JUDGMENT
Natarajan, J.
1. These writ Petitions and Writ Appeals have been filed by Messrs. Indian Rare Earths Limited, a company wholly owned by the Government of India, for seeking reliefs in the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge of Padmanabhapuram in references made to him under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The writ petitions have been filed for issue of Writ of certiorari to quash the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge in forty-nine original petitions taken on file under Section 18 of’ the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) The writ appeals have been filed against the orders passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in twelve cases vacating earlier orders of stay relating to deposit of enhanced compensation amounts.
2. The writ petitions and the writ appeals have come to be filed in the following circumstances: The petitioner company is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and wholly owned by the Government of India, Its main objects are to process beach raw sands for producing rare minerals like limenite, monazite, zireon, rutile, sillimanite, etc. required for the purposes of atomic energy. The raw sands have to be obtained from deposits from inland and coastal beaches. After obtaining technical advice, certain strips of land in villages like Manavalakurchi and Kolachal were. identified near the sea-coast of Kanyakumari District as the area where the required quantities of rare earths are likely to be found for large scale exploitation. The extent of land that was identified is 60.05 acres. The lands were in the possession of several individuals. For acquiring the lands, the petitioner requested the State Government to take acquisition proceedings under Part II of the Land Acquisition Act. The State Government, which was empowered by the Government of India to take the acquisition proceedings on its behalf, agreed to acquire the lands and issued a notification according sanction for acquisition under Part II of the Act by contributing a token sum from the public revenue. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published in the Government Gazette. As the lands were urgently required for exploitation of the minerals, the State Government conceded the need for expediency and exercised its powers under Section 17 and dispensed with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act. As a result of such dispensation, the petitioner took possession of the lands on two dates, viz., 21st July, 1979 and 14th November, 1981.
3. The Land Acquisition Officer, after taking into consideration all the relevant factors computed the market value of the lands at certain rates and fixed the total amount payable to the several owners of the lands as well as solatium of 15 per cent and also the compensation amount that should be paid for trees, etc. The petitioner, in compliance with the awards passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, remitted the compensation amounts together with the solatium etc., payable to each land owner.
4. As the owners of the lands were not agreeable to the rate of compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer and wanted references under Section 18 of the Act to be made to the Civil Court, the Land Acquisition Officer referred the cases of all the land owners to the Subordinate Judge of Padmanabhapuram. The Subordinate Judge passed orders in the several references in favour of the land owners and enhanced the compensation amount payable to them. Consequently as against a compensation amount of Rs. 21,61,642.50 determined by the Land Acquisition Officer, the Subordinate Judge enhanced the compensation amount to Rs. 68,81,268.65p. But, while conducting the enquiries on the references, the Subordinate Judge had neither issued notice to the petitioner, nor afforded it any opportunity to defend the claim of the land owners for payment of enhanced compensation.
5. Against the awards for enhanced compensation, passed by the Subordinate Judge, the State Government did not prefer appeals to this Court. The petitioner, therefore filed writ petitions for mandamus being issued to the State Government directing them to file appeals to the High Court against the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge. The writ petitions were admitted and interim stay of execution of the awards was granted subject to the condition that the petitioner deposited 50 per cent of the compensation amount in court and furnished Bank guarantee for the balance of compensation amount.
As the petitioner failed to deposit 50 per cent of the compensation amount, the interim stay was vacated. Against the orders of the single Judge vacating the stay, the petitioner filed writ appeals. When the writ appeals were pending, the Government Pleader represented that the State had since filed appeals to the High Court against the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge. In view of that representation, the writ appeals were dismissed and the parties were directed to maintain status quo.
6. In spite of the State having filed appeals against the awards, the petitioner has filed these writ petitions for obtaining writs of certiorari to quash the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge.
7. The main ground on which the petitioner assails the validity and enforceability of the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge is that even though the petitioner is an interested party, it has not been issued any notice in the enquiry conducted by the Subordinate Judge in the reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Act and, as such, the awards contravene the provisions of the Act and also the principles of natural justice. Since, according to the petitioner, the awards are ab initio void, they should be quashed by this Court by means of writ of certiorari.
8. While filing the writ petitions, the petitioner had also filed writ miscellaneous petitions and obtained orders of stay of execution of the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge. In twelve cases the orders of stay have been vacated and it is against those orders the writ appeals have been filed.
9. No counter affidavit has been filed by any of the respondents. However, Mr. Srikumaran Nair, Mr. R. Gandhi and Mr. Selvaraj appearing for the land-owners questioned the maintainability of the writ petitions and also advanced arguments to sustain the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge. Their arguments were, adopted by the other counsel appearing for the rest of the claimants.
10. The principal question that falls for consideration in the writ petitions is whether when a land is acquired for a company registered under the Indian, Companies Act, notice to the said company under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act has got to be issued by the civil court before taking up for enquiry a reference made to it under Section 18 of the Act. Before considering this question, certain preliminary objections raised by the counsel for the land – owners require mention and consideration.
11. The first objection raised was that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be filed against an award of a civil court, to wit, the court of the Subordinate Judge of Padmanabhapuram in this case. So far as this contention is concerned, it has to be pointed out that a civil court to which a reference is made under Section 18 of the Act, does not act as a court of plenary jurisdiction in dealing with the reference, but acts only as a special tribunal. Its powers are not unrestricted nor does it have the power of remand or inherent powers available to a civil court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but on the other hand, its powers and jurisdiction are restricted by the terms of the reference. Section 19 of the Act sets out the particulars which should be furnished by the Collector when he makes a reference, under Section 18 for the information of the court. Section 20 to the terms of which a detailed reference will be made in a later portion of the Judgment, enjoins the court to effect service of notice on the applicant and all the persons interested in the determination of the references by. it. Section 21 indicates the parameters of the enquiry to be conducted by the civil court. In. order to understand what the parameters are, we must look to the terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 18. That sub-Section sets out that any person interested, if he has not consented to the award, may apply in writing to the Collector requiring him to make a reference to the court for determination of his objection regarding (i) the measurement of the land, (ii) the amount of the compensation, (iii) the persons to whom the compensation is payable, and (iv) the manner of apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Incidentally, we may point out here that the last two grounds of objection would, by themselves, give rise to a reference to the civil court by the Collector himself under Section 30 of the Act. It therefore follows that the scope of enquiry in a reference to a civil court will stand restricted only to the four kinds of objections set out in Section 18(1). There can be no such restriction on the scope of the enquiry if the court were to deal with a reference under Section 18 as a civil court of plenary jurisdiction. It can also be appositely pointed out here that Section 22 while laying down that a proceeding arising out of a reference under Section 18 shall take place in open court, also sets out that “all persons entitled to practise in any civil court in the State shall be entitled to appear, plead and act (as the case may be) in such a proceeding”. This provision is another pointer to show that a court to which a reference is made under Section 18 does not act as a civil court and exercise its powers as such, but only acts as a tribunal for determination of the limited questions referred to it for consideration. One other feature would also throw light on the matter. Under Section 18 of the Act, any person interested can move for a reference to the civil court in respect of the subject – matter of the award. But, if any item in the land acquired is omitted and is not a subject – matter of the award, then the person or persons interested cannot seek a reference under Section 18, because the left-out item is not a subject – matter of the award. The aggrieved person in such a case will have to file an independent suit in the civil court. Vide: State of Bihar v. Nimdari Singh ,B. . Resort to an independent remedy beofre the civil court for securing compensation for items omitted to be included in the award, would also go to show that a court to which a reference is made under Section 18 does not act as a civil court, but only acts as a special tribunal. This position has been conclusively laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra by holding that the court functioning under the Land Acquisition Act is a tribunal of special jurisdiction, and not a civil court. In such circumstances, the contention that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked, to quash an award passed on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, does not have any merit in it.
12. Mr. Thyagarajan, Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that even if it is held that the Sub Court, Padmanabhapuram had acted as a civil court, and not as a special tribunal under the Act, the petitioner is entitled to seek the quashing of the award by means of a writ of certiorari if the award is ex facie illegal and has been passed in clear violation of the law. In support of this contention, the counsel cited the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Badu Lal where it was held that where a court acts illegally and usurps jurisdiction and there is an error on the face of the record then the record has to be corrected by certiorari. Resort to this ratio is not called for in the present case, because there is direct authority in Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra that a court dealing with a reference under Section 18 of the Act only functions as a special tribunal and not as a civil court as known to law. Consequently, an’ error committed by the tribunal can be corrected by certiorari. Therefore, what really falls for consideration is whether the Sub Court has committed any error in passing the awards in the cases referred to it under Section 18 of the Act, without giving notice to the petitioner.
13. Another preliminary objection raised was that inasmuch as appeals have been preferred to this Court against the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge, the petitioner cannot legitimately contend that it is left with no other remedy but to file petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution to seek redressal against the awards. It is, no doubt, true that Sub-article (3) of Article 226 interdicts the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 if any other remedy for redressal of the injury is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. It is equally true that at the instance of the petitioner, the State has preferred appeals to this Court against the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge. Even so, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the nature and scope of the two proceedings are entirely different. An appeal preferred against an award can only raise for consideration the question whether the court was justified in enhancing the compensation amount or in refusing to enhance the compensation amount on the basis of the materials placed before it. On the other hand, a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash an award passed by the court will go to the root of the matter, viz., whether the award is sustainable at all irrespective of the question whether the court was justified in enhancing or refusing to enhance the compensation amount on the face of the materials placed before it. To put it differently an appeal against an award can have reference only to the quantum of compensation that was awarded or refused to be awarded by the court, but it cannot go beyond and call for examination of the validity and legality of the award itself. On the other hand’, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash an award will call for examination of the more fundamental question of the validity and legality of the award itself. Therefore, having regard to the difference in the scope of the two proceedings, there is no room for a technical objection being raised regarding the maintainability of a writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy is available and, in fact, that has been availed of.
14. The question of alternative remedy being available, also calls for a look from a different perspective. Though the petitioner has succeeded in making the State Government file appeals to the High Court against the awards passed by the Sub Court the petitioner can only be a passive spectator in the appeal proceedings and it cannot take a direct or active part and seek reduction of the compensation amount. This is because of the fact that in a reference under Section 18 there can only be two parties, viz., the Collector and the claimant who has raised the objection to the award. The person for whom the land is acquired has no locus standi to demand a reference under Section 18 and he can only appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The proviso to Section 50(2) of the Act makes this position clear. Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek intervention in the appeal and advance independent arguments to assail the correctness of the award passed by the civil court. This position has been sufficiently pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in Kanyaka Parameswari Devastha-nam v. Ambalavana Sannadhi and also in Indo Swiss Time v. Umrao . It may therefore be seen that the filing of appeals by the Collector to the High Court against the awards passed by a civil Court cannot strictly be called an effective alternative remedy for the petitioner. From that point of view also, the petitioner is entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to seek quashing of the awards passed by a civil court on grounds of illegality and violation of the principles of natural justice.
15. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in S. Jagadeesan v. A.N.J.A. College to reiterate their objection that since an alternative remedy by way of appeal against the award of the civil court was available under the statute, to the petitioner, and in fact, such a remedy has also been availed of, the petitioner is precluded from filing petitions under Article 226 to seek quashing of the awards. We are unable, to see merit in this contention. The decision relied on was concerned with a writ petition filed to quash a resolution passed by the Syndicate of the Madurai Kamaraj University directing reinstatement of a member of the teaching staff. Since a direct remedy by way of an appeal under Section 37 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 was available to the aggrieved party, the Supreme Court held that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition, but should have called upon the party to seek the alternative remedy of filing an appeal for redressal of his grievance. The facts here are perceptibly different. The petitioner cannot, by itself, file an appeal against the award passed by the civil court, nor can it even seek impleadment in an appeal preferred by the State or by the owner of the land against an award. Hence, even if an appeal is filed, the petitioner cannot directly voice its grievance or put forth its contentions, but has only to rely upon good offices of the State to protect its interests. It this position is realised, it can never be said that the indirect remedy available to the petitioner by inducing the State Government to file an appeal will constitute an alternative remedy as equal to and effective as the filing of a petition under Article 226 for the issue of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate order.
16. The maintainability of the writ petitions was assailed by Mr. Gandhi on a different ground. Learned Counsel argued that in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions, the petitioner had deliberately refrained from stating that appeals have already been filed against the awards, but notwithstanding the resort to the alternative remedy, the petitioner was constrained to file the writ petitions for compelling reasons. The counsel therefore argued that the petitioner is guilty of material suppression and because of this deliberate lapse, the petitioner ought not to be permitted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. Since we have already held that the filing of appeals will not amount to an effective alternative remedy for the petitioner, we are unable to countenance this argument of the counsel.
17. In the course of the arguments, it was brought to our notice that in one reference, viz., L.A.O.P. No. 7 of 1981, the petitioner has accepted the award passed by the Civil Court and paid enhanced compensation to the landowner in terms of the award. An argument, was therefore advanced that when in one case the petitioner has suffered the award and paid the compensation amount at revised rates to the landowner, it is estopped in law from disputing the validity of the awards passed in the other cases or to deny its liability to pay compensation at enhanced rates in terms of the awards. The petitioner’s counsel met the argument by saying that in that particular case the increase in the compensation amount was negligible, viz., Rs. 693.15p. and since the landowner had taken out execution, the compensation amount was paid under protest. We find the explanation acceptable. More than that, we are of the view that payment of the compensation amount cannot act as an estoppel, especially when the petitioner is not a party to the reference proceedings, when the challenge is on the validity of the award and not merely on the quantum of increase in the compensation amount.
18. Coming now to the main question, viz., whether the award passed by the civil court without giving notice to the petitioner to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation as envisaged in Sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act, is proper we may briefly refer to the scheme of the Act and some of its relevant provisions. For this purpose, we may reproduce with advantage the following summarisation by the Privy Council in Samullah v. Collector, Aligarh L.R. 73 I.A. 44 : (1946) 1 M.L.J. 333 : A.I.R. 1946 75 (at page 77) : 59 L.W. 312.
Under Section 4 of the Act it is provided that where it appears to the Provincial Government that land is needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect is to be published as directed. Under Section 5(a) persons interested in the land which has been notified may object to its acquisition, and the Collector has to hear the objection and make a report thereon to Government. Under Section 6, if the Government is satisfied, after considering the Collector’s report, that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company (a subject dealt with in later Sections of the Act) a declaration to that effect has to be made and published. Under Section 9 notice has to be published by the Collector stating that the Government intend to take the land and that claims to compensation for all interest in such land may be made to him. Under Section 11 the Collector has to inquire into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 and into the respective interests of persons claiming compensation and to make an award of (inter alia) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land. Under Section 12 notice of the award has to be given. Under Section 18 any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require him to refer the matter (which may include the amount of compensation) to the court. Under Section 19(1)(d) the Collector in making the reference, is required to state for the information of the court, if the objection be to the amount of compensation, the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined. Under Section 23, the court is required to take into consideration (inter alia) the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 and to add 15 per cent to the market value for the compulsory acquisition. Under Section 26 the award is to be deemed a decree. ‘Collector is defined in the Act as including a Deputy Collector and any officer specially appointed by the provincial Government to perform the functions of a Collector under the Act’.
For the purposes of these petitions, a reference to some more sections of the Act is also called for. After entertaining a reference under Section 18, the Court is enjoined under Section 20 to cause notice to be served on (i) the appellant, (ii) all persons interested in the objection (underpinning ours) except such of those as have consented to receive payment of the compensation amount, and (iii) the Collector, if the objection raised by the claimant is with regard to the area of the land or to the amount of compensation. Section 21 lays down that the scope’ of the enquiry in every such proceeding shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected (underlining ours) by the objection. Then, we come to Section 50 which pertains to acquisition of land at the Cost of a local authority or a company. Sub-section (1) of Section 50 provides that if the provisions of the Act are made use of for acquiring a land for a local authority or a company, then the charges of and incidental to, such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by the funds of the local authority or company. Sub-section (2) of Section 50 and the proviso thereto are important provisions and therefore, we extract them hereunder:
Section 50: (1)….
(2) in any proceeding held before a Col lector or court in such cases, the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation:
Provided that no such local authority or company shall be entitled to demand a reference under Section 18.
As per the terms of Section 50(2), when the land is acquired on behalf of a local authority or a company, then the concerned local authority or company has been given a right to appear in the land acquisition proceedings or adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The proviso however, makes it clear that as against an award passed by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer, the local authority or the company will not be entitled to demand a reference under Section 18. Section 54 provides for an appeal to the High Court against awards passed by the civil court, subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals from origional decree and a further appeal to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order 45 thereof.
19. In the light of these provisions, what falls for consideration is whether the petitioner company is a person interested in the acquisition proceedings and if so, whether it is entitled to notice of hearing under Section 20(b) of the Act, and the further question would be whether, if such notice was not issued and the non-issue of notice had deprived the petitioner an, opportunity of adducing evidence for proper determination of the amount of compensation,. such non-issue would amount to contravention of the Act and violation of the principles of natural justice.
20. The matter is no longer res integra, because these identical questions have come to be considered by the Supreme Court as well as the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. We shall therefore proceed M refer to those decisions and the dictum contained therein. In Town Improvement Trust v. Sahaji Rao the Town Improvement Trust, Gwalior filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ to set aside an award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of a land acquired for it. The writ petition was allowed and it was held that the Town Improvement Trust, Gwalior was a person interested in the proceedings and it therefore, had the requisite locus standi to seek quashing of the award. On the merits of the case, the award was quashed and the matter was remitted for fresh determination of the amount of compensation. In Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Coutinho one of the questions which fell for consideration was whether a private company on whose behalf certain lands were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. had locus standi to file a writ appeal against a rule issued at the instance of the owner of the land for quashing the acquisition proceedings. Dealing with the matter, the Supreme Court, after reviewing various earlier pronouncements has held as follows:
Thus the preponderance of judical opinion seems to favour the view that the definition ‘of the person interested’ must be liberally construed so as to include body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of, equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital? For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him. Similarly, if such a person is not heard by the Collector or a Court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation, which, in case he is allowed to appear before a court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land, We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company; local authority or a person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors concern its future course of action’ and if decided against him, seriously prejudice his rights. Moreover, in view of the decision of this Court referred to above R.L. Arora v. State of U.P . We hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by Section 18(1) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus standi to file an appeal before the Bench.
21. Mr. Thyagarajan also brought to our notice two unreported judgments of the Supreme Court, the first being in U.G.E.P. Ltd. v. State of Mysore and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 1045/77 (Supreme Court Judgment, dated July 31, 1980). The Bench held as follows:
The question of compensation had to be decided after hearing the necessary parties. The party most affected with regard to the payment of compensation was the appellant before us, because the funds had to be found by the appellant for whose benefit the land was being acquired
…..
The absence of the appellant before the Civil Court had a disastrous impact on it because while the land acquisition officer had ordered a sum of Rs. 46,000 by way of compensation, the civil Judge raised it to Rs. 2,39.000. We are not making any observation about the merits of the contentions. All that we need say is that there is an imperative obligation to give notice and hear the appellant’s petition before the High Court, and on the strength of Section 20 referred to above, the High Court should have allowed the writ petition and set aside the decision of the civil Judge. Instead of doing so, the High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine.
This view has been reiterated in the second case, in Town Municipal Council, Harihar v. The Secretary to the Government of Karnataka and Ors. CA. No. 2665 of 1980 (S.C.) : dated 5th March 1980. Learned Counsel for the respondents sought to distinguish N.G.E.F. Ltd. v. State of Mysore and Ors. C.A. No. 1045 of 1977 (S.C), dated 31st 3uly, 1980 on the ground that the State of Mysore had amended Sub-section (2) of Section 20. of the Act and specifically provided that if the acquisition was not made for Government, then notice should be issued to the authority or the person for whom it is. made. We may deal with this contention at this stage itself, because there is no room for differentiating the judgment on the subtle ground put forward by the respondents counsel. In the very judgment under consideration, the Supreme Court has held that the party most affected by enhancement of the compensation by the civil court would be the company or the local authority and it is in realisation of this position, the Karnataka Government has introduced a specific provision for notice to the company or local authority under Section 20(c). The judgement, therefore, makes it clear that even without the amendment to Section 20(c), the Supreme Court would have sustained the grievance expressed by the company and allowed the appeal.
22. In view of these clear and authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, we do not think there is any scope for the respondents to contend that the petitioner is not a ‘person interested’ in the objection and therefore, it is not entitled to issue of notice or a right of hearing before the civil court when it dealt with the references under S.I8 of the Act. In our opinion, the position of law is now well-settled and that is why we have prefaced our discussion with the observation that the matter is no longer res integra. Even so, the Learned Counsel for the respondents, sought to canvass before us by means of various arguments that the position of law on the question is yet to receive judicial pronouncement and that the decisions referred to above, do not conclude the matter.
23. Mr. Srikumaran Nair argued that the petitioner may be aggrieved and affected person on account of the enhancement of compensation by the civil court, but it will not be a person ‘interested’ within the meaning of Section 3(b) or Section 20(b) of the Act, and unless the petitioner is a person interested, it is not entitled to notice in the reference proceedings under Section 18 to the civil court. Learned Counsel argued that the term ‘person interested’ has been defined in Section 3(b) of the Act and as per the definition, the expression includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of the land under the Act. According to the counsel, the petitioner is not a person claiming compensation, nor is it a claimant to any easementary right over the acquired land, and as such, the petitioner is not a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b). Arguing further, the counsel referred to Section 18(1) and submitted that only a person-interested can apply to the Collector provided he has not accepted the award for a reference being made to the civil court for consideration of his objection about the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, etc. Placing reliance upon Section 3(b) and Section 18(1), Mr. Srikumaran Nair argued that the expression ‘persons interested’ occurring in Section 20(b) of the Act should be construed in conformity with the abovesaid provisions, and so construed the petitioner has no locus standito insist upon notice from the civil court before it dealt with the references under Section 18. We are not persuaded by the argument of the counsel, because the argument contains a fallacy. The expression ‘person interested’ defined in Section 3(b), will have application only to Section 18 of the Act, but not to Section 20(b) because the words used in Section 20(b) are different. While Section 18 refers only to ‘persons interested’ the words used in Section 20(b) are ‘person interested in the objection’. It cannot therefore be said that the expression in Section 20(b) should be construed in terms of the definition contained in Section 3(b). Moreever, it should also be noticed that Section 18(1) restricts the types of objections which could be raised by a person interested in the acquisition proceedings. Only four kinds of objections can be raised to an award passed by the Collector, viz., objections regarding (i) measurement of the land, (ii) amount of compensation, (iii) person to whom the compensation is payable, and (iv) the manner of apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. It is only on these matters a person interested’ can ask the Collector to make a reference under Section 18. When an objection is raised about the inadequacy of the compensation amount, it goes without saying that the court will have to find out whether the compensation awarded by the Collector is reasonable and, if not, what is the higher compensation amount that should be given. When such a matter is considered by the court, the company or the local authority, for whose benefit the land is acquired will undoubtedly be interested in the objection raised by the claimant, because any enhancement of the compensation amount will directly affect the company or the local authority inasmuch as it has to pay the compensation amount for the land. It is on account of this fact, the Supreme Court had held in the decisions referred to above that if notice is not given to the company or local authority and the said company or local authority is not afforded opportunity to participate in the reference proceedings, then it will have disastrous consequences for the company or local authority and therefore, it is imperative that notice should be given to the affected party before the reference proceedings are enquired into and an award is passed.
24. We may also usefully refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas . In that case, the compensation amount for a land which was acquired was apportioned equally between the landowner and the lessee. Both of them raised objections, the landowner claiming the entire compensation amount and the lessee claiming a higher share. In the meanwhile, a decree-holder of the lessee attached’ the compensation amount allotted to the lessee and withdrew the money from court. Subsequent to that, the landowner and the lessee filed a compromise petition before the civil court. The decree-holder, sought impleadment in the reference proceedings under Section 18 which were pending. The court held that he was not a person interested and refused impleadment. On revision, the High Court ordered impleadment of the decree-holder. Against the order of the High Court, an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that a person claiming interest in the compensation need hot necessarily be a person claiming interest in the land, that the definition of ‘person interested’ in Section 3(b) is an inclusive definition, and that any person, whose interest is likely to be affected by an objection raised to the amount of compensation or the apportionment of the compensation will also be a person interested and hence such a person is entitled to be heard by the court in the proceedings under Section 18. When even a decree-holder of one of the claimants to the compensation amount has been held to be a person interested, it goes without saying that the petitioner who has to bear the burden of the additional compensation should be considered all the more a person interested. In such circumstances, if notice is not issued to the petitioner and it is deprived of an opportunity of making representations, before the civil court it would amount to a violation of the rule of audi alteram partem.
25. Learned Counsel for the respondents sought to contend that as per Section 20(c), if an objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of compensation, then the Court is enjoined to serve notice only on the Collector and not on the company or local authority for whose benefit the land is acquired. We do not find any merit in this contention, because it overlooks the specific provision made in Section 50(2) for a company or local authority appearing before the Collector or court and adducing evidence for the purposes of determining the compensation. We have also to bear in mind that a person interested may refuse to receive the compensation amount awarded by the Collector and seek a reference under Section 18 for determination of one or more of the four kinds of objections specified therein. The first two objections pertain to the extent of the land and to the amount of compensation, while the third and fourth objections pertain to the persons to whom the compensation amount is to be distributed and the manner of apportionment among the several claimants if the objection is only with reference to the persons to whom the compensation amount is to be paid or the manner of apportionment of the same among the vaious claimants, then the Collector is not a necessary party and the court need not issue notice to him or call upon him to controvert the objections. In fact, those cases will fall under Section 30 of the Act and the Collector himself will have to make a reference to the court under Section 30. No separate provisions has been made in the Act specifying the procedure to be followed by the Court in dealing with a reference under Section 30. Therefore, Section 20 will cover not only references made under Section 18, but also references made under Section 30. It therefore follows that when a reference is made Only for determination of the question as to who are the persons entitled to the payment of compensation or the manner in which the apportionment of the compensation is to be made, the court need not give’ notice to the Collector. In order to make this position clear, it has been specifically stated in Section 20(c) that notice need be given to the Collector only when the objection is in regard to the area of the land or the amount of the compensation. Hence Section 20(c) cannot be construed to mean that in a reference made under Section 18 for determining a dispute regarding the area of the land or the amount of compensation, the court should give notice only to the Collector and to none else and in such circumstantces, a company or a local authority for which a land is acquired is not entitled to notice under Section0, even if the award by the court will prejudicially affect the interests of the company or the local authority.
26. If the contention of the respondents is given acceptance, then sub-Section (2) of Section 50 will be rendered otiose. The well established principle is to interpet the provisions of a statute as harmoniously as possible so that there is no conflict of the provisions and likewise, that no provision is rendered otiose. We cannot, therefore, sustain the argument that the petitioner is not a person interested in the objection and as such, it cannot assail the award on the ground of non issue of notice to it by the court when it dealt with the reference under Section 18.
27. A somewhat curious argument was advanced by Mr. Selvaraj to contend that even if the petitioner is entitled to notice in the award proceedings, it must be deemed to have given up its right because of its failure to have adduced evidence before the Land Acquisition Officer prior to his passing an award under Section 11 of the Act. We see no force in this contention because Section 20 does not restrict the issuance of notice only to those persons who participated in the enquiry under Section 11. Further, it has to be remembered that as against an award passed by the Collector, a company or local authority has no right to seek a reference under Section 18. Objections regarding the compensation amount fixed by the Collector can arise only after an award is passed under Section 11 and the landowners feel that the compensation awarded is low and inadequate. It is only then the company or the local authority will be faced with the necessity of considering those objections. It cannot, therefore be said that the failure of a company or local authority to have participated in the enquiry under Section 11 will preclude it from seeking a notice from court when a reference is made under Section 18 or from claiming a right of representation in such a proceeding. The reference proceedings under Section 18 are different from the award proceedings under Section 11 and as such, there can be no argument that non-participation in the enquiry held under Section 11 will constitute waiver of notice under Section 20 as well.
28. Lastly, it was contended by Mr. Selvaraj that the petitioner, being a company wholly owned by the Government of India, must be equated with the Union Government itself and that it cannot claim the status of a separate entity and raise an objection that the Court should not have passed awards on the references without giving notice to the company. For advancing such a contention, Mr. Selvaraj placed reliance on the amendment made to Section 3(e) of the Act, by the Amending Act 68 of 1984. Prior to the amendment, Section 3(a) of the Act read as follows:
The expression ‘company’ means a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882 or under the (English) Companies Acts, 1862 to 1890, or incorporated by an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by an Indian Law, or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent and includes a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1869, and a registered society with in the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, or any other law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State.
As per the amendment effected by Act 68 of 1984, the relevant provisions read as follows:
The expression ‘Company’ means –
(1) a company as defined in Section 3, of the Companies Act, 1956, other than a Government company referred to in Section 3, Clause (cc) of the Land Acquisition Act, – Section 3, Clause (a)
Clause 3(cc) of the Act is to the following effect:
The expression ‘Corporation owned or controlled by the State’ means any body corporate established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, and includes a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in any State, being a society established or administered by Government and a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State, being a cooperative society in which not less than fifty-one per centum of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, or by any State Government or Governments, or partly by the Central Government and partly by one or more State Governments.
Since, as per the amended clause, a Government company as defined in Clause (cc) has been taken away from the expression ‘company, the Learned Counsel argued that the petitioner cannot claim the status of a company and invoke Section 50(2) to its aid and insist upon issue of notice to it by the court in the reference made under Section 18. Even though the acquisition proceedings had taken place long prior to the enactment of the Amending Act 68 of 1984, Mr. Selvaraj argued that the Court is bound to take notice of subsequent events and mould the relief to the parties in the light of the subsequent events. In support of the argument that the Court is entitled to take notice of the subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly. Mr. Selvaraj placed reliance on Lachameshwar v. Keshwar Lal (1941) 1 M.L.J. (Supp) 49 : A.I.R. 1941 F.C.5 : 53 L.W. 373; Pasupuleti v. Motor Traders , M.M. Quasim v. Monohar Lal Sharma and Hasmat Raj v. Raghunath Prasad . It was alternatively contended that even without the amendment, the petitioner company should be construed as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as it is a company wholly owned by the Government of India and from that standpoint also, the petitioner cannot claim the status of an independent company and a right of hearing in the reference proceedings in that capacity. By way of judicial authority for this proposition, Mr. Selvaraj referred to the decision in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India and Raman, C.V. v. The Management of Bank of India (1985) Writ L.R. 360.
29. Arguing contra, Mr. Thyagarajan submitted that the petitioner, in spite of being a company wholly owned by the Government of India, is a distinct entity and its status as such cannot be refuted. The Learned Counsel argued that merely because the shares of the company are wholly owned by the Government of India, the company will not cease to be a company, within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act or become part and parcel of the Government of India. So far as the amendment to Section 3(3) is concerned, the counsel submitted that the amendment has been effected long after the acquisition proceedings had been completed and furthermore, the amendment cannot have retrospective effect. To lend authority to his contention, Mr. Thyagarajan cited Punjab Tin Supply Co. v. Central Government where it was held that retrospective effect to an amendment may be given only where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation was intended.
30. On an examination of these contentions, we find that the petitioner company can by no stretch of imagination, be identified with the Government of India and to have no separate legal existence of its own. It is true that the petitioner is a company wholly owned by the Government of India. Even so, its status in law prior to the amendment is only that of a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882. It has a separate seat and juristic personality of it own. In the two cases cited above, viz., Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India and Raman C.V. v. The Management of the Bank of India (1985) Writ L.R. 360 what was contended was that the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. in the first case, constitution an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution so as to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court and in the second case, the Bank of India constituted an authority under the control of the Government India so as to dispel the application of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act to its employees. The controversy raised in those two cases was therefore entirely different. Hence the dictum contained in those decisions has no relevance to the question posed before us. On the other hand, the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority Korba will apply on all fours to this case. Therein it has been laid down that even if the entire share -capital of a company has been subscribed by the Government of India, it cannot be predicated that the company is itself owned by the Government, but on the contrary the company incorporated under the Companies Act has a corporate personality of its own distinct from that of the Government of India. It was further held that any lands and buildings owned by the company will stand vested only in the company in spite of the Government of India owning the entire share capital.
31. So far as the retrospective application of the amended Section 3(e) is concerned, it is needless to discuss the matter in detail because the amendment does not contemplate either expressly or impliedly a retrospective application of the amended Section. The acquisition proceedings had come to a conclusion long before the Amendment Act came into force. Possession of the lands had also been handed over to the petitioner long back and the award under Section 11 had also been passed before Act 68 of 1984 was enacted. What remained to be done was only the payment of compensation after examining the objections raised by the landowners regarding the compensation amount fixed by the Collector. The pendency of those proceedings cannot be taken to mean that the acquisition proceedings themselves we’re inchoate or incomplete.
32. In the light of the conclusions reached by us, we are clearly of opinion that all the writ petitions should succeed. Learned Counsel for the respondents raised a poser as to what would become of the appeals preferred by the State against the awards passed by the civil court. It goes without saying that once the awards of the Civil Court are quashed by means of certiorari, then the appeals will have to be necessarily withdrawn. Learned Counsel for the petitioner conceded this position. We have. to therefore observe that once the references are taken for fresh enquiry by the Subordinate Judge, the appeals preferred to this Court will become infructuous and will therefore, have to be withdrawn.
33. In the result, we hold that all the writ petitions will stand allowed and there will be a rule in each of them quashing the awards passed by the Subordinate Judge, Padmanabhapuram in the references made under Section 18 of the Act. All the references will stand restored to the file of the Subordinate Judge, Learned Counsel for the petitioner states that formal notice is not necessary and that the petitioner will enter appearance within four weeks from the date the references stand restored to the file of the Subordinate Judge. After appearance by the petitioner, the Subordinate Judge will dispose of the references afresh after giving opportunity to the petitioner herein to make whatever representations it wants and opportunity to the claimants also to adduce further evidence if they so desire. Since all the awards are quashed by means of the rule, the need for ordering stay of payment of the additional compensation amount does not arise. The writ appeals therefore become infructuous and, accordingly, they will stand dismissed.
34. There will be no order as to costs in the writ petitions as well as the writ appeals.
35. Having regard to the long drawn out nature of the proceedings the Subordinate Judge, Padmanabhapuram is directed to dispose of the references within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the records.
