JUDGMENT
N.K. Kapoor, J.
1. Plaintiffs feeling aggrieved by the order of Registrar whereby he refused to register the document filed a suit for declaration and injunction.
2. The defendants in pursuance to the notices issued by the Court put in appearance and filed written statement. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to 5 in their written statement have controverted the assertion of the plaintiffs and have pleaded that the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction; the suit as framed does not lie under Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act; the suit is not within limitation and that defendant No. 5 is a bona fide purchaser for consideration and without notice.
3. On the pleadings of the parties, various issues were framed between the parties. However, the crux of the matter revolved round decision of issues No. 13-whether the suit is within time? Other issues were either not pressed by the defendants or same were decided in favour of the plaintiffs. Under issue No. 13, the trial Court came to the conclusion that though the impugned order dated 28.3.1974 was announced without fixing any date but all the same one of the plaintiffs namely, Jai Singh had acquired knowledge of the dismissal of the petition and this way the time would run from the date of order i.e. from May 28, 1974. Since the suit was filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 30 days, the same was clearly barred. Resultantly the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 2.6.1978.
4. Before the appellate Court too, the appellants sought reversal of decision of the, trial Court in respect of issue |No. 13 only. The learned counsel for the appellants highlighted the fact that the appeal was heard by the Collector on May 28, 1974 and that no date for final order was fixed by the Collector. This way the period of limitation would start from the date on which the plaintiffs got knowledge of passing the impugned order by the Collector. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellants referred to documents Exhibit P-ll to P-18 which are the certified copies of the various orders passed by the Registrar, Kurukshetra, in connection with the petition filed by the plaintiffs/appellants. The lower appellate Court having observed that the petition was adjourned from 14.5.1974 to 28.5.1974 and thereafter the record of the case did not show if any date was fixed for the pronouncements of the order by the Collector, yet chose to dismiss the appeal holding that their counsel had notice of the date of pronouncement of the order.
5. The present suit was filed in terms of Section 77 of the Registration Act, 1908. Section 77 of the Registration Act 1908. reads as under: —
“Suit in case of order of refusal by Registrar :-(1) Where the Registrar refuses to order the document to be registered, under Section 72 or Section 76 any person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent, may, within thirty days after making of the order of refusal, institute in the Civil Court, within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction is situate the office in which the document is sought to be registered, a suit for a decree directing the document to be registered in such office if it be duly presented for registration within thirty days after the passing of such decree.
(2) The provisions contained in sub sections (2) and (3) of Section 75 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to all documents presented for registration in accordance with any such decree, and, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the document shall be receivable in evidence in such suit.”
6. A bare perusal of the section reveals that as and when registration of a document is refused by the Registrar, any person claiming under such document, or his representative or agent can institute such a suit within 30 days after the ‘making of the order of refusal in a civil court within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction is situate the office in which the document is sought to be registered. Thus the time start from ‘making of the order’. This expression means not merely recording the order of refusal in writing, but communicating it to the party concerned so as to bind him by its. Any other interpretation would lead to the absurdity that a suit might be barred by time before the persons entitled to impeach the order came to know of its existence. As per facts of the present case, the Collector adjourned the proceedings from 14.5.1974 to 28 5.1974, There is nothing on the record to suggest that any specific date was fixed for pronouncement of the order by the Collector. It also does not mention whether the order was announced in the presence of the parties or even their counsels. It would be thus safe to infer that the parties had no knowledge of the passing of the impugned order. Much emphasis has been laid by the Courts below as to the deposition of Sh. Satya Dev, PW-2, who has deposed that a Clerk had gone to the Court of Registrar on 12.6.1974 to know the result of the appeal. Since it was noted by the Clerk in the diary, the Courts below came to the conclusion that it was known to their counsel and this way the plaintiffs have acquired knowledge. I feel the Courts below have erred in law in relying upon the solitary statement of Satya Dev who, admittedly, had no first hand information. Even if it be taken that it had come to the knowledge of the counsel, admittedly, there is no proof on record that any such further communication was addressed by the counsel to the clients, namely, plaintiffs informing them, of the result of the petition pending before the Registrar. Even the Clerk who is stated to have noted in the diary has not been produced by the other side. It is well settled that before a person is to be deprived of his valuable right, it must be proved beyond element of doubt that he had actual or constructive communication of such an order. This test is singularly lacking in the instant case. Somewhat similar proposition came up for consideration before the apex Court in case reported as Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1500. and the Court held as under : —
“Where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order, by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned So the knowledge of the party affected by the award made by the Collector under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, either actual or constructive is an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice Therefore, the expression “the date of the award” used in proviso (b) to Section 18(2) of the Act must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him cither actually or constructively. It will be unreasonable to construe the words from the date of Collector’s award used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.”
7. Accordingly, I accept the appeal, set aside the judgments and decree, of the Courts below and decree the suit of the plaintiffs as prayed for. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall however/bear their own costs