REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 338 OF 2007
Jagdish .....Appellant
Versus
State of M.P. ...Respondent
JUDGMENT
HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.
1. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC
for having murdered his wife, four minor daughters and a
minor son all between 1 and 16 years of age and was
sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Manasa by judgment dated 24th April, 2006. On an
appeal and reference to the High Court, the conviction
and sentence has been maintained leading to the present
appeal. The prosecution story is as follows:
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2. At about mid night of the 19th August, 2005 PW1
Ramprasad, the brother of the appellant, on being
informed by PW-4 Balchand that he had heard a huge
commotion from the appellant’s house, rushed that side
and looking through the window saw the appellant sitting
in the room with a bloodstained knife in his hand and his
clothes soiled in blood and the dead bodies of his wife
Amribai, and daughters Karibai, Vidhyabai, Rajubai and
Rachna aged 16 years, 12 years, 8 years and 6 years
respectively and his son Dilkhush aged 1 year lying
besides him. Ramprasad asked the appellant as to what
he had done but he threatened him with dire
consequences and told him that he would kill him as
well. Ramprasad thereupon retreated and raised an
alarm which attracted the occupants of the neighbouring
houses, and also locked the room from the outside to
prevent the appellant’s escape. He also rushed to Police
Station, Manasa accompanied by Sarpanch Devilal (PW3)
and recorded the F.I.R.. He then returned to the village
with a police party, headed by PW15 SI Karulal Patel.
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The appellant was arrested on the spot and on
interrogation a bloodstained pajama and knife hidden in
a quilt were seized. On the completion of the
investigation, he was brought to trial on six counts of
murders. He pleaded innocence and claimed trial. The
trial court observed that the case rested almost
exclusively on circumstantial evidence and then went on
to examine the various circumstances. The court found
that the evidence of PW1 Ramprasad that the dead
bodies were lying in the room was supported by the
evidence of PW3 Devilal, PW11 Vinod as also PW15 SI
Karulal. The court also observed that the medical
evidence of PW-8 Dr. R.K. Joshi and PW-9 Dr. Dinesh
Bansal, who, between themselves, had carried out the
post-mortem examinations on the dead bodies to the
effect that the murders had been committed with a knife
and that the knife which had been recovered at the
instance of the appellant from inside the room could be
the murder weapon, corroborated the ocular account.
The court further held that though in a case of
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circumstantial evidence motive was of great significance,
it could not be said as a matter of principle that the
absence of motive would render the prosecution story
weak and in the light of the fact that the murders had
been committed in the family home which was locked
from the inside, with no other person present at that
time, it was to some extent obligatory on the appellant to
have given some explanation as to the murders. The
court then observed that the explanation in the
statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was
unacceptable as it had been simply pleaded that he had
been sleeping in the room and had woken up on hearing
a noise outside and the police had entered the room and
caught hold of him and had immediately arrested him.
The appellant also undertook to produce evidence in
defence, but ultimately did not do so. PW-1 Ram
Prasad’s statement at the trial that some thief had been
present in the room on the date and time in question was
rejected, as being an after thought as he was the
appellant’s brother, and was making a belated attempt to
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save him. The court finally found that the extra judicial
confession made before Ramprasad PW1 and Devilal PW3
and the fact that he had been arrested from the spot,
clearly proved his involvement. On a cumulative
assessment of the circumstances, the Court concluded
that the appellant was involved in the multiple murders.
The question as to the sentence to be imposed was then
examined in depth and relying on various judgments of
this Court and in particular on Mohan Singh vs. State of
Delhi AIR 1977 SC 949, Rajendra Prasad vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh AIR 1979 SC 916, Bachan Singh vs. State
of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898, Mahesh & Ors. Vs.
State of M.P. AIR 1987 SC 1346, Darshan Singh vs.
State of Punjab AIR 1988 SC 747, Dhananjay Chatterji
vs. State of West Bengal 1994 JT 33 SC, and Nirmal
Singh vs. State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1221 held that
the offence which the appellant had committed was
reprehensible and truly diabolical and that the only
sentence appropriate to the gravity of the crime was a
sentence of death. The plea on behalf of the appellant’s
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counsel based on the judgment of this Court in Nathu
Garam vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1979 SC 716 that a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence should not
ordinarily invite a death penalty, was rejected. A
Reference was thereafter made by the Sessions Judge to
the High Court as postulated by Section 366 of the
Cr.P.C. and the accused too challenged the judgment in
appeal. The High Court first examined the appeal and
concluded that the evidence against the appellant was
conclusive as to his involvement and though there was
no apparent motive, the other circumstances were
sufficient to bring home the charge. The merits of the
murder reference were then examined and after days
consideration it was held that the matter fell within the
category of the rarest of rare cases and relying on the
judgments of this Court in Ravji vs. State of Rajasthan
1996(2) SCC 175, Umashankar Panda vs. State of M.P.
1996 (8) SCC 110, Dayanidhi Bisoi vs. State of Orissa JT
2003 (5) SC 590, State of Rajasthan vs. Kheraj Ram JT
2003(7) SC 419, Sushil Mumu vs. State of Jharkhand JT
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2003(10) SC 340, and Union of India & Ors. Vs.
Devendra Nath Rai 2006 (2) SCC 243 observed that as
the murders were particularly foul, vile and senseless,
the death penalty was the only appropriate sentence in
such a situation. The High Court, accordingly, dismissed
the appeal and confirmed the Reference. The matter is
before us by way of special leave in this backdrop.
3. This Special Leave Petition first came up before this
Court on the 1st September, 2006 and was adjourned to
call for the records. On 25th September, 2006, when the
case was again taken up, it appears that an argument
was raised that the appellant had been suffering from
some mental ailment at the time of the murders and the
counsel sought time to go through some documents
pertaining to his treatment. On 8th January, 2007, this
Court made an order that the counsel should find out, if
possible, the date and place where the petitioner may
have been treated. On 12th February, 2007, the counsel
made a statement that the appellant’s family members
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had been able to collect some documents which would be
received by him shortly. On 12th March, 2007 leave was
granted, limited however, to the question of sentence
only. During the pendency of this appeal, and on the
direction of this Court, yet another enquiry was made to
find out if the appellant had any mental disorder and had
been undergoing any treatment to this effect.
Consequent to the enquiry, a report has been tendered to
this Court supported by an affidavit of Shri Vineet
Kumar, Additional Superintendent of Police, District
Neemuch, Madhya Pradesh to the effect that no medical
record which could establish that the appellant had
undergone treatment for a mental or psychological
problem had been found but statements of his family
members and others including Mohan Lal, his elder
brother and his parents Mohan Lal and Sita Devi and the
Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, Achalpur which were
to the effect that the appellant had been addicted to
drugs, particularly to Ganja, and had become mentally
disturbed and had been under treatment, and it was on
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account of this mental illness that he had killed his
family, had been received, were being put on record.
4. Relying on these statements, the learned counsel for the
appellant has pointed out that as the appellant appeared
to be of unsound mind and incapable of understanding
the nature of his actions he was absolved of any liability
under Section 84 of the IPC. On merits, it has been
urged that in the light of the fact that there was no eye
witness to the incident, the mere circumstance that the
murders had happened in the family home, was
insufficient to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt,
and reliance has finally been placed on Nathu Ram’s case
(supra) to contend that a sentence of death based on
circumstantial evidence was a risky proposition, and was
thus not called for.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the record very carefully. The sheer
enormity of the crime, the diabolical manner of the
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murders, and the feeling of abhorrence which would
undoubtedly be raised in the mind of the court, are
factors which have persuaded us to examine the entire
story with even greater care and notwithstanding that a
notice limited to the question of sentence only had been
issued, we have, in the backdrop of the new issue that
has been raised, and the horrific consequences for the
appellant, permitted his counsel to argue the entire
appeal.
6. We first examine the argument of the appellant’s counsel
based on Section 84 of the I.P.C.. Section 84 reads as
under:
“Act of a person of unsound mind. – Nothing is an
offence which is done by a person who, at the time
of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is
incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that
he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.”
7. The benefit of this provision is available to a person who
at the time when the act was done was incapable of
knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing
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was wrong or contrary to law. The implication of this
provision is that the offender must be of this mental
condition at the time when the act was committed and
the fact that he was of unsound mind earlier or later are
relevant only to the extent that they, alongwith other
evidence, may be circumstances in determining the
mental condition of an accused on the day of incident.
We have gone through the status report filed by Shri
V.K.Jain, Additional S.P. and find it based exclusively on
the statements made by close family members of the
appellant. It is significant that before the trial court as
well as in appeal in the High Court, no plea with regard
to the appellant’s mental condition had been taken and it
was only in this Court at the SLP stage when, shaken by
the sheer brutality of the crime, this Court perhaps felt
that only a person of unsound mind could commit such a
horrendous crime, and it had thus been thought prudent
to have the matter re-examined. We are of the opinion
however, that the statements in the status report and the
affidavit do not advance the appellant’s case whatsoever.
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8. We find that the case against the appellant has been
proved by the evidence of PW1 Ramprasad, his brother,
PW3 Devilal and PW11 Vinod his neighbours, who had all
seen the dead bodies with the appellant sitting beside
them armed with a knife and he had in fact threatened
that anyone else interfering would meet the same fate. It
is also significant that Ramprasad had locked the door
from the outside and it was in that condition that the
appellant had been arrested by SI Karulal and his
bloodstained clothes and knife had been recovered. It is
true that in a case of circumstantial evidence motive does
have extreme significance but to say that in the absence
of motive, the conviction based on circumstantial
evidence cannot, in principle, be made is not correct. It
bears repetition that the appellant and the deceased
family members were the only occupants of the room and
it was therefore incumbent on the appellant to have
tendered some explanation in order to avoid any
suspicion as to his guilt. The story that a thief was
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present in the room introduced by Ramprasad at the
stage of the trial was doubtless an attempt to help the
appellant who was his brother. The medical evidence
also supports the prosecution story in its entirety. The
two doctors, R.K.Joshi and Dinesh Bansal who had
conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead
bodies, concluded that the knife recovered at the
instance of the appellant could have been used to commit
the murders. There is another extremely relevant
circumstance pointing towards the appellant’s
involvement. The appellant, after arrest, was found with
injuries on his person and was subjected to a medical
examination by PW5 Dr. K.C.Kothari. The doctor reported
six superficial incised injuries on his person, some on the
neck and the others on the fingers, and opined that they
could all be self suffered. This statement was further
corroborated by the unrebutted testimony of PW3 Devi
Lal who testified that the appellant had told him that
after killing his family he had attempted to commit
suicide. All the factors referred to above are undoubtedly
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circumstances, but they are so evidently categoric, that
they constitute a chain even stronger than an eye-
witness account, and do remind us of the clichi that men
often lie, circumstances do not. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the conviction of the appellant on the charge
of multiple murders is fully justified.
9. The crucial question, and the question on which the
learned counsel for the appellant has argued with some
emphasis, is the question of sentence. It has been
submitted that the death sentence in a case of
circumstantial evidence was not called for and as there
appeared to be some evidence that the appellant was of
unsound mind and the sheer enormity and senselessness
of the killings also pointed in that direction, and also
indicated that something unusual had happened on that
day were all factors which required consideration. He
has also submitted that as the murders had been
committed in the year 2006 and as the death sentence
had been hanging over the appellant’s head for more
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than three years was itself a punishment, the death
sentence ought to be commuted to life. He has also
referred us to some of the judgments abovementioned.
The learned State counsel has submitted with equal
emphasis that the enormity of the crime, the brutality
with which had been executed, the helpless state of the
victims vis-`-vis the assailant who was a husband and
father were all factors which brought the matter within
the category of the rarest of the rare cases. He too has
relied on Ravji vs. State of Rajasthan 1996(2) SCC 175,
Umashankar Panda and Devendra Nath Rai cases
(supra). In Ravji’s case (supra), which pertained to the
inexplicable murder of a wife and 5 others (including
three minor children) this Court, after examining several
earlier cases, observed that the killing of a wife in an
advanced stage of pregnancy and three minor children
for no reason whatsoever “was one of the most heinous
crimes” and that the appellant being the head of the
family had a solemn duty to protect them but he had on
the contrary “betrayed the trust reposed in him in a very
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cruel and calculated manner without any provocation
whatsoever” and that the court “would be failing in its
duty in not imposing an adequate punishment for a
crime which had been committed not only against the
individual victim but also against the society to which the
criminal and victim belonged,” and that the “enormity of
the crime requires that the society’s cry for justice
against such a criminal should be heard.” Umashankar
Panda’s case again pertained to the murder of a wife and
two children and grievous injuries to 3 children during
an attempt to kill them and it was observed as under:
“We have already given the injuries
inflicted on the deceased persons as well
as on the children who escaped death.
We find that the accused had caused in
all 64 sword injuries to all the six persons
including the three deceased persons and
those injuries speak for themselves about
the gruesome nature of the crime
committed by the accused. Be it noted
that there was no provocation and there
is nothing to suggest that there was any
quarrel between the accused and his wife
or among any one of the family members.
The way in which the crime was executed
clearly shows that it was a premeditated
one and not on account of sudden
provocation or any “mental
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derangement”. The motive suggested in
the course of cross-examination of the
prosecution witnesses is also not helpful
to the accused inasmuch as he has
pleaded alibi in his statement (under
Section 313 CrPC) and that has also been
taken note of by the trial court as well as
by the High Court. As pointed out
earlier, both the Sessions Judge and the
High Court have given special reasons for
awarding death sentence and we are also
of the opinion that the crime indulged by
the accused is undoubtedly gruesome,
cold-blooded, heinous, atrocious and
cruel. We are also satisfied that on the
facts established on the record, there
appears to be no mitigating
circumstances whatsoever, but only
aggravating circumstances which justify
the imposition of death sentence. If we
look into the manner in which the crime
was committed, the weapon used, the
brutality of the crime, number of persons
murdered, the helplessness of the
victims, we cannot come to any other
conclusion except the one, the Sessions
Judge and the High Court arrived at to
award the capital sentence to the
appellant.”
In Devendra Nath Rai’s case (supra) this Court after examining
Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, Machhi
Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 and and Devender
Pal Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2002) 5 SCC 234 culled
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out the broad principles with regard to the infliction of the
death penalty in the following terms:
“The community may entertain such
sentiment in the following circumstances:
(1) When the murder is committed in
an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical,
revolting, or dastardly manner so as to arouse
intense and extreme indignation of the
community.
(2) When the murder is committed for
a motive which evinces total depravity and
meanness; e.g. murder by hired assassin for
money or reward; or cold-blooded murder for
gains of a person vis-`-vis whom the murderer
is in a dominating position or in a position of
trust; or murder is committed in the course for
betrayal of the mother land.
(3) When murder of a member of a
Scheduled Caste or minority community, etc. is
committed not for personal reasons but in
circumstances which arouse social wrath; or in
cases of `bride burning’ or `dowry deaths’ or
when murder is committed in order to remarry
for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to
marry another woman on account of
infatuation.
(4) When the crime is enormous in
proportion. For instance when multiple
murders, say of all or almost all the members of
a family or a large number of persons of a
particular caste, community, or locality, are
committed.
(5) When the victim of murder is an
innocent child, or a helpless woman or old or
infirm person or a person vis-`-vis whom the
murderer is in dominating position, or a public
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figure generally loved and respected by the
community.
If upon taking an overall global view of all
the circumstances in the light of the aforesaid
propositions and taking into account the
answers to the questions posed by way of the
test for the rarest of rare cases, the
circumstances of the case are such that death
sentence is warranted, the court would proceed
to do so.”
These aggravating circumstances have been reiterated in
Dhananjay Chatterjee’s case (supra).
10. A bare perusal of the aforesaid judgments would bring
this matter within principles 1, 4 and 5. We find the case in
hand that the murders were particularly horrifying, as the
assailant was in a dominant position and a position to trust as
well as he was the head of the family, the crime was enormous
in its proportions as the entire family had been done away, the
hapless victims being the wife and the minor children of the
assailant, the youngest being the only son, just one year old.
We have also examined the mitigating circumstances referred
to in Bachan Singh’s case (supra) and in Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6
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SCC 498. We find that the balance sheet is heavily weighted
against the appellant.
11. The appellant’s counsel has also referred to the lapse of
about three years between the sentence of death awarded by
the Sessions Judge and the hearing of this appeal and has
submitted that as a delay in the execution of the death
sentence was itself a dehumanizing and an unreasonable
procedure, the death sentence ought to be converted to one for
life. We have examined this matter very carefully. In
T.V.Vatheeswaran vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1983) 2 SCC 68
and Ediga Anamma vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1974) 4
SCC 443 it has been held that a delay of two years was
permissible beyond which the sentence ought to be converted
to life. In Bhagwan Bux Singh & Anr. vs. The State of U.P.
(1978) 1 SCC 214 similar observations were made with respect
to a delay of two and a half years and in Sadhu Singh vs.
State of U.P. (1978) 4 SCC 428 to a delay of three and a half
years. We find, however, that as per the latest position in
law, no hard and fast rules can be laid down with respect to
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the delay which could result as a mitigating circumstance, and
each case must depend on its own facts. We have in this
connection gone through the judgment in Vivian Rodrick vs.
The State of West Bengal (1971) 1 SCC 468 and this is what
the Court had to say:
“It seems to us that the extremely
excessive delay in the disposal of the case of the
appellant would by itself be sufficient for
imposing a lesser sentence of imprisonment for
life under Section 302. Section 302, IPC
prescribes two alternate sentences, namely,
death sentence or imprisonment for life, and
when there has been inordinate delay in the
disposal of the appeal by the High Court it
seems to us that it is a relevant factor for the
High Court to take into consideration for
imposing the lesser sentence. In this particular
case, as pointed out above, the appellant was
committed to trial by the Presidency Magistrate
as early as July 31, 1963, and he was convicted
by the Trial Judge on September 4, 1964. It is
now January 1971, and the appellant has been
for more than six years under the fear of
sentence of death. This must have caused him
unimaginable mental agony. In our opinion, it
would be inhuman to make him suffer till the
Government decides the matter on a mercy
petition. We consider that this now a fit case for
awarding the sentence of imprisonment for life.
Accordingly, we accept the appeal, set aside the
order of the High Court awarding death
sentence and award a sentence of imprisonment
for life. The sentences under Section 148,IPC
and Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act
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and under Section 302, IPC, shall run
concurrently.”
Likewise in State of U.P. vs. Sahai & Ors. (1982) 1 SCC
352 which pertained to a murder of four persons in a
particular ghastly manner, it observed as under :
“The next question that remains is as
to the sentences to be imposed on the
respondents. Although the Sessions Judge
had given all the respondents, excepting
Sahai, sentences of life imprisonment
under Section 302 read with Section 149
of the Indian Penal Code, he had passed
the sentence of death on Sahai because he
alone had shot dead three of the deceased
persons. The occurrence took place
sometime in December 1972, and more
than eight years have elapsed since. The
accused had been convicted by the
Sessions Court but acquitted by the High
Court. The present appeal has been
pending for five years. Having regard to the
reasons given above, therefore, we feel that
although the murders committed by Sahai
were extremely gruesome, brutal and
dastardly, yet the extreme penalty of death
is not called for in the circumstances of this
particular case.”
It is true that in some of the cases referred to above, a
delay beyond two or three years has been said to be excessive
but in Sher Singh vs. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 344, this
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Court while agreeing with the broad proposition with regard to
the delay in death penalty cases, declined to accept the outer
time limit of two years for the execution of a death sentence,
failing which it would be incumbent on the court to commute
it to life but at the same time had some very pertinent
observations to make. We reproduce some of them herein
below:
“But we must hasten to add that this Court
has not taken the narrow view that the
jurisdiction to interfere with a death sentence
can be exercised only in an appeal against the
judgment of conviction and sentence. The
question which arises in such appeals is
whether the extreme penalty provided by law is
called for in the circumstances of the case. The
question which arises in proceedings such as
those before us is whether, even if the death
sentence was the only appropriate sentence to
impose in the case and was therefore imposed.
It will be harsh and unjust to execute that
sentence by reason of supervening events. In
very recent times, the sentence of death has
been commuted to life imprisonment by this
Court in quite a few cases for the reason, inter
alia, that the prisoner was under the spectre of
the sentence of death for an unduly long time
after the final confirmation of that sentence,
consequence upon the dismissal of the
prisoner’s special leave petition or appeal by
this Court.”
and further
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“The prolonged anguish of alternating
hope and despair, the agony of uncertainty,
the consequences of such suffering on the
mental, emotional, and physical integrity and
health of the individual can render the
decision to execute the sentence of death an
inhuman and degrading punishment in the
circumstances of a given case.”
“Death sentence is constitutionally valid
and permissible within the constraints of the
rule in Bachan Singh. This has to be accepted
as the law of the land. We do not, all of us,
share the views of every one of us. And that is
natural because, every one of us has his own
philosophy of law and life, moulded and
conditioned by his own assessment of the
performance and potentials of law and the
garnered experiences of life. But the decisions
rendered by this Court after a full debate have
to be accepted without mental reservations
until they are set aside.”
The Bench also relied on a sociological study
“Condemned to Die, Life Under Sentence of Death” by Robert
Johnson which we too have found appropriate to quote to
complete the narrative :
“Death row is barren and uninviting. The
death row inmate must contend with a
segregated environment marked by immobility,
reduced stimulation, and the prospect of
harassment by staff. There is also the risk that
visits from loved ones will become increasingly
rate, for the man who is “civilly dead” is often
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abandoned by the living. The condemned
prisoner’s ordeal is usually a lonely one and
must be met largely through his own
resources. The uncertainties of his case –
pending appeals, unanswered bids for
commutation, possible changes in the law –
may aggravate adjustment problems. A
continuing and pressing concern is whether
one will join the substantial minority who
obtain a reprieve or will be counted among the
to-be-dead. Uncertainty may make the
dilemma of the death row inmate more
complicated than simply choosing between
maintaining hope or surrendering to despair.
The condemned can afford neither alternative,
but must nurture both a desire to life and an
acceptance of imminent death. As revealed in
the suffering of terminally ill patients, this is
an extremely difficult task, one in which
resources afforded by family or those within
the institutional context may prove critical to
the persons’s adjustment. The death row
inmate must achieve equilibrium with few
coping supports. In the process, he must
somehow maintain his dignity and integrity.
Death row is a prison within a prison,
physically and socially isolated from the prison
community and the outside world. Condemned
prisoners life twenty-three and one-half hours
alone in their cells…..”
The Court concluded with the following significant
observations :
“A prisoner who has experienced living
death for years on end is therefore entitled to
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invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for
examining the question whether, after all the
agony and torment he has been subjected to, it
is just and fair to allow the sentence of death
to be executed. That is the true implication of
Article 21 of the Constitution and to that
extent, we express our broad and respectful
agreement with our learned Brethren in their
visualisation of the meaning of that Article.
The horizons of Article 21 are ever widening
and the final word on its conspectus shall
never have been said. So long as life lasts, so
long shall it be the duty and endeavour of this
Court to give to the provisions of our
Constitution a meaning which will prevent
human suffering and degradation. Therefore,
Article 21 is as much relevant at the stage of
execution of the death sentence as it is in the
interregnum between the imposition of that
sentence and its execution. The essence of the
matter is that all procedure, no matter what
the stage, must be fair, just and reasonable.”
The judgments rendered aforesaid have
thrown model underlying philosophy of the
aforesaid judgments has already indicated
above stem out not only from Article 21 of the
Constitution but from the judgments rendered
by the 8th Amendment in the US Constitution
ratifying way back in 1791 which provide that
no cruel and unusual punishment shall be
inflicted. While construing this provision, the
Court of the Magistrates while observing that
the Eight Amendment does not prohibit capital
punishment did indicate that as pending
execution had it dehumanizing effect and
lengthy imprisonment prior to execution and
the judicial and administrative procedures
essential to the due process of law are carried
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27
out. Penologists and medical experts agreed
that the process of carrying out a verdict of
death is often so degrading and brutalizing to
the human spirit as to constitute psychological
torture. Relying on Coleman vs. Balkcom, 451
U.S. 949, 952 (1981) observed that “the
deterrent value of incarceration during that
period of uncertainty may well be comparable
to the consequences of the ultimate step itself”
and when the death penalty “ceases
realistically to further these purposes,…..its
imposition would then be the pointless and
needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or
public purposes. A penalty with such
negligible returns to the State would be
patently excessive and cruel and unusual
punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment.” The Courts have, however,
drawn a distinction whereby the accused
himself has been responsible for the delay by
misuse of the judicial process but the time
taken by the accused in pursuing legal and
constitutional remedies cannot be taken
against him. The Court nevertheless cautious
which we have reproduced as under:
“We must take this opportunity to
impress upon the Government of India and
the State Governments that petitions filed
under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution
or under Sections 432 and 433 of the
Criminal Procedure Code must be disposed of
expeditiously. A self-imposed rule should be
followed by the executive authorities
rigorously, that every such petition shall be
disposed of within a period of three months
from the date on which it is received. Long
and interminable delays in the disposal of
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these petitions are a serious hurdle in the
dispensation of justice and indeed, such
delays tend to shake the confidence of the
people in the very system of justice. Several
instances can be cited, to which the record of
this Court will bear testimony, in which
petitions are pending before the State
Governments and the Government of India
for an inexplicably long period. The latest
instance is to be found in Criminal Writ
Petition Nos. 345-348 of 1983, from which it
would appear that petitions filed under
Article 161 of the Constitution are pending
before the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir for
anything between five to eight years. A
pernicious impression seems to be growing
that whatever the courts may decide, one can
always turn to the executive for defeating the
verdict of the court by resorting to delaying
tactics. Undoubtedly, the executive has the
power, in appropriate cases, to act under the
aforesaid provisions but, if we may remind,
all exercise of power is pre-conditioned by the
duty to be fair and quick. Delay defeats
justice.”
12. We have also examined the case law on this aspect with
respect to other jurisdictions. We may refer to a few such
decisions. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the death
sentence has two underlying philosophies ;
(1) that it should be retributive, and
(2) it should act as a deterrent
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and as the delay has the effect of obliterating both the above
factors, there can be no justification for the execution of a
prisoner after much delay. Some extremely relevant
observations have been quoted above from Coleman v.
Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981). While examining the
matter in the background of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution which provides that :
“excessive bail should not be required,
nor excessive fine imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted”
it has observed that though the death penalty was permissible,
its effect was lost in case of delay (Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976). The Court also has repeatedly examined the
consequences on a prisoner who was under the spectre of
death over a period of time and has emphasised “when a
prisoner sentenced by a Court to death is confined in the
penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the
most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during
that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it”. The U.S.
Supreme Court and other courts have repeatedly held that
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“the cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the
execution itself and the pain incident thereto, but also in the
dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to
execution” and that “the prospect of pending execution
exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long wait between
the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of
death”.(Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238, 288-289 (1972)
13. We are of the opinion that the underlying principles of
the Eighth Amendment with regard to the infliction of a cruel
and unusual punishment has its echo in Article 21 of our
Constitution as well and it would, therefore, be open to a
condemned prisoner, who has been under a sentence of death
over a long period of time, for reasons not attributable to him,
to contend that the death sentence should be commuted to
one of life. The power of the President and the Governor to
grant pardon etc. under Articles 72 and 161 of our
Constitution though couched in imperative terms, has
nevertheless to be exercised on the advice of the executive
authority. In this background, it is the Government which, in
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effect, exercises that power. The condemned prisoner and his
suffering relatives have, therefore, a very pertinent right in
insisting that a decision in the matter be taken within a
reasonable time, failing which the power should be exercised
in favour of the prisoner. We, as Judges, remain largely
unaware as to the reasons that ultimately bear with the
Government in taking a decision either in favour of the
prisoner or against him but whatever the decision it should be
on sound legal principles related to the facts of the case. We
must, however, say with the greatest emphasis, that human
beings are not chattels and should not be used as pawns in
furthering some larger political or government policy. We may
hark back to our own experiences in life. Even a matter as
mundane or trivial as the impending result of an examination
or the report of a medical test arising out of suspicion of a
serious disease, or the fate of a loved one who has gone
missing or a person hanging between life and death on
account of a severe injury, makes it impossible for a person to
maintain his equanimity or normal way of life. Contrast this
with the plight of a prisoner who has been under a sentence of
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death for 15 years or more living on hope but engulfed in fear
as his life hangs in balance and in the hands of those who
have no personal interest in his case and for whom he is only
a name. Equally, consider the plight of the family of such a
prisoner, his parents, wife and children, brothers and sisters,
who too remain static and in a state of limbo and are unable
to get on with life on account of the uncertain fate of a loved
one. What makes it worse for the prisoner is the indifference
and ennui which ultimately develops in the family, brought
about by a combination of resignation, exhaustion, and
despair. What may be asked is the fault of these hapless
individuals and should they be treated in such a shabby
manner.
14. The observations reproduced above become extremely
relevant as of today on account of the pendency of 26 mercy
petitions before the President of India, in some cases, where
the Courts had awarded the death sentences more than a
decade ago. We, too, take this opportunity to remind the
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concerned Governments of their obligations under the
aforementioned statutory and Constitutional provisions.
15. Those of us who have had the occasion to inspect a Jail
where executions are carried out have first hand knowledge of
the agony and horror that a condemned prisoner undergoes
every day. The very terminology used to identify such
prisoners – death row in-mates, or condemned prisoners, with
their even more explicit translations in the vernacular – tend to
remind them of their plight every moment of the day. In
addition to the solitary confinement and lack of privacy with
respect to even the daily ablutions, the rattle on the cell door
heralding the arrival of the Jailor with the prospect as the
harbinger of bad news, a condemned prisoner lives a life of
uncertainty and defeat. In one particular prison, the horror
was exacerbated as the gallows could be seen over the wall
from the condemned cells. The effect on the prisoners on
seeing this menacing structure each morning during their
daily exercise in the courtyard, can well be imagined. To cap
it all, some of these prisoners, sentenced to death by the
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Sessions Judge in a case of multiple murders, were later
acquitted by the High Court in appeal for lack of evidence.
16. The facts of the present case; the incident happened on
the 20th August 2005. The Additional Sessions Judge
rendered his judgment on 24th April 2006 and the judgment
was confirmed by the High Court on 27th June 2006. This
matter first came up in this Court on 1st September 2006 and
was adjourned repeatedly on the request of the appellant’s
counsel so as to find out if some material could be collected to
substantiate his claim that he was unsound mind and it was
on 12th March 2007 that leave was granted limited to the
question of sentence only. The matter is being disposed of by
us in September 2009. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
there is no delay whatsoever in the aforesaid circumstances.
The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
……………………..J.
(Harjit Singh Bedi)
……………………..J.
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35
(J.M.Panchal)
New Delhi,
Dated: September 18, 2009