change in the character of the land from that

of, namely, as possessed by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board

after the award No.5/74, dated 4.1.1975 to have lawfully

transferred back to the original owner Rajalakshmi

Ammal in order for the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities

to initiate any proceedings for acquisition under Section

11(1) of the 1978 Act and thereafter, for the original

owner to claim retention of the land after the repeal

of the 1978 Act. We can only conclude that the

proceedings emanated from the Office of the Urban Land

Ceiling Authorities were one other set of documents,

which might have been designedly made with a view to

support other fraudulent transactions, which were

perpetrated from the date of execution of the sale deeds,

dated 15.3.1996. Here again, we want to stress upon the

stand of the original owner Rajalakshmi Ammal in her

reply notice, dated 31.3.1998 in having stated in no

uncertain terms that after the acquisition under award

No.5/74, the possession of the lands in S.No.297/1

changed hands, i.e. in favour of the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board and thereafter, she was never put back in

possession of those lands.

67. When the notification, dated 7.2.1996 is

considered along with the subsequent proceedings of the

Urban Land Ceiling Authorities, it has not been

disclosed as to whether there was any consideration

about the land acquisition proceedings which culminated

in the award No.5/1974, dated 4.1.1975 and the change of

name of ownership from that of Rajalakshmi Ammal to

that of Tamil Nadu Housing Board. For the Urban Land

Ceiling Authorities to initiate proceedings for

acquisition of excess land, the basic information as

to the ownership would have been only from the land

revenue authorities, namely, the concerned Tahsildar

under whose jurisdiction, the record of ownership is

maintained. The issuance of the notification, dated

7.2.1996, mentioning the name of Rajalakshmi Ammal as

owner of the property creates serious doubts as to

whether at all any such notification was issued, after

duly ascertaining the ownership of the lands in

question. In any event, when as a matter of fact, the

ownership in respect of the land situated in

S.No.297/1, vested with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board

after the award dated 4.1.1975, in award No.5/74, the

notifications issued in the year 1996 under the

provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1975 would

definitely be of no consequence as that would not in

any way change the character of ownership from that

of Tamil Nadu Housing Board to that of Tmt.

Rajalakshmiammal.

68. Further, when Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal

having denounced her rights in respect of the land

situated in S.No.297/1, as could be seen from the reply

notice, dated 31.3.1998, the attempted challenge to the

notification, dated 7.2.1996 in the year 2003 was yet

another deliberate attempt to hoodwink the authorities

and to manipulate the proceedings in order to grab the

Government land by some hook or crook.

69. Since W.P.No.20552 of 2003 challenging

the notification, dated 7.2.1996 has been filed by

Tmt.Rajalakshmi Ammal by swearing to an affidavit as

verified by us from the original papers of that writ

petition, we can only state that the said attempt of

Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal was a deliberate fraudulent

attempt to regain ownership with reference to the land

situated in S.No.297/1 which had been lawfully acquired

by the State Government under award No.5/74, dated

4.1.1975. The filing of the said writ petition was a

clear case of abuse of process of this Court, in as much

as in that writ petition, this Court had no opportunity

to examine the correctness of the ownership claimed by

Tmt.Rajalakshmi Ammal since unfortunately, the

Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Ceiling himself

reported to the learned Special Government Pleader in

writing asserting as though Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal was

the owner and that she continue to remain in

possession.

70. In the light of such statement placed

before this Court, the order came to be passed in

W.P.No.20552 of 2003 on 19.12.2003, holding that the

Urban Land Ceiling Proceedings in the notification,

dated 7.2.1996 abated after the repeal of the 1978

Act. The conduct of the Assistant Commissioner of Urban

Land Ceiling in having made such a report in writing to

the learned Special Government Pleader creates serious

doubts as to whether there was diligent discharge of

duties in having made such a report before this Court.

Merely because, the said authority was functioning

under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, it

did not mean that he was not expected to ascertain

the correct position as regards ownership of any property

before making any such statement in writing in this

Court. The minimum that was expected of an authority

of that level, namely, the Assistant Commissioner, was

to have ascertained from the Town Survey Register which

definitely contained an entry as regards the lands in

S.No.297/1 to the effect that it belonged to the Tamil

Nadu Housing Board. In fact, from the records placed

before us by the 11th respondent as contained in

Volume III page 4, we find a copy of the village sub

divisions statement of Kodambakkam Division with

reference to the S.No.297/1 in which after the name of

the original owner Velu Mudaliar, the name of the Tamil

Nadu Government has been recorded. The said statement has

been attested by the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land

Tax, T.Nagar. The said statement apparently was issued

long prior to the order passed in W.P.No.20552 of 2003,

dated 19.12.2003. Therefore, the Urban Land Ceiling

Authorities cannot be heard to say that in spite of the

said record maintained in the Office of the Tahsildar,

Mambalam, Guindly Taluk, the Urban Land Ceiling

Authorities were still able to state that Tmt.

Rajalakshmiammal was the owner of the property in

respect of S.No.297/1.

71. Therefore, no reliance can be placed

upon the proceedings of the Urban Land Ceiling

Authorities in order to state that the purchase made by

the 11th respondent on 1.12.2004 was made after

ascertaining the ownership of the predecessors in title,

namely, M/s. Neduncheziyan and others and prior to them

Tmt. Rajalakshmi Ammal herself. Therefore, we have to

necessarily reject any submission made based on the

proceedings of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities in

order to state that the 11th respondent was bona fide

mislead, while ascertaining the ownership of the lands

in S.No.297/1 and consequently, the subsequent purchase

of flats by other respondents 12 to 64.

72. It will also be appropriate to mention at this

juncture that the transfer of ownership recorded in

the Town Survey Register on 10.6.2004 appeared to have

been made based on two proceedings, namely, one dated

19.1.2001 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and the one

dated 31.5.2004 by the Assistant Commissioner of Urban

Land Tax Authorities. We have discussed at length as to

how the proceedings of the Urban Land Tax Authorities

cannot be given any credence to ascertain the

ownership of the land as claimed by Rajalakshmi Ammal.

As far as the proceedings, dated 19.1.2001 issued by

the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, we wish to refer to the

letter subsequently issued by the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board itself, dated 30.6.2005 addressed to the Collector

of Chennai.

73. A perusal of the said communication makes

it clear that after the award No.5/1974, dated

4.1.1975 and also G.O.Ms.No.1031, dated 31.10.1973, the

land to an extent of 4.95 acres was in the possession of

the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and there was no further

change in the extent of the land which was already in

the possession of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. There is

also a categorical statement contained in the said

letter, dated 30.6.2005 which reads as under:

“The letter No.KKNS/4174/97,
dated 19.1.2001 has not been issued by the
Executive Engineer and Administrative
Officer, R.A.Nagai Division Office.”

74. Therefore, it is quite apparent that the

proceedings dated 19.1.2001 stated to have been issued

by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board was one other fraudulent

manipulation in the creation of records at the instance

of the parties, who wanted to gain a hold over the land

in S.No.297/1. Since the starting point for the the 11th

respondent to claim title in respect of the subject land

in S.No.297/1 in an extent of 0.90 cents is the sale

deeds, dated 15.3.1996, it will have to be stated that

the attempt of the parties concerned to grab the

Government land must have emanated in and around that

date, namely, 15.3.1996, since it is claimed in the

sale deed, dated 15.3.1996 that the purchasers were

already in possession, it only goes to show that every

attempt was made to de-fraud the State by manipulating

the government records to snatch away the valuable land

and make some unlawful gains.

75. In the above said background, the impugned

order of the DRO, dated 15.6.2006, is perused. His

conclusions that records were manipulated and

documents were fabricated to suit the needs of the

parties to unlawfully grab the land were perfectly

justified.

76. One other set of documents on which

reliance was placed upon by the 11th respondent to

support his claim was the reclassification ordered by

the C.M.D.A., and the subsequent notification issued

by the State Government reclassifying the land from one

of “institutional zone” to “residential zone”. The

C.M.D.A., issued a notification No.R1/3/2005 by way of

paper publication both in an English daily and a Tamil

daily. In the said notification, the C.M.D.A. has

referred to various requests made by different parties

for reclassification of lands in use and the details

of the same. In Serial No.14, the name of the applicant

has been mentioned as Thiru. Ramamoorthy and others

with reference to T.S.No.14/2, Block No.129 of

Kodambakkam Village. The site address has been mentioned

as Bharathidasan Salai, Ashok Nagar, Chennai. The

extent has been shown as 0.36.7 in the column and the

use as per first master plan, it is mentioned as

“institutional use zone”. In the column change of land

use requested by the applicant, it is mentioned as

“Primary Residential use zone for construction of

residential building”. At the bottom of the

notification, it is stated that the land use maps

relating to all the above reclassification requests are

available for inspection in their office between 10.00

A.M. to 1.00 P.M. on any working day. Thereafter,

there was a gazette notification, dated 22.2.2006

wherein, after referring to the power delegated by the

Government of Tamil Nadu, the C.M.D.A. made the following

variation in the master plan by way of an explanatory

note, which was stated as under:

“T.S.No.14/2, (old S.No.279
part), Block 129, Chennai District
classified as “institutional” use zone
is now reclassified as “primary
residential” use zone as per this
Notification.”

77. By referring to the above two documents,

it was contended on behalf of the respondents 11 to 64

that when necessary steps were taken by issuing the above

notification for reclassification of the lands from

“institutional zone” to “primary residential zone” if

really any one much less, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board

or the State Government, had any concern for the

subject land in S.No.297/1, the same should have been

raised in the form of objections or representations to

the C.M.D.A., in response to the above notification

which was issued on 22.2.2006.

78. The submission was that since none were

interested in the property as lawful owner other than

the predecessor in title from whom the property was

purchased by the 11th respondent and others, it was too

late in the day for the Pro Bono Publico and for

anybody else to interfere with the lawful rights of the

11th respondent and the respondents 12 to 64 through

him. We are not able to appreciate the submission of

the respective counsel based on the above referred to

proceedings of the C.M.D.A. After all, the C.M.D.A.,

issued a Notification No.R1/3/05, combining various

applications seeking for reclassification of several

lands, which also called for objections from whomsoever

interested in those lands. It will have to be

remembered that the C.M.D.A. was not concerned with

the correctness or otherwise of the ownership rights

when somebody applied to it seeking for

reclassification. The C.M.D.A. is not the authority

concerned to decide ownership right of any party

concerned. Since because it called for objections as

regards the reclassification of the lands as a statutory

authority, it cannot be taken to mean that by itself

created a valid right in favour of the applicant who

sought for the re-classification. The ownership right

in respect of any immovable property by anyone has to be

established by unimpeachable title deeds, tracing such

title from the date of its origin. Unless such title

is traced without any ambiguity, viz., the immovable

property concerned, merely because one applied for

reclassification to a statutory authority, namely, the

C.M.D.A., and that such authority, subsequently,

accepted the application and notified the

reclassification cannot be taken to mean that on that

score a valid title came to be established in favour

of the concerned applicant and on that basis, the

rights of the original owner, in the case on hand, the

Tamil Nadu Housing Board/State Government would

automatically cease to exist. The submission made on

behalf of the respondents 11 to 64 on the above

referred to documents can only be stated as a feeble

attempt to retain possession of the Government land

which possession as claimed from the sale deed, dated

15.3.1996 was illegal and was nothing but an attempt

by way of deliberate land grabbing. Therefore, we

reject the submissions made by referring to the

above proceedings of C.M.D.A.

79. One other aspect to be examined is the

grievance of the 11th respondent and the other

petitioner in W.P.Nos.8624 and 8625 of 2007 where

they have challenged the orders of the 7th and 9th

respondents, namely, the Special Commissioner and

Commissioner of Land Administration and the DRO, dated

28.2.2007 and 15.2.2006.

80. One of the grievances of the petitioner

was that the 9th respondent, namely, D.R.O., passed his

orders levelling very many mala fide and derogatory

remarks both against the 11th respondent and his

predecessor in title and very many statutory authorities

and that such serious remarks came to be made

without giving proper opportunity to the 11th

respondent. In other words, even without any notice

to the 11th respondent, the DRO, passed his orders,

dated 15.6.2006, which was confirmed by the Special

Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration

without passing a reasoned order.

81. To buttress the above stand, it was

contended on behalf of the State that the 11th

respondent was issued with a notice, dated

24.3.2006, wherein, while directing him not to proceed

with the construction, he was informed about the

pending proceedings as regards the grant of patta in

the Office of the District Collector. It was therefore,

contended that since specific intimation was given to

him as regards the patta proceedings, he cannot be heard

to say that he had no notice. However, when we examine

the various records placed before us, even the

original records, culminating in the order of DRO,

dated 15.6.2006, we were not able to find any specific

notice having been issued to the 11th respondent

calling upon him to attend any enquiry before the

D.R.O., for cancellation of patta. In the order, dated

15.6.2006, the D.R.O. himself has mentioned that

enquiry was conducted on various dates, between

14.6.2005 and 31.3.2006 and one Thiru. Chitrarasu one of

the respondents appeared for the enquiry only on

9.8.2005, 13.10.2005 and 28.2.2006.

82. It is also stated that despite

information to Thiru.MahendrakumarJain, Thiru.Udhayakumar

and Thiru. Ramamoorthy Saravanakumar representing Metro

Steel Rolling Mills Ltd., they did not appear for the

enquiry and that the respondent Thiru. T.Chitrarasu

claimed that he represented other respondents

including Mahendra Kumar Jain and others. However, the

fact remains that no specific notice appeared to have

been issued to the 11th respondent or Ramamoorthy

Saravanakumar or Mr.Mahendra Kumar Jain.

83. A copy of the order, dated 15.6.2006 of the

D.R.O. was however, sent to Mahendra Kumar Jain,

Director of Metro Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd.,

through the 11th respondent and Mr.Ramamoorthy

Sarvanakumar. As far as the appellate authority’s

order, dated 28.2.2007, passed by the Special

Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration is

concerned, all parties were duly heard. As far as the

said order is concerned, the grievance of the 11th

respondent is that there was total non application of

mind while passing the said order. In fact, on a

perusal of the order, dated 28.2.2007, we find that

the authority has merely referred to various documents

in the major part of his order and in the penultimate

para of the order, he reached an abrupt conclusion that a

perusal of the entire records disclosed that the suit

lands in S.No.297/1 covered by award No.5/74, dated

4.1.1975 was handed over to P.W.D. for construction of

Government Peripheral Hospital and therefore, the order

of the D.R.O., dated 15.6.2006 does not call for

interference. Though such infirmities as regards

service of notice did exist in respect of the above

referred to orders of the D.R.O., and the Special

Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration, we

feel that on that score also there is no need to call

upon those authorities to renew the proceedings.

Since whatever grievance the petitioners in

W.P.Nos.8624 and 8625 of 2007, wanted to urge before

those authorities were elaborately addressed before us,

we feel that there would be no point in directing those

authorities to reopen those proceedings since we have

considered all the above referred to submissions in

detail and have reached a conclusion that the

petitioner, namely, the 11th respondent in W.P.No.8624

of 2007 and the other petitioner in W.P.No.8625 of

2007 have no valid right in respect of 0.90 cents in

S.No.297/1 for the reasons we have adduced in this

order. Those orders of the D.R.O., and the Special

Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration,

dated 15.6.2006 and 28.2.207, respectively, therefore,

do not call for any interference.

84. One other issue raised on behalf of the

11th respondent was the locus standi of the petitioner

and the interloper in filing this Public Interest

Litigation.

85. Submissions were also made on behalf of the

respondents 11 to 64 casting serious aspersions

against the interloper as well as the pro bono publico.

As far as the interloper Mr.Arumuga Pandian was

concerned, it was contended that he himself did not

have valid right in respect of the lands in S.No.297/1

and that he made every attempt to grab the land by

resorting to various litigations and that since he

failed in some of the proceedings filed in this Court,

he wanted to wreak revenge on the 11th respondent by

setting up the pro bono publico under the garb of

public interest litigation.

86. As far as the petitioner in Public

interest litigation is concerned, we were taken through

certain newspaper representations and certain alleged

telephonic conversation made by the said petitioner,

wherein, he attempted to blackmail the 11th

respondent by threatening to resort to this

litigation.

87. At the outset, we are not inclined to go

into the details of very many litigations perpetrated

by the interloper Mr. Arumuga Pandian since we have

come to a definite conclusion based on the various

materials placed before us that the subject land in

S.No.297/1 absolutely belonged to the Tamil Nadu

Housing Board and nobody else has got any right in

respect of the said property. When we come to such a

definite conclusion as regards the subject land, the

litigations perpetrated by the interloper are of no

consequence. In other words, the said conclusion of

ours as regards the subject land would operate not only

as against the 11th respondent and the respondents 12

to 64 but also against the interloper Arumuga Pandian

himself. In the Public Interest Litigation, the role of

the petitioner or anyone supporting the petitioner

would be only to bring to the notice of the Court the

predominant public interest involved and thereafter,

it is for the Court to examine whether any real public

interest is involved or not in the PIL. In the event of

the Court finding a predominant public interest, which

required to be safeguarded, the Court will take every

effort to safeguard such interest and in that

process, there is no scope for anyone to gain any

personal advantage much less by the petitioner concerned

or anyone supporting the petitioner.

88. Viewed in that angle, we hold that when in

the public interest litigation, the issue related to

protection of the State owned housing board lands from

the clutches of the land grabbers and once this Court

is able to ascertain the status of the subject

property as the property of the Housing Board and

appropriate orders can be issued for protecting the

status of the property, viz, the Housing Board, then it

will be a wasteful exercise if the allegations and

counter allegations as between the petitioner, the

interloper and the 11th respondent are seriously

discussed in this order. Therefore, we reiterate that

such allegations and counter allegations which are to

very large extent personal as between the petitioner in

the public interest litigation, the interloper and the

11th respondent they are not germane to the real public

interest to be protected and therefore sans of those

allegations, we wish to save the land of the Housing

Board and protect its possession in the interest of

public at large.

89. As far as the petitioner was concerned,

as stated by us earlier, it was contended that he

claimed ransom for not raising this issue and since the

11th respondent refused to budge to his demand with a

view to wreak vengence, he has come forward with this

Public Interest Litigation.

90. As far as the interloper, Thiru. Arumuga

Pandian is concerned, it was contended that he

himself was one of the encroachers and in order to

restore his unlawful possession, he perpetrated several

litigations and since he could not secure any

orders in any of those proceedings, he set up the

petitioner by furnishing all the materials to file

this litigation.

91. We reiterate that we are not inclined to

go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations

levelled against the petitioner in the PIL., or the

interloper since based on the materials placed before

us, both by the petitioner as well as the respondents,

we are convinced that the 11th respondent himself was

not legally entitled to remain in possession, inasmuch

as the subject land belongs to the State and the

Tamil Nadu Housing Board. As per various proceedings

issued by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, the subject land

was allotted for the construction of a peripheral

hospital in a Housing Board colony. On this aspect, we

also wish to refer to few decisions of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, where the scope of the PIL has been

elaborately dealt with and guidelines have been given

to deal with such litigations. The said decisions are

reported in 2004(3) SCC 349 Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs.

West Bengal, 2004(3) SCC 363 and 2004 (5) CTC 748.

92. In 2004 (3) SCC 349, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has succinctly stated the position in pargraph 12.

The said position was reiterated in 2004 (3) SCC 363.

In the said decision in paragraphs 4, 14 and 15, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained how to handle such

public interest litigation which reads as under:-

“4. ………………There must
be real and genuine public interest
involved in the litigation and concrete or
credible basis for maintaining a cause
before court and not merely an adventure
of a knight errant borne out of wishful
thinking. It cannot also be invoked by
a person or a body of persons to further
his or their personal causes or satisfy
his or their personal grudge and enmity.
Courts of justice should not be allowed
to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by
resorting to the extraordinary
jurisdiction. The credibility of such
claims or litigations should be adjudged
on the creditworthiness of the materials
averred and not even on the credentials
claimed of the person moving the courts in
such cases. ………

14. The Court has to be
satisfied about: (a) the credentials of
the applicant; (b) the prima facie
correctness or nature of information
given by him; and (c) the information
being not vague and indefinite. The
information should show gravity and
seriousness involved. Court has to strike
a balance between two conflicting
interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to
indulge in wild and reckless allegations
besmirching the character of others; and

(ii) avoidance of public mischief and to
avoid mischievous petitions seeking to
assail, for oblique motives, justifiable
executive actions.” …………….

15. Courts must do justice by
promotion of good faith, and prevent law
from crafty invasions. Courts must
maintain the social balance by
interfering where necessary for the sake
of justice and refuse to interfere where
it is against the social interest and
public good. (See State of Maharashtra Vs.
Prabhu and A.P. State Financial Corpn. V.
Gar Re-Rolling Mills.)

93. When we apply the above standards

prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the case on

hand and having regard to the caution outlined by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, we made a detailed reference to

the various materials in order to ensure that under

the guise of PIL anyone’s private interest should not be

allowed to be seriously impaired.

94. In our considered opinion, the materials

placed before the Court disclose that if the issue

raised in the PIL, is not probed into, then it may

result in a public wrong or public injury, on the

other hand, the issue if probed into, then it would

result in redressal of a genuine public wrong.

Further, eschewing the alleged antecedents of the

petitioner as well as the interloper, having regard

to the voluminous documents placed before us, we were

able to sift the materials and ascertain the

correctness of the information furnished by the

petitioner and the interloper and we were able to find

out that such informations were not vague or

indefinite. That apart, in our conclusion, based on such

materials and the information, we could assess the

gravity and the seriousness of the issue involved.

95. In that process, we could notice that

very valuable land to an extent of 0.90 cents located

in a very prime locality surrounded by a Housing Board

Colony occupied by several thousands of citizens have

been deprived of full-fledged peripheral hospital being

set up by a calculated move to grab the said land by

twisting and creating records to suit the purpose of

such land grabbing attempt.

96. Therefore, though it was shown to us that

adjacent to the subject land, peripheral hospital has

been located and is functioning, it will have to be

held that it is not for the 11th respondent or for that

matter any other encroacher to state where and how any

land allotted for a public purpose should be

utilised. When the subject land was specifically

earmarked by the State Government for the construction of

a hospital to cater to the welfare of the public at

large, it cannot lie in the mouth of an encroacher to

state that a hospital with some facilities has been

set up in the adjacent land and therefore, the

encroached land which was also meant for the

construction of a hospital should be left out to be

enjoyed by the encroacher sacrificing the need of the

public at large. We are not in a position to appreciate

such a stand put forth on behalf of the 11th

respondent.

97. All the above factors would go to show that

irrespective of the allegations against the petitioner

and the interloper having regard to the gravity of the

issue highlighted and brought to our notice which in our

considered opinion is in the interest of the public at

large, we are convinced that necessary orders should be

passed in this PIL to ensure that no one is permitted

to grab the Government land earmarked for the development

of such land for the welfare of the public at large.

98. In such a situation, when the 11th respondent

wants to rely upon the orders of this Court passed in

W.P.No.20552 of 2003, dated 19.12.2003, the order dated

19.4.2005 in W.P.No.5630 of 2005 and confirmation of the

said order in W.A.No.420 of 2006, dated 3.4.2006 and

the interim order, dated 28.3.2006 in W.P.M.P.No.9583 of

2006 in W.P.No.8618 of 2006 and the order dated

10.8.2006 passed in W.P.No.24456 of 2006, we wish to be

guided by a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

reported in (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 221 (A.V.

PAPAYYA SASTRY AND OTHERS VS. GOVT. OF A.P. AND

OTHERS). The principles set out by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in paragraphs 21-26 are very relevant, which

are extracted hereunder:

“21. Now, it is well-settled
principle of law that if any judgment or
order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be
said to be a judgment or order in law.
Before three centuries, Chief Justice
Edward Coke proclaimed:

“Fraud avoids all judicial acts,
ecclesiastical or temporal.”

22. It is thus settled proposition
of law that a judgment, decree or order
obtained by playing fraud on the court,
tribunal or authority is a nullity and
non est in the eye of the law. Such a
judgment, decree or order – by the first
court or by the final court – has to be
treated as nullity by every court,
superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any court, at any time, in
appeal, revision, writ or even in
collateral proceedings.

23. In the leading case of Lazarus
Estates Ltd., V. Beasley Lord Denning
observed: (ALL ER p. 345 C)

“No judgment of a court, no order of a
Minister, can be allowed to stand if it
has been obtained by fraud.”

24. In Duchess of Kingstone,
Smith’s Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p.644,
explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey,
C.J. Stated that though a judgment
would be res judicata and not impeachable
from within, it might be impeachable from
without. In other words, though it is
not permissible to show that the court
was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it
was “misled”. There is an essential
distinction between mistake and
trickery. The clear implication of the
distinction is that an action to set
aside a judgment cannot be brought on
the ground that it has been decided
wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the
decision was one which should not have
been rendered, but it can be set aside, if
the court was imposed upon or tricked
into giving the judgment.

25. It has been said: fraud and
justice never dwell together (fraus et just
nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit
ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus
nemini patrocinari debent).

26. Fraud may be defined as an act
of deliberate deception with the design of
securing some unfair or undeserved benefit
by taking undue advantage of another. In
fraud one gains at the loss of another.

Even most solemn proceedings stand
vitiated if they are actuated by fraud.
Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act
which vitiates all judicial acts, whether
in rem or in personam. The principle of
“finality of litigation” cannot be
stretched to the extent of an absurdity
that it can be uitlised as an engine of
oppression by dishonest and fraudulent
litigants.

99. The above principles set out by the Hon’ble

Supreme court squarely apply to the facts of this case.

When the judgment came to be passed in W.P.No.20552 of

2003 by applying the repealing Act of the Tamil Nadu

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, this

Court had no occasion to examine the nature of

possession as claimed on behalf of the erstwhile owner

Rajalakshmi Ammal. Unfortunately, the Assistant

Commissioner of Urban Land Tax also supported the

petitioner in that Writ Petition by written instruction

to the learned Special Government Pleader to the effect

that she was still in possession irrespective of the

proceedings which were available in his office in the

form of an extract from the revenue records of Guindy-

Mambalam Taluk which specifically disclosed that the

property in S.No.297/1 was transferred in the name of

Tamil Nadu Government from the erstwhile ownership of

Velu Mudaliar/Rajalakshmi Ammal.

100. In the said circumstances, none of the above

Court orders can be relied upon by the 11th respondent

as those orders would in no way support his claim.

Further, the order passed in W.P.No.20552 of 2003

cannot be relied upon by the 11th respondent, since

without disclosing the true, complete and correct facts,

the Court based on the representation of the Special

Government Pleader passed the order.

101. In that context, reliance placed upon by the

petitioner in the decision reported in JT 2007 (10)

SC 218 (M/s. Prestige Lights Ltd. V. State Bank of

India) is quite apposite. Paragraph 34 of the said

judgment is very relevant for our purpose which reads as

under:

“It is well settled that a
prerogative remedy is not a matter of
course. In exercising extraordinary
power, therefore, a Writ Court will
indeed bear in mind the conduct of the
party who is invoking such jurisdiction.
If the applicant does not disclose full
facts or suppresses relevant materials
or is otherwise guilty of misleading the
Court, the Court may dismiss the action
without adjudicating the matter. The
rule has been evolved in larger public
interest to deter unscrupulous litigants
from abusing the process of Court by
deceiving it. The very basis of the writ
jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true,
complete and correct facts. If the
material facts are not candidly stated or
are suppressed or are distorted, the very
functioning of the writ courts would
become impossible.”

102. Equally, the claim made on behalf of the 11th

respondent that the subject land has been developed by

him at a very huge cost advanced by the respondents 12

to 64 cannot also be accepted.

103. When once it is found that the right claimed

by the 11th respondent in respect of the subject land

situated in S.No.297/1 in an extent of 0.90 cents was

illegal and was not supported by any valid title and

that the said land belonged to the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board and the State Government, such pleas put forward

by the 11th respondent and the respondents 12 to 64

cannot in any way mitigate against the lawful ownership

of the State Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board.

104. In this context, the decision of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 253 (DR. G. N.

KHAJURIA AND OTHERS VS. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

AND OTHERS) can be usefully referred to. Paragraph 8 of

the said judgment is relevant for our purpose which

reads as under:

“We therefore, hold that the land
which was allotted to respondent No.2 was
part of a park. We further hold that it
was not open to the DDA to carve out any
space meant for park for a nursery school.

We are of the considered view that the
allotment in favour of respondent No.2
was misuse of power, for reasons which
need not be adverted. It is, therefore, a
fit case, according to us, where the
allotment in favour of respondent No.2
should be cancelled and we order
accordingly. The fact that respondent
No.2 has put up some structure stated to
be permanent by his counsel is not
relevant, as the same has been done on a
plot of land allotted to it in
contravention of law. As to the
submission that dislocation from the
present site would cause difficulty to
the tiny tots, we would observe that
the same has been advanced only to get
sympathy from the Court inasmuch as
children, for whom the nursery school is
meant, would travel to any other nearby
place where such a school would be set up
either by respondent No.2 or by any other
body.”

105. On behalf of the 11th respondent, reliance was

placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

reported in (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 91 (R & M TRUST

VS. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP AND OTHERS).

Specific reliance was placed upon paragraphs 34 to 36

of the said judgment which read as under:

“34. There is no doubt that delay is
a very important factor while exercising
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb
the third-party interest created on
account of delay. Even otherwise also why
should the Court come to the rescue of a
person who is not vigilant of his rights?

35. We are of the opinion that delay
in this case is equally fatal, the
construction already started by the
appellant in 1987 and building had come
up to three floors. Thereafter, it was
stopped in 1988 and in March 1991 it
resumed after permission was granted.
The writ petition was filed in November
1991 meanwhile construction was almost
complete. Therefore, delay was fatal in
the present case and learned Single Judge
rightly held it to be so. It was also
brought to our notice that 46 multi-storey
buildings have come up in this area.
Learned counsel has produced photographs
to show that buildings more than three
and four floors have been constructed
in and around this area.

36. However, we are satisfied that
there is no prohibition under the
provisions of the Act and Rules putting
the ceiling on construction of the multi-
storey building. We are also satisfied
that the delay is also fatal in the present
case.”

106. That case related to the rights of the

individual flat owners as against the promoter. It was

in that context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that

the belated approach to the Writ Court cannot be

entertained inasmuch as the subsequent development by

way of constructions made by the promoter deprived of

other occupants to claim any relief in the writ

petition as against the equitable rights of the

promoter. The said decision, therefore, does not help

the 11th respondent in the present case.

107. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of

the Supreme Court reported in (2001) 6 Supreme Court

Cases 512 (KEWEL CHAND MIMANI (D) BY LRS., VS. S.K. SEN

AND OTHERS), in particular in paragraph 27, where it

has been stated as under:

“27. ……………… it is
on this score that Mr. Nariman, the
learned Senior Advocate appearing for one
of the respondents very strongly contended
that the statute has created an
enforceable obligation and question of
acting contra to the provisions of law
does not and cannot arise. It is on this
score, the issue of complete justice
between the parties has been brought to our
notice. It is trite knowledge that
presently, the law courts are being guided
by a justice-oriented approach, since
the concept of justice is the call of the
day and the need of the hour. Justice is
the goal of jurisprudence –

processual/procedural, as much as
substantive. Puritan approach has lost its
significance in the present-day context;
since justice ought to be end product of
equity and go to the roots. It is this
complete justice between the parties which
stands statutorily recognised in
Section 108 (A) as noticed above (please
see the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in
Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. V. Ramanlal
Govindram).

108. In the subsequent paragraph, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court also highlighted how the justice-oriented

approach was not of recent origin and was being applied

even four decades ago. However, in the very same

judgment in paragraph 33, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has stated how any misplaced indulgence shown and

laxity on the part of the law courts would be an

unauthorised exercise of jurisdiction which would put

a premium on illegal acts. In paragraphs 32 and 33, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated the principles in the

following words :

“32. ……………….There must be
some semblance of right at least and
that right must continue till the judgment
is pronounced, because on the day of the
pronouncement of the judgment, the Court
can pass an appropriate order only in the
event of entitlement of such judgment,
but not otherwise. The Mimanis were in
fact not entitled to obtain the
possession on the date of the judgment
by reason of the expiry of the deed of
lease and how that right can be enforced
by the Court in the event of non-

       entitlement    thereof  -   there   is   no
       satisfactory reply thereto.             33.

The principle of justice is an inbuilt
requirement of the justice delivery
system and indulgence and laxity on the
part of the law courts would be an
unauthorised exercise of jurisdiction
and thereby put a premium on illegal acts.”

109. Therefore, the said judgment also goes to

show that where a person is in illegal possession, he

has no right to claim equitable justice.

110. On behalf of the respondents 12 to 64,

reliance was placed upon the decision reported in

(1994) 2 Supreme Court Cases 647 (A.P. State Financial

Corporation Vs. M/s.Gar Re-Rolling Mills and Another) in

the context of the orders passed in the Urban Land

Ceiling Proceedings and the order of this Court, dated

19.12.2003 passed in W.P.No.20552 of 2003. Inasmuch as

we have held that the said proceedings were not

genuinely pursued both by the authorities constituted

under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1978 and that full

facts were not placed before the Court by the petitioner

therein at the time when orders came to be passed in the

said writ petition, we do not find any scope to apply

equitable justice to be rendered under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India as stated in the above

referred to decision.

111. The other decision relied upon by the learned

Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 12 to

64 is reported in AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 2403 (The

Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board,

Bangalore, Vs. H. Narayanaiah etc., etc.). In fact, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has made it very clear in para 23,

which is asunder:

“23. ……….. We know the maxim
that “equity follows the law”. We have not
heard of the proposition that some
transcendental Equity should be so used
as to defeat or amend the law as it
stands. Maitland said long ago that
equity came to supplement and not to
supplant the law. We think that if we
were to equate a notification under
Section 18 with the notification under
Section 6 of the Act for purposes of
determining the market value, which is
to be awarded. We would be doing nothing
short of supplanting at least the law
as found clearly laid down in Section 27
of the Bangalore Act read with Section 23
of the Acquisition Act.”

112. Going by the above statement of law declared

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there can be no claim

based on equity in the light of blatant illegality

committed against the State. The other decision relied

upon is the one reported in (2007) 5 MLJ 436 (SC)-(Amey

Co-operatiave Housing Society Ltd. and Another Vs.

Public Concern for Governance Trust and Others. That

was a case where it was alleged in a PIL that a

preferential allotment of Housing Board was secured by

floating a bogus Co-operative Society and that later,

after allotment, it came to light that it was to

favour an individual developer for a commercial

venture. The Bombay High Court after accepting the

case of the Probono Publico issued directions, after

quashing the allotment, to forfeit the constructions

already made and vest it with the Statutory body for

re-allotment. In para-56, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,

taking note of the stage of the constructions (i.e.)

beyond 4th floor as well as the alternate prayer in the

PIL for making a revaluation and collect the

difference, chose to take recourse to the alternate

prayer while setting aside the order of the High Court.

In the first blush, though the above decision appear

to support the case of the contesting respondents 11 to

64 on a deeper scrutiny, we are not in a position to

apply the said decision to the facts of this case. In

the first place, that was a case where allotment of

certain flats came to be made by the statutory

Corporation by way of development of the township.

Unlike, the case on hand, where the ownership is now

claimed by resorting to an illegal act of land grabbing.

Therefore, there is no semblance of any right in the

11th respondent, as against the above referred to

decision, where initial allotment was made in a lawful

manner by a Statutory Corporation. That apart, in that

Public Interest Litigation, there was an alternate prayer

made to the effect that there should be a direction for

revaluation since one of the allegations was that the

land was undervalued while making the allotment.

Further, the land was meant for allotment to a Co-

operative Society for construction of housing, as

against the case on hand, where the allotment of the

subject land for a welfare purpose, viz., for

construction of a peripheral hospital. When there is

large scale attempt to grab the public land by making

encroachments by resorting to other illegal means even

by way of manipulation of government records, we are of

the view that the application of the above decision to

the case on hand will not be appropriate.

113. Arguments were also addressed on behalf of

the 11th respondent as well as respondents 12 to 64

based on the principle of Promissory Estoppel and the

availability of the said doctrine even against the

Government actions.

114. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for

respondents 11 as well as 12 to 64, relied upon certain

decisions based on the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.

As far as the said doctrine is concerned, it has been

explained in P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law Lexicon in the

following words.

“Estoppel, promissory. That which
arises when there is a promise which
promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on part of promisee,
and which does induce such action or
forbearance and such promise is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of promise.”

115. For the application of the said doctrine in

so far as, it is related to public bodies or the

Government, it is well settled that the same will not

apply if such promise or representation is contrary to

law or which is outside their authority or power. The

doctrine also cannot be invoked if it is found to

be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement. When we

apply the above principles to the case on hand, in the

first place, we are unable to find any definite promise

extended either by the State Government or the Tamil

Nadu Housing Board to anyone, much less, the 11th

respondent, who wants to assert his title to the

subject land.

116. In fact, if the origin of the title claimed by

the 11th respondent is examined, it is traceable from

the sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996. As far as the said

document is concerned, after a detailed analysis of

the various materials, we have held that the said

document came into existence as part of a fraudulent

creation at the instance of the erstwhile Rajalakshmi

Ammal or her so-called power agent Thiru.Mohan. We have

also referred to the written statement of the said

Rajalakshmi Ammal, in her reply notice, dated 31.3.1998,

i.e., after the execution of the so-called sale deeds,

dated 15.3.1996 to the categorical effect that the

subject lands situated in S.No.297/1 ceased to be her

property and that the State Government/Tamil Nadu Housing

Board was the owner of the above said property.

Therefore, if at all any promise is to be claimed now on

behalf of respondents 11 to 64 such promise should have

been extended by the State Government or the Tamil

Nadu Housing Board only to the said erstwhile owner

Rajalakshmi Ammal. In the light of the various factors

discussed above there could have been no scope at all

for any such promise being extended in the manner so

claimed and therefore, the very application of the

doctrine does not arise.

	117.    If      the     respondents    11   to  64 

want     to      rely      on     the        proceedings

of the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities, for the

application of the said doctrine, hereagain, it will

have to be stated that the said authorities were not

concerned with the title or ownership of the subject

lands. We have already pointed out that there were

total lack of bona fides in the issuance of the

proceedings by the said authorities inasmuch as in

their own records, the Mambalam-Guindy Taluk revenue

proceedings was very much in existence to disclose

that at no point of time after the entry of the name

of the Government as owner in respect of the land in

S.No.297/1, nobodyelse’ name was recorded in the revenue

register. In such circumstances, any contrary proceedings

issued not in consonance with the revenue register

relating to the ownership of the subject property cannot

be relied upon in order to claim any promise on the part

of the authorities of the State in order to apply the

doctrine of Promissory Estoppel as against the State

Government.

	118.      Though      in      some      of      the

proceedings    issued    by  the  Urban   Land    Ceiling

Authorities, it is stated that S.No.297/1 was further

classified as S.Nos.297/1A, 1B and 1C, there were no

such sub divisions said to be in existence in the parent

records of the Town and Country Planning Department to

support the above proceedings. Therefore, any such

proceedings issued by the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Ceiling

Authorities can only be considered as proceedings

which was contrary to law and were outside their

authority or jurisdiction. Therefore, there is no scope

for applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel on

this ground as well.

119. In fact, the decision relied upon by the

learned counsel is reported in AIR 1980 SUPREME COURT

1285 (M/s. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others Vs. The State

of Haryana and another), in paragraph 39, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has summed up the scope of application of

the doctrine against the Government in the following

words:-

“39. The scope of the plea of
doctrine of promissory estoppel against
the Government may be summed up as
follows:

(1) The plea of promissory estoppel
is not available against the exercise
of the legislative functions of the
State.

(2) The doctrine cannot be invoked
for preventing the Government from
discharging its functions under the law.

(3) When the officer of the
Government acts outside the scope of his
authority, the plea of promissory estoppel
is not available. The doctrine of ultra
vires will come into operation and the
Government cannot be held bound by the
unauthorised acts of its officers.

(4) When the officer acts within the
scope of his authority under a scheme and
enters into an agreement and makes a
representation and a person acting on that
representation puts himself in a dis-

advantageous position, the Court is
entitled to require the officer to act
according to the scheme and the agreement
or representation. The Officer cannot
arbitrarily act on his mere whim and
ignore his promise on some undefined and
undisclosed grounds of necessity or
change the conditions to the prejudice of
the person who had acted upon such
representation and put himself in a
disadvantageous position.

(5) The officer would be justified
in changing the terms of the agreement to
the prejudice of the other party on
special considerations such as difficult
foreign exchange position or other matters
which have a bearing on general interest
of the State.”

120. Applying the above restrictions stated in the

said decision to the case on hand, we are unable to

countenance the plea of the respondents 11 to 64 based

on the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.

121. In the light of our above conclusion on the

application of the doctrine promissory estoppel, the

other decisions relied upon by the learned Senior

Counsel reported in AIR 1979 SUPREME COURT 621 (

M/s.Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. The State

of Uttar Pradesh and others), (1985) 4 Supreme Court

Cases 369 (Union of India and others Vs. Godfrey Philips

India Ltd.), (2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 465 (State of

Punjab Vs. Nestle India Ltd. and Another) are also not

helpful to the respondents 11 to 64.

122. Having realised the position that no valid

title passed on to the 11th respondent, a submission

was also made to claim equity by contending that in the

light of the fact that the subject land was promoted

by the 11th respondent by investing huge sum of

rupees, viz., three crores by way of the cost of the

land, apart from the investments made by the

respondents 12 to 64 by borrowing heavy sums from banks

and financial institutions, it was submitted that a

huge structure consisting of 54 flats have been put

up which have been now sold out by 11th respondent to

the respondents 12 to 64 by way of residential flats.

123. It was contended that since the respondent

state remained as mute spectators till the completion of

the construction, it will not be equitable at this stage

for the State Government and the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board to merely state that the lands were acquired in

award No.5/74, dated 4.1.1975 and on that basis,

deprive the respondents 11 to 64 to enjoy the fruits of

promotion of the property by investing several crores of

rupees. It was, therefore, contended that equity

demands some order to be passed sustaining the rights of

the respondents 11 to 64 to retain their possession by

passing some equitable orders.

124. In the first place, though the submission

looks highly persuasive, we are not in a position to

countenance such a submission having regard to our

conclusion that the Government land was illegally

occupied by certain persons with deliberate intention to

grab the said land knowing full well that the property

belonged to the State. The respondents 11 to 64 cannot

be heard to plead ignorance of the earliest award in

Award No.14/64 or the subsequent Award No.5/74, dated

4.1.1975 as well as Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.1031,

dated 31.10.1973. It was a futile attempt on the part

of the 11th respondent to contend that in the Award

No.5/74, dated 4.1.1975, the extent of land mentioned

was only 4.05 acres and not 4.95 acres. If at all

anything is to be said about the said contention, it

can only be said that it is a myth like statement, which

was wholly incorrect. The contention of the 11th

respondent that he was unaware of the real ownership of

the State over the subject land can never be believed.

Even though in the earlier sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996,

there was no reference to the prior ownership of the

0.90 cents conveyed under those documents, at least when

the sale deed, dated 1.12.2004, was drafted, which was

sought to be conveyed by the individual parties through

the Power of Attorney, namely, M/s. TVS Finance &

Services Ltd., the ownership even prior to Velu

Mudaliar and Rajalakshmi Ammal was traced and there was

also a specific reference to the awards, namely, award

Nos.14/64 and 5/74 and when the 11th respondent wanted

to invest a huge sum of Rs.3,00,00,000/-, it is hard to

believe that he did not even bother to verify with the

relevant authorities, namely, the concerned revenue

authorities and the Town and Country Planning

Authorities, where the record of ownership is being

kept and in which records the ownership of the Tamil

Nadu Housing Board/State Government has been duly

mentioned even as on the date of the execution of the

sale deed, dated 1.12.2004.

125. The various other proceedings issued by the

Urban Land Ceiling Authorities on which heavy reliance

was sought to be placed was only a vain attempt on the

part of the 11th respondent to cover up his own

misdeeds. Apparently, in collusion with certain

other parties, who appeared to have

perpetrated the fraud by engineering the execution of the

sale deeds, dated 15.3.1996 the subsequent transaction

must have been emanated. As we have no doubt to conclude

that the whole attempt was designedly made as a

paramount exercise of land grabbing activity and

in that process to make a monetary gain by involving

gullible purchasers, namely, the respondents 12 to 64,

we are not in a position to accede to the plea of

exercise of equitable jurisdiction in favour of either

the 11th respondent or the respondents 12 to 64.

Though on behalf of the 11th respondent, it was

suggested that he was even now prepared to pay a sum

of Rs.3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores only) to the

Tamil Nadu Housing Board for conveying the subject land

in favour of the respondents 12 to 64, we are of the

view that countenancing the said prayer would only

give a wrong signal to the land grabbers to indulge in

such land grabbing activity by adopting all unlawful

tactics and by involving gullible purchasers and

ultimately come forward with such a plea and create an

impression that after carrying out all fraudulent

activities one can escape from all woe-full consequence

by getting the seal of approval of the Court under the

garb of exercise of equitable jurisdiction. Our

endeavour is to ensure that no one indulging in such

fraudulent attempt of land grabbing activity can get

away with it by seeking the sympathy of the Court on

the ground of equitable principles involving others

who were not directly involved in the fraudulent

activities designedly made.

126. As far as the respondents 12 to 64 are

concerned, though it is claimed on their behalf that

their loan transactions were scrutinised by very many

banks and financial institutions, after a detailed

analysis of the various documents, and they being

innocent purchasers of the flats, they should not be

deprived of their right to hold the flats which would

cause very serious prejudice to them inasmuch as

they have parted with the cost of construction of the

flats to the 11th respondent by making heavy

borrowings and that irrespective of they being

allowed to enjoy the possession of the flats, they

will be forced to repay the loans borrowed by them

to the banks and financial institutions. Such a plea

put forth on behalf of the respondents 12 to 64

looks quite appealing. In the first place, when their

claim is considered in the light of the rank fraud

played against the State Government, as Court of

Justice, we are bound to maintain solemnity by restoring

the property to the State which was earmarked for

extending much more greater welfare measures to the

entire public at large, who live in and around the

subject land.

127. It will have to be remembered that 0.90 cents

of land was part of other extent of lands adjacent to it

for the construction of peripheral hospital at the time

when the acquisition was made during the period, namely,

1964-1974. When a huge housing colony was proposed to

be set up, the construction of a peripheral hospital

with all facilities available in the Government General

Hospital was thought of so that the residents of the

housing colony being set up by the Tamil Nadu Housing

Board can avail the medical services of every kind in

that peripheral hospital to be set up. When the above

said land was acquired by the State and earmarked by

the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for the lofty purpose of

setting up a peripheral hospital, the action of the 11th

respondent in his attempt to gain a hold over the said

land under the guise of promoting a project cannot be

permitted to succeed and equally the claim made by the

respondents 12 to 64 through the 11th respondent that

they have made huge investment in the project cannot also

be countenanced in their favour as that would deprive

of a greater welfare activity for the benefit of the

public at large which would otherwise get defeated.

Therefore, the claims of the respondents 12 to 64 when

pitted against the entire public at large who would

otherwise avail the medical services in the event of

the peripheral hospital being set up would virtually

veto the claim of the latter. We are not, therefore,

inclined to apply the plea of equity put forth on

behalf of the respondents 12 to 64 as well in order to

permit the 11th respondent to pay back a sum of

Rs.3,00,00,000/- to the Housing Board and allow the

respondents 12 to 64 to take possession of the flats

constructed in the subject land. Further, it will also

be appropriate to mention that when there is a long

waiting list for allotment of housing board plots/flats

to the low income group and middle income group people,

who cannot afford to compete in the private real estate

market to own a residence or flat, it will be wholly

unjustified if such land grabbers are shown any sympathy

or mercy on the ground that the land was developed

after its grabbing and therefore, they should be allowed

to retain possession. It will be a misplaced sympathy if

such prayers are to be countenanced, viz., the common

men, who are waiting in the long queue with the fond

hope that one day or other, he will get allotment in his

favour by the State. Of late, when owning of a piece of

land by ordinary people is becoming a dream and most of

the families are drowning in the process of buying plots

and construction of houses, it will be wholly inequitable

to consider the claim of 11th respondent and respondents

12 to 64 to recognize their illegal holding.

128. In our considered view, mere promotion of the

subject land by way of construction of so many flats by

itself need not stand in the way of restoration of the

land to the State Government as we feel the interest of

respondents 12 to 64 can to some extent obviated by

suggesting some other alternatives. We wanted to be firm

and ensure that the ownership of the land of the

State/Tamil Nadu Housing Board is restored from the

clutches of any encroachers and in the case on hand,

from the 11th respondent at this point in order to

send a clear message that no one who indulge in such

land grabbing activity can never be successful in

their attempt and that at one point of time, the long

arms of the Court will ensure that such attempts are

dethroned with a firm hand.

129. Having regard to our conclusions, we pass the

following order:

“a. The respondents 1 to 4 are
directed to take possession of the land
situated in S.No.297/1 along with the
superstructure forthwith free from any
encumbrance from the respondent 11 as well
as 12 to 64.

b. The respondents 1 to 4 are
further directed to examine the scope of
using the construction now put up on
the subject land in S.No.297/1 in an
extent of 0.90 cents for putting the same
to the best use as part of peripheral
hospital said to have been already set up
in the rest of the land earmarked for that
purpose, if necessary, by making any
alterations required. In the event of the
respondents 1 to 4 not able to use the
building for the activities of the
peripheral hospital, it is open to the
fourth respondent to bring those flats
constructed therein for sale in public
auction and appropriate the same.

c. The 11th respondent is
directed to refund the value of purchase
money paid by respondents 12 to 64 for
the purchase of flats, along with
undivided share of the property promoted
in S.No.297/1, with interest at 6% p.a.
from the date of payment of such purchase
money within six weeks from the date of
receipt of a copy of this order. After
making the refund to respondents 12 to
64, it will be open to the 11th respondent
to claim the value of cost of construction
made in the subject land in S.No.297/1
from the 4th respondent, if so advised. It
is for the 11th respondent to work out
his claim as against the 4th respondent
and it is open to the 4th respondent to
deal with the said claim, if made, in
accordance with law.

d. The respondents 1 to 4 and 8
are directed to place all the
documents, concerning the subject land
right from award No.14/1964 till the so-
called transfer of patta stated to have
been made in favour of the 11th
respondent and two others, dated
10.6.2004 and 5.5.2005 including the Urban
Land Ceiling Proceedings, before the CBCID
Authorities to cause an investigation and
in the event of prima facie case being
made out, every endeavour to book the
culprits, be it the Government Authorities
or the 11th respondent or the erstwhile
owner Rajalakshmi Ammal or her so-called
power agent Thiru.Mohan or the purchaser of
the sale deed, dated 15.3.1996 or their
Power of Attorney M/s.TVS Finance &
Services Ltd. or any other person involved
in manipulation of any of the records.
The records should be handed over within
one month from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order.

e. Having regard to the magnitude
of the scandal relating to the Government
property and since a considerable time of
this Court had to be devoted in this
litigation, we feel it appropriate to
impose exemplary costs on the 11th
respondent and the 11th respondent is
directed to pay costs of Rs.50000/-. Out
of the said sum of Rs.50000/-, a sum of
Rs.35000/- shall be paid to the Tamil Nadu
Mediation and Conciliation Centre, a sum of
Rs.5000/- to the Indian Red Cross Society,
Tamil Nadu Branch and the balance sum of
Rs.10000/- to the Tamil Nadu State Legal
Services Authority. The costs should be
paid within four weeks from the date of
receipt of a copy of this order.

f. It is also made clear and
declared that none of the other parties,
either the petitioner or the interloper
Arumuga Pandian or anybody else have got
any right in respect of the land situated
in S.No.297/1. Apart from the construction
made by the 11th respondent, if there are
any other encroachments in the said survey
number, it is open to the respondents 1 to
4 as well as the respondents 8, 9 and 10
to take necessary lawful action for
removing such encroachments.

g. The Fourth respondent is
directed to ensure the compliance of the
directions contained in paras (a), (b),

(d) and (f) of this order within six months
from the date of receipt of a copy of
this order and file a report in proof of
such compliance into the Registry.

                   h.  W.P.No.4950  of  2007    is
       allowed    with   the   above   directions.
       W.P.No.8624   and  8625    of    2007   are

dismissed confirming the orders of the
D.R.O., dated 15.6.2006 and the order of
the Special Commissioner and Commissioner
of Land Administration, dated 28.2.2007
and W.P.No.8618 of 2006 is also dismissed.
All connected W.P.M.Ps. are closed. Costs
as directed in sub-para (e) of this order.

RNB

To

1. The Secretary
Housing & Urban Development Department
Government of Tamil Nadu
Fort. St. George
Chennai 9.

2. The Secretary
Public Works Department
Fort St. George
Chennai 9.

3. The Secretary
Health Department
Fort St. George
Chennai 9.

4. The Managing Director
Tamil Nadu Housing Board
No.493
Anna Salai
Nandanam
Chennai 35.

5. The Commissioner
Corporation of Chennai
Rippon Buildings
Chennai.

6. The Member Secretary
CMDA
Thalamuthu Natrajan Maaligai
Egmore
Chennai 8.

7. The Spl. Commissioner & Commissioner of Land Administration
Chepauk
Chennai 5.

8. The Collector
Chennai Collectorate
M.Singaravelar Maaligai
Chennai 1.

9. The District Revenue Officer
Chennai District
Chennai 1.

10. The Tahsildar
Mambalam-Guindy Taluk
Taluk Office
Bharathidasan Colony
K.K. Nagar
Chennai 78.