JUDGMENT
O. P. Garg, J.
1. By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the order dated 27.1.1999, Annexure-14, and the order dated 24.3.1999. Annexure-15 respectively passed by the Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Varanasi respondent No. 2 and the District Judge, Varanasi respondent No. 1 have been challenged. It is prayed that both these orders be quashed and the respondents be directed not to interfere with the functioning of the duly elected body of U. P. Olympic Association (for short ‘U.P.O.A.’) and its General Secretary, Sri Anandeshwar Pandey. who are petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 respectively.
2. Sri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 3. He stated that he would not file any counter affidavit and on the basis of material available with the writ petition, it may be finally decided on merits. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, I proceed to decide this writ petition finally at the stage of admission according to the Rules of Court.
3. Heard Sri V. B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri R. N. Singh. assisted by Sri V. K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 Mohd. Razauddin.
4. The Indian Olympic Association (for short ‘I.O.A.’) is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and is engaged in promoting athletic and sport activities both at national and international level. The petitioner No. 2 U.P.O.A. is also a society registered under the Societies Registration Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and is affiliated to the I.O.A. The U.P.O.A. is engaged in promotion of sports and games in the State of U. P. There arose a dispute about the internal management of U.P.O.A. Mohd. Razauddin respondent No. 3 claimed himself to be it s General Secretary. The dispute of election was referred to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 of the Act. The Sub-Divisional Officer (South), Prescribed Authority, Varanasi decided the said dispute by award dated 14.3.1997. This award was challenged in Civil Misc. Writ No. 17696 of 1998 filed by the U.P.O.A. In the said writ petition, by order dated 19.5.1998. this Court stayed the operation of the award dated 14.3.1997, a copy of which is
Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The President. I.O.A. by order dated 6.5.1997. Annexure-2 to the writ petition, appointed Lt. Col. N. Kumar (Retd.) as Chairman of the ad hoc Committee of U.P.O.A. It was mentioned that the ad hoc committee will look after the affairs of the U.P.O.A. as regards the preparation and participation of U. P. contingent in the National Games of 1997 and that it may take support of and coordinate with the Director, Sports Department, U. P. Government. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the President of the I.O.A., Mohd. Razauddln filed Suit No. 621 of 1997 in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Varanasi. In the said suit, Mohd. Razauddin prayed for the relief of injunction to restrain the defendants from creating any sort of hindrance in the working of the plaintiffs, for example, preparation, selection, coaching of the players/officials, participation of the U. P. Contingent according to the list prepared by the plaintiff. The detailed relief claimed by the respondent No. 3 in the aforesaid sutt has been quoted in paragraph 4 of the writ petition. Learned Civil Judge (S.D.) by order dated 23.5.1997 refused to grant ex parts order of injunction and merely issued notices to the defendants of the said suit. Mohd. Razauddln preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No. 180 of 1997 (subsequently converted into Civil Revision No. 294 of 1997) in which the revislonal court passed an order dated 28.5.1997 directing the issue of notice to the defendants of the suit and meanwhile they were restrained from interfering in the list prepared by U.P.O.A.
5. Rule XIX of the Indian Olympic Association Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) deal with the settlement of disputes/conflicts in the National Sports Federations/State Olympic Associations. Clause (iii) of Rule XIX reads as follows :
“All unresolved disputes arising within the National Sports Federations/Associations/State Olympic Association affiliated to the I.O.A. shall be referred by the Federations/Associations to the
I.O.A. for settlement by the I.O.A. For this purpose the I.O.A. Executive Council, on the recommendation of the President, I.O.A. shall recommend the names to the disputing parties to select one name in consultation with the President I.O.A. which shall be acceptable to both the parties. The Arbitration proceedings shall be completed within the period specified by the I.O.A. Executive Council. President, I.O.A.. based on the circumstances of the case has the authority to extend or vary, the period.”
Accordingly, the I.O.A. appointed Lt. Col. N. Kumar as Arbitrator under the aforesaid provision on 4.8.1997. The respondent No. 3 sought the order of injunction to restrain the Arbitrator from functioning. The trial court by order dated 9.9.1997 restrained the Arbitrator Lt. Col. N. Kumar from functioning as such. This order was to remain operative till the next date fixed. On 4.11.1997. Interim order passed by the trial court was not extended as it was brought to the notice of the trial court that in view of the arbitration clause and the decision of the Apex Court, civil court shall have no jurisdiction in the matter. Accordingly, Lt. Col. N. Kumar proceeded to resolve the dispute by arbitration and ultimately made a recommendation on 10.12.1997 that fresh elections of the office-bearers of U.P.O.A. should be conducted under the supervision of I.O.A. and that only those affiliated units of U.P.O.A. should be eligible for casting their votes who were enrolled as members torior to the expiry of the term of office dated 24.4.1994. The recommendation made by Lt. Col. N. Kumar, Arbitrator was accepted by the President. I.O.A. and authorised the former by letter dated 22.12.1996 to hold fresh elections for office-bearers of U.P.O.A. Immediately. The elections were held on 9.7.1998 at Sports Stadium, Meerut under the aegis of I.O.A. Mohd. Aslam Khan and Anandeshwar Pandey were elected respectively President and General Secretary of U.P.O.A. besides other host of officebearers and members. Intimation of
this election was given to all the concerned authorities.
6. It would not be out of place to mention here that the respondent No. 3 Mohd. Razauddin who was not successful in getting the injunction order dated 9.9.1997 passed by the trial court extended beyond 4.11.1997, filed Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court, which was dismissed. He then filed Civil Misc. Writ No. 1051 of 1998 before Delhi High Court in which he claimed the relief that the appointment of Lt. Col. N. Kumar (Retd.) as Arbitrator be quashed, the proceedings taken by the Arbitrator be declared null and void and that the I.O.A. be restrained from interfering in the functioning of Mohd. Razauddin. It appears that the Apex Court as well as High Court, Delhi were approached by Mohd. Razauddin in pursuance of the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of K. Murugan v. Fencing Association of India, Jabalpur and others, (1991) 2 SCC 412, in which it was held that in the interest of appropriate functioning of the Association, litigation outside the headquarters of the Association, i.e.. Delhi should not be permitted. Mohd. Razauddin met with no better luck either before Apex Court or before Delhi High Court.
7. After the new elected body of U.P.O.A. had taken over and started functioning. Mohd. Razauddin moved an application for temporary injunction on 27.1.1999 before the trial court in Suit No. 621 of 1997, which was pending. By the impugned order dated 27.1.1999, Annexure-14 to the writ petition, the trial court ordered that the present petitioners who are defendants in the suit, cannot be allowed to establish a parallel body with a view to frustrate the order passed by learned District Judge on 28.5.1997 in Revision Application No. 294 of 1997 and accordingly granted temporary injunction in favour of the respondent No. 3 and directed the defendants of the suit to file objections by the date fixed, i.e., 11.2.1999. Anandeshwar Pandey petitioner No. 3 filed a revision application No. 91 of 1999 to challenge the order dated 27.1.1999
passed by the trial court. This revision application has been dismissed at the admission stage on 24.3.1999. Anncxure-15, by the learned District Judge, Varanasi.
8. Sri V. B. Singh. learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the impugned order passed by the trial court on 27.1.1999 is clearly against the provisions of law and has been passed in a suit, which was not maintainable. it was also urged that the said order was passed without notice to the petitioner who had already put in appearance in the suit and that the reasoning given by the trial court to grant the injunction order on 27.1.1999 is wide off the mark as on that date, the order passed by the District Judge on 28.5.1997 in Civil Revision No. 294 of 1997 did not exist. Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 repelled all the above submissions and pointed out that the trial court has committed no illegality in passing the impugned order dated 27.1.1999 as it is clearly in keeping with order passed by the revisional court. it was also pointed out that this Court would be slow enough to interfere with the interim orders passed by the civil courts in a pending suit. A reference was made to the decision of the Apex Court in Swetambar Jain Samiti v. Alleged Committee of Management, JT 1996 (3) SC 21, in which it has been held that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be permitted to be relegated to the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil court. A reference was also made to a decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge. Hapur, AIR 1991 All 114, in which it has been held that ordinarily in the writ jurisdiction, orders passed by the civil courts should not be interfered with unless they violate fundamental principles of law or cause substantial injustice. I have given thoughtful consideration to the matter and find that there can be no quarrel with the principle of law laid down in the aforesaid two decisions. One has to proceed with the caution that the observations made in a particular case cannot be
transplanted to the facts of another case which may be entirely on a different footing. The above principle, though salutary in nature, is not of universal application. Sometimes, extraordinary situations may demand interference with the orders passed by civil courts in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The question of alternative remedy with reference to the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution came to be considered in a very recent decision of the Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks. Mumbai and others. (1998) 8 SCC J. After analysing the various authorities, the Apex Court observed that much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed, is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation. Law as it stands, has been summarised in paragraph 15 of the aforesaid decision as under :
“Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition, But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the
vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decision of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”
In my view, law is no cold-blooded
craft bound by traditional techniques
and formal forceps handed down to
us in the form of precedents but a
warm blooded art with a break for the
past and a tyrist with the present
deriving its soul force from the
current slant of the decision of the
Apex Court, the latest of which is
Whirlpool (supra). In the instant case,
the impugned order dated 27.1.1999 was passed by the trial court without
giving an opportunity to the present
petitioners who had, in fact, put in
appearance. Power of
superintendence over all Courts by
the High Court has been conferred
under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India. This power casts a duty on
the High Court to keep the inferior
Courts and Tribunals ‘within the
bounds of their authority and to see
that they do what their duty requires
and that they do it in a legal manner.’
Article 227 vests the High Court with
the prerogative to correct the
decisions of the subordinate courts in
cases of great dereliction of duty and
flagrant abuse of fundamental
principles of law or justice. In the
instant case. I feel that the order of
injunction dated 27.1.1999 has been passed by the trial court in a most cursory, perfunctory and mechanical manner on the mere excuse that the
injunction order is necessitated with
a view to ensure that the order passed
by the revisional court is not
frustrated. The trial court had
forgotten that after passing of the
order dated 28.5.1997 by the
revisional court, much water has
flown, i.e., Arbitrator had been
appointed under Rule XIX (iii) of the
Rules ; in the absence of the stay
order. Arbitrator has given award and
in pursuance of the award/
recommendation, fresh elections to
constitute a new body of U.P.O.A. had been held and new body had assumed office. To cap all these facts, there
was also an unsavory feature which marred the case of the respondent No. 3, inasmuch as, he had lost in Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court and was not successful in getting any relief in writ petition filed before Delhi High Court. The message which has been conveyed by the Apex Court in the two celebrated decision in K. Murugan (supra) as well as in Madhya Pradesh Triathlon Association and another v. Indian Triathlon Federation and others. AIR 1997 SC 2398. has also not been taken note of by the trial court as well as revisional court. It is in these circumstances that I am constrained to lake cognizance of the matter in writ petition.
9. The Apex Court has lamented about litigative zeal pursuits by various national and regional bodies. In the case of Madhya Pradesh Triathlon Association and another (supra), the Apex Court observed that ‘all these Associations are busy in the Court proceedings and spending their spirit on the litigation instead of inculcating spirit of sports in the tract and field’. The practice of taking the disputes with regard to the office bearers of the I.O.A. and the Regional Associations to the Courts has been seriously deplored by the Apex Court. One cannot escape from the stark reality that Olympic games arc one of the biggest international events and provide great opportunities to amateur sportsmen in the different classifications. The I.O.A. as well as Regional Associations have been brought into existence to sponsor, supervise, finance, regulate and control all aspects of sports activity in relation to the Asian. Commonwealth, Olympic and international competitions and tournaments under the patronage of the I.O.C. If the parent body is pitted against it s own subsidiary Regional Bodies and are allowed to fight amongst themselves to project the individual interest as opposed to the national commitment and honor, the very purpose and objective of bringing the Associations to the forefront would be given a complete go by. The Courts would be slow enough to aid and abet such a situation.
10. Under the I.O.A. Rules, there is a salutary provision for resolving the disputes in between National Sports Federations/ Associations and State Olympic Associations affiliated to the I.O.A. This provision obviously shuts the doors of the civil courts for the office bearers of the rival parent and subsidiary Associations. The trial court has ignored the Rules of the Indian Olympic Association and has passed an omnibus order to restrain the petitioners from functioning with a view to perhaps protect the interest of a private individual i.e., respondent No. 3. The casual approach of the trial court in the matter cannot but be condemned. The revisional court would have received commendation if it would have stepped into to rectify the mistake committed by the trial court. In the revisional Jurisdiction, the Court can always correct the glaring mistakes committed by lower courts. The revisional court also failed to grasp the real controversy and has adopted a short-cut method of dismissing the revision application summarily at the admission stage.
11. In the conspectus of the above facts, the impugned orders passed by the trial court as well as revisional court cannot be sustained. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned orders dated 27.1.1999. Annexure-14, passed by the trial court and order dated 24.3.1999 passed by revisional court, Annexure-15 are hereby quashed and the office bearers of U.P.O-A. elected on 9th July, 1998 shall continue to function.