ORDER
Nainar Sundaram, J.
1. In this writ petition, the challenge is of the order of the first respondent in G.O.Ms. No. 1407, Labour and Employment Department, dated 2.7.1981. By that order, the first respondent decided to refer for adjudication an industrial dispute with reference to non-employment of respondents 2 to 6 by the petitioner. Earlier on 26.5.1980, the first respondent declined to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication by G.O.Ms. No. 1261, Labour and Employment Department. The reconsideration of the question of referring the industrial dispute for adjudication arose on account of a petition therefor preferred, by the Secretary, Panjalai Thozhilalar Sangam (CITU), Rajapalayam, Ramanathapuram District to the first respondent. The specific case of the petitioner is that the first respondent did not by itself give notice to and hear the petitioner on the question of reconsideration. There is no counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 2 to 6. There is a counter affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent. What is claimed in the counter affidavit of the first respondent in substance is that on the petition for reconsideration, submitted by the Panjalai Thozhilalar Sangam (CITU), Rajapalayam, Ramanathapuram District, the Labour Officer, Ramanathapuram at Madurai, who is the conciliation machinery, heard the petitioner, which offered its remarks to the said Labour Officer on 23.4.1981 and it was not necessary that the first respondent, who would pass orders regarding making a reference or otherwise should by itself give notice to and hear the petitioner on the question. It is further claimed that the first respondent passed orders only after considering the relevant materials.
2. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that when there had been earlier a decline on the part of the first respondent to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication and when the first respondent has subsequently chosen to make up his mind to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication, the first respondent by itself ought to have given notice to and heard the petitioner and in the instant case admittedly there was no such opportunity afforded to the petitioner by the first-respondent, and this violated the principles of natural justice. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in this behalf would place reliance on the ratio of a Full Bench of this Court in G. Muthukrishnan v. Administrative Manager, New Horizon Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., Pondicheny and Ors. (1980) 4 L.L.J. 215. In that case, there was a decline to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication earlier and subsequently the question was reconsidered and that there was an order of reference. That order of reference was challenged on the ground that the management was not given notice and heard by the Government before making the order of reference. This grievance was countenanced by the learned single Judge and the appeal from the order of the learned single Judge was heard and disposed of by the Full Bench and the Full Bench answered the question as to whether the government for the second time, without notice to and without hearing the management can act and call upon the Labour Court to adjudicate on a dispute, which on an earlier occasion, the Government declined to refer for adjudication, by saying that it would breach the well-known maxim of audi alterum partem and the resultant decision by the Government would be a nullity. The Full Bench opined that the principles of natural justice would be invocable even in a case of administrative decision, saying thus:
Thus, therefore, the principles of natural justice appear to be equally invocable even in a case where an administrative decision is taken by a statutory functionary. Failure to adhere to such principles would result in a decision which is a nullity because of total absence of jurisdiction. In the above background let us consider matters which might arise in an industry. An industry is a society within a total society, being a segment of it. It projects rights and privileges which workers have in juxta position to such rights and privileges which employers have. In the words of a famous author, ‘Industrial relations mean as they do, a totality of life, a diversity of inter-relations between labour, employer, consumer and Government’. Thus therefore, if a matter which has an impact on such relationship comes up for scrutiny and it becomes necessary for statutory functionaries under the Industrial Disputes Act, including the Government though acting in an administrative capacity, should appreciate that it is a body invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals.
3. The files produced by the learned Government Advocate, appearing for the first respondent, show that the first respondent by itself did not give any notice to and did not hear the petitioner. The stand of the first-respondent that the hearing, if any, done by the conciliation machinery would suffice the purpose, cannot satisfy the principles of natural justice in a matter like this. It was the first-respondent, which should make up its mind on the question of reconsideration. The first respondent alone had to decide and in fact it decided. Hence, any hearing after due notice should have been done by the first respondent only, the reason being, it was the authority to decide the matter and it should be the authority to give notice to and hear the petitioner on the matter. Otherwise the whole process would be an empty formality and a farce. We cannot give sanction to such a process. Even assuming that the first respondent could do the exercise of hearing the reconsideration petition without personal rapport with the petitioner, who would be affected and aggrieved by the ultimate decision of the first respondent, through any conciliation machinery to which theory we are not supposed to give our seal of approval-yet in the present case, we find that the first respondent did not advert to the substance of the remarks of the petitioner made to the concerned Labour Officer on 23.4.1981 and deal with it indicative of a due consideration of the same. The impugned order does not bear this out. As legitimately complained by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, there was not only no hearing by the first respondent of the petitioner, after the notice to it, but there was also lack of consideration of even the remarks, which the petitioner offered to the concerned Labour Officer. This feature obliges us to interfere in writ powers and accordingly the Writ Petition is allowed and the matter is remitted to the file of the first respondent for a fresh consideration of the question, avoiding the infirmities noted by us, which alone obliged us to interfere in writ powers. We make no order as to costs. Considering the fact that the matter is very old, the first respondent will do well to give a disposal of the same with expedition and in any event before the lapse of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.