JUDGMENT
A.K. Sikri, J.
1. The appellant herein known as `Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India)’ has filed this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause (X) of the Letters Patent of Judicature at Lahore as applicable to Delhi against Order dated 9-1-2002 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court. By the said order which has been passed in CM.6240/2001 in CW.3577/2001 the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said application filed by the appellant herein.
The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition as well as aforesaid CM are stated in some detail by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. Therefore, it may not be necessary to indulge in this exercise all over again. However, still it would be appropriate to recapitulate some of the salient facts to understand the controversy involved in the matter.
2. As per the appellant Institute, it is in existence for over 85 years and is a renowned and respectable institution which has churned out hundreds and thousands of engineers for the welfare of this country. It has over 75,000 students members and 1,000 corporate members. The appellant Institute conducts examination for award of certificate which is at par with diploma/degree. It is mentioned that the appellant Institute was working satisfactorily. One Mr.R.N.Engineer became President of the appellant Institute who held charge till 30.8.99 when he was voted out at the Annual General Body meeting which was held in Delhi on 30.8.99. After his ouster he started conducting a campaign against the appellant Institute and this led to administrative enquiry against him by respondent No.1. However, the enquiry conducted was one sided without giving any opportunity to the appellant Institute. The appellant by its letter dated 1.7.2000 presented its point of view to the respondent No.1 and welcomed the enquiry into its affairs. On 13-9-2000 respondent No.1 informed the appellant that a High Powered Committee has been set up to review the functioning of the appellant. However, as the appellant felt that it was not granted any opportunity to explain its stand, it filed CW.2739/2001 in this Court seeking an opportunity of hearing before the respondents before reaching some conclusion. This writ petition was dismissed by order dated 1.5.2001 giving the liberty to the appellant to approach the Bombay High Court. It appears that the appellant did not file any petition in the Bombay High Court. In the meantime on 9.5.2001, the High Level Committee held its meeting at New Delhi and made the following recommendations:
“Summing up the deliberations, the Chairman of the High Level Committee suggested that the recognition granted to IME(I) for their part I and II Technician Engineers Examination and Section A & B Associate Membership Examination be temporarily suspended for a period of 3 months.
In the meanwhile.
a) The institute should take immediate action to rectify the defects in the system of examination and also remove all shortcomings pointed out by the expert committee. The examination should be conducted with utmost fairness and secrecy.
b) Revise the constitution, to ensure no person becomes an office bearer of the Society for a period of more than 3 years in one post and more than 6 years in all other posts.
c) A fresh General Meeting be held under the aegis of Registrar of Societies, Maharashtra. The election should be by Secret Ballot and a proper management structure should in place.”
3. Based on the aforesaid recommendations, notification dated 23.5.2001 was issued by the respondent No.1 whereby it was decided to temporarily suspend the recognition granted to the examinations being conducted by the appellant Institute for a period of three months and to withdraw the same in case the appellant Institute failed to remove the shortcomings as pointed out by the Committee within the stipulated time. At this stage the appellant filed CWP.No.3577/2001 in this Court challenging the recommendations of the High Level Committee and the proceedings dated 9.5.2001 as well as notification dated 23.5.2001. Along with this writ petition CM.6240/2001 was filed for ad-interim relief. In this application the learned Single Judge passed order dated 30.5.2001 which is to the following effect:
“Since the examination are to be held on 14th June 2001 and 25,000 students are said to be candidates the notice is made returnable on 4th June 2001 before the Vacation Court. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that for an adverse order of suspension of three months passed on 9th May, 2001 the notice was given to the petitioner only on 8th May 2001 and it had no occasion or opportunity to deal with the adverse comments against the petitioner Notice.
Ms. Monika Arora accepts notice on behalf of the respondents. Reply be filed on or before 2nd June, 2001 with advance copy to the counsel for the respondent. Rejoinder, if any, before the next date of hearing. It is stated by Mr.Rajeev Dutta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the notification dated 22nd May 2001 has not yet been gazetted. Until the next date of hearing the notification dated 22nd May 2001 shall not be gazetted”.
4. Thereafter, the matter came up before the
learned Single Judge from time to time and the
aforesaid order was continued and on 18.9.2001 the
following order was passed:
“CMs.9180/01, 6240/01 in CW 3577/01.
The impugned order dated 9th of May, 2001
challenged in the writ petition related
to a final Report dated 20th of December,
2000 submitted by the Sub Committee based
on the visits of the respondent No.1’s
officials to the petitioner Institute.
There were certain suggestions,
observations and recommendations in the
said report which are contained at pages
146-147 of the petition. In the impugned
order, three directions are given at page
71 of the petition which are based upon
the alleged shortcomings pointed out by
the Expert Committee in its Report dated
20th of December, 2000.
Mr.Dutta, the learned Senior Counsel,
appearing fo the petitioner states that
without prejudice to its pleas, the
petitioner Institute will file a response
to the Report of the Expert Committee
dated 20.12.2000 within two weeks from
today and will attend the hearing
thereafter before respondent No.1 as
suggested by Ms.Monica Arora, the learned
counsel for respondent No.1.
Response be filed on or before 3rd of
October, 2001. The hearing will be held
on 10th of October, 2001 at 2.00 P.M.
The hearing of the case before this
Court, stated for 10th of October, 2001
with the consent of the parties is now
fixed for 17th of October, 2001 instead
of 10.10.2001. Accordingly, the case
need not be listed on 10.10.2001 before
this court.”
Interim orders to continue up to the next
date.”
5. As is clear from the aforesaid order the
appellant had to file its response to the report of the
Expert Committee dated 20.12.2000 by 3.10.2001 and
thereafter hearing was fixed before the Committee on
10.10.2001 at 2 PM. The appellant submitted its
detailed representation on 3.10.2001 for consideration
by the Expert Committee. It also submitted additional
representation dated 10.10.2001. On 10.10.2001 the
representative of the appellant along with counsel
reached the venue of meeting in time. They were,
however, told that due to parliamentary hearing in
which concerned officer was involved hearing in their
case would be held at 3 PM or thereafter. According to
the appellant’s version its counsel waited up to 2.25
PM where after he left and gave his cell phone number to
one of the official there with request that he may be
informed on the cell phone as and when the Committee
wanted to start the hearing. When the meeting was
convened by the Expert Committee, which started at 3PM,
as nobody was present on behalf of the appellant,
ex-parte hearing was held. We shall revert to the
version of different parties about the happening on
that date. At this stage it would be sufficient to
notice that the appellant did not or could not
represent itself. This resulted in passing order of
rejection dated 5.11.2001 by the respondent No.1 which
reads as under:
“The compliance report submitted by the
Institution of mechanical Engineers
(India), Mumbai dated 3-10-2001 and the
representation dated 10-10-2001 were
considered by the Sub-Committee of High
Level Committee for recognition of
education qualifications. It has been
found that the Institution has not taken
any action to remove the shortcomings or
to initiate improvements in the
Constitution of the society of
Institution of Mechanical Engineers
(India), Mumbai”.
6. Thereafter, the matter came up for hearing
before the learned Single Judge from time to time. The
appellant Institute made a grievance that no proper
opportunity was given by the respondent No.1 before
rejecting the representation of the appellant by order
dated 5.11.2001. Various affidavits were filed by the
appellants and the respondents. Ultimately the learned
Single Judge passed the impugned order dated 9.1.2002
vacating the interim order granted on 30.5.2001.
7. At this stage it may be mentioned that the
respondent No.3 known as “FORUM FOR FAIRNESS IN
EDUCATION” had moved an application for intervention in
the writ petition which was allowed and, therefore,
this Forum was also heard. The Forum is opposing the
writ petition filed by the petitioner as well as grant
of any interim order.
8. LPA.49/2002 is also filed challenging the same
order dated 9.1.2002 passed by learned Single Judge by
some students. Their submission is that they are bona
fide students and the impugned order would adversely
affect their career.
9. It may be mentioned at the outset that
Mr.G.L.Sanghi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant Institute made a submission to the effect
that the main grievance of the appellant was non-grant
of sufficient and proper opportunity by the respondent
No.1 even after agreed order dated 18.9.2001 was
passed. This, according to him, has resulted in
violation of principles of natural justice. His
submission was that the learned Single Judge did not
appreciate or looked into the matter from this angle
and vacated the interim order granted on 30.5.2001 by
impugned order on irrelevant grounds. He submitted
that the impugned order would show that the learned
Single Judge was influenced by following considerations
in passing the order:
A. On 10.10.2001 when the hearing was fixed
by the Committee, even if it did not start at 2 PM
there was no reason for the representative of the
appellant Institute and his counsel to leave the place
at 2.25 PM and they ought to have waited at least till
3PM when they were told that hearing would be started
at 3PM or thereafter.
B. The conduct of the appellant Institute was
not totally above Board as the appellant Institute had
filed a suit for declaration claiming reliefs
overlapping with those claimed in the writ petition
without disclosing in the said suit about the pendency
of the writ petition in this court.
C. The three suggestions given by the Expert
Committee and the Govt. in the impugned order were
ameliorative in nature which suggest serious deficiency
in the academic conduct of the appellant Institute and,
therefore, it was necessary for the appellant to take
these steps.
10. The learned counsel submitted that the
aforesaid reasons for vacating the earlier interim
order were not cogent or based upon records. Referring
to first ground, his submission was that the learned
Single Judge although accepted the plea of the
appellant Institute that its counsel Mr.A.V.Bajaj who
had represented the appellant Institute on 10.10.2001
was not well and also accepted that it is the
respondents who were remiss by not conducting the
hearing at the time ordered by the Court but at the
same time put the blame on the appellant from departing
the venue of hearing at 2.25 PM.
11. Adverting to the second ground the submission
of learned counsel was that the suit which was filed by
the appellant Institute was primarily against AICTE
challenging the jurisdiction of AICTE to interfere with
the affairs of the appellant Institute and, therefore,
that was altogether a different matter and there was no
necessity to mention the pendency of the writ petition
in that suit. In any case, it was submitted, if there
was some concealment of facts made in the suit filed by
the appellant Institute that could have adverse affect
on the grant of interim injunction in the suit and it
had no bearing on the outcome of the interim
application filed in the writ petition as there was no
such concealment insofar as writ petition is concerned.
12. With regard to third ground the submission of
learned senior counsel was that so far as alleged
deficiencies pointed out by respondents are concerned
they are clearly misconceived and the appellant had
challenged the same in the writ petition. In fact it
was the grievance of the appellant Institute that it
was not given proper opportunity and the material
produced by it were not considered by the respondents
which led to the passing of the impugned order and,
therefore, alleged deficiency should not have been
taken into consideration while passing the impugned
order. His further submission was that since the
appellant was not given proper opportunity, the learned
Single Judge should have directed the respondent No.1
to give this opportunity and in the meantime continue
the interim order dated 30.5.2001.
13. Before dealing with the aforesaid submissions
of the appellant, it would be appropriate to reproduce
the relevant portion of the impugned order whereby on
the three grounds mentioned above, the application for
interim relief of the appellant was dismissed. The
relevant discussion is contained in paras 15 to 17
which read as under:
“Para15: The conduct of the
petitioner-Institute, however, leaves
much to be desired. The following
instance of the petitioner’s conducted
need to be noticed and in my view would
have a vital bearing on the continuance
of the interim order. The fact that the
petitioner-Institute chose to walk out
from the hearing specifically fixed by
this Court at a particular time on the
plea that the concerned officers did not
sit at the stipulated time is
significant. The learned counsel for
respondent No.1-UOI sought to rebut this
plea by submitting that the hearing was
delayed due to a Parliamentary Committee
hearing in which the concerned officer
was involved but the petitioner was given
adequate notice of the postponement of
the meeting. In particular the
hand-written notation made by the counsel
for the petitioner, Sh.A.V.Bajaj, on the
typed representation prepared by the
petitioner dated 10th October, 2001, is
significant. It notes that at 2.20PM the
counsel for the petitioner was told that
the hearing was at 3.00PM. Or
thereafter. The petitioner’s counsel has
given reasons for his early departure
from the hearing and the departure from
Delhi by a late night flight. Various
grounds including grounds of ill-health
of the counsel, appearing for the
petitioner in the hearing, fixed on 10th
of October, 2001 at 2.00 PM pursuant to
this court’s order dated 18th of
September, 2001. Without going into the
veracity of the affidavit of the counsel
for the petitioner, prima facie it does
appear that the petitioner was not over
anxious to go on with the hearing fixed
by this court on 10th of October, 2001 at
2.00 PM so as to grant the petitioner an
opportunity to being heard which was the
principal plea in the present suit
petition. While I do not for a moment
doubt the medical condition of the
counsel of the petitioner as per his
affidavit. There is no satisfactory
explanation of the departure of the
petitioner and his counsel from the
hearing at 2.25 PM. While the Senior
counsel for the petitioner has pointed
out with some vehemence that it is the
respondents who were remiss by not
conducting the hearing at the precise
time ordered by this court and this plea
is not entirely lacking in merit,
nevertheless the petitioner’s conduct
does show that even the petitioner was
not anxious in the least to go with the
hearing. The departure from the site of
hearing at 2.25 PM by leaving a cellphone
number is not sufficient demonstration of
the bonafides of the petitioner. While
the respondents may not have been
entirely right in not commencing the
hearing at the precise time prescribed by
this court but since the petitioner
enjoyed an interim order in its favor it
ought to have at least waited till 3.00
PM. The time when the hearing was to
take place as per the postponement by
respondent No.1 before departing from the
place of hearing. Presumably this was
because an interim order had been
operating in favor of the petitioner.
16. The other ground why the
petitioner’s conduct has been said to be
not totally above board as per the
respondents contentions is the fact that
while this writ petition was pending in
this court the petitioner chose to file a
suit for declaration claiming reliefs
overlapping with those claimed in the
writ petition without disclosing the
pendency of writ petition in this court.
An explanation is sought to be given for
this omission but at this stage I am not
going into the correctness of these
pleas. In so far as the
intervenors-students’ pleas are
concerned, the mere fate of students
cannot justify the continuance of an
interim order which impedes the academic
functioning of the institution.
Furthermore the students of the
petitioner institute are part time
students are mostly employed gainfully
and no serious prejudice would be caused
to them by the vacation of the interim
order. In fact if the functioning of the
petitioner institute improves, it will
only benefit the students.
17. In any case, I am of the view that
even on merits the impugned order giving
three ameliorative suggestions as noted
earlier. In the light of the facts of
the case which suggests prima facie
serious deficiencies in the academic
conduct of the petitioner institution,
are such types, interdiction of which is
not required at the interim stage in the
present writ petition. The steps
indicated merely suggest (a) the
improvement of the system of the
examination as recommended by the Expert
Committee (b) the revision of the
constitution to prevent monopoly of
office bearers and (c) the holding of
fresh Annual General Meeting. I am of
the view that the impugned directions are
not such so as to require an interim stay
by this court and accordingly, the
interim order dated 30th of May, 2001
stands vacated with effect from 16th of
January, 2002.”
14. It may be mentioned that we are dealing with
the validity of the impugned order, which is an interim
order in this appeal. Therefore, we would
address ourselves keeping in view the limited scope
of this appeal viz. whether the learned Single
Judge was right in dismissing the application for
interim stay.
15. The first question that needs to be determined
as to whether the appellant Institute was given proper
opportunity on 10.10.2001. It is significant to note
here that on 18.9.2001 an order, almost on agreed
terms, was passed whereby and whereunder appellant
Institute was granted another opportunity to represent
its case before the Expert Committee. In fact the
order clearly indicates that it was the suggestion of
the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 which was
accepted by the learned counsel for the appellant which
led to passing of that order. In compliance of this
order the appellant Institute had submitted its
response to the report of the Committee. It was to be
given oral hearing for which date of 10.10.2001 was
fixed and time and venue was also fixed. Hearing was
to start at 2PM as per the order. It is not in dispute
that the appellant’s official along with counsel
reached the venue of hearing before 2PM. It is also
not disputed that hearing did not start at 2PM and the
appellant was told that the same would start at “3PM or
thereafter”. It is not necessary to go into the
reasons as to why the hearing did not start at 2PM
although the allegations of the appellant is that the
reason given, namely, pre-occupation of one of the
officers in the parliamentary committee hearing was
false. Fact remains that no definite time was given to
the appellant as to when the hearing would start and
they were told that the hearing would start at “3PM or
thereafter”. There is also a dispute about the
circumstances under which the appellant and his counsel
left at 2.25 PM The appellant has filed as many as five
affidavits seeking to explain its position on the basis
of which it was argued by the respondents that the
version given by the appellant is clearly false and the
appellant has tried to improve upon its version.
However, it is also not necessary to go in all these
allegations. Inasmuch as one of the grounds for
leaving early was that Mr.A.V.Bajaj, counsel for the
appellant was not feeling well and the learned Single
Judge has accepted the medical condition of the counsel
of the appellant as per his affidavit. It is also
accepted by learned Single Judge that the respondents
were remiss by not conducting the hearing at the
precise time ordered by the court by observing that
this plea is not entirely lacking in merit. However,
the learned Single Judge has doubted the conduct of the
appellant in leaving the venue of hearing at 2.25 PM on
the basis of which it is inferred that the appellant
was not anxious in the least to go with the hearing.
At the same time it is also accepted by the learned
Single Judge that while leaving the venue of hearing at
2.25PM the appellant had given his cell phone number
but it is not treated as sufficient demonstration of
the bona fides of the appellant, observing that the
appellant ought to have at least waited till 3PM.
16. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge
would itself amply demonstrate that the explanation
offered by the appellant to leave at 2.25 PM is
virtually accepted. It is also accepted that it is the
respondents who should have conducted the hearing at
the time ordered by the court, namely, at 2 PM. It is
also accepted that no definite time was mentioned by
the respondents as to when hearing would start. In
such a situation when the respondent No.1 is also at
fault, taking such a strict view by the learned Single
Judge simply because appellant left the venue of
hearing at 2.25 PM may not be appropriate. It could
have been better had appellant waited up to 3PM.
However, keeping in view the medical condition of the
counsel for the appellant coupled with the fact that no
definite time as to when hearing was to start was given
by the Expert Committee and that the appellant had in
any case left its cell phone number to enable the
respondents to inform the appellant about the scheduled
time of hearing, would indicate that the appellant was
not to be blamed entirely and, therefore, it could not
be concluded that the appellant was not anxious in the
least to go ahead with the hearing. After all the
appellant’s representative and its counsel had come to
Delhi from Bombay and reached the venue at appointed
time. Therefore, we feel that when the Expert
Committee was to start the hearing, the least that was
expected was to inform the appellant on cell phone
number given by the appellant. In view of this lapse
on the part of the respondents as well as other
circumstances favoring in favor of the appellant
Institute pointed out by the learned Single Judge in
the impugned order itself, we are of the opinion that
the appellant are not dealt with fairly in the conduct
of proceedings on 10.10.2001.
17. When the respondents had agreed to give
hearing to the appellant, it should have been an
effective opportunity. May be both the parties are to
be blamed. However, still we fell that ends of justice
demand that the appellants be given another opportunity
by the Expert Committee.
18. There is yet another reason to arrive at this
conclusion. The Committee which had earlier
deliberated, consisted of 14 members. However, on
10.10.2001 it is the sub-committee which allegedly
conducted the proceedings. Therefore, even the hearing
is not by the Expert Committee with all its members.
The intention behind passing order dated 18.9.2001 was
to accord the hearing to the appellant by the Expert
Committee and not its sub-committee.
19. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the
opinion that the appellants should be given another
hearing. Order dated 5.11.2001 passed by respondent
No.1 is accordingly set-aside. The Committee would fix
date and venue, as expeditiously as possible and in any
case within 15 days from the date and after hearing the
matter, respondent No.1 would pass appropriate orders.
20. This brings us to the next question, namely,
what should be interim arrangement. Even if we agree
with the appellant Institute that they deserve another
opportunity, it would not necessarily follow that order
dated 30.5.2001 needs to be restored or, for that
matter, earlier order dated 23.5.2001 passed by the
respondent No.1 needs to be stayed. In order to
succeed in getting such a stay order the appellant has
to make out a case for grant of such an order on
merits. Interim order dated 30.5.2001 was passed
keeping in view the fact that examinations were going
to be held on 14.6.2001. However, at that stage the
merits of the matter for grant of interim order had not
gone into. This exercise for the first time is done in
the impugned order dated 9.1.2001. Third ground on
which stay application is dismissed by the learned
Single Judge deals with this aspect. It is observed by
learned Single Judge that even on merits the appellant
was not entitled to stay taking into consideration the
three ameliorative suggestions given by the High Level
Committee which made recommendations on 9.5.2001.
These are already referred to in the opening paras of
this judgment. It is further observed by learned
Single Judge that the steps indicated merely suggest:
1. improvement of the system of the
examination as recommended by the Expert Committee.
2. the revision of the constitution of
appellant Institute to prevent monopoly of office
bearer.
3. holding of fresh annual general meeting.
21. Insofar as this aspect of the case is
concerned, we are one with the opinion expressed by
learned Single Judge. We are of the considered opinion
that no interim stay need be granted. We say so for
various reasons. These are:
(i) The alleged irregularities which are
pointed out by the Committee cannot be lightly brushed
aside. No doubt the Expert Committee would now take
final view after hearing the appellant which
opportunity was given by order dated 18.9.2001 without
prejudice to the contention of the parties. However,
while taking prima facie view of the matter, this fact
cannot be lost sight of that respondent No.1 had
constituted High Level Committee which had visited the
appellant Institute and based on their visit and study
and after conducting the deliberations into the affairs
of the appellant Institute, report dated 9.5.2001 was
submitted. The order dated 23.5.2001 is passed whereby
the recognition is suspended by respondent No.1 for a
period of three months.
(ii) It may also be noted at this stage, as
vehemently contended by Mr.P.V.Kapoor, learned senior
counsel appearing for the Forum that the High Level
Committee was constituted by respondent No.1 pursuant
to directions given by the Bombay High Court in a writ
petition which was a petition filed by way of Public
Interest Litigation.
(iii) If the stay of the impugned order dated
23.5.2001 is given the effect of that would be to allow
the students to take exams and if ultimately the
impugned order passed by the respondent No.1 is
sustained and the writ petition is dismissed, the
students who are now permitted to take exams would
claim equities and such a situation would give rise to
multiplicity of litigation. The Apex Court had dealt
with this kind of situation number of times and it has
been emphasised that interim/interlocutory orders of
this nature permitting the students to take
examinations when the recognition is
suspended/withdrawn should not be passed. One such
case is Baba Mungipa Medical College and Research Centre Students Guardian Forums & Anr. Vs. Government of Tripura & Ors. . We
may also refer to the case of K.John Koshy Vs.
Tarakeshwar Prasad Shaw (Dr.), as also
case of C.B.S.E & Anr. Vs. P.Sunil Kumar & Ors. JT
1998 (4) SC 105 and case of Central Board of Secondary
Education Vs. Nikhil Gulati and another . Reference in this connection can also be made to
two more judgments relied upon by Mr.P.V.Kapoor,
learned counsel for the Forum. The first case is
Dental Council of India Vs. Harpreet Kaur Bal and
others 1995 Supp (1) SCC 304 wherein the Apex Court
inter alia observed as under:
“There are many pronouncements of this
Court cautioning against exercise of
jurisdiction characterised more by
benevolence than on settled legal
principles. A relief must be such as
could be considered permissible in law
and worked out by the application of
legally recognised principles. The
decision must have legitimacy of legal
reasoning and should not incur the
criticism of lacking objectivity of
purpose and rational and legal
justification. Where an educational
institution embarks upon granting
admissions without the requisite
affiliation and recognition and the
students join the institution with their
eyes wide open as to the lack of
legitimacy in the admission, it would be
preposterous to direct the University to
hold examinations for the benefit of such
students. We cannot sufficiently deplore
this attitude and approach. The High
Court has, by its order, simply bolstered
the hopes and aspirations of these
students without any means of gratifying
these expectations in a manner known to
law. We have, therefore, no hesitation
in setting aside the order under appeal
as totally unjustified”.
The second case is Chander Chinar Bada Akhara
Udasin Society and others Vs. State of J. and K. and
others, etc. expressing the same
sentiments. These cases afford answer to the arguments
put forth by Mr.Ravinder Sethi,Sr.Advocate on behalf of
students.
(iv) Having regard to the orders passed by
Gujarat High Court in a petition relating to the
appellant Institute, to which detailed reference is
made hereinafter.
22. Before parting we may also note another aspect
of the matter. AICTE is respondent No.2 in the present
petition. Mr.Ravi Gupta, learned counsel appearing for
the AICTE submitted that after the enactment of All
India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) Act by the
Parliament, recognition of such an Institute can be
only by AICTE and when the appellant Institute is not
recognised by the AICTE, it cannot continue its
affairs. In this connection, learned counsel referred
to various provisions of the AICTE Act and also the
judgments of Supreme Court in the cases of State of
Tamil Nadu & another Vs. Adhiyaman Educational &
Research Institute and others, etc., and Jaya Gokul Educational Trust Vs.
Commissioner & Secretary to Government, Higher
Education Department, Kerala and another .
23. In State of Tamil Nadu & Another Vs.Adhiyaman
Educational & Research Institute and Others, etc.
(Supra), it was held that the provisions of the AICTE
Act including its preamble make it abundantly clear
that the Council was established for coordinated and
integrated development of the technical education
system at all levels throughout the country and is
enjoined to promote qualitative improvement of such
education in relation to planned quantitative growth.
The Council is also required to regulate and ensure
proper maintenance of norms and standards in the
technical education system. It is also required to
provide guidelines for admission of students and has
power to with-hold or discontinue grants and to
derecognise the institutions where norms and standards
laid down by it and directions given by it from time to
time are not followed. It was held by the Supreme
Court that the Council has on its Board,
representatives not only of the States but also of the
State Universities who have a say in the matter of
laying down the norms and standards which may be
prescribed by the Council for such education from time
to time. The Council has further the regional
committees and the constitution and functions of the
committees are to be prescribed by the regulations of
the Council. It was further held that the subject
covered by this statute is fairly within the scope of
Entry 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III. These
regulations Along with other regulations made by the
Council and the rules to be made by the Central
Government under the Act are laid before the
Parliament. Hence, on the subjects covered by this
statute, the State could not make a law under Entry 11
of List II prior to Forty-Second Amendment nor can it
make a law under Entry 25 of List III after the
Forty-Second Amendment. It was held by the Court that
if there was any such existing law immediately before
the commencement of the Constitution within the meaning
of Article 372 of the Constitution, as the Madras University Act, 1923, on the enactment of the present
Central Act, the provisions of the said law if
repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act would
stand impliedly repealed to the extent of repugnance.
It was further held that under Section 10 of the
Central Act (AICTE Act) it is the Council which is
entrusted with the power, particularly, to allocate and
disburse grants, to evolve suitable performance
appraisal systems incorporating norms and mechanisms
for maintaining accountability of the technical
institutions, laying down norms and standards for
courses, curricula, staff pattern, staff
qualifications, assessment and examinations, fixing
norms and guidelines for charging tuition fee and other
fees, granting approval for starting new technical
institutions or introducing new courses or programmes,
to lay down norms for granting autonomy to technical
institutions, providing guidelines for admission of
students, inspecting or causing to inspect colleges,
for withholding or discontinuing of grants in respect
of courses and programmes, etc.
24. He also referred to the writ petition being
Special Civil Application No.3883 of 2001 filed in High
Court of Gujarat and order dated 9.10.2001 passed in
the said writ petition wherein the Gujarat High Court
passed the following observations in the writ petition
relating to appellant Institute:
“Further, it is not disputed that the
courses conducted by the said Institution
are not approved by the All India Council
for Technical Education, a statutory
body. I am, therefore, of the view that
pending this petition, the respondent
No.3-Institution shall not be permitted
to admit students to its courses or to
give them examination or award the
degree/diploma; as the case may be,
until such courses are brought at par
with that of the other institutions and
the courses conducted by the said
Institution, the examination given to the
students and the manner in which the
project reports and the answer papers are
examined are approved by the All India
Council for Technical Education.
In above view of the matter, pending this
petition, the respondents No.3, 4 & 5 are
directed not to advertise its courses in
the State of Gujarat nor they shall admit
any student who has passed qualifying
examination from the State of Gujarat to
their courses; either directly or
through any agency, nor they shall
conduct any examination within the
territories of the State of Gujarat. It
is clarified that the said respondents
No.s 3,4 & 5 shall be at liberty to move
this court for vacation of the above
injunction after its courses and
examinations are approved by the All
India Council for Technical Education.”
25. No doubt this order is applicable for the
State of Gujarat, but it is persuasive enough for us
not to grant any indulgence by way of interim relief to
the appellant Institute when respondent No.1 has itself
taken steps to pass impugned order to similiar effect.
26. However, we may observe that a suit has been
filed by the appellant Institute challenging the
jurisdiction of AICTE which is pending on the Original
Side of this Court and the appellant Institute as well
as AICTE would be free to argue their respective points
of view in those proceedings. As pointed out earlier,
keeping in view the limited scope of these appeals,
matter is considered taking prima facie view only.
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, subject
to direction relating to giving another opportunity to
the appellant, these appeals are dismissed.