JUDGMENT
Hemant Gupta, J.
1. The defendant Nos. 7, 8 & 9 are in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff for possession of the land measuring 2 bighas 4 biswas.
2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for possession of the land measuring 2 bighas 4 biswas alleging the same to be part of Khasra No. 6792/2 and that the defendants have illegally encroached and trespassed over the suit land and made construction there upon without any right or title therein. Defendant No. 7 in her written statement asserted that she has purchased the suit property from one Bishamber vide registered sale deed dated 9.2.1987 and in fact, Bishamber had purchased the said property from Nafe Singh son of Jage Ram on 2.3.1984. Whereas, defendant Nos. 8 and 9 asserted in their written statement that they have purchased the suit property from defendant No. 1 in May, 1972. With the said plea, the defendant-appellants raised a plea that they are in exclusive, peaceful, continuous and hostile possession of the suit property and they are owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession.
3. Both the Courts have found that the defendants have failed to prove the sale of the suit land, as alleged by the appellants, and that the plaintiff is proved to be owner of the suit land and thus, entitled to possession of the same.
4. Learned Counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the suit land could not be identified and thus, a decree for possession cannot be granted in respect of such land and that the courts will not pass a decree which cannot be executed. Reliance is placed on Sant Singh v. Gulah Singh A.I.R. 1928 Lahore 573. It is also contended that the plaintiff has seen the defendants raising construction over the suit land and thus, the plaintiff is estopped to seek possession from the defendants. Reliance is placed on a judgment of this Court reported as Food Corporation of India v. Dayal Singh 1991 P.LJ. 425.
5. The question that the plaintiff has not established the identity of the suit land or the property cannot be identified, is not borne out from the record. The defendant-appellants have raised a plea of adverse possession. Once a plea of adverse possession is raised, it pre-supposes the title over the suit land of the plaintiff. The title of the plaintiff is deemed to be admitted, the argument that the property is not identifiable falls to be ground. Therefore, the argument raised by learned Counsel for the appellants that infurctuous decree could not be passed, is not made but in view of the plea of adverse possession over the suit land raised by the appellants.
5.1 The argument that the plaintiff has seen the defendants raising construction and thus estopped to claim possession, is not tenable. The appellants have asserted title on the basis of purchase. However, neither the alleged vendor nor their title nor any document of title has been produced. In the absence of any document of title in their favour, the argument that the defendants are in possession of the suit land as owners and that they have a legal right to retain it, is not made out. Once the defendants have raised a plea of adverse possession, the plaintiff is presumed to be owner of the suit land. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the defendants have to allege and prove that their possession over the suit land is hostile to the knowledge of the true owners for a continuous period of 12 years. In fact, there is no plea or evidence that the defendants entered into possession of the suit land to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The possession was not hostile at the time of inception. The possession, how so ever long, does not confer any right or title in favour of the defendants. Therefore, the plea of estoppel cannot be raised as the defendants could defeat the claim of the plaintiff only on proof of adverse possession.
6. The judgment referred to by learned Counsel for the appellants is of no help to the appellants as it was found that a Government undertaking should not have raised plea of adverse possession and in fact, the learned First Appellate Court has granted decree for payment of compensation of the constructions raised. In the present case, no such plea is available. The appellants have failed to prove their title and have raised unsuccessful plea of adverse possession. Neither law or equity warrants any indulgence to such person.
7. Thus, I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the findings recorded by the learned Courts below which may give rise to any substantial question of law for consideration of this Court in second appeal. The present appeal stands dismissed.