ORDER
Bhawani Singh, J.
1. The petitioner (hereinafter
‘the tenant’) has a grievance against the
judgment of Appellate Authority (under the
Rent Act) whereby the appeal preferred by
him against the order of Rent Controlled
Shimla, in case No. 50-2/80 decided on 19-3-
1982 was dismissed and the findings of the
Rent Controller were upheld with a direction
to the tenant to handover vacant possession
of the demised premises to the landlord in a
month. The tenant, therefore, assails the
decision of the Appellate Authority arrived at
in C.M.A. No. 51-S/14 of 1982, decided on
16-6-1982.
2. Briefly, the facts are that the respon-dent (hereafter ‘the landlord’) preferred an eviction petition before the Rent Controller, Shimla, against the tenant on 5-9-1980. The tenant is occupying the top floor of Home No. 4, Upper Kaithu Bazar, Shimla. The accommodation consists of two rooms, kitchen, bath, latrine, balcony and an open verandah. He pays Rs. 272/- as rent per annum.
3. The claim of the landlord for the rejectment of the tenant is that he is employed as Doctor Major (now stated to be Colonel) in the Army and since September, 1979, is
posted in a non-family station and his family, consisting his wife and two school going children, are living in a rented accommodation at Pune, therefore, the premises in question are required for the occupation of his family members. In consonance with his status, he required the entire house including the premises in the top floor in the occupation of the tenant and those in the ground floor in the occupation of one Ghan Shyam Bist.
4. The tenant contested this petition and raised number of objections in his reply. Those, which relate to the arguments addressed during the hearing of this case, are that the petition is bad for non-joinder of other co-owners and that the premises were not bona fide required by the landlord for the occupation of his family and looking to the small size of the family, the present accommodation, in the occupation of the landlord, was sufficient for his family and the petition was filed with a view to either enhance the rent or to sell the same at a higher price since the premises in occupation of a tenant do not have the potential of fetching higher price- in the market. A few submissions were also made by Shri M. L. Sharma, learned counsel for the tenant. They will be considered at proper places in the course of this decision. However, at the trial stage, on the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following issues:
“1. Whether the petition is bad for want of non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged in preliminary objection No. 1. If so, its effect? OPR
2. Whether the petition is premature as alleged in preliminary objection No. 2. If so, its effect? OPR
3. Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition as alleged in preliminary issue No. 3. If so, its effect? OPR
4. Whether the petition is not in accordance with law and rules. If so, its effect? OPR
5. Whether the petition is misconceived as alleged in preliminary objection No. 5. If so, its effect? OPR
6. Whether the petition is not verified in
accordance with law as alleged. If so, its effect? OPR
7. Whether the petitioner requires the premises for his personal bona fide use and occupation of family members as allged. If so,
its effect? OPP
8. Relief.”
5. The parties led evidence and all the pleas, raised by the tenant, failed with the Rent Controller who, after hearing the parties, decided the matter in favour of the landlord and ordered the eviction of the tenant. The matter was brought before the Appellate Authority but here too, the tenant did not succeed. This is how the matter has come before this Court.
6. Shri M. L. Sharma made number of submissions. He urges that the decisions of the courts below are thoroughly inapt, arbitrary, against the evidence on the record, besides being against the principles of law involved in the present case. Elaborating his grivance, first submission is that the family of the landlord is very small and consists of his wife, son and daughter. They are now studying in Colleges and living in hostels outside Shimla, therefore, the requirement of the landlord cannot be more than the premises in his occupation, namely, two rooms, bath room, kithchen and open verandah. In addition to this, the landlord has already sought an eviction order against Shri Ghan-shayam Bist, in occupation of one room, kitchen, bath, gallery, in the basement of the premises. While making submissions on this aspect, it is also submitted that in case the landlord wanted to have die premises for the occupation of his family, there was no reason for him to keep Shri Ghanshyam Bist in occupation of the premises despite the order of eviction by the Court.
Before I answer these submissions, I refer to the plea raised by Shri G. C. Gupta, learned counsel for the landlord. He contends that this Court is exercising the powers of a revisional Court, so even if it is admitted that the powers of this Court under the Rent Act are broader than those exercisable by this Court under the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in that event too,
there is no justification for reappreciating the evidence and tinkering with the concurrent findings by the courts below. Shri G. C. Gupta places reliance on 1987 (3) RLR 665 (Gurditta Mall v. Gita Devi) (see also (1988) 2 SCC 172 : (AIR 1988 SC 852) (Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury), (1987) 3 SCC 538 (Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri), (1987) 2 SCC 219 : (AIR 1987 SC 1150) (Sushila Devi v. Avinash Chandra Jain), AIR 1968 Delhi 299 (Sant Ram v. Mekhu Lal) and decision of this Court in Civil Revision No. 79 of 1989 (Som Nath Sharma v. Prem Lata), decided on August 16, 1989.
7. Keeping in view the ambit of the jurisdiction of this Court, I do not see any justification to disturb the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority since they have been reached, after exhaustive analysis of the whole matter in issue. The claim of the landlord is quite bona fide and genuine. He is a well placed officer in the Indian Army. He is in occupation of only two rooms and one of the two rooms cannot be used as some passage therefrom goes to the basement accommodation, thus leaving only one proper room for his living. The order of eviction qua the premises in occupation of Shri Shyam Bist had been passed by the Rent Controller on the admission of the tenant that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide. This accommodation neither appears to be proper nor the same in any way improves the total requirement of the landlord. Shri G. C. Gupta submits that this accommodation can be used by the landlord for keeping his attendants or servants as soon as the accommodation with the present tenant becomes available and Shri Ghan Shyam Bist has been allowed to continue in the premises till that time only. This submission is genuine and acceptable.
8. Further, the argument of Shri M. L. Sharma is that the small family of the landlord does not require more accommodation because two children of the landlord are now studying in Colleges and living in hostels outside Shimla. This submission is utterly of no substance. The children, who could once
live together in one room, cannot so live now since they are grown up. Obviously, they need separate rooms to live whenever they come to stay in Shimla. Similarly, the landlord and his wife will require at least two rooms to be used for living and other two rooms for drawing and dining accommodation. Moreover, looking to his status, the landlord may be visited by his friends and colleagues. He may require additional accommodation not only for them but also for other co-owners who may come to Shimla and live with him at least for sometime. An army officer may require tent or barrack accommodation while in the battle field, but while away from it, he and his family have to live honourably and befitting their status. All these facts point out clearly that the claim of the landlord is quite genuine and bona fide.
9. Shri M. L. Sharma further contends that the petition is not maintainable since many of the co-owners have not been added as parties in the case and that the landlord could seek eviction qua 1/3rd share of the house and as the landlord was already occupying more than 1 / 3rd share, therefore, the petition seeking for more accommodation of the share belonging to other co-owners, cannot be maintained. I am not impressed by this argument of the learned counsel for the tenant for the simple reason that one co-owner can sue without adding the other co-owners as party in this case. Reference, in this connection, can be made to AIR 1977 SC 1599 (Smt. Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak), AIR 1976 SC 2335 (Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagn-nath), 1984 (1) RCJ 595 (Rikhi Ram v. Tara Chand), 1986 (1) RLR 434 (Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh) and 1978 (2) RCJ 78 (Puran Chand v. Jagdish Lal). In addition to this, the landlord has added two co-owners, namely, Kali Charan Bhatt and Jiwan Parakash Bhatt as the respondents in this case. None of the co-owners have come forward to raise any objection against the claim of the landlord. This question, as a matter of fact, pertains to personal relationship of the co-owners and has nothing to do with the tenant. The tenant is not, at all, affected, in any way, by their inter se relations qua this property. Therefore, the submission of Shri M. L. Sharma that
the landlord cannot sue without them and the cannot ask for more than his share, is without any substance legally and factually.
10. The next submission of Shri M. L. Sharma is that the landlord is not in genuine requirement of the premises and had he been so, the petition should have been filed immediately when he was posted at the non-family station. It is contended that the petition was filed after a lapse of about six months thereafter, thus eliminating his genuine requirement for more accommodation for the occupation of his family. It is also submitted that the certificate of employment of the landlord at a non-family station is quite old and it cannot be said that the landlord is still serving at such a place and entitled to the benefit of special treatment under Section 14(3)(a)(iii) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act. This argument, in my opinion, is again untenable. It is not necessary that the landlord should have filed the petition immediately after his posting at a non-family station. Period taken in the filing of the petition is not, at all, unreasonable. More so, in view of the contention of Shri G. C. Gupta that the delay occurred because the landlord had been requesting the tenant to vacate the premises and when the tenant failed to do so, the landlord, soon thereafter, filed two petitions — one against the tenant and the other against Shri Ghanshyam Bist. Two certificates were placed before the Rent Controller pointing out the claim of the landlord that he was serving in a non-family station. These certificates are Ex. PH dated 8-4-1981 and Ex. P8 dated 21-9-1981. In addition to these certificates, the landlord has filed two more certificates dated July, 1982 and 22-3-1988 with CMP(CR) No. 151 of 1988 in this Court. There is no rebuttal and these certificate being conclusive of the facts stated (see C.R. No. 60 of 1989, Dalip Singh v. M.K. Chauhan, decided on 12-6-1989). Therefore, the landlord is entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 14(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
11. Further, there is no justification in the assertion of the tenant that he is occupying the premises for the last 60 years or the landlord cannot maintain two petitions on the same
ground. There is no law prohibiting any such
thing.
12. Finally, it is argued that the provisos under Section 14(3)(a)(i) are applicable to Section 14(3)(a)(iii) as well and, therefore, the landlord, approaching the Court, under Section 14(3)(a)(iii) has also to satisfy the requirements of these provisos. This plea is not at all correct. These are independent provisions. While interpreting statutes, it is cardinal principle that provisos are read with the main provision which precedes it. In case the intention of the legislature had been what Sh. M. L. Sharma contends, it would have been added either with every part of the section at least at the end of the section. This is not so. In case the argument of Shri M. L. Sharma is accepted, the operation of other provisions in the section will become nugatory and unworkable. It can, therefore, be said that these provisos are relatable to Section 14(3)(a)(i) only. However, the present petition by the landlord has been moved under both these provisions independently seeking the eviction of tenant. Equally untenable is the plea that the object of landlord is to get the premises vacated since the landlord wants to sell the same at much higher price or that the landlord, when failed to increase the rent, resorted to these proceedings for the eviction of the tenant. There is no convincing evidence on these assertions of the tenant and it is difficult to say that the eviction petition has been filed simply because the landlord failed to convince the tenant for payment of more rent for the premises in his occupation or he wants to sell the same after getting it vacated.
13. No other point was argued by the learned counsel for the parties.
14. The result is, there is no merit in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. The tenant is allowed a period of two months to hand over the vacant possession of the premises in his occupation to the landlord.
15. Parties are left to bear their own costs.