JUDGMENT
K.A. Swami, C.J.
1. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 9.11.1993 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 19811 of 1993. In the said writ petition, the petitioners appellants have sought for quashing the order dated 16.6.1993 passed in M.P. No. 653 of 1990 in R.C.O. P. No. 862 of 1988.
2. It may be pointed out here that the petitioners/appellants had also filed another writ petition in W.P. No. 19810 of 1993, seeking a writ in the nature of prohibition, prohibiting the V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, from proceeding further with O.S. No. 3877 of 1987.
3. Learned Single Judge has rejected both the writ petitions by a common order. As already stated, the present writ appeal relates only to the subject matter of W.P. No. 19811 of 1993.
4. R.C.O.P. No. 862 of 1988 is filed by one Hamid Sultan for fixing the rent. In that proceeding, W.P. No. 653 of 1988 is filed on the ground that the proceeding is not maintainable, since there is no relationship of landlord-tenant existing, and the court has no jurisdiction, therefore, the said issue should be tried as a preliminary issue. The learned XIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, by order dated 16.6.1993, has rejected the said application on the ground that the trial of the case has advanced and the present petition is only intended to procrastinate the proceedings. Learned Judge has also referred to the evidence recorded in the case and the stage at which the R.C.O.P. is pending.
5. It may be pointed out that the learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition on the ground that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be allowed to be invoked against an order passed by the civil Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, when the aggrieved party is entitled to avail the remedy under the Act. In support of this view, the learned single judge has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Issardos S. Lulia v. Smt. Mari and also on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Ghan Shyam Das Gupta v. Anat kumar Sinha and Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria .
6. However, the contention of Mr. M. Ranka, learned Counsel for the appellants, is that when the very jurisdiction of the court is challenged, the petitioner/appellants should not be made to undergo the ordeal of the proceedings, and the writ petition in such a case can very well be maintained. It may be pointed out that whether the court, exercising jurisdiction under a special enactment or under a common law, has jurisdiction or not, to deal with the case brought before it, is a matter which can very well be decided by that court. It is not as though our law does not permit to decide such question by that court. When the question as to whether a court has jurisdiction, or not, can be decided by that court and it is open to the aggrieved party to avail the remedy under the law as against that order, certainly Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not to be exercised in such cases. In such cases, if Article 226 is to be exercised, we would better close all the courts and exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 alone. Therefore, the Supreme Court has laid down in Ghan Shyam Das Gupta v. Anatkumar Sinha , referred to above, that the remedy provided under Article 226 is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief before a Civil Court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions, in Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria , it has been further held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be used for deciding disputes for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available.
7. Therefore, we are of the view that the remedy open to the petitioners is to urge all the contentions raised herein before the civil court. If they fail there, it would be open to them to file an appeal or revision as provided under the Act. Hence it is not possible to appreciate the contention urged on behalf of the appellants.
8. However, learned Counsel tried to persuade us by referring to certain rent receipt to indicate that the landlord has tried to split the tenancy, and thereby, he has tried to create a tenancy in favour of the second petitioner (wife of first petitioner) which accordance to him is not permissible. All that we can say is that, as it is open to the petitioner/appellants to urge all these contentions before the court which is seized of the matter it would not be appropriate for us to express any opinion on the rent receipts produced before us.
9. For the reasons stated above, we see no ground to admit the writ appeal. Accordingly, it is rejected. However, we make it clear that all the contentions of the petitioners/appellants are left open to be urged in the appropriate proceedings.
10. As soon as we pronounced the aforesaid order, learned Counsel for the appellants made an oral application under Article l34-A of the Constitution for granting a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance which need to be decided by the Supreme Court, we are of the view that no such substantial question of law of general importance arises in this case, and our decision rests on the decisions of the Supreme Court as already pointed out above. Certificate sought for is refused.