JUDGMENT
Ramakrishna, J.
1. The complainant Jabhiulla invoking the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (the Act for short), has sought to punish the respondents-accused 1 and 2 for the reasons set out in the complaint.
2. A few facts that are necessary for the disposal of this petition, are as follows :-
The complainant filed W.P. No. 2976 of 1992 seeking a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to consider his case for offering him a post in the Karnataka Electricity Board, (hereinafter called the Board) on compassionate ground, on the ground that his father Dastagir who had been serving as an employee of the Board in Chickmagalur Division died on 4-9-1989 in harness while on duty leaving behind him the members of his family consisting of his wife and eight children and that his application for appointment on compassionate ground came to be rejected by the Board though he was entitled to the appointment under the scheme called Appointment on Compassionate grounds of widows, sons, unmarried daughters etc., of a Board employee who dies while in service. The learned single Judge not being satisfied with the case made out by the complainant dismissed the writ petition. The matter was taken up in W.A. No. 2327 of 1992. The Division Bench of this Court on a consideration of the matter afresh allowed the writ appeal by its order dated 22-9-1993 and issued the directions as follows :-
“5. In the result, the appeal is allowed. In substitution of the order passed by the learned single Judge, we direct the respondents to consider the representation of the appellant for appointment on compassionate ground in the light of the decision referred to above and in accordance with the scheme prevailing at the time of the death of the appellant’s father. The respondents shall comply with this order within three months from this date.”
3. Aggrieved by the above order, the respondents took up the matter before the Supreme Court in SLP. No. 7460 of 1994 which came to be dismissed with the following observations :-
“Delay condoned.
The impugned order merely requires the petitioners to consider the representation made to them by the respondent herein for appointment on compassionate ground in accordance with law. There is no direction made in the impugned order to give such an appointment in case the respondent is not entitled to the same in accordance with law. The petitioners cannot, therefore, have any grievance against such an order. The SLP is dismissed with these observations.”
4. Subsequent to the order made by this Court on 22-9-1993 in WA No. 2327 of 1992, according to the complainant, be made a representation to the Board on 21-10-1993 seeking appointment on compassionate ground, but the Board failed to consider it though three month’s time given by this Court in the writ appeal to do so expired on 22-12-1993. Therefore, he has filed this contempt petition seeking to punish the respondents in accordance with law for disobedience of this Court order.
5. However, it is to be noted that by Annexure-R1, endorsement issued by the Board on 18-6-1994, appended to the statement of objections to this petition, the representation of the complainant came to be rejected by the Board having considered it in the light of the orders made by this Court and the Supreme Court on the ground that the deceased family getting a monthly income of, in all, Rs. 13,262/- was having enough means to live and hence the complainant need not be appointed on compassionate ground.
6. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
7. Sri G. V. Shantaraju, learned counsel for Sri. Jayanth M. Pattanashetty, learned counsel for the complainant, urged the following points :-
(1) The consideration of the representation of the complainant by the Board was not in conformity with the direction issued by the Supreme Court and this Court.
(2) The appointments of the other dependants of the deceased in the Board were during his life-time while he was in service and not after his death; therefore, the application of the complainant seeking appointment in the Board on the death of his father while in service ought to have been considered.
(3) The scheme envisages appointment to one of the dependants states therein regard being had to the facts and circumstances in which they are kept in harness on the death of their sole bread-winner, which has been ignored by the respondents.
(4) The respondents failed to obey the order of the Division Bench within the given time nor did they seek for extension of time to do so.
(5) The view taken by this Court in K. Raja v. Karnataka Electricity Board is in favour of the complainant and in the light of the said decision, the respondents ought to have considered the case of the complainant for appointment on compassionate ground as envisaged in the scheme. This having not been done, a clear case of contempt is made out.
8. Sri Sundaraswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Board, brought to our notice the stand taken by the respondents in the detailed statement of objections presented on their behalf. We have perused it. With a view to enable the respondents to consider the case of the complainant, the Board called for the details of the family of the deceased Dastagir from the local Officers. The information so received discloses that deceased Dastagir, Board employee, died on 4-9-1989 leaving behind his wife and eight children – Six sons and two daughters; that the daughters are married and that out of six sons, four have been presently working in the Board in different capacities, drawing salary as follows :-
1. Noorulla Basha, driver Gr. II, Rs.
MRT Sub-Dvn., KEB, Shimoga ... 3650/-
2. Ameer Jan, Cleaner, Rural
Sub-Dvn., KEB, Shimoga .... 2600/-
3. Abdul Ghani, D.A., Gr. I.MT Sub-Dvn., KEB,
Shimoga .... 2600/-
4. Nabi Jan, Asst. Lineman, Hirenullur Section,
KEB, Birur .... 2270/-
That apart, the widow of deceased Dastagir has been given DCRG of Rs. 67,940-40 Ps. Besides, she is getting a monthly pension of Rs. 2,412/-. Thus the family is getting a monthly income of Rs. 13,262/-.
9. Sri Sundaraswamy, therefore, submitted that of course, the scheme had been evolved by the Board in order to provide appointment for one of the immediate dependants of the Board employee who died in harness while in service as as to give immediate relief to the bereaved family from the difficulties by the sudden demise of their sole bread winner, but regard being had to the quantum of income being derived by the family of the deceased after his death particularly the salaries of the other three sons of the deceased already working in the Board and the pension and DCRG given to his wife, the Board arrived at the conclusion that this was not a case where the discretion available under the scheme could be exercised to offer a job to the complainant on compassionate ground. Thus he submits that taking into consideration all the factors, the Board rightly rejected the representation of the complainant by its endorsement, Annexure-R1, and that therefore, he is not entitled to the fruits of the scheme.
10. Sri Sundaraswamy also brought to the notice of the Court an important aspect that so far as the personal law applicable to the Muslims is concerned, there is no such doctrine as the Hindu Undivided Family in Hindu Law where if the Kartha of the family is the only bread-winner and there is no partition of the joint family, the dependants, on the death of the Kartha, who are entirely depending upon his only source of earning deprived of by his death, are entitled to the benefits as envisaged in the scheme and that such a thing is not found in the family of the Muslims. We are of the view that in this case, there is no need for us to go into this question as, without referring to this question, we may decide this matter by referring to the law declared by the Supreme Court in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, relied upon by Sri Sundaraswamy. A Division Bench of the Supreme Court considering the question of appointment on compassionate ground in public service held as follows :- (at p. 2307 of AIR SCW)
“The object is not to give a member of such family a post muchless a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family …….”
11. In paragraph-4 of the judgment, the Supreme Court distinguishing its earlier decision in Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, held as follows (1994 AIR SCW 2305 at p. 2308, para 4) :-
“….. The only ground which can justify compassionate employment is the penurious condition of the deceased’s family. Neither the qualifications of his dependant nor the post which he held is relevant. It is for this reason that we are unable to understand the following observations of the High Court in the impugned Judgment …..” In paragraph-6 thereof, their Lordships laid down : (at p. 2309 of AIR SCW)
“….. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.”
12. In another decision in LIC v. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar, the Supreme Court held that hardship of the candidate did not entitle him to compassionate appointment dehors the provisions of statutory regulations and instructions and that the High Court should have merely directed the employer Corporation to consider such candidate’s claim and should not have straightway directed the Corporation to give him compassionate appointment under Article 226 of the Constitution. In paragraph-11 thereof the Supreme Court has further observed that the Courts should endeavour to find out whether a particular case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law, that disregardful of law, however hard the case may be, should never be done, that in the very case itself, there are regulations and instructions governing the matter and that the Court below has not even examined whether a case would fall within the scope of relevant statutory provisions.
13. In the light of the rulings of the Supreme Court in the above cases, we have to say that the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in K. Raja’s case () supra is no longer a good law.
14. Sri Shantaraj, learned counsel for the complainant, has not been able to convince us that there has been either disobedience of the order of this Court or positive act of contempt sought to be established against the respondents.
15. Viewed from any angle, we do not see any good ground to interfere with this petition to initiate contempt proceedings against the respondents as sought for.
16. In the result and for the reasons stated above, we drop these proceedings.
17. Petition dismissed.
