ORDER
1. By order F. No. 1/45/Tech/94-SC dated November 11, 1994, as amended by the order dated December 16, 1994, the Chairman of the Income-tax Settlement Commission constituted a Special Bench comprising the following :
1. Shri S.B. Potnis Chairman
2. Shri P.K. Appachoo Vice-Chairman, Additional Bench,
Bombay
3. Shri A.C. Mathur Vice-Chairman, Additional Bench,
Calcutta
4. Shri A.N. Misra Member, Principal Bench, New
Delhi
5. Shri O.N. Mehrotra Member, Additional Bench, Madras.
2. A single issue was set out in the abovementioned order dated November 11, 1994, for the consideration of the Special Bench. This was :
“Whether in terms of the definition of ‘case’ under Section 245A(b), the proceeding’s for assessment of any person in respect of any year can be said to be ‘pending’ before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) after the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has passed the appellate order until the said order is ‘served’ on that person.”
3. Three of the cases where this issue arose, were notified for hearing, Two of them, Chander Kant Jain, New Delhi (applicant No. 1) and Suraj Mal Meena (Hindu undivided family), Rajasthan (applicant No. 2) were heard. One could not be heard. Shri Mohan Lal, advocate, represented applicant No. 1. Shri Y, P. Sabharwal, advocate, represented applicant No. 2. Shri S. K. Bhardwaj, Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative), represented the Department. As a single common issue is to be considered in two cases, this common order is passed in respect of them.
Facts in brief giving rise to the constitution of the Special Bench :
4. The three cases under consideration were earlier taken up by the Principal Bench, New Delhi, for passing necessary orders under Section 245D(1) either allowing the applications to be proceeded with or to reject them. The law enjoins an opportunity of hearing being given to the applicant, if the Commission proposes to reject his application. The application (S. A. No. 8/9/515 of 1989-I.T.) was fixed for hearing on June 7, 1993. The Bench recorded the view that the issue for consideration whether the proceeding by way of appeal in respect of the assessment year 1986-87 continued to be pending even after passing of an order in appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) until it was served on the assessee, though covered by an earlier decision of the Principal Bench in the case of Super Rubber Industries, New Delhi (S. A. No. 8/7/496 of 1988-I.T.), deserved to be reconsidered and heard by a larger Bench. The Members of the Bench as constituted for June 7, 1995, and presided over by the Chairman, had reservations about the correctness of the earlier decision on the subject.
5. The other two applications (S. A. No. 8/27 of 1993/1-I.T. and S. A. No. 9/31 of 1992/7-I.T.) involving a similar issue were subsequently decided to be referred to the Special Bench. That is how the Special Bench came to be constituted by the Chairman under Section 245BA(5A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for July 8, 1994, and on adjournment of hearing again for January 27, 1995.
6. We have given a chronology of the events in this regard in some detail, because learned counsel for the applicants Nos. 1 and 2 expressed some doubt regarding the propriety of the order to constitute a Special Bench. Counsel relied on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in V. V. Tram-Investments (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1994] 207 ITR 508. Shri Mohan Lal, counsel for the applicant, pleaded that so far as his knowledge goes, there is no conflicting order on the issue by any Bench of the Commission and the Constitution of the Special Bench is not called for when the conflict of views does not exist. Shri Y. P. Sabharwal, counsel for the applicant, made, similar arguments and also contended that conflict of views among the different Benches of the Commission is not clear from the order constituting the Special Bench. Shri S. K. Bhardwaj, Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative), argued that the order of the Chairman is indicative of the difference of opinions among the Members of the Commission and that would be sufficient ground for constituting a larger Bench to render a binding opinion for the sake of uniformity of views among the different Benches. He also pointed out that the Supreme Court has admitted (see [19941 210 ITR (St.) 11) an appeal by special leave against the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
7. We have already stated the circumstances under which the order
under Section 245BA(5A) came to be passed by the Chairman, There was
a judicial order for reference by the Principal Bench, New Delhi, when
the question came up for consideration on June 7, 1993, in the case of
applicant No. 1 and the Bench recorded that the earlier decision of the
same Bench required reconsideration. Thus, the order of the Chairman
to constitute the Special Bench is well in accordance with law as explained
in the decision (supra).
Factual matrix of the issue for consideration in the three applications :
Applicant No. 1-Chander Kant Jain
(i) Date of filing the settlement application for the
assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88 2-1-1990
(ii) Date of appellate order of the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) for the assessment year
1986-87 21-12-1989
(iii) Date of service of the appellate order on the
applicant 22-1-1990
(iv) Date of despatch of the appellate order to the
Commissioner of Income-tax 28-12-1989
8. The issue for consideration in this case is whether the proceeding by way of appeal for the assessment year 1986-87 was pending before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on the date (i.e., January 2, 1990) of making the application under Section 245C(1), after the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had passed the appellate order on December 21, 1989, and served it on the applicant on January 22, 1990.
Applicant No. 2-Messrs. Suraj Mal Meena (Hindu undivided family):
(i) Date of making the settlement application for the
assessment years 1980-81 to 1988-89 12-4-1993
(ii) Date of appellate orders of the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) for the assessment years
1961-82 to 1987-88 29-3-1993
(iii) Date on which the appellate orders sent by
registered post to the applicant 31-3-1993
9. The above facts were not denied by Shri Y. P. Sabharwal, counsel for applicant No. 2. He, however, expressed his inability to give the relevant facts due to the absence of the applicant. We also noted that in his reply dated January 3, 1994, to the show-cause notice dated December 9, 1993, learned counsel did not give the exact date of service of the appellate order by making a non-committal statement that the appellate orders were not received on or before April 12, 1993. Since the orders were sent by registered post on March 31, 1993, as stated before us by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative), they must have been received by the applicant within reasonable time before April 12, 1993. Be that as it may, in this case also a similar issue arises for consideration.
Applicant No. 3-Guli Chand, Faridabad :
(i) Date of making the settlement application for the
assessment years 1989-90 and 1990-91 5-2-1993
(ii) Date of assessment order under Section 148 for the
assessment year 1990-91 2-2-1993
(iii) Date of service of the order on the applicant 10-2-1993
(iv) Date of filing an appeal before the Deputy
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) 1-3-1993
10. Nobody appeared before us on behalf of applicant No. 3. The question arising in this case is slightly different. What is in issue is whether the proceeding for the assessment year 1990-91 was pending before the Assessing Officer after he had passed the order prior to the date of filing the settlement application. The frame of the question for consideration before us also does not cover the controversy involved in this case. Therefore, we decided to take out this case from the purview of our consideration.
The submissions made before us :
11. Learned counsel for the two applicants made the following submissions :
(a) A proceeding by way of appeal once commenced by institution of an appeal gets concluded by communication of the order in writing of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) disposing of the appeal under Sub-section (7) of Section 250.
(b) Section 250 with Sub-section s (1) to (7) entitled “Procedure in appeal” is a complete code on the subject. The obligation on the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to communicate the order passed by him to the assessee and to the Commissioner of Income-tax is the last stage of the completion of appeal proceeding. It is significantly put separately in Sub-section (7). That it is significant is proved by the fact that despite Section 253(3} providing for the right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal to be filed within 60 days of the date of communication, the Legislature still provided for an obligation on the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to communicate the order. By comparison, there is significant absence of such obligation of communication on the Commissioner of Income-tax who passes an order under Section 263(1) or 264. Likewise, there is no requirement of law for communication of the assessment orders framed under Sections 143(3), 144 and 147. The provisions speak about the assessment order in writing, but are silent about the service of the order.
(c) The applicant can make an application under Section 245C(1) read with Section 245A(b) “at any stage of the proceeding relating to him” and this expression should be interpreted to mean all stages of the appeal under Section 250 including the last stage of communication of the appellate
order.
(d) According to Shri Mohan Lal, the issue is not whether the appellate order is valid or invalid till it is communicated to the assessee.
The real issue is that in order to be an effective and valid order, it should be communicated, or else it cannot take away the valuable right of the applicant to make, an application to the Settlement Commission at any stage of the appeal proceeding. Shri Y. P. Sabharwal argued further that the appellate order cannot be taken to be passed till communicated to the assessee and the date of the order would be the date of communication. On a query from the Bench whether the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) can change his order or cancel it for rehearing, before he serves such order on the assessee and the Commissioner of Income-tax. Shri Sabharwal replied that the appellate authority can do so without hearing the two parties, while Shri Mohan Lal said that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) will follow the rules of natural justice in allowing the opportunity of being heard before changing or cancelling the order.
(e) Though putting the date in an assessment or reassessment passed by an Assessing Officer is essential, yet there is no uniform practice in the Department regarding date of order. It is only Section 250(7) which, in turn, deals with the date of service of the appellate order. It is only after the communication of the order that rights and duties of the assessee as well as of the Department are determined. The further right to pursue his remedy with the Appellate Tribunal is filing an appeal under Section 253(3) within 60 days of the date of communication of the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The right to pursue his remedy with the Settlement Commission would be available to the applicant till the date of communication of the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to him.
(f) Both counsel relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Mahabir Prasad Poddar [1974] 93 ITR 215. The Calcutta High Court drew support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395, and observed that an order made by an authority under a statutory provision does not become an order as soon as it is drawn up and signed. It does not become an effective and valid order until it is served upon the party affected. The requirement of communication arises only when a party is likely to be deprived of his right to property or is likely to be otherwise prejudiced by the order.
12. To sum up, counsel for the applicant pleaded that the Special Bench may uphold the decision in the case of Super Rubber Enterprises.
13. Shri S. K. Bhardwaj, Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative), countered all the foregoing arguments. He argued that
the reliance by the applicants on the decision in CIT v. Mahabir Prasad Poddar [1974] 93 ITR 215 (Cal), is not apposite because whatever was observed there in the context of an administrative order under Section 132(8) of the Income-tax Act cannot be applied while interpreting the provisions of Section 250(6) and (7) which deal with the quasi-judicial order disposing of appeal. The Calcutta High Court drew support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395, which case also dealt with the validity of an administrative order of suspension of a Government servant. The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative) referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, AIR 1970 SC 214 (discussed at page 130 of K. U. Srinivasa Rao v. CWT [1985] 152 ITR 128 (AP). There the expression which fell for construction was the word “communicate”. The question was, when does an order of suspension pending enquiry passed against a Government servant take effect ? The Supreme Court held that the word “communicate” cannot be interpreted to mean that the order would become effective only on its receipt by the concerned Government servant. It was held that the communication is complete once the order is put in the course of transmission and thus goes out of the control of the authority passing it. Shri Bhardwaj pleaded that even though the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court are in the context of an administrative order and as such are not applicable to an appellate order under Section 250 which, without any dispute, is a quasi-judicial order, yet the applicant, Suraj Mal Meena (Hindu undivided family), would lose its claim regarding pendency of appeal on the date of filing the application. In this case, the appellate order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) sent by registered post on March 31, 1993, will stand communicated to the applicant in accordance with the Supreme Court decision in Khemji Ram’s case, AIR 1970 SC 214. Shri Bhardwaj, however, submitted that the Department’s case is based on the correct interpretation of the words “any proceeding by way of appeal …. which may be pending” in Section 245A(b) which is the sine qua non for making an application to the Commission.
14. Shri Bhardwaj quoted the meaning of “pending” from the various
law dictionaries as under :
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth edition :
“Begun, but not yet completed ; during ; before the conclusion of ; prior to the completion of ; unsettled ; undetermined ; in process of
settlement or adjustment. Thus, an action or suit is ‘pending’ from its inception until the rendition of final judgment.”
Law Lexicon by Venkataramaiya :
“Legal proceeding is ‘pending’ as soon as commenced and until it is concluded, i.e., so long as the court having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matters in issue, or to be dealt with therein ;”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary :
“Not yet decided ; in continuance ; in suspense.”
15. According to him, the proceeding once commenced remain pending till concluded by the concerned authority. A proceeding by way of appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) commences as soon as an appeal in the prescribed form duly verified is filed within the prescribed time. This is provided in Section 249. The next Section 250 with headnote “Procedure in appeal” provides for the steps of hearing and disposal of the appeal and also for communication of the order to both the parties. The conclusion of the proceeding is with the passing of an order disposing of the appeal in writing under Sub-section (6) of Section 250. The communication of such order to the concerned parties is a stage subsequent to disposal of the appeal by an order. This is clear from the opening words in Sub-section (7) of Section 250 : “On the disposal of the appeal . . . .” No special meaning can be attached to Sub-section (7) by comparing these provisions with the provision in Sections 143(3), 144, 147, 263 and 264. A quasi-judicial ‘order like an assessment order, an appellate order or an order of revision takes effect when passed in writing by the authority competent to pass it. Such order may not be made in the presence of the assessee or appellant and, hence, the law requires that it should be served or communicated. Even though the law under Section 153 prescribed a period of limitation for making an order of assessment/reassessment, it does not further require that it should be communicated within the period prescribed. He relied on the decision referred in Srinivasa Rao (K. U.) v. CWT [1985] 152 ITR 128 (AP).
16. The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative) pointed out that there is no period of limitation for the passing of an appellate order by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Still the two separate stages of making of an order in writing and service or communication thereof to the concerned parties are clearly marked out in the two Sub-section s (6) and (7) of Section 250. No special meaning can be attached to the location of such provision and counsel for the applicants
are not correct to assert that communication of an appellate order is also * a stage before the conclusion of the proceeding in appeal. He contended that the pendency of the proceeding in appeal cannot go beyond the date of the passing of the order under Section 250(6).
17. Shri Bhardwaj explained that the applicant’s right to approach the Settlement Commission by filing the application arises with the commencement of a proceeding by way of appeal under Section 249 and gets extinguished with the disposal of the appeal by an order in writing under sectipn 250(6). There is no prejudice caused to the assessee by such extinguishment, because his other right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal starts from the date of communication of the order by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).
18. The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative) pointed out that the Calcutta High Court’s decision in Mahabir Prasad Poddar’s case [1974] 93 ITR 215 had been inappropriately relied on by the Principal Bench, because the High Court was dealing with an administrative order. This decision was discussed by the Supreme Court in their judgment in OT v. Oriental Rubber Works [1984] 145 ITR 477. The Supreme Court modified the Calcutta decision by observing that the communication of the Commissioner of Income-tax’s approval under Section 132(8) must be made as expeditiously as possible after the order of approval is passed by him. It is nobody’s case before the Special Bench that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)’s order under Section 250(6) was not served on the applicant within reasonable time. None of the counsel has pleaded that the relevant appellate order in the applicant case is ineffective and invalid for whatever reason. The reliance on the Calcutta decision is, therefore, misplaced.
Special Bench’s conclusion :
19. We have carefully considered the contentions of counsel for the applicants and also of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative). We feel that the controversy before us has been blown up out of focus by the sheer force of sophistry and by quoting from the judicial decisions out of the context. The real issue is whether a proceeding in appeal which commenced with the filing of an appeal under Section 249 before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) gets concluded with the passing of an order in writing by him under Section 250(6) or with the communication of the said order under Section 250(7). For our focus, the relevant provisions of law are as follows :
Section 245C(1) : “An assessee may, at any stage of a case relating to
him, make an application in such form and in such
manner as may be prescribed, and containing a full
and true disclosure of his income which has not
been disclosed before the Assessing Officer, the
manner in which such income has been derived,
the additional amount of income-tax payable on such
income and such other particulars as may be
prescribed, to the Settlement Commission to have
the case settled and any such application shall be
disposed of in the manner hereinafter provided :”
Section 245A(b) : “In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires,– ….
(b) ‘case’ means any proceeding under this Act for
the assessment or reassessment of any person in
respect of any year or years, or by way of appeal
or revision in connection with such assessment or
reassessment, which may be pending before an
income-tax authority on the date on which an appli-
cation under Sub-section (1) of Section 245C is
made:”
Section 249 : “(1) Every appeal under this Chapter shall be in the
prescribed form and shall be verified in the
prescribed manner.
(2) The appeal shall be presented within thirty days
of the following date, that is to say,–. …”
Section 250(6) : ” The order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals)
or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)
disposing of the appeal shall be in writing and shall
state the points for determination, the decision
thereon and the reason for the decision.
Section 250(7) : On the disposal of the appeal, the Deputy Commis-
sioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Commis-
sioner (Appeals) shall communicate the order passed
by him to the assessee and to the Chief Commis-
sioner or Commissioner.”
20. We may, therefore, first find an answer to the question for our consideration from the provisions of law themselves, “Case” for the purpose of Chapter XIX-A – “Settlement of Cases” – means a proceeding in respect of one or more assessment years and may be a proceeding pending at the stage of assessment or reassessment or in appeal or revision. The pendency of a proceeding before the income-tax authority is an important condition. At any stage of such proceeding, the applicant can make an application to the Commission for settlement of his case. The question for our consideration pertains to the proceeding in appeal which commenced with the filing of an appeal within the prescribed time. We have now to decide whether the pendency of such proceeding concluded with the passing of the appellate order by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) or it continued even up to the date on which the appellate order was communicated to the applicant and the Commissioner of Income-tax.
21. There is no dispute regarding the commencement of the proceedings in appeal in the cases before us. Significantly the Act envisaged a dispute in this regard and it has been provided in the proviso to Section 245A(b) that where an appeal has been preferred after the expiry of the period specified for the filing of such appeal and which has not been admitted such appeal shall not be deemed to be a proceeding pending. It is clear that by the passing of an order by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 249 admitting a belated appeal, there would be a commencement of the proceeding in appeal and as such it would be pending till it is disposed of by an order of disposal in writing under Section 250(6). Thus, the Act has clearly stipulated the passing of an order admitting the belated appeal and there is no suggestion whatsoever anywhere that the order admitting the belated appeal should also have been communicated to the appellant and the Commissioner of Income-tax.
22. Since the controversy is with regard to the event happening at the conclusion of the pending proceeding, apart from what we find as the intention of law in the proviso to Section 245A(b), we may rely on the provisions of Section 250. We are not impressed with the arguments on behalf of the applicants that Section 250 with seven sub-sections is a code by itself delineating the stages of the proceeding in appeal and that subsection (7) thereof being the last stage of the proceeding in appeal should be given importance in deciding the issue. Section 250 with the heading “Procedure in appeal” deals with the procedure after the appeal has already been filed under Section 249. The pendency of the appeal, therefore, starts from the date when the appeal is filed and such date would definitely be
anterior to the date of hearing of the appeal which is the first step of the procedure in appeal provided in Section 250. Therefore, even during the interregnum between the date of the filing of the appeal and the date of first hearing of the appeal, there would be pendency in appeal. Even assuming that both Sections 249 and 250 are a complete code for the procedure in appeal, it would not mean that the pendency of appeal would continue till the date of communication of the order disposing of the appeal.
23. We may point out that we could not get a satisfactory answer to our query from counsel for the applicants. Shri Mohan Lal, advocate, stated that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) could amend his appellate order or even cancel it for rehearing provided he follows the rules of natural justice of hearing the concerned party. Impliedly he accepted that there is in existence a valid order (though unserved) disposing of the appeal which could be interfered with by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in accordance with law. On the other hand, Shri Y. P. Sabhar-wal, advocate, stated that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) could amend or cancel his appellate order remaining uncommunicated, because such order is ineffective and invalid. As pointed out in the decision in K. V. Srinivasa Rao v. CWT [1985] 152 ITR 128 (AP) referred to by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative), a quasi-judicial order is made or passed on the date on which it purports to have been made and the communication of such order would not vest it with any special significance as regards the validity of such order.
24. We are aware of the case-law on the subject of completion of assessment proceeding, vis-a-vis, the date of limitation. The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Departmental Representative) copiously quoted from judicial decisions on the subject. We also see the relevance of such case-law while deciding the issue of pendency of appeal proceeding. One of the cases cited before us is K. N. K. Reddy v. CIT [1974] 97 ITR 450 (Mys). At page 456, the following observations are very apposite and helpful :
” It cannot be denied that an order, before it is made effective, must be served on the person against whom the order is made. Thus, from the point of view of the person who is affected by the order, the order is made when it is communicated to him. But this does not mean that until an order is communicated, the order is not made at all Notice under Section 29,of the Income-tax Act presupposes an order of assessment under Section 23(1) or 23(3). Notice under Section 29 can only be served after an order of assessment is made. Thus, the making or passing of an assessment order, the issue of notice under Section 29, and service of notice or
communication of the assessment order are different stages or steps before an assessee pays the assessed tax. In other words, the date of making the order, the date of issue of notice and the date when the order is communicated need not necessarily be the same date. Admittedly, in the instant case, the order of assessment was made on March 26, 1959, which is a date within four years after the end of the assessment year. It is true that the order of assessment has been communicated to the assessee on April 1, 1959, which date falls four years after the end of the assessment year, But the date of communication of the order cannot be the date of making the order because communication pre-supposes the determination of the thing to be communicated. From the point of view of the taxability or liability to pay tax on the part of the assessee, the date of communication may be the most effective date. An order to be communicated presupposes the existence of an order and the existence of the order is only possible when the Income-tax Officer has made that order. From the point of view of the Income-tax Officer, he has discharged the statutory liability to assess if he makes an order of assessment within four years after the end of the assessment year. The statute does not say that the Income-tax Officer must communicate the order of assessment within four years after the end of the assessment year.”
25. By the same logic, the proceeding in appeal is concluded by an -order in writing of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). That order may be effective against the appellant when it is communicated to him. But this does not mean that until the order is communicated, the order is not made at all. From the point of view of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), he has discharged the statutory obligation to dispose of the pending appeal by an order in writing under Section 250(6) and has brought to conclusion the pending proceeding in appeal.
26. Before we conclude, we would like to quote from the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Rasik Ramji Kamani v. S. K. Tripathi [1993] 203 ITR 848 at pages 852-853. According to the court, it is not reasonable for an assessee to expect the Settlement Commission to function as if it were a mere rubber stamp or yet another limb of the ordinary executive mechanism of tax-gatherers. A party approaching the Settlement Commission has to adjust itself to the requirements of the scheme and the needs of the procedure.
27. We, therefore, conclude that in terms of the definition of “case” under Section 245A(b), the proceeding by way of appeal in respect of any assessment year cannot be said to be pending before the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) after the appellate authority has disposed of the appeal by an order in writing under Section 250(6) of the income-tax Act. Further the communication of the appellate order by the Commissioner (Appeals) to the assessee and to the Commissioner is subsequent to the conclusion of the appeal proceeding. We, therefore, overrule the decision of the Principal
Bench, New Delhi, in the case of Super Rubber Enterprises, New Delhi.
28. The applications in the cases of Chander Kant Jain and Suraj Mal
Meena (Hindu undivided family) as also in the case of Guli Chand, Farida-bad, will now go back to the Principal Bench of the Settlement Commission, New Delhi, for appropriate orders to be passed by them under Section 245D(1) of Income-tax Act.