JUDGMENT
M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This is tenant’s petition filed under Section 15(6) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 challenging concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the courts below holding that the demised shop is required by the son of the landlord-respondents, who has completed his diploma in D. Pharma and intends to open his business of medicines. The afore-mentioned findings have been recorded in paras 14 and 15 of the judgment, which read as under:-
“Now coming to another contention, the statement made by the appellant while appearing in the witness box before the learned Rent Controller as RW-4 is quite relevant. In his cross-examination he has admitted in unequivocal terms that the respondents require the property for their personal use as there is a bona fide necessity. Besides this, the respondents had categorically pleaded in their petition in the following words:-
“The applicant requires the building in dispute bona fidely for her son Sachin Kumar who has completed in D-Pharma and intends to do his business of medicines in the building in question. The applicant has no other accommodation to give to her son for doing his business. As such the applicant requires the said shop for bona fide requirement of her son.”
In reply to these pleadings an evasive reply was filed by the applicant. It was stated by that the sub-para ii of para No. 3 of the petition was wrong and hence denied. It is almost a settled law that where the opposite party had denied a fact in an evasive manner, the leadings shall be deemed to have been admitted. Since the pleadings made by the respondents that the site in question was bonafidely required for the use of their son and they had the personal necessity were admitted by the appellant in his written statement as well as while making his statement on oath while appearing in the witness box as RW-4 the learned Rent Controller had rightly decided issue No. 3 in favour of the respondents.”
2. Mr. Gurdev Singh, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has drawn my attention to the language of Section 13(3)(a) and urged that there are specified grounds for eviction of the tenants, which are confined to specified categories of professionals and none else. According to the learned counsel, if the other family members are permitted to seek eviction under the general provision provided by Section 13(3)(a)(i) then the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) would be rendered otiose. The learned counsel has further argued that the afore-mentioned provisions is confined to residential area alone and not to that of commercial area.
3. After hearing the learned counsel, I find that the instant petition is liable to be dismissed because it has been concurrently found by both the Courts below that the demised shop is required by the landlord-respondent for personal necessity in order to establish his son by opening a chemist shop, who has qualified D-Pharma. It is well settled that personal necessity of the landlord would also include the personal necessity of his other family members like sons, daughters and even further. The afore-mentioned opinion has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, . The relevant observations on the issue made by the Supreme Court reads as under:-
“The expression for his own use as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning, the requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be requirement of the landlord for his own use. The expression-landlord requires for ‘his own use’, is not confined in its meaning to actual physical use by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal ’emanetions’ of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as inter-relationship and inter-dependence-economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society of region to which they belong. The tests to be applied are:
(i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord’s own requirement? and, (ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord s ‘his own’ occupation or user? The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as ‘his own’ and the person who would actually use the premises; (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward, and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The Court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord’s claim.
While casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life. In the instant case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii).”
In view of the above observations, I do not find any substance in the argument raised.
4. The other argument that the demised shop is required by the son of the landlord-respondent is confined only to residential area, has also not impressed me because the judgment of Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. The State of Punjab, (1996-1)112 The Punjab Law Reporter 227 as followed by this Court in Ved Parkash Gupta v. State of Haryana, (1997-2)116 P.L.R. 775 has done away with the distinction between the residential and commercial area for the purpose of personal necessity because the distinction was found to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, I do not find any substantial force in the argument as well.
5. No other argument has been urged warranting interference of this Court under Section 15(6) of the Act.
In view of the above, there is no merit in the petition. Dismissed.