JUDGMENT
Markandeya Katju, C.J.
Page 2388
1. By this judgment we propose to dispose off LPA Nos. 2244, 2506 and 2507 of 2005 which arise out of the impugned judgment of a learned single Judge in WP(C) No. 8784/2005 dated 21.9.2005.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.
3. The facts are set out in detail in the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge and hence we are not repeating the same, except where necessary.
4. The respondent filed a Writ Petition in this Court challenging the validity of the order of the Central Government retrospectively extending the term of the Cantonment Board, Secunderabad under the first proviso to Section 14(4) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) after the expiry of the period for which the board was constituted. The petitioner also challenged the appointment of a civilian member of the Secunderabad Cantonment Board under Section 14(2)(c) of the Act as it was allegedly done without consultation of the Officer Commanding in Chief.
5. The mode of constitution of a Cantonment Board has been prescribed in Section 13 of the Act. The statutory term of the last Cantonment Board of Secunderabad expired in the year 2000 and thereafter no elected board was constituted. Instead, by order dated 28.2.2003 the Central Government constituted a varied board under Section 14(1) of the Act.
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6. Since the aforesaid board did not have a civilian member, as is required under Section 14(2)(c) of the Act, a writ petition was filed challenging the constitution of the Board, being WP(C) No. 4369/2004 and that writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the Central Government to nominate a civilian member in terms of Section 14(2)(c) within six weeks.
7. It may be mentioned that Section 14(4) of the Act states that the term of office of a varied board constituted by a declaration under Section 14(1)(b) shall not ordinarily extend beyond one year. Since the Board was constituted by a declaration under Section 14(1)(b) on 28.2.2003, its term was to expire on 28.2.2004. In the meantime, the Central Government issued a notification dated 27.2.2004 nominating one Mr.J. Pratap as civilian member of the Secunderabad Cantonment Board. This appointment was challenged in WP(C) No. 13355/2004 which was allowed on 26.10.2004. The Court held that there was no proper consultation in the matter.
8. It is stated in para 5 (xiv) of the writ petition that the term of the varied board constituted under Section 14 expired on 2.3.2005. Thereafter, the Central Government issued a notification dated 6.4.2005 extending the term of the Secunderabad Board retrospectively from 3.3.2005 for a period of six months. Shri J. Pratap has been nominated as a civilian member of the extended varied board by a letter dated 21.4.2005.
9. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that there could not be any retrospective extension of the term of the board in view of Section 14(5) of the Act which states:-
“When the term of office of a Board constituted under this section has expired or ceased, the Board shall be replaced by the former Board which, but for the declaration under sub-section (1), would have continued to hold office, or, if the term of office of such former Board has expired, by a Board constituted under section 13.”
10. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the term of a board constituted under Section 14(1) of the Act can only be extended during the currency of the Board and not retrospectively after the term had expired. Reliance had been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala (1993) 3 SCC 422.
11. The writ petitioner also contended that the nomination of Shri J. Pratap was done without consultation with the Officer Commanding in Chief.
12. The learned single Judge in the impugned judgment held that there was proper consultation under Section 14(2)(c) of the Act. Hence, the challenge to the notification dated 1.4.2005 on that ground failed.
13. However, the writ petition was allowed on the ground that the statute does not permit extension of the life of a board after it had expired. The learned single Judge has observed that Section 14(5) of the Act mandates that upon expiry of the term of a varied board constituted under Section 14, such a board shall be replaced by the former Board or a board constituted under Section 13, but the term of a varied board cannot be extended.
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14. The learned single Judge has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala (supra).
15. In our opinion, these appeals have to be allowed.
16. It may be mentioned that if the Cantonments Act is read as a whole, we have to hold that there cannot be any gap in the administration of a Cantonment Board. Section 10 of the Act makes this clear when it states:-
“For every cantonment there shall be a Cantonment Board.”
Hence, we cannot give an interpretation without taking into account the consequences of such an interpretation.
17. With due respect to the learned single Judge, the view which she has taken, though at first glance appearing plausible, will result in a situation when there will be no Cantonment Board at all in Secunderabad. This is because the term of the elected board admittedly expired in the year 2000 and after that there has been no elected board, but only varied boards under Section 14 of the Act. The term of the varied board admittedly expired on 2.3.2005. Hence, in view of Section 14(5) of the Act we have to have a board constituted under Section 13(3) of the Act. Sub-clause (f) of Section 13(3) requires 7 elected members. Obviously, this election is bound to take some time and in the meantime, there will be no Cantonment Board at all. Such an interpretation, in our opinion, has to be eschewed, as it will violate Section 10 of the Act.
18. The first proviso to Section 14(4) of the Act states:-
“Provided that the Central Government may from time to time, by a like declaration, extend the term of office of such a Board by any period not exceeding one year at a time;”
19. In our opinion, Section 14(5) of the Act cannot be read in isolation, but has to be read along with the first proviso to Section 14(4) of the Act, which permits the Central Government to extend the term of office of such a Board by any period not exceeding one year at a time.
20. Section 14(5) contemplates two situations. The first is a situation where the life of the board constituted under Section 13(3) had not expired, but before expiry of that term a varied board was constituted under Section 14(1). In such a situation, if the term of office of the Board which was constituted under Section 13 has not expired that board will stand revived, if the term of office of the board constituted under Section 14 had expired.
21. However, where the term of office of a board constituted under Section 13(3) has expired, and if the term of a board constituted under Section 14 has expired or ceased, a fresh board under Section 13(3) will have to be constituted. Such a board under Section 13(3) has also to have elected members vide clause (f). Such elections will naturally take some time. Hence, the expression “by a board under Section 13” which occurs at the end of Section 14(5) will have to be read as “a board which should be constituted under Section 13.”
22. No doubt, by taking such an interpretation we may be adding words to a statute which normally has to be avoided. However, there are exceptional Page 2391 situations where we may have to depart from the literal rule of interpretation. Thus, in Chapter 11 entitled “Exceptional Construction” in ‘Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes”, Twelfth Edition, it is stated:-
“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence (See Att.-Gen. v. Lockwood (1842) 9 M. & W. 378, per Alderson B.; Jub v. Hull Dock Co. (1846) 9 Q.B 443, per Lord Denman C.J.; Becke v. Smith (1836) 2 M. & W. 191, per Parke B.; Norman v. Norman [1950] 1 All. E.R 1082). This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman’s unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used, vide Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 App. Cas. 627; R. v. Vasey [1905] 2 K.B. 748; R. v. Ettride [1909] 2 K.B. 24. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: “the canone of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution, vide Cramas Properties Ltd v. Connaught Fur Trimmings,Ltd [1965] 1 W.L.R 892, at p.899.
23. Maxwell has given certain examples of such exceptional construction :-
Thus, Section 374 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, which enacted that no license granted by Trinity House to pilots “shall continue in force beyond the 31st of January” after its date, but that “the same may … be renewed on such 31st day of January in every year, or any subsequent day,” was construed as meaning, not that the renewed licenses must be actually issued on or after that day, but that they should take effect from January 31. This departure from the strict letter was justified by the great inconvenience which would have resulted from a rigid adherence to it, since it would have left a whole district for days or even weeks without qualified pilots, vide The Beta (1869) 3 Moo.P.C (N.S) 23.
…
A more recent example of interpolation occurred in Adler v. George [1964] 2 Q.B 7. A prohibition upon being “in the vicinity of any prohibited place” and obstructing certain persons on duty there was construed as referring to being “in or in the vicinity of” the place. An accused person thus failed to escape conviction by pleading that, while actually within the perimeter of a Royal Air Force station, he had not literally been in its vicinity or neighborhood.
24. Similarly, in Craies Statute Laws, 7th Edition, it is stated:-
“Where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction Page 2392 which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words.”
The above interpretation has been followed in H.C. Suman v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Co-operative House Building Society Ltd, (vide pages 2167-2168); and M.J. Exports Ltd. v. Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, .
25. Words may also be read to give effect to the intention of the Legislature which is apparent from the Act read as a whole, vide Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowear, ; and H.C.Suman’s case (supra). Application of the mischief rule or purposive construction may also enable reading of words by implication when there is no doubt about the purpose which the Parliament intended to achieve, vide Pickstone v. Freemans Plc., (1988) 2 All ER 803, pp. 813, 817 (HL); Lister v. Forth Drydock and Engineering Co. Ltd., (1989) 1 All ER 1134 (HL).
26. In Siraj-ul-Haq v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P, the Supreme Court held that the words “any person interested in a Waqf” in Section 5(2) of the U.P. Muslims Waqfs Act, 1936, mean “any person interested in what is held to be a Waqf”. In the same decision the Supreme Court also observed that “where literal meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative”.
27. In State Bank of Travancore v. Mohammad, the Supreme Court held that the words “any debt due before the commencement of this Act” as occurring in section 4(1) of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1970, have to be interpreted to mean “any debt due at and before the commencement of this Act”. In the same decision the Supreme Court observed that while it would have normally hesitated to fashion the clause by so restructuring it, but it saw no escape from that course since that is the only rational manner by which it could give meaning and content to it so as to further the object of the Act.
28. In Gujarat Composite Ltd. v. Ranip Nagarpalika one of the items mentioned is ‘Grog Minerals’. Since there is no Page 2393 such mineral as ‘Grog Mineral’, whereas Grog and Mineral are known to the technical world, the expression ‘Grog Minerals’ was read to mean ‘Grog and Minerals’, instead of rejecting them as meaningless.
29. In Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellappan, , the words ‘where any penalty is imposed’ in Rule 14(1) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,1968, were construed to mean where any ‘penalty is imposable’.
30. In Champa Kumari Singhi v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal, , the words ‘be reckoned’ had been inadvertently omitted in section 46(7)(iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and were hence supplied by construction otherwise the provision would have become meaningless.
31. As regards the case of Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala (supra), that related to elections to the Bar Council of Kerala and hence, in our opinion, the ratio of the case has no application to the Cantonments Act.
32. It is well settled that a decision should not be applied mechanically. It must be remembered in this context that a case is only an authority for what it decides. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra :-
“A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury, LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495:
“Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”
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33. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors. the Supreme Court observed:-
“The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.”
34. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd (2003) 2 SC 111 (vide para 59), the Supreme observed:-
“It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.”
35. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Anr. v. N.R.Vairamani and Anr. (AIR 2004 SC 778), a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation.
36. In the same judgment the Supreme Court also observed:-
“Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.
In London Graving dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
“The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Wiles,J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to distract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.”
10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin’s speech is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition it will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry,J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: “One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J as if it were an Act of Parliament.” And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:
“There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in setting of the facts of a particular case.”
11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
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12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
“Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.”
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“Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.”
37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no illegality in the impugned notification dated 6.4.2005 and we respectfully disagree with the view taken by the learned single Judge. Hence, these appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside.
38. However, we cannot, but, express our regret that a board under Section 13 of the Act has not been created for Secunderabad since the year 2000. A board under Section 14 is to be created only in exceptional circumstances, whereas in normal circumstances a board under Section 13 must be constituted. It is regrettable that for five years no board under Section 13(3) has been constituted by the authorities.
39. In the circumstances, we direct that a board under Section 13(3) of the Act be constituted for Secunderabad Cantonment as expeditiously as possible, preferably not later than six months from today. Election of 7 members under sub-clause (f) of Section 13(3) of the Act should be concluded before this period.