High Court Patna High Court

In Re: Udit Narain vs Unknown on 14 March, 1917

Patna High Court
In Re: Udit Narain vs Unknown on 14 March, 1917
Equivalent citations: 39 Ind Cas 996
Author: Chapman
Bench: Chapman


JUDGMENT

Chapman, J.

1. In this case the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Purnea, Sudder Sub-Division, instituted proceedings under Section 145 and passed an order under Sub-section 1 of that section. The dispute appears to have been between the proprietors of the Semapur Factory and the proprietors of the Kollasy Factory. The first step was a report by a chaukidar to the Police, but before the Police took up the investigation the tenants claiming possession under the Semapur Factory instituted complaints charging members of the Kollasy Factory party with criminal trespass, mischief and rioting. There was a local enquiry into these complaints made by a Magistrate on the 24th of November 1916. In this report he recommended proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Police were accordingly directed to prepare a report in accordance with the requirements of the Code. Subsequently on the 24th of November the Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed the complaints upon the ground that several disputes were involved. On the 27th of November the Sub-Divisional Officer passed an order upon the Police report recommending that action should be taken against the Semapur Factory under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure The order on this report was the “Semapur Factory should show cause why proceedings under Section 107 should not be taken.” On the 14th of December the Semapur Factory appeared and showed cause and applied for institution of proceedings under Section 145. The Vakil for the other party, the Kollasy Factory, was heard in these proceedings. On this material the Sub-Divisional Officer elected against proceedings under Section 107 and drew up the proceedings to which I have already referred under Section 145. He found that the claim of the Semapur Factory to possession was bona fide and that it would not be possible to satisfactorily deal with the matter except under proceedings under Section 145, inasmuch as it was necessary to determine the question of actual possession. Against this order the learned District Magistrate was moved. He was of opinion that from the findings of the various officers who enquired into the matter the Kollasy Factory were in actual possession. He, therefore, directed that proceedings should be instituted under Section 107 and he directed that proceedings under Section 145 should remain in abeyance, simultaneously directing that these proceedings should be transferred to his own file.

2. It appears that on the merits the only ground upon which the District Magistrate would have been justified in interfering would be that he differed from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s finding that the claim of the Semapur Factory to possession was bona fide. No doubt there is an expression of the opinion of the learned District Magistrate upon the fact of actual possession, but I am unable to say that he has come to a finding that the claim to possession is not bona fide or has reversed the finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer to the effect that the claim was bona fide. In addition to the difficulty arising out of the merits it is, in my opinion, impossible to say that upon the same material there can be simultaneously two proceedings, one under Section 107 and the other under Section 145. The fact that the District Magistrate has maintained the proceedings under Section 145 and has not terminated them, suggests that he too thinks that there was a case under Section 145. This fortifies me in my conclusion that he did not expressly disturb the finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer as to the bona fides of the claim to actual possession. In these circumstances I am of opinion that the order directing to institute proceeding under Section 107 should be sat aside and that the matter should be dealt with under Section 145, which should be terminated by an order such as is contemplated by the law, that is to say, determination of the question of possession or in the absence of the possibility of such a determination by an order of attachment.