JUDGMENT
Vishnudeo Narayan, J.
1. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties on I.A. No. 682 of 2003 and I.A. No. 681 of 2003.
2. A prayer has been made in I.A. No. 682 of 2003 to implead Chaitali Nandi, who is the informant of this case, as opposite party. It has been submitted that she had filed a complaint petition against her petitioner-husband, Jagbandhu Nandi and others under Sections 498A, 406 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code which was referred to the police for institution and submission of final form and thereafter charge-sheet has been submitted in that case and the petitioners were convicted for the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code only and the appeal filed by them was also dismissed and as against that they have preferred this revision before this Court. It has also been submitted that she is a necessary party in this revision in view of the settled law that no order to the prejudice of an accused or any other person can be made unless the said accused or the said person has been given an opportunity of being heard in view of the mandate of the law contained under Section 401(2), Cr.P.C. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has no objection in respect thereof.
3. In view of the submissions aforesaid it appears that Chaitali Nandi is a necessary party in this criminal revision as she is the informant in the case in which the petitioner-husband and others were convicted by the Trial Court and their conviction was upheld by the Appellate Court. A such I.A. No. 682 of 2003 is hereby allowed. Let Chaitali Nandi be impleaded as opposite party No. 2 in the cause title of this criminal revision.
4. It has been submitted in respect of I.A. No. 681 of 2003 for the opposite party that opposite party No. 2 Chaitali Nandi is the lawfully wedded wife of her petitioner-husband Jagbandhu Nandi and due to aberrations in their conjugal life she had filed a case under Sections 498A, 406 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code in which her petitioner-husband and his relatives were convicted by the Trial Court and the appeal filed by them was also dismissed and as against that they have come before this Court in revision. It has also been submitted that opposite party No. 2 Chaitali Nandi has also filed a Matrimonial Suit No. 100 of 1995 for dissolution of her marriage with her petitioner-husband aforesaid under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act which was dismissed by the Trial Court and she had preferred F.A. No. 142 of 1998 before this Court in which a mutual petition under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed by her along with her petitioner-husband and their marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce under Section 13B of the said Act in view of the fact that the marriage between them has become practically and emotionally dead which cannot be retrieved. It has also been submitted that in this view of the matter she has no objection if this revision is disposed of in terms of the averments made in her petition under Section 13B of the said Act.
5. It has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that F.A. No. 142 of 1998 and this criminal revision have been tied up with for hearing and a decree of divorce dissolving their marriage had been passed in FA. No. 142 of 1998 under Section 13B of the said Act and in terms thereof this revision may be allowed as Section 320(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that this Court acting in exercise of revisional jurisdiction may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound. It has also been submitted that Section 498A, I.P.C. in which the petitioner has been found guilty is not compoundable but there are catena of decisions in which it has been observed that in a case where matrimonial disputes have been resolved between the parties then in that case offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. may be compounded between the parties for according to them an opportunity to settle in life afresh. In support of his contention reliance has been placed on the ratio of the cases of Mahesh Chand and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 2111; B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr., I (2003) DMC 524 (SC)=II (2003) SLT 689=2003 AIR SCW 1824, Jai Prakash Chaurasia v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1994) BLJR 825, and Ranjana Banerjee v. Bijay Bhushan Banerjee and Ors., 1996(2) East. Cr. C. 808 (Pat).
6. In the case of Ranjana Banerjee (supra), a Bench of this Court has observed which runs thus:
“It appears that good sense have been prevailed amongst the spouses and when it became impossible for them to lead conjugal life any further and when the matrimonial home has been broken for all practical purposes, they have decided to withdraw all allegations and counter allegations against each other and get themselves separated on divorce by mutual consent. Although, Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is not compoundable, but in the nature and circumstances of the case and the situation prevailing, accord is hereby granted to compromise the dispute between the parties and hence joint petition filed in both the cases are hereby allowed.”
Relying upon the ratio of the case of Mahesh Chand (supra) an another Bench of this Court in the case of Jai Prakash (supra) under Sections 498A, 406 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code has observed that:
“After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence has been committed, it would be proper to compound the offence and in my opinion, it would be also meet the ends of justice.”
7. The case of Mahesh Chand (supra) was under Section 307, I.P.C. and the appellant was convicted by the High Court reversing the judgment of acquittal and during the pendency of special leave petition before the Apex Court the parties wanted to compound the case and whereas the counter case has already been compromised between the parties. The Apex Court has observed which runs thus.
“We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the offence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the Trial Court shall permit them to compound the offence.”
The case of B.S. Joshi (supra) was a case under Section 498A, I.P.C. filed by the wife against her husband and his relations and the wife settled her disputes with the husband and his relations and there was a mutual petition under Section 13B for dissolving their marriage and their marriage was accordingly dissolved and she invoked the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 for quashing the proceeding under Section 498A initiated by her against her husband and his relatives. The Apex Court has observed which runs thus;
“It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye’s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing, It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.”
It has further been observed therein which runs thus:
“There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XXA containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interest of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code.
In view of the above discussions, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers and quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.”
8. Admittedly, the marriage between the parties has become emotionally and practically dead. The matrimonial suit filed by the O.P. wife has been finally disposed of under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act by dissolving their marriage by a decree of divorce. The criminal case under Section 498A, I.P.C. is the off-shoot of the said matrimonial dispute. The parties have come to their terms and in pursuance thereto the opposite party does not intend to proceed with this case and she has made a prayer to dispose of this criminal revision in terms of joint mutual petition under Section 13B which is on the record of F.A. No. 142 of 1998 and this criminal revision have been tied up with that appeal. In view of the ratio of the cases referred to above, I see no impediment in allowing this criminal revision in the special facts and circumstances of this case and the subsequent events taken together.
9. In this view of the matter, this criminal revision is hereby allowed in terms of the joint mutual petition filed under Section 13B of the said Act. The impugned judgment of both the Courts below is hereby set aside and both the petitioners, namely, Jagbandhu Nandi and Ardhendu Nandi are hereby acquitted and discharged from liabilities of their bail bonds.