JUDGMENT
G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. These three petitions are directed against the notifications dated 7.5.1991 and 18.3.1992 issued by the Government of Punjab under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’). Identical issues of facts and questions of law arise for determination in all the petitions. For these reasons, we are deciding these petitions by a common order.
2. The Government of Punjab, Department of Industries, issued notification No. 3/119/89-3 IB/3518 dated 7.5.1991 under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of the land for a public purpose, namely, setting up of industrial focal point at Ludhiana in villages Dhandari Kalan, Mundian Kalan, Mundian Khurd, Mangli Nichi and Dholapur. This was followed by another notification No. 3/119/89-3/IBI/2386 dated 18.3.1992 under Section 6 of the Act. By these two notifications, land measuring 796.5 acres situated in the five villages mentioned therein, including land belonging to the petitioners has been acquired. Land Acquisition Officer (Industry Department), Punjab, gave an Award dated 15.3.1994. In so far as Pawandeep Sandu and Baljit Singh petitioners are concerned, they have received a part of compensation payable to them under the Award.
3. Now they have questioned the acquisition’ of land on the ground that the Government has acquired the land for big companies in the garb of ‘public purpose’. Plea of the petitioners is that acquisition of land for the companies can be made only by following the procedure prescribed in Chapter VII of the Act and that acquisition of land for companies cannot be treated as an acquisition for public purpose in terms of section 3(f) of the Act. Further, plea of the petitioners is that land has been acquired with the avowed object of the setting up of a industrial focal point, but allotment of big chunks of land to the companies is sufficient proof of the fact that the impugned acquisition has been made in the colourable exercise of powers. Yet another focal point is set up by the Government in order to help small entrepreneurs by giving them small plots/sheds and by making other infrastructure available for setting up of small scale industries but that allotment made in favour of big companies totally frustrates the public purpose for which the land is acquired. The petitioners have also asserted that the Land Acquisition Officer has given Award for 774 acres of land only leaving out 22 acres of land and since no award has been given for 22 acres of land within a period of two years from the date of issue of notification under Section 6 of the Act the entire acquisition proceedings will be deemed to have lapsed in terms of section 11A of the Act.
4. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 have in their written statement pleaded that the Government of Punjab has decided to set up industrial focal point at Ludhiana as proposed by the Punjab Small Industries and Export Corporation. The purpose for which the land has been acquired, namely, setting up of industrial focal point has remained unchanged. In all 430 acres of land has been earmarked for, small scale industries and a part of the remaining land has been given to large scale industries. A committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab has been set up. This committee held its meeting on 9.3.1994 and it decided to allot land to the big industries on the condition of payment of price in lump sum. These allottees have been called upon to pay development charges and departmental charges separately. Small pieces of land belonging to the petitioners form part of the total land acquired by the Government and almost all of the petitioners have accepted the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. They have also filed application under Section 18 of the Act for reference. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 have justified the acquisition on the ground that the Government has paid compensation to the landholders and setting up of an industrial focal point is in the larger public interest of the state in general and the local population in particular.
5. In their separate replies, the private respondents have pleaded that the petitioners are estopped from questioning the legality of the acquisition proceedings because they have already accepted the amount of compensation. They have further stated that industrial focal point being set up at Ludhiana would consist of small, medium and large scale industries, which will provide employment to about 4000 people and investment running into crores of rupees will be made by the industries.
6. First contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned notifications are contrary to the provisions of the Act, inasmuch as the Government is not vested with any authority to acquire land for the companies without following the procedure prescribed in Part VII of the Act. Learned counsel argued that the expression “public purpose” used in Section 3(f) of the Act does not include acquisition for the companies and the very act of allotment of large portion of the land to big industries is conclusive proof of the fact that the impugned acquisition is meant for big companies. He further contended that power of acquisition of land by issue of notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act has been abused by the Government by acquiring land for alleged public purpose though in reality and in substance it is an acquisition for companies.
7. Learned Advocate General and other learned counsel argued that acquisition of the land is clearly for a specified public purpose, namely, setting up of industrial focal point at Ludhiana. They argued that industrial focal point would consist of small, medium and large scale industries and, therefore, even if a part of the land by the Government is being allotted to the companies, it cannot be inferred that the impugned acquisition is exclusively for companies. Learned Advocate General laid stress on the fact that funds for acquisition have been made available by the Government and, therefore, impugned acquisition cannot be nullified only on the ground that a part of the acquired land is being allotted to the companies.
Clause 3(f) of the Act as it exists today and as it was existing on the date of issue of the impugned notifications is undoubtedly different than the one which existed prior to the amendment of the ‘Act’ by Amending Act 68 of 1984. The existing Section 3(f) reads as under:-
“the expression “public purpose” includes:-
(i) the provision of village-sites, or the extension, planned development or improvement of existing village-sites;
(ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning; (iii) the provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of Government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object of securing further development as planned;
(iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State;
(v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State;
(vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State;
(vii) the provisions of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority;
(viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office,
but does not include acquisition of land for Companies.”
8. A bare look on the above-quoted definition of the expression “public purpose” shows that it includes various purposes for which the land can be acquired, but does not include acquisition of land for companies. The expression “but does not include acquisition of land for Companies” is equivalent to an express exclusion, of acquisition of land for companies from the ambit of definition of “public purpose”. Part VII of the Act deals with acquisition of land for companies. Perusal of provisions contained in Sections 38 to 44B of the Act shows that a procedure different than the one prescribed in Part II is required to be followed when acquisition of land for companies is sought to be made. Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that provisions of Part II of the Act will not apply to acquisition of land for companies appears to be plausible. However, we do not consider it necessary to finally decide the issue in these cases and leave it open for decision in appropriate case. This is so because in our opinion, argument of the learned counsel that the impugned acquisition of land is in reality and in substance an acquisition for companies, does not merit acceptance. The purpose specified in Annexures P-1 and P-2 (in CWP No. 5135 of 1994) clearly falls within the scope of Section 3(f)(vii) of the Act. Even Shri Cheema has not argued that setting up of industrial focal point in the State does not fall within the ambit of definition of “public purpose”. In our opinion, subsequent allotment of portion of land to big industries cannot in any manner affect the validity of the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Above all, assertion made by some of the respondents that 430 acres of the total land acquired by the impugned notifications has been set apart for small scale industries, has not been controverted by the petitioners. It has not been shown to us that allotment of land reserved in favour of small scale industries is being made to companies as defined in Section 3(e) of the Act. It is also significant to note that the land has been allotted to Vardhaman and Oswals, which are known industries doing business of wool and woolen garments. Similarly, Avon Cycles and Hero Cycles are two companies engaged in the manufacturing of bicycles and similar other equipments. Already there exists substantial infrastructure for wool and woolen garments industries as well as bicycles industries in Ludhiana and it would be greatly beneficial to the people of the area in general and the small industries in particular that big companies set up their industries at the industrial focal point. Above all, we are also of the opinion that a small diversion or deviation from the avowed “public purpose” specified in the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act cannot be a ground for declaring that the acquisition itself is arbitrary or malicious. In this regard, we may take note of the decision of the, Supreme Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 2077. In that case acquisition was challenged on the ground that although the Government had acquired land for the companies, it had subsequently allotted a part of it to the co-operative societies. While rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court observed that merely because the Government allotted a part of the property to co-operative societies for development, it would not follow that the acquisition was for co-operative societies and, therefore, Part VII of the Act has been attracted.
9. In Inderjit C. Parekh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1182, the Supreme Court held that even if the State contribution was only one rupee, it is not possible to hold that the acquisition was done in colourable exercise of powers. An identical view has been expressed in Manubhai Jethamal Patel v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1984 Supreme Court 120. That was a case in which acquisition of land was made for Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. The Court held that acquisition of land for Road Transport Corporation was for a “public purpose” and that the State Government has the power to acquire land for “public purpose” from the revenue of the State. In a recent judgment rendered in Srinivasa Coop. House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry, JT 1994(4) SC 197, the apex Court once again reiterated the principle that once token contribution from the public revenue is made, the acquisition cannot be declared as illegal on the ground of colourable exercise of powers. The Supreme Court has relied on its earlier decision and observed that an acquisition for companies can also be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part VII, if the cost or a portion of the cost of the acquisition is to come out of public funds.
10. Thus, we do not find any merit in the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners.
11. Second contention of the learned counsel is that failure of the Land Acquisition Officer to give Award for the entire land covered by the notifications (Annexure P-1 and P-2) has the effect of rendering the entire acquisition as void. Learned counsel relied on the deeming provisions contained in Section 11A of the Act.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Collector is not obliged to give single award in respect of the entire land acquired by the State and it is open to him to give more than one award. Alternative argument of the learned counsel is that even if provision of Section 11A is applied, acquisition of the land will stand nullified to a limited extent only. They argued that only in respect of that land Section 11A would be attracted, for which award is not made within the time prescribed by Section 11A.
13. Section 11A has been inserted in the Act by amending Act 68 of 1984. This Section enjoins upon the Collector to make award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of declaration and further provides that if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of land shall lapse. Undoubtedly, Section 11A contains a clause which is penal in character qua the acquisition proceedings and failure of the Collector to make an award within the stipulated time may result in nullification of the acquisition of the land. However, in our opinion, the expression “entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land” has to be read in the context of the remaining part of the Section. Main part of Section 11A imposes a duty on the Collector to make a. award within two years. The proceedings of acquisition shall lapse in respect of that land for which award is not given. Failure of the Collector to make award in respect of a piece of land out of the total land acquired by the Government can not entail the consequence of nullification of the acquisition in respect of whole of the land. There are two reasons for this conclusion. Firstly, if the Collector makes an award within two years from the date of publication of the declaration, the acquisition proceedings acquire finality in so far as that part of the land is concerned in respect of which award has been made. That finality does not get obliterated merely because in respect of another portion of the land acquired by the Government, the Collector has failed to make an award within the stipulated time. Secondly, an interpretation, as suggested by the learned counsel, would lead to absurd result. It would then be possible for unscruplous persons to persuade the Collector to pass an award excluding a very small piece of land and thereby nullify the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land. Such a consequence was not intended by the legislature and it is one of the settled rules of interpretation that if two interpretations of a statute or a part thereof are plausible, the one which makes the statute workable, should be preferred over the one which brings about absurd results or anomalous consequences.
14. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the entire acquisition proceedings cannot be treated to have as lapsed for failure of the Collector to give award in respect of 22 acres of the land.
15. Third submission of the learned counsel is that the Government has charged higher prices from the small scale industries in comparison to the big companies. He argued that almost three times price has been charged from the small scale industries vis-a-vis big companies and this action of the Government amounts to discrimination between different industries. We have mentioned this argument of the learned counsel only to reject it summarily. Petitioners cannot make a grievance of allotment of land to big industries at a lower price. In fact, none of the allotment orders/letters issued in favour of the big companies has either been placed on record or impugned in the petition. We are, therefore, not prepared to examine the merits and demerits of the allotment made in favour of the companies.
16. Before concluding, we may refer to a preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. Learned counsel argued that the petitions are highly belated. They pointed out that notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 18.3.1992 and petitions have been filed on 23.4.1994 or thereafter and no explanation worth the name has been offered by the petitioners for this abnormal delay of two years. Learned counsel further submitted that most of the persons, including two of the petitioners, have accepted compensation and after acceptance of compensation, it is not open to the petitioners to question the legality of the acquisition proceedings.
17. Shri K.S. Cheema, on the other hand, argued that the petitioners were not aware of the mala fide intention of the Government to acquire the land for big companies and as soon as they acquired knowledge about the allotment of land to the big companies, these writ petitions have been filed before this Court. Perusal of paragraph 7 of Civil Writ Petition No. 5135 of 1994 to which out attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners shows that the only explanation advanced by the petitioners for the delay of two years in filing of the petitions is that the petitioners were not aware of the mala fide intention of the Government. However, we find that the petitioners have not produced an iota of evidence to show that they acquired the knowledge about the alleged illegality only in the year 1994. They have not disclosed source of information regarding disparity in the price of the land allotted to big companies and the compensation paid to them. No material has been placed by the petitioners to show that they had at any point of time protested against the proceedings of acquisition. Having refrained from lodging any protest against the acquisition proceedings and having kept silence for a period of two years before filing the petitions seeking nullification of the acquisition made in the year 1992, the petitioners have clearly disentitled themselves from claiming any indulgence by this Court. In our opinion, failure of the petitioners to move the Court immediately after the issue of the notification is fatal to the entertainability of the petitions. The petitioners are clearly guilty of laches. During the intervening period rights of third parties have been created. A period of two years is too long to be ignored by the Court in a matter involving challenge to the land acquisition particularly when the purpose of the acquisition is to bring about industrial development of the area. An interference by the Court at this belated stage would cause injury to the public interest as well as to the individuals who may have invested money for the purpose of securing allotment of land and for preparing infra-structure for setting up of industrial units. Therefore, in our opinion, petitions deserve to be dismissed on the ground of laches as well.
18. For the reasons aforementioned, the writ petitions fail and the same are hereby dismissed. Costs made easy.
