JUDGMENT
Madan, J.
1. The undisputed facts are that the petitioners are the members of Jawaharpuri Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti (hereinafter referred to as “the Samiti”) and they have filed this writ petition in representative capacity as the members of the Samiti which is a registered Housing Society.
2. The case of the petitioners is that the petitioner-Samiti entered into an agreement of sale dt. 31.7.1981 with the khatedara of the land in dispute. Urban Improvement Trust Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as “the UIT”) sought to acquire the land in dispute for planned development of Jaipur City by issuing a notice under Section 52(2) of the Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1959”). Pursuant to this, khatedara of the land raised objections but the acquisition proceedings had come to an end. Thereafter, the land in dispute was demarcated for the “residential colony” known as Sriram Colony, Tonk Road, Jaipur, plan of which was submitted to the Additional Collector, JDA for Land Conversion who in turn forwarded the matter to the JDA for approval. In compliance of the layout plan some of the members deposited conversion charges. However, the matter for regularisation of the said land was pending for necessary approval of the JDA.
3. Thereafter, the State Govt. issued notification dt. 10.1.1990 (Annexure-3) under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1894”) for acquisition of the said land to which, khatedara of the land raised objections. Hence, the respondents issued a notification on 4.1.1991 (Annexure-4) under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894 whereby the proceedings under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 were dispensed with and notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued.
4. Feeling aggrieved against the impugned notification issued by the respondents under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, the Khatedars of the land in dispute filed a petition before this Court bearing SB CWP No. 5561/1991 (Ramavtar v. State & Ors.) wherein, this Court directed the parties to maintain status-quo.
5. Thereafter, the State Govt. had taken policy decision vide order dt. 24.3.1994 (Annexure-5) and issued a circular to regularise the land in dispute; to which Housing Society entered into an agreement to sate on 31.7.1981 and deposited the partial conversion charge vide Annex.-2 dt. 13.4.82 for regularisation of the land in their favour.
6. In pursuance of the above Policy decision of the State Govt. taken vide Circular dt. 24.3.1994, the JDA asked the petitioner Samiti to furnish the documents pertaining to agreement to sale and in compliance of which the petitioners furnished the requisite documents alongwith the receipt indicating the deposit of conversion charges. When the respondents did not take any further action in the matter, the petitioners submitted a representation to the JDA requesting it to regularise the scheme pursuant to the State Government’s Policy mentioning therein that the members have constructed their boundary walls and some of them have started residing by constructing their houses alongwith their families. In the meanwhile, in order to fulfill the object of Master Plan, the JDA discussed the matter with the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Raj, for the purpose of construction of Link Road. Thereupon, the authorities perused the boundary walls and dwelling units. After discussion, the matter was placed in the meeting of Building Plan Committee of JDA on 22.4.1995 and it was decided to approve the scheme and possession of the land in dispute was to be taken no sooner the petition is withdrawn from the respective Court.
7. Ramavtar who was petitioner in SBCWP No. 5561/91 submitted an affidavit for withdrawal of the petition immediately after the scheme is approved. Thereafter, Meeting was convened at the instance of the respondent in which following decision was taken:-
“(1) The Society will surrender the land to Jaipur Development Authority falling within the right of way of the proposed By-pass. The society will not claim any compensation for this surrender of this land for road.
(2) The Director (Engg.), Jaipur Development Authority will immediately take up the construction work of the proposed road as per the alignments to be finalized by the Town Planning Wing of Jaipur Development Authority.
(3) The Chief Engineer, Rajasthan Housing Board also agreed to provide all necessary help for the construction of the important By-pass so that there is a smooth flow of traffic from Mansarovar to Malviya Nagar, Tonk Road and Airport areas.
(4) After considering the layout plan of the society scheme the Jaipur Development Authority will take the possession of the land falling within the right of way and the society will withdraw the court stay.”
8. In view of the aforesaid decision taken in the meeting, it was decided to regularize the scheme and the construction over the by-pass was taken to be free of cost and thus, the Building Committee of the JDA in its meeting approved the plan. .
9. Thereafter, on the request of the Members of the Samiti (the petitioners & other persons) the JDA declared the programme for holding camp of Housing Society (Sriram Colony) and advertised the same in Rajasthan Patrika dt. 18.6.1995 (Ann. 16) for holding the camp on 22.6.1995. Pursuant to the above advertisement, the petitioners (Samiti) deposited the conversion charges.
10. Hence, on account of the above decision taken by the JDA, Ramavtar (petitioner In SBCWP No. 5561/91) withdrew, the said petition as not pressed.
11. In the backdrop of above events, Shri R.S. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has stated at the Bar that after achieving the benefit out of the Court/settlement, now the JDA cannot take contrary view against the Principle of Promissory Estoppel and in support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Akhara Brahm Duta, Amritsar vs. State of Punjab (1), wherein the apex Court held, as under:-
“The conclusion of the High Court is clearly erroneous. The learned
counsel for the State has argued that in view of the Section 41 of the
Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1992 it was within the discretion of
the State Government to have agreed with the modification of the
Scheme or not and the State cannot be forced to take a particular
decision. This argument is clearly erroneous as the State is bound to
modify the Scheme in view of its stand before the High Court in pursuance of which the judgment in the earlier with petition was given. It also appears that the Collector while making the award relied upon the said agreement and fixed the compensation of the entire area at Rs. 2 per Sq. Yard only, having taken advantage of the agreement in part and having repeatedly agreed to the agreement in part and having repeatedly agreed to the terms of the compromise between the appellant and the Improvement Trust, the State Government cannot now be permitted to back out.”
12. Apart from above, learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon the Division Bench’s decision of this Court dt. 15.9.2001 given in (Rochees Hotel Pvt. Ltd. vs. JDA) (2).
13. Counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the other judgments, as under:-
(2) Hiralal Chawala v. Stale of U.P. (4)
(3) Akhara Brahm Buta, Amritsar v. State of Punjab (supra).
(4) Rochees Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. JDA JDA v. Rochees Hotels Pvt. Ltd.
(5).
14. In Uttar Pradesh Residents Employees Cooperative House Building Society (supra), the case of the appellant was that it was a registered Housing Cooperative Society under the UP Cooperative Societies Act. The object of the society was to acquire lands for its members for constructing residential houses for its members having the employees of the Central and State Government. For development of certain areas in the State of U.P, into industrial and urban township and for matters connected therewith, the UP Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, was enacted and thereafter the UP Government by a Notification dated April 17, 1976 declared the villages named in the schedule annexed to the notification to be an Industrial Development Area within the meaning of the Act, to be called as “Noida”.
15. Soon after constituting this Authority a notification under Sections 4 & 7 (Sub-section (1) of Section 4 and Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the UP Extraordinary Gazettee stating the land in village Chhalera Bangar was needed for the planned industrial development. The land of the appellant society was included in the notification. In continuation of Notification dated April 30, 1976, another Notification under Section 6 dated May 1, 1976 was issued stating the land mentioned in the schedule was needed for a public purpose. Thereafter, again a notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act was issued notifying that the land in question was needed for public purpose and that the case was of urgent nature and as such the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act was applicable to the land in dispute.
16. Thereafter, the appellant society demanded the land acquired in the Noida complex and after several representations and correspondence a committee was constituted and in the meeting it was decided that the sites would be given to various cooperative societies nearest to Delhi on the basis of the Noida Master Plan which was under consideration and it was decided to give the developed plots to the bonafide members of the society whose lands were acquired and an approximate rate was offered at Rs. 130/- per square metre.
17. Hence, the Society challenged the notification issued under Sections 4 & 6 of the Act in a petition before the High Court but the High Court dismissed the said petition holding that the appellant society had no legal right to get a particular land and that the society did not avail of the concession granted by the Authority.
18. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the Society went in SLP before the Apex Court and the Apex Court while disposing of the appeal held in its concluding part of the order, as under:-
“Town Planning in NOIDA is said to be in accordance with the norms laid down by itself and the same are prescribed by the Board of which the Chief Town and Country Planner of Uttar Pradesh is a member. We direct that all the norms laid down by NOIDA in the matter of development shall be strictly followed. Supervision of this operation of course shall be by NOIDA but we hope and trust that the society would co-operate with NOIDA in this regard. The appeal is disposed of with these directions without any orders as to costs.”
19. In Hiralal Chawla (supra), white disposing of the appeal, the Apex Court held as under:-
“There is a limit to waiting and human patience and the span of the life of the applicants is not available to be extended by NOIDA. Taking an overall picture of the matter we direct that a period of nine months beginning from March 1, 1990, is the limit within which developed plots shall be allotted to the 2380 entitled persons now represented by the federation and such other persons as referred to above.”
20. In Akhara Brahm Buta, Amritsar (supra), the Apex Court while allowing the appeal held as under:-
” Having taken advantage of the agreement in part and having repeatedly agreed to the terms of the compromise between the appellant and the Improvement Trust, the State Government cannot now be permitted to back out.”
21. In Rochees Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. JDA, the Division Bench of this Court held that the contract between the State or its instrumentality i.e. the JDA and private party, cannot be altered, changed or cancelled in an arbitrary or irrational manner. The Division Bench further held that in this case, upon offer given by JDA for allotment of land, appellants-petitioners deposited the amount as per terms & conditions and agreement was executed between them and JDA. Hence, the JDA being under statutory obligation has no authority to refuse the said agreement and the petitioners (appellants in the appeal before the High Court) could not be deprived of valuable legal rights so vested in them. Hence, the JDA being under the statutory obligation, have to accused approval to building plan as per norms and bye-laws within the special period.
22. In view of above stated position, the Division Bench of this Court was of the view that the learned Single Judge was not justified in giving the alternative direction to the JDA to refund the deposited amount alongwith interest to the appellants. The JDA was thus under a contractual obligation not only to approve the building plans but also to give necessary approval and by its refusal had violated the statutory obligation to great prejudice and disadvantage of the appellants and thus gave directions to the JDA to give necessary sanction for approval of building plans submitted by the petitioners (appellants) for construction of Hotel over the land in question and pass necessary orders within a period of thirty days from the date of communication of the certified copy of the order of the Division Bench.
23. Mr. Mahendra Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Rajasthan Housing Board i.e. respondent No.3 though has not disputed the above stated position of the petitioner but has taken a plea that since possession of the land in question taken by the State Govt. was handed over to the Board on 5.12.1991 and thus the land came to be vested with the Board free from all encumbrances the JDA has no competence or authority later on to approve any residential scheme in respect of the land in question particularly when, the land in question had not been acquired by or for the respondent JDA.
24. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material available on record as well as the legal position at issue.
25. Prima-facie, I am of the considered view that the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench in Rochees Hotel (supra) is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case : as after having duly executed the agreement between the parties vide Annexure-A i.e. the sale-deed, it was not open either to the Housing Board or to JDA to take a contrary stand and in view of this agreement having arrived at between the parties, no intermeddling or any unauthorised activity can be permitted over the land in question which already stood allotted to the petitioners.
26. In my considered view, the ratio of the decisions on which learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance are fully applicable to the instant case.
27. As a result of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned-notice/information vide Rajasthan Patrika dated 31.5.1996 (Annexure-30) is quashed and set-aside.
28. The respondent Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur is accordingly directed to issue the patta of the land in question to the petitioners (Society) forthwith.