JUDGMENT
M. Katju and Krishna Kumar, JJ.
1. This writ petition has been filed against the Impugned order dated 5.9.95, Annexure-3 to the petition communicating the adverse entry to the petitioner for the year 1994-95 and also to quash the D.O. dated 30.8.95. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing the orders dated 29.1.1996 and 8.10.96 by which the petitioner’s representations have been rejected.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The petitioner was appointed in U. P. Judicial Service in 1972, He was promoted as Chief Judicial Magistrate in 1981 and as Additional District Judge in July, 1985. It is alleged in para 2 of the writ petition that the petitioner discharged his duties with utmost sense of responsibility, integrity and honesty and at no point of time, the petitioner was communicated any adverse entry.
In the year 1993 when the petitioner was posted as Addl. Distt Judge, Palzabad, one advocate O. P. Dwivedi criminally assaulted Sri R. L. Ojha the Addl. District Judge III, Faizabad. who lodged a complaint in the police Station Kotwali district Faizabad on the said date itself. A true copy of the, complaint is Annexure-1 to the petition. It is alleged in para 4 of the petition that the bail application of the said accused Advocate O. P. Dwivedi came up for consideration before the District Judge, Faizabad who transferred the said case to the Court of the petitioner who rejected the ball application. A copy of the said order is Annexure-2 to the petition. It appears that subsequently an adverse entry was communicated to the petitioner by communication dated 5.9.95, Annexure-3 to the petition. The said adverse entry reads as follows :
“His disposal is 174.50% which is above the prescribed standard, however, his judgments were not found to have been properly written. Most of the cases were remanded on substantial grounds. Members of the bar did not speak high of him. There was rumour of doubtful integrity. His integrity needs supervision and as such it is not certified.”
4. In our opinion the entry is very vague and consists of sweeping generalizations. The first allegation is that petitioner’s judgments were not found to have been properly written. No detail of any case has been mentioned, and hence such a vague remark should not have been made. The next allegation is that most of the cases were remanded on substantial grounds. This allegation is also vague as no details are given. The further allegation that members of the bar did not speak high of the petitioner and there was rumour of doubtful integrity is very vague. Merely because the members of the bar did not speak highly about the petitioner is no ground to give an adverse entry to the petitioner. There are many Judges who are very strict and do not succumb to the pressures of some members of the bar and thus become
unpopular, but for this reason, no adverse entry can be given to them. The observation that there was rumour of doubtful integrity is also vague since no details have been given therein. Moreover, no adverse entry can be given on mere rumours. otherwise no Judge will be safe.
5. The petitioner’s disposal is 174.50% which shows his good performance. In our opinion an adverse entry should not be given without anything specific against the Judicial officer otherwise no Judge can function freely. In Shaileshwar Nath Singh v. High Court Writ Petition No. 43758 of 1997. decided on 11.8.99 this Court held that an adverse entry cannot be given to a Judicial Officer because his relation with the bar is not good.
6. In Sheo Prakash Misra v. High Court of Judicature, 1999 ACJ 927, we have quashed a similar adverse entry given by the Inspecting Judge of the High Court which had been upheld by the Administrative Committee. In that decision a division bench of this Court held that adverse entries given too readily ’cause’ demoralization in the judicial officers.
7. In this connection, we would like to point out the difficulties and adverse circumstances in which the Judges of the subordinate judiciary tn this State are functioning. Against the norm of 300 cases which each Judge is supposed to have in fact most Judges have about 3,000 to 5,000 cases pending in their Courts. Against the norm of 75 sessions trial. about 600 to 700 or even more sessions trial, are pending in most sessions courts. Apart from this. Judges of the subordinate judiciary are not provided with sufficient and proper facilities for discharging their duties. If proper and sufficient facilities are provided to the subordinate judiciary, we may expect high quality judgments from them but the truth is that the members of the subordinate judiciary are not provided with proper facilities and they have to carry a load 10 to 15 times greater than the normal load. Often the Judges of the subordinate judiciary
have to sit in dark and dingy courtrooms, sometimes without electricity while sweating profusely in almost inhuman conditions. A large number of Courts are lying vacant and the other Courts have to carry this extra load. The number of the Judges has to be greatly Increased if-high quality justice is required from time.
8. In our opinion, if certain orders of the petitioner were not as good as they should have been, the District Judge could have been told to instruct the officer orally to be more careful but it is not proper in our opinion to give an adverse entry in such a case, which will adversely affect the career of the petitioner. If adverse entry is given in such cases, in our opinion, the Judges shall not be able to decide cases freely.
9. In our opinion, the adverse entry should not have been given against the petitioner. This Court should not be too harsh to Judges of the subordinate judiciary and should take into account the tremendous difficulties and pressures under which they are working and only in extreme cases where there is total lack of integrity or there is some other serious allegation which is found true that the Court should give an adverse, entry, because adverse entry given too readily spoils the career of a Judge and causes demoralisation in the subordinate judiciary.
10. In this connection reference may be made to the Supreme Court’s decision in K.P. Tewari v. State of M. P., AIR 1994 SC 1031, wherein somewhat similar circumstances the Supreme Court observed :
“We are however, impelled to remind the Judge of the High Court that however anguished he might have been over the unmerited ball granted to the accused, he should not have allowed himself the latitude or Ignoring judicial precaution and propriety even momentarily. The higher courts every day come across orders of the lower courts which are not Justified either in law or in fact and modify them or set them aside. That is one
of the function of the superior courts. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges and hence provides for appeals/revisions. A Judge tries to discharge his duties to the best of his capacity. While doing so, sometimes, he is likely to err. It is well said that a Judge who has not committed an error is yet to be born. And that applies to Judges at all levels, from the lowest to the highest. Some times, the difference in view of the higher and lower courts is purely a result of a difference in approach and perception. On such occasions, the lower courts are not necessarily wrong and the higher courts always right. It has also to be remembered that the lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a psychological pressure with all the contestants and their lawyers almost breathing down their necks more correctly up to their nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere of the higher courts to think coolly and decide patiently. Every error, however gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive. It is possible that a particular judicial officer may be consistently passing orders creating a suspicion of judicial conduct which is not wholly or even partly attributable to innocent functioning. Even in such cases, the proper course for the higher court to adopt is to make note of his conduct in the confidential record of his work and to use it on proper occasion. The Judges in the higher courts have also a duty to ensure judicial discipline and respect for the judiciary from all concerned. The respect is not enhanced when judges at the lower level are criticized intemperately and castigated publicly. No greater damage can be done to the administration of Justice and to the confidence of the people in the judiciary when Judges of the higher courts express lack of faith in the subordinate Judges for one reason or the other. it must be
remembered that the officers against whom such strictures are publicly passed, stand condemned for ever in the eyes of their subordinates and of the members of the public. No better device can be found to destroy the Judiciary from within. The judges must, therefore, exercise self-restraint. There are ways and ways of expressing disapproval of the orders of the subordinate courts but attributing motives to them is certainly not one of them. That is the surest way to make the judiciary go downhill.”
11. Similarly in Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 3240. the Supreme Court observed :
“it cannot be forgotten that in our system, like elsewhere, appellate and revisional courts have been set up on the pre-supposition that lower courts would in some measure of cases go wrong in decision making, both on facts as also on law, and they have been knit up to correct those orders. The human element in justicing being an important element computer-like functioning cannot be expected of the Courts, however, hard they may try and keep themselves precedent trodden in the scope of discretions and in the manner of Judging. Whenever any such intolerable error is detected by or pointed out to a superior court, it is functionally required to correct that error that may. here and there, in any appropriate case, and in a manner befitting, maintaining the dignity of the Court and independence of judiciary, convey its message in its Judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellow but clear and result orienting, but rarely as a rebuke. Sharp reaction of the kind exhibited in the afore-extraction is not in keeping with institutional functioning. The premise that a Judge committed a mistake or an error beyond the limits of tolerance, is no ground to inflict condemnation on the Judge-Subordinate, unless there existed something else and for exceptional grounds. We should therefore.
think, without much ado, that the High Court was unkind to the appellant and, therefore, the afore-paragraph deserves to be and is hereby pulled out from the orders of the High Court dated 28.1.1993 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 12034 of 1991 titled Lala Pandey v. State of Bihar and others, decided by the High Court of Patna, as well as all other references in the said order which tell upon the functioning of the appellant.”
12. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India. JT 1997 (3) SC 26. In that case, the High Court had passed strictures against a Judge of the subordinate judiciary for granting bail in a case. The Supreme Court held that if an order of a subordinate court Judge is wrong it can be corrected in appeal/revision by the higher court, but passing strictures is not justified. Similarly, a division bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 21324 of 1997. Sarnam Singh v. High Court decided on 16.7.98 (per R. R. K. Trivedi and R. K. Mahajan. JJ.) quashed the adverse entry given to a judicial officer for granting bail in some cases. The devision bench observed “The system of writing annual remarks is defective. In this system, the officers who are very good and work with utmost sincerity and devotion cannot get good entries. On the other hand, those officers who are expert in flattering and other activities get excellent entries. Sometimes pressures and other factors also work. The honesty, dedication and integrity have been given a go-bye in most cases.”
13. The division bench also considered the question whether on the Judicial side, this Court could quash an entry given by the Court on its administrative side, and held that it could. The division bench relied on Wade’s Administrative Law’ and the Wednesday principle of reasonableness for reaching to its conclusion.
14. In the circumstances, this writ petition is allowed. The adverse entry contained in Annexure 3 to the
petition and the orders of the Administrative Committee of the High Court rejecting the petitioner’s representations are quashed.