JUDGMENT
A. Lala, J.
1. All the aforesaid matters being W.P. 20111(w)/1999, W.P. 10411(W)/98, C.O. 18397(W)/95, W.P. 10843(W)/99 and W.P. 15208(W)/ 2001 are arising out of the same cause of action. The cause of action is the recognition of a minority Post Graduate Basic Training College at Sarisha, District-24 Pgs. (South). The parameter of the ultimate submission of Mr. Siddhartha Sankar Ray, the learned senior counsel appearing In support of the petitioners is that a consideration was made by the authority without following the direction of the single Judge of this Court In a contempt application being C.O. 18397(W)/95 (Abdul Rashid v. Dilip Bhattacharyya and Ors.). Such contempt application is yet pending before this
Court and both the parties Insisted for going through the records available in such case to come to an appropriate conclusion.
2. The further contention of Mr. Roy, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Is that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners in coming to conclusion on 16.7.98 by the Principal Secretary of the Higher Education Department, Government of West Bengal. Mr. Ray contended that under the contempt application one Mr. Dilip Bhattacharyya, the then Principal Secretary was directed to hear out the matter and when one of the petitioners attended the office and he found some other person were there then he declined to appear. However, I find from the records that there was an order passed by a single Judge of this Court in the said contempt application on 15.7.98 wherein the new incumbent was directed to hear out the matter. Such order was passed in presence of the petitioners. Therefore, there was no embargo upon such petitioner to attend the Secretary concerned in hearing the matter. Mr. Ray has relied upon a well recognised judgment in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Hindustan Development Corporation and Ors., to strengthen his argument on the point of legitimate expectation from the Governmental authority. The plinth of the case of the petitioner is that from 1948 till this date they are fighting for their cause of recognition of the Institution as Post Graduate Basic Training College but the same was turned down repeatedly. Although on different occasions limited interim orders were passed allowing the candidates to appear in the examination obtained their certificates on which their respective governmental services were validated but recognition of the Institution giving certificates is not given. Therefore, when the candidatures of the candidates were recognised why the Institution will not be recognised is unknown to them. The respondent has taken a fundamental question of policy decision and effect of coming of a Central Act being the National Council for Teacher’s Education Act, 1993.
3. According to Mr. Sumit Panja, learned counsel appearing in support of the respondent the effective year of the Act is 1995. Section 14 of such Act gives parameter of consideration about recognition of such Institution. The P.G.B.T. course is no more in existence. There is no embargo in granting recognition to institution as B.Ed Institution. At one point of time the petitioners wanted to settle the matter amicably by withdrawing all the writ petitions as well as the contempt application. Therefore, the hands of the State are tight in recognising the institution as P.G.B.T. institution and that too beyond the scope of purview of the National Council for Teacher’s Education Act, 1993 being the Central Act introduced for the purpose of bringing all teachers of the country under one umbrella for the purpose of uniformity. Under the Act, the recognition would be in the hands of the local Universities. Section 14(1) proviso says that an institution offering a course or training in teacher education immediately before the appointed day, shall be entitled to continue such course or training for a period of six months. If It has made an application for recognition within the said period and until the disposal of the application by the Regional Committee.
4. Mr. Ray, in reply, submitted that there is no indication in the writ petition as well as the contempt application about the existence of an application of the National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993.
Therefore, the new cause of action cannot be brought Into the domain of the pending application before this Court arising out of cause of action available at the relevant point of time. In turn, Mr. Panja, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner has not come with clean hands to get an order of legitimate expectation. In the year 1991, it was notified in the newspaper that the said Institution can be treated as Government College for B.Ed. Education. Since P.G.B.T. courses are no longer be exlstable. Mr. Panja has conceded to the extent that if the Court directs him he will not refuse in considering the matter afresh.
5. Under such circumstances, I do not find any reason to keep all the writ petitions along with contempt application pending for an Indefinite period. Therefore, I dispose of all the writ petitions along with Interlocutory application in connection thereto upon directing the Principal Secretary, Education Department, Government of West Bengal to consider the matter afresh upon giving fullest opportunity of hearing and by passing a reasoned order thereon within a period of 3 months from the date of communication of the order. As a consequential effect the earlier order stands set aside.
6. It is recorded hereunder that all the points agitated before this Court as to whether the Institution will be recognised as P.G.B.T. College or as B.Ed. College, the applicability of the policy decision and also reference of the matter under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 will also be taken into account. The authority concerned will also be empowered to take a decision, if necessary, to refer the matter to the National Council for Teacher Education after due consideration to complete the chapter once for all.
For the sake of all formalities in connection with the contempt application, the rule of contempt is disposed of. Personal presence of the contemners is permanently dispensed with. There will be no order as to costs.
All the aforesaid writ petitions are disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
This order will govern on all other writ petitions.