ORDER
L. Rath, J.
1. This is an application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for release of the (petitioner who has been undergoing sentences on account of convictions in different trials. The admitted facts are that the petitioner was taken to custody on 10-5-1982 and was tried in S.T. No. 3/94 of 1982 on account of occurrence on 4-1-1982 for offences Under Sections 395 and 397, IPC. In that case he was convicted and sentenced by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Puri, on 7-10-1983 to undergo R.I. for a period of seven years. The petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 1983 which was dismissed by this Court on 10-12-1990. While undergoing such sentence he was also tried in S.T. No. 15/127 of 1983 in respect of an occurrence on 3-1-1983 Under Section 457 and 395, IPC and was convicted and sentenced by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Puri, on 12-7-1984 to undergo R.I. for five years. He also stood a third trial Under Section 457 and 392, IPC in ST Case No. 25/174 of 1984 for an occurrence on 15-3-1983. In that case he was convicted and sentenced by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Puri-, on 13-5-1985 to undergo R.I. for five years. Apart from these convictions, he also stood trial Under Section 395, IPC in S.T. No. 82 of 1983 wherein he was convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge, Puri, to undergo R.I. for five years, but was acquitted in Jail Criminal Appeal No. 148/ 84. In all the cases, while the sentences were imposed, no orders were passed directing those to run concurrently. The petitioner has now come before this Court with the prayer that since he has already spent nine years in Jail he should be released treating the sentences as concurrent instead of consecutive. Such move by the petitioner is resisted by the learned Additional Standing Counsel on the ground that since no direction had been made at the time of passing of the judgments for the sentences, to run concurrently, such order should not be passed.
2. Undoubtedly Session 427, Cr. P.C. provides that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment shall pommence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he had been previously sentenced unless the court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentence. The only exception is that when a person already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced, on a subsequent conviction, to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.
3. The provisions being specific it is undoubtedly the intention of the legislature that ordinarily the sentences imposed upon a convict in different cases are to run consecutively unless direction is issued to the contrary. It is also correct to state that a criminal court after passing the judgment having become functus officio, can no more pass an order directing the sentences to run concurrently unless the same has been passed at the time of judgment. But however it does not appear that power of this Court is in any way fettered by Section 427, Cr. P.C. to give a suitable direction in the event the Court feels that in the interest of justice, the sentences should run concurrently. The law on the subject has been clearly discussed in (1983) 55 Cut LT 73 : (1983 Cri LJ 527) (Basudeb Pradhan v. State of Orissa) where similar contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate was repelled and the power of the court under the inherent provisions was upheld. The learned counsel apearing for the petitioner has also placed reliance on several other decisions on the same question which however are not necessary to be referred to.
4. While the Court may exercise powers Under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to direct the sentences to run concurrently, yet it is another question as to whether in a given case it shall be so exercised. As has been submitted by the learned Additional Standing Counsel, the petitioner has been convicted in series of dacoity cases. As will appear from the nature of the cases it seems that he had a propensity to commit dacoity. For such reason, ordinarily the inherent power should not be exercised to his benefit. It is however noticed that all the occurrences in respect of which the petitioner was convicted took place from 4-1-1982 to 15-3-1983, i.e. a period of about one year and two months, about eight years back. Since long time has elapsed in between, it may reasonably be expected that the petitioner, if once released, would not indulge in similar offences and would rather choose a more acceptable means of livelihood. The purpose of conviction and sentence is never retaliatory but is reformative in nature. To a quary made by the Court, the learned Additional Standing Counsel submits that there has been no report against the conduct of the petitioner during his incarcerstion. It would hence be reasonable to assume that the petitioner, should he be given a chance to return to the mainstream of life, would make an effort to adapt himself to the society in a meaningful and new possible manner. Being impelled by such considerations. I would direct that the sentences suffered by the petitioner be treated as concurrent to the extent of the sentences as already undergone by him and that he be released forthwith subject to the conditions that this order shall not be deemed to have taken effect if the petitioner is found to have been involved and convicted of any further offence involving dacoity, in which event he has to suffer all the sentences consecutively. The petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.
The Criminal Misc. Case is allowed.