PETITIONER:
INDIAN & GENERAL INVESTMENT TRUST LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHRI PURNA CHANDRA MARDARAJ & CO.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
13/12/1966
BENCH:
ACT:
Orissa Estates Abolition Act 1951 (Act I of 1952), s.
20(1) & (2), and Orissa Money Lenders Act 1939, ss. 10 &
11--Claims Officer required under Abolition Act to determine
amount of debt 'legally and justly due'--In doing so whether
can take into account provisions of Money Lenders Act.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant company advanced a loan to the
predecessor-in-title of the respondents against a mortgage
of land in 1906. In 1953 the said land vested in the State
of Orissa by virtue of a notification under s. 3 of the
Orissa Estates Abolition Act 1951. Under s. 18 of the Act
the appellant filed a claim in respect of the loan before
the Claims Officer. The mortgagor contended that since the
appellant had realised more than double the amount of the
loan as interest, the debt stood extinguished according to
ss. 10 and 11 of the Money Lenders Act 1939. The Claims
Officer and the High Court held against the appellant though
on different grounds. The appellant came to this Court and
contended that the procedure for determining a claim as
provided ;in s. 20 of the Abolition Act was exhaustive and
recourse to the provisions of the Money Lenders Act was
unjustified.
HELD: The Claims Officer cannot under s. 20(2) of the
Abolition Act determine the principal and interest due under
a mortgage without considering the question as to whether
the claim is true or whether it is barred by any other law,
or whether the claim is still subsisting. These are all
matters which properly arise for consideration by the Claims
Officer. The expression 'legally and justly due' occurring
in s. 20(1) clearly indicates that the first and initial
duty of the Claims Officer is to find out whether any
principal amount is at all due to the creditor. For this
purpose he would be perfectly justified in relying on any
provisions of other statutes bearing upon that subject-in
this praticular case the provisions of the Money Lenders
Act. Taking section 10 and 11 of the latter Act into
account it was clear that no amount was due to the
appellants as they had already received more than double the
amount of the original loan. [224 F; 225 A-D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 850 of
1964.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 4, 1963 of
the Orissa High Court in Misc. Appeal No. 94 of 1960.
B. Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.
G. L. Sanghi, for respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
Deepak Dutta Choudhuri and R. N. Sachthey, for respondant
No. 3.
246
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, on certificate, is directed
against the judgment of the Orissa High Court, dated January
4, 1963, and rendered in Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 94 & 95
of 1960.
The circumstances, under which this appeal arises, may be
briefly stated. The predecessor-in-title of the respondents
had executed three mortgages in favour of the appellant-
company, which is registered in London. The first mortgage
was executed on October 23, 1903, securing a sum of pound
1,35,000/-. Inasmuch as, according to both parties, this
mortgage has been completely redeemed in 1935, it is not
necessary to make any further reference to this transaction.
The second mortgage was executed on December 18, 1906, under
which a sum of pound 77,500/- was borrowed by the mortgagor.
Even according to the appellant, in respect of this mort-
gage, the respondents had paid a total sum of pound
1,77,349/-, by way of interest which is more than twice the
principal amount covered by the mortgage. The third
mortgage was executed on October 21. 1935, under which a sum
of pound 65,0001- was borrowed by the mortgagor.
The appellant demanded the repayment of the amounts due
under these mortgages, but the mortgagor, so far as the
mortgage of 1906 was concerned, repudiated the same on the
ground that the entire transaction had been wiped off, by
virtue of s. 10 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act, 1939
(Orissa Act III of 1939) (hereinafter called the Money-
Lenders Act), inasmuch as he had paid more than double the
original principal amount, as admitted by the mortgagee.
The appellant, however, did not accept this repudiation and,
in consequence, the company took legal proceedings in London
and obtained an. ex parte decree. But attempts to execute
the decree in India did not succeed, as will be seen from
the decision of the Calcutta High Court in I G. Investment
Trust v. Raja of Khalikote(1). The High Court held that the
decree obtained by the appellant in London was not
executable in India.
In the meanwhile, the mortgaged properties vested in the
State of Orissa, under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act,
1951 (Act I of 1952) (hereinafter called the Abolition Act),
on June 1, 1953, by virtue of the notification issued by the
State Government under s. 3 thereof. Inasmuch as the
appellant had not realised the dues under the two later
mortgages, they filed a claim petition before the Claims
Officer, under s. 18 of the Abolition Act.
Under s. 18(1) (a) of the Abolition Act, every creditor,
whose debt is secured by the mortgage of, or is a charge on,
any estate or
(1) A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 508.
247
part thereof, which has vested in the State Government under
s. 3, has to file a claim within the period mentioned
therein, to the Claims Officer, for the purpose of
determining the amount of debt ‘legally and justly payable
to each such creditor in respect of his claim’. Though the
claim included the third mortgage dated October 21, 1935,
also, there does not appear to have been much of a serious
contest about the liability under that mortgage and,
therefore, both the Claims Officer, as well as the High
Court, on appeal, have substantially accepted the claim of
the appellant. Therefore, the rights of the parties under
that mortgage, do not also arise for consideration, in this
appeal.
So far as the mortgage of December 18, 1906, under which the
mortgagor had borrowed a sum of pound 77,500/-, is
concerned, in the claim petition the particulars of the
properties mortgaged were all given in detail. The
appellant had also admitted having received, by way of
interest, in respect of this mortgage, a sum of pound
1,77,34918-0 and he had given, in a statement, details of
this receipt. The rate of interest payable under the
mortgage was 6 % per annum.
It is also seen, from the said statement, that the
appellant has given credit to payment of a sum of pound
29,000/- towards the principal amount and, as such, a
balance of E48,500/- remained due as principal. The
appellant had claimed this amount, as well as the balance of
interest payable, in the sum of E17,460/-, as being due upto
May 1, 1953. The appellant had also claimed certain other
amounts which, according to him, were payable as commission
and premium as per the terms contained in the mortgage deed.
The equivalent of all these amounts, in Indian currency, was
also given by the appellant in the claim petition. The
appellant, in consequence, prayed for payment of these
amounts, stated to be due to him under this mortgage.
The mortgagor contested the claim of the appellant before
the Claims Officer. He pleaded that the claim of the
mortgagee, under the mortgage, was no longer subsisting and
that the mortgage liability had been discharged by payments
and by operation of law. The mortgagor pleaded that,
inasmuch as the appellant had realised interest which is,
admittedly, far greater than the amount of the original
loan, the liability under the mortgage had become exting-
uished, under s. 10 of the Money-Lenders Act.
The mortgagor further contended that the mortgage liability
must be considered to have been extinguished, under s. 17 of
the Money-Lenders Act, inasmuch as the mortgage, in
question, is a possessory mortgage and the mortgagee had
been in possession and enjoyment of the mortgaged security
for a period of 15 years.
248
There were also certain other objections, raised by the
mortgagor to the claim made by the mortgagee by way of
commission and premium.
The Claims Officer accepted the plea of the mortgagor that
the mortgage of December 18, 1906, is a possessory mortgage
and the mortgagees were in possession and enjoyment of the
properties for 15 years from the date of the mortgage. In
consequence, the Claims Officer held that, in terms of S. 17
of the Money-Lenders Act, the mortgage of 1906 should be
deemed to have been extinguished on the expiry of 15 years
from the date of the mortgage, i.e., long before 1953, and
even long before 1947, when the mortgagor repudiated his
liability under the mortgage. But the Claims Officer was
not prepared to accept the plea of the mortgagor that under
ss. 10 and 11 of the Money-Lenders Act, the transaction
should be considered to have been extinguished. So far as
the applicability of ss. 10 and 11 of the Money-Lenders Act
is concerned, the view of the Claims Officer appears to be
that those provisions can be invoked only when a claim is
made by the mortgagee in a ‘suit’, and when a ‘Court’ has to
adjudicate upon the same. According to the Claims Officer,
he is not a ‘Court’ and the proceedings before him,
initiated by the mortgagee, by way of a claim, under the
Abolition Act, is not a ‘suit’, so as to attract the
provisions of ss. 10 and 11.
Therefore, the Claims Officer held that ss. 10 and 11, of
the Money-Lenders Act, did not apply. But, inasmuch as he
held in favour of the mortgagor, applying s. 17 of the
Money-Lenders Act, that the mortgage claim had been
extinguished, no relief was granted in favour of the
appellant, so far as this transaction was concerned.
Both the appellant and the respondents, had filed appeals
under s. 21 of the Abolition Act to the Board, which, in
this case, was the High Court, as provided under s. 22 of
the Abolition Act. The appellant had challenged the
rejection of his claim, in respect of this mortgage, by the
Claims Officer, relying upon s’ 17 of the Money-Lenders Act.
Certain other reliefs, which had been denied by the Claims
Officer, were also the subject of this appeal. The
respondents had filed their appeal, similarly, regarding
certain claims which had been allowed in favour of the
appellant; and, in particular, challenged the decision of
the Claims Officer regarding the non-applicability of ss.
IO and II of the MoneyLenders Act, to this transaction.
Both the appeals have been disposed of by the Board, by a
common judgment, dated January 4, 1963. So far as this
mortgage is concerned, the Board has held that the view of
the Claims
249
Officer, that it has been extinguished, in view of S. 17 of
the MoneyLenders Act, is not correct. The Board has, after
a consideration of the evidence on record, come to the
conclusion that the mortgagee has not been in possession for
the requisite period referred to in s. 17 and that, on the
other hand, the mortgagor himself had been in possession.
Therefore, the Board, differing from the conclusions arrived
at by the Claims Officer, has held that the mortgage cannot
be considered to have been discharged under S. 17 of the
MoneyLenders Act.
But, the mortgagor, pressed before the Board the contention
that, applying ss. 10 and 11 of the Money-Lenders Act, the
mortgage claim, in any event, must be considered to have
been extinguished. Though this contention, as we have
pointed out, did not find acceptance at the hands of the
Claims Officer, the Board, ultimately, upheld this plea of
the mortgagor. No doubt, the Board was of the view that the
Claims Officer, though not a ‘Court’, could exercise larger
powers and grant relief to the mortgagor, because it is a
tribunal and its jurisdiction must be considered to be
wider. On this basis, the Board, after reference to S.
20(1) of the Abolition Act,, was of the view that, in
considering the question whether the amount was ‘legally and
justly due’, to the appellant, the Claims Officer could have
due regard to the provisions contained in the Money-Lenders
Act. In this view, the Board, ultimately, held that
inasmuch as, even according to the appellant, the mortgagee
had paid a sum of pound 1,77,349/-, the entire balance of
principal and interest claimed by the mortgagee should be
considered to have been fully paid. The Board was also of
the view that certain claims made, by way of premium and
commission, had also been paid off by the excess amounts
paid by the mortgagor. Therefore, the Board, like the
Claims Officer, ultimately. held that no amount at all was
payable under the second mortgage.
It will be seen that both the Claims Officer, as well as the
Board have come to an identical conclusion in favour of the
mortgagor, viz., that no amount is payable under the
mortgage of December 18,1906. While the Claims Officer came
to the conclusion by applying S. 17 of the Money-Lenders
Act, the Board, on the other hand, reached the same
conclusion, by applying ss. 10 and 11 of the Money-Lenders
Act read with S. 20(1) of the Abolition Act. The mortgagee-
appellant has come to this Court, challenging this decision
of the Board that no amounts are due by the mortgagor under
the mortgage of December 18, 1906.
Though, in this Court, on behalf of the mortgagors-respon-
dents, Mr. G. L. Sanghi, learned counsel, has challenged the
correctness of the decision of the Board about the non-
applicability of S. 17 of the Money-Lenders Act, we do not
think it necessary to go
250
into that aspect, because we are accepting his contention
that the Board was justified in holding that the mortgage
has been extinguished under ss. 10 and It of the Money-
Lenders Act.
Before we advert to the contentions of Mr. B. Sen, learned
counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to refer to the
material provisions of the two Acts, referred to above.
The Money-Lenders Act has been enacted in 1939; and the
preamble says that it was found expedient, by the
Legislature, to regulate money-lending transactions and to
grant relief to debtors in the State of Orissa. Section 9
provides the maximum rates at which interest may be decreed.
Sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 10, which are relevant for our
purpose, are as follows :
“10. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any other law or in
anything having the force of law or in any
other contract, no Court shall, in any suit,
whether brought by a money-lender or by any
other person, in respect of a loan advanced
before or after the commencement of this Act,
pass a decree for an amount of interest for
the period preceding the institution of the
suit which, together with any amount already
realised as interest through Court or
otherwise, is greater than the amount of the
loan originally advanced.
(2) Where, in any suit, as is referred to in
sub-section (1), it is found that the amount
already realised as interest through Court or
otherwise, for the period preceding the
institution of the suit, is greater than the
amount of the loan originally advanced, so
much of the said amount of interest as is in
excess of the loan shall be appropriated
towards the satisfaction of the loan and the
Court shall pass a decree for the payment of
the balance of the loan, if any.”
Sub-s. (3) of s. 10 gives jurisdiction to the executing
Court to grant similar appropriate relief. Section 11,
again, enables the Court to re-open the transaction and
appropriate excess interest towards the loan.
In particular, it will be seen, that under sub-s. (2) of S.
10, extracted above, if it is found that the amount already
realised as interest through Court, or otherwise, for the
period preceding the institution of the suit, is greater
than the amount of the loan originally advanced, it is
necessary to appropriate towards the satisfaction of the
loan, so much of the said amount of interest as is in excess
of the loan, and the Court can pass a decree only for the
payment of the balance of the loan, if any. Pausing here
for a moment,
251
it may be stated that, in this case, the mortgagor, when a
demand was made for payment of the amount by the mortgagee,
has, by his letter dated September 14, 1947, repudiated his
liability, relying on these provisions of the Money-Lenders
Act.
Coming to the Abolition Act, S. 18 provides for a creditor,
whose debt is secured by a mortgage or is a charge on any
estate or any part thereof vested in the State Government,
to apply to the Claims Officer for determining the amount of
debt ‘legally and justly payable’ to each such creditor in
respect of his claim. Sub-sections (1) and (2), of s. 20,
of the Abolition Act, which are material, are as follows :
“20. (1) The Claims Officer, shall, in
accordance with the rules prescribed,
determine the principal amount legally and
justly due to each creditor and the interest
(if any) due at the date of such determination
in respect of such principal amount.
(2) In determining the principal amount and
interest under sub-section (1), the Claims
Officer shall, notwithstanding the provisions
of any agreement or law to the contrary,
proceed in the following manner
(a) he shall ascertain the amount of the
principal originally advanced in each case,
irrespective of the closing of accounts,
execution of fresh bonds, or decree or order
of a Court;
(b) he shall ascertain the amount of the
interest already paid or realised and shall
set off towards the amount of the principal
any amount paid or realised as simple interest
in excess of six per centum per annum or the
stipulated rate of interest whichever is
lower;
(c) he shall separately specify the amount
of the principal and the amount of the
interest, if any, due to the creditor, such
interest being calculated at the rate
mentioned in clause (b) and being limited to
the amount of the principal originally
advanced;
(d) if he finds, that in any case the
creditor has received or realised by way of
interest an amount equal to or more than the
amount of the principal, he shall not allow
any further interest to run on such principal;
Explanation : In the case (if a usufructuary
mortgage, or a lease executed in lieu of an
advance made of an estate or in the case of
possession of such estate or part thereof by a
widow in lieu of her dower debt, the net
amount of rents and profits accruing from such
estate shall be deemed to be the ;Interest for
the purposes of this section.
252
(e) in other cases, the amount of the
principal ascertained to be due to the
claimant shall carry interest at such rate not
exceeding six per centum per annum as may be
prescribed by the State Government;
(f) no future interest shall run on any
interest ascertained to be due to a creditor.”
Mr. B. Sen, learned counsel for the appellant, attacks the
order of the Board, applying the provisions of ss. 10 and 11
of the MoneyLenders Act, to the transaction in question. .
According to the learned counsel, these provisions do not
apply, when a claim is made by a secured creditor before a
Claims Officer, and which claim is adjudicated upon by that
Officer exercising his special jurisdiction under the
Abolition Act. According to learned counsel, the Abolition
Act is a self-contained Code and, in particular, has very
elaborately laid down, in s. 20, the various matters, which
alone could be taken into account, by the Claims Officer, in
determining the principal amount and interest that is
payable to a creditor. Counsel points out that the Claims
Officer, exercising jurisdiction under this special
enactment, viz., the Abolition Act, can have, and should
have, recourse only to the provisions of that statute. Mr.
Sen also points out that there is absolutely no indication
in the Abolition Act that the Claims Officer can, take into
account provisions contained in the Money-Lenders Act.
Inasmuch as the Legislature has not made the provisions of
the Money-Lenders Act applicable to proceedings under the
Abolition Act, Mr. Sen points out, the Board has acted
illegally in applying the provisions of the Money-Lenders
Act and, in consequence, holding in favour of the mortgagor.
Counsel also points out that the provisions in the two
statutes cannot be applied in respect of the same
transaction; because, the provisions regarding the
adjudication of a claim under the Money-Lenders Act will
have to be done on a basis entirely different from that
contained in the Abolition Act. Therefore, the short
contention, of the learned counsel, is that ss. IO and II
of the Money-Lenders Act should not have been applied at all
so as to non-suit his client.
Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the respondents, on the
other hand, pointed out that the mortgagor had, as early as
1947, repudiated his liability under the mortgage, relying
on the provisions of the Money-Lenders Act. In the absence
of any indication in the Abolition Act that a debtor cannot
avail himself of relief granted to him under other
ameliorative measures-in this case, the MoneyLenders Act-the
Board, according to the learned counsel, was perfectly,
justified in applying ss. 10 and 11 of the Money-Lenders Act
to find out whether at all any principal amount was due to
the mortgagee. Counsel also points out that the object of a
claim being filed by a creditor, like the appellant is, as
indicated in S. 18(1)(a)
253
of the Abolition Act, for the purpose of determining the
amount of debt, ‘legally and justly payable, to each such
creditor in respect of his claim’. Counsel further points
out that, even under s. 20(1) of the Abolition Act, the duty
of the Claims Officer is to determine the principal amount
‘legally and justly due’ to each creditor. For the purpose
of adjudicating on the claim of the appellant, and finding
out what is the principal amount, ‘legally and.justly due to
him, the Board was perfectly justified in relying upon the
provisions of the Money Lenders Act. Counsel also points
out that if, by applying the provisions of the Money-Lenders
Act, the liability of the mortgagor is extinguished, that,
certainly, will clearly show that there is no principal
amount ‘legally and justly due’ to the appellant. If the
appellant had instituted a suit in the Orissa Courts to
enforce his claim on this mortgage, the Courts would have
certainly applied the provisions of the Money-Lenders Act
and held that the appellant’s claim had been satisfied.
Because of the fact that the claim is made under the
Abolition Act, counsel points out that it could not have
been the intention of the Legislature to make the position
of creditors, like the appellant, better than it is under
the MoneyLenders Act.
Though we are not inclined to accept the reasons given by
the Board for applying the provisions of ss. 10 and 11 of
the MoneyLenders Act, we are, nevertheless, in agreement
with the views expressed by the Board that those provisions
can be applied- If so, the conclusion arrived at by the
Board, that the mortgage liability has been extinguished, is
correct. We do, no doubt, see force in the contention of
the learned counsel, for the appellant, that there is no
specific provision in the Abolition Act making any reference
to the Money-Lenders Act. We are also conscious that the
Abolition Act does lay down some principles in clauses (a)
to (f) of sub-s. (2) of s. 20, as to how exactly the
calculation has to be made. There is also a slight
difference in the method of calculation adopted by the
Money-Lenders Act and the Abolition Act. But, notwithstand-
ing these circumstances, we are of opinion that, in order to
determine ‘the principal amount legally and justly due to
each creditor’ as laid down in s. 20(1) of the Abolition
Act, it is the duty of the Claims Officer to find out
whether, in respect of a claim that is made by a creditor,
there is a legal impediment for recognising the same, i.e.,
whether the claim is such which will be recognised by a
Judicial Tribunal.
The legislature emphasises upon this aspect even in s.
18(1)(a) of the Abolition Act. The purpose of a claim being
made by a secured creditor, under s. 18(1)(a) is, as we have
already pointed out, ‘for the purpose of determining the
amount of debt legally and .justly payable to each creditor
in respect of his claim’. The same idea is, again,
reiterated by the legislature in s. 20(1) of the Aboli-
254
tion Act when it makes it obligatory on the Claims Officer
‘to determine the principal amount, legally and justly due
to each creditor’. No rules, as contemplated under s. 20(1)
of the Abolition Act, have been brought to our notice. The
expression ‘legally and justly due must, certainly, in our
opinion, mean that before a claim is recognized by the
Claims Officer he must be satisfied that the principal
amount covered by that claim is ‘legally and justly due’
i.e., that such a claim, if sought to be enforced in a Court
or Judicial Tribunal, will find recognition on the basis
that it does not suffer from any legal infirmity.
In this case, even according to the appellant, in respect of
the principal amount of pound 77,500/- advanced under the
mortgage of December 18, 1906, admittedly, a sum of pound
1,77,349-18-0 has been received by him as interest. This
amount is more than two times the principal amount advanced
under this mortgage. If, in spite of this, the present
claim had been made for recovery of further amounts, on the
basis of this mortgage, by the appellant, in any Court, it
is needless to state that the Court would have applied the
provisions of the Money-Lenders Act. By applying ss. 10 and
11 of this Act, the Court would have come to the conclusion
that the appellant is not entitled to recover any more
amounts inasmuch as the entire claim must be considered to
have been satisfied by the respondent, having paid a sum of
pound 1,77,349-18-0 by way of interest. That means, the
Court would have come to the conclusion that no further
amounts, by way of principal, are ‘legally and justly due’
to the appellant; and, quite naturally, the further finding,
would be that no interest at all is due. If no Court would
have recognized the present claim of the appellant, the same
principles must be applicable when the Claims Officer is
also called upon, under s. 20(1) of the Abolition Act, ‘to
determine the principal amount legally and justly due’. For
the purpose of determining whether the principal amount is
‘legally and justly due’, he would be perfectly justified in
relying on any provisions of other statutes bearing upon
that subject-in this particular case, the provisions of the
Money-Lenders Act.
Mr.B.Sen, learned counsel, has urged that in order to
consider a claim made by the creditor, the jurisdiction of
the Claims Officer is restricted, by the various provisions
contained in clauses (a) to (f) of s. 20(2) of the Abolition
Act. We are not inclined to accept this large contention of
the learned counsel for the appellant. For instance, if a
plea of discharge is raised by a debtor in a claim pro-
ceeding, or, if a plea is raised by a debtor that the claim
is barred by the law of Limitation, no provision is made in
clauses (a) to (f) of s. 20(2) giving jurisdiction to the
Claims Officer either to entertain such objection or to
investigate the same. Acceptance of the contentions of the’
learned counsel for the appellant, will lead to this
255
conclusion that when a claim is made under the Abolition
Act, the Claims Officer will have, straight away, to
determine the. principal amount and interest under sub-s.
(2) of S. 20 without considering the question as to whether
the claim is true or whether it is barred by any other law,
or whether the claim is still subsisting. These are all
matters which, in our opinion, property arise for
consideration when a Claims Officer has to determine the
principal amount under S. 20(1) of the Abolition Act. The
expression ‘legally and justly due’, occurring in S. 20(1),
clearly indicates that the first and initial duty of the
Claims Officer is to find out whether any principal amount
is at all due to the creditor which he is entitled to
recover either in law or justly. It may be that, after
arriving, on this aspect, at a conclusion, one way or the
other, and depending upon that decision, the Claims Officer
will have to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties,
having due regard to the various matters mentioned in
clauses (a) to (f) of sub-s. (2) of S. 20. We are therefore
satisfied that the Board is correct when it, held that the
provisions of the Money-Lenders Act can be taken into
account by the Claims Officer, under S. 20(1) of the
Abolition Act. If the provisions of the MoneyLenders Act
apply, as they have been applied by the Board, there is no
controversy that the claim under the mortgage of December
18, 1906, must be considered to have been extinguished and
that no further amounts will be due, as held by the Board.
The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. In
the .circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to
costs.
G.C. Appeal dismissed.
256