PETITIONER:
JAIN INK MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/08/1980
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
KOSHAL, A.D.
CITATION:
1981 AIR 670 1981 SCR (1) 498
1980 SCC (4) 435
CITATOR INFO :
D 1988 SC1708 (23)
RF 1991 SC 855 (45)
ACT:
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants)
Act, 1971, S. 2(2)(g)- Unauthorised occupation of public
premises-Tenant in possession before the premises became
public premises-Eviction whether can be ordered under the
Act.
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants)
Act, 1971, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) & Slum
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956-over-riding
effect of Acts-No conflict as scope and objects of Acts are
different-Premises Act whether prevails over Rent Act.
HEADNOTE:
The L.I.C. (respondent No. 1) purchased a building at a
court auction. The appellant was inducted as a tenant by the
prior owner of the premises. The L.l.C. gave notice under
section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act directing the
appellant to vacate the premises. As the appellant did not
vacate the premises the L.I.C. filed a complaint with the
Estate Officer, L.I.C. (respondent No. 2) under the
provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
occupants) Act 1971, who issued a notice to the appellant
under section 4(1) of the Act to show cause why the
appellant be not evicted. Before the Estate Officer the
appellant raised preliminary objections which related to th
equestion of jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to proceed
under the Premises Act. The Estate Officer decided the
question against him and the High Court confirmed the order.
In appeal to this Court on behalf of the appellant it
was contended: (1) The appellant could not be described as
an 'unauthorised occupant' within the meaning of section
2(2)(g) of the 1971 Act because he had entered into
possession of the premises long before they were purchased
by the L.I.C.; (2)(i). The Premises Act of 1971 which had
been given retrospective effect from the 16th September,
1958 should be construed as a law having been passed in 1958
and so construed the Rent Act (The Delhi Rent Control Act)
passed in 1959 over-rides the Premises Act; (ii) The Rent
Act which is a special law would override the Premises Act
and (iii) The intention of the Legislature in passing the
Rent Act as seen from section 3(a) was merely to exclude
from its operation only premises belonging to the Government
and if the intention was to exclude other premises belonging
to corporate bodies or Corporations then section 3(a) would
have been differently worded.
Apart from the Rent Act section, Section 19 of the Slum
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 which is also a
Special Act applying only to such places which are declared
to be slums under the Act, would override the provisions of
both the Rent Act and the Premises Act.
499
Dismissing the Appeal:
^
HELD: (1)(a) The appellant was undoubtedly in
unauthorised occupation of the premises. [503 D]
(b) Section 2(2)(g) does not use the word 'possession'
or the words 'entry into possession' at any point of time at
all. The section merely requires occupation of any public
premises. Entry into possession connotes one single
terminus, viz., the point of time when a person enters into
possession or occupies the property whereas occupation is a
continuous process which starts right from the point of time
when the person enters into possession or occupies the
premises and continues until he leaves the premises.
[502 G-H]
In the instant case the lease was determined by the
landlord by a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the
appellant was in unauthorised occupation of the premises
once the lease was determined. [503 Cl
Raj Kumar Devendra Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab and
Ors. [1973] 2 SCR 166 distinguished.
2(i) The Premises Act was passed in 1971 and came into
force on 23rd August, 1971 that is long after the Rent Act
was passed in 1959. The mere fact that by virtue of a
fiction the Premises Act was given retrospective effect from
1958 will not alter the date when the Premises Act was
actually passed, that is August 23, 1971. The Premises Act
being subsequent to the Rent Act would naturally prevail
over and override the provisions of the Rent Act. [503 G]
(ii) The scope and the object of the Premises Act is
quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is
of much wider application, inasmuch as it applies to all
private premises, which do not fall within the limited
exceptions indicated in section 2 of the Premises Act. The
object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to
all the tenants or private landlords who are neither a
Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies. Even under
the Rent Act, a special category has been carved out by
section 25B which provides for special procedure for
eviction to landlords who require premises for their
personal necessity. Section 25B, therefore, becomes a
special law within the Rent Act. Therefore, the Premises Act
as compared to the Rent Act, is a Special Act and overrides
the provisions of the Rent Act. [505 B-C]
Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal [1977] 2 SCR 421 &
Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd.
[1956] SCR 603 referred to.
(iii) once the Premises Act becomes a Special Act
dealing with the premises belonging to the Central
Government, Corporations and other statutory bodies, the
Rent Act stands superseded. [505 F]
3. Section 19 of the Slums Act shows that it is in
direct conflict with the Premises Act which expressly
provides for the forum for evicting persons in unauthorised
occupation of premises which fell in section 2 of the
Premises Act The Premises Act, being subsequent to the Slums
Act, as amended in 1964, and again being a special Act
having a very limited sphere, must necessarily override the
Slums Act. [506 D]
500
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 224 of
1979.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 6-12-1978 of the Delhi High Court in C.W. No. 1361/78.
P. Parameswara Rao and R. Nagarathnam for the
Appellant.
K. Parasaran, Sol. Genl., V. Gauri Shanker, K.L. Hathi
and Mrs. Hemantika Wahi for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed
against a Division Bench judgment dated December 6, 1978 of
the High Court of Delhi and arises under the following
circumstances.
The appellant was inducted as a tenant by one Mithanlal
who was the owner of the premises in question and the rent
payable at the time of the tenancy-was Rs 55 per month. The
premises were, however, purchased by the Life Insurance
Corporation of India (for short, LIC) at a court auction on
July 19, 1958 and the appellant in view of the same attorned
to the new landlord, namely, the LIC. The Delhi Rent Control
Act of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rent Act’) came
into force on February 9, 1959 and on July 24, 1969 the new
landlord gave a notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act to the appellant determining the tenancy. This
notice, however, was subsequently withdrawn and after some
correspondence with the appellant the rent was increased by
the LIC from Rs. 55 to Rs. 125 per month. Sometime towards
the end of July 1966, the LIC gave a fresh notice under s.
106 of the Transfer of Property Act purporting to determine
the tenancy. Thereafter, there were some parleys between the
LIC and the appellant and ultimately the LIC agreed to
accept the enhanced rent of Rs. 300 per month from the
appellant with effect from December 1, 1976. On April 23,
1977 the LIC gave another notice under s. 106 superseding
the previous notice and directing the appellant to vacate
the premises on or before May 31, 1977. As the appellant did
not vacate the premises, the LIC filed a complaint with
respondent No. 2, the Estate Officer, LIC under the
provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Premises Act’). Thereafter, the second respondent issued a
notice to the appellant under s. 4(1) of the Premises Act to
show cause why the appellant be not evicted. The appellant
appeared before the Estate Officer and raised certain
preliminary objections which having been decided against
him, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Delhi High
Court against the order of the Estate Officer and reiterated
the preliminary objections taken by him before
501
the Estate Officer. After considering the preliminary
objections which mainly related to the question of
jurisdiction of the Estate officer to proceed under the
Premises Act, the High Court overruled all the objections
and dismissed the writ petition in limine, though by a
reasoned order. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Before dealing with the contention raised by counsel
for the respondent we might mention that the proceedings
before the Estate officer under the Premises Act have only
been stayed and not yet decided on merits because the
appellant wanted the Estate officer to decide the question
of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.
In support of the appeal, Mr. Parmeshwar Rao submitted
three main contentions before us. In the first place, he
submitted that the provisions of the Premises Act would have
no application to the present premises because the appellant
could not be described as an unauthorised occupant as he had
entered into possession of the premises long before they
were purchased by the LIC. It was argued that the condition
precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Estate
officer was that the appellant must be an unauthorised
occupant, and if the possession of the appellant was lawful,
though the property changed hands subsequently, the
appellant could not be dubbed as an unauthorised occupant.
In this connection, reliance was placed on a decision of
this Court in Rajkumar Devindera Singh & Anr. v. State of
Punjab & Ors We have gone through the decision cited before
us and we find that the provisions of the Punjab Act, which
was the subject matter of interpretation by this Court in
that case, were substantially and materially different from
s. 2(2)(g) of the Premises Act which defines unauthorised
occupation. Mr. Rao, however, strongly relied on the
following observations made by this Court in the case
supra:-
“If the appellants were in possession before the
date of the sale of the property to the Government, it
could not be said that the appellants entered into
possession of public premises, for, at the time when
they were in occupation of the property, the property
was not public premises. Then it was either the joint
family property or the property of the Maharaja,
namely, Yadavindra Singh. The property was not public
premises before it was sold to the Government.”
If these observations of this Court are torn from the
context they may presumably support the argument of the
appellant but we have to read these observations in the
light of the specific provisions of the Punjab, Public
Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act,
502
1959 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Punjab Act’). Relevant
portion of s. 3 of that Act may be extracted thus:
“For purposes of this Act, a person shall be
deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public
premises:-
(a) where he has whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, entered into possession
thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of
any allotment, lease or grant.” [Emphasis Ours]
It would be seen that before a person could be said to
be in an unauthorised occupation, the Act required the
following conditions:-
(1) that the occupant had entered into possession
before or after the commencement of the Act.
(2) that he had entered into such possession otherwise
than under and in pursuance of any allotment,
lease or grant.
That Act, therefore, lays special stress on only one point,
namely, the entry into possession. Thus, if the entry into
possession had taken place prior to the passing of the Act,
then obviously the occupant concerned would not be an
unauthorised occupant. What made the occupancy unauthorised
was his entry into possession at a particular point of time.
It was in construing these provisions that this Court held
that if the appellants in that case were in possession
before the sale of the property to the Government, their
entry into possession could not be said to be unauthorised.
These observations, however, would have absolutely no
application to the instant case where s. 2(2)(g) defines
unauthorised occupation thus:-
“unauthorised occupation’, in relation to any
public premises, means the occupation by any person of
the public premises without authority for such
occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation
by any person of the public premises after the
authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of
transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the
premises has expired or has been determined for any
reason whatsoever.”
To begin with, it is manifest that s. 2(2)(g) does not use
the word ‘possession’ or the words ‘entry into possession’
at any point of time at all. The section merely requires
occupation of any public premises. Entry into possession
connotes one single terminus, viz., the point of time when a
person enters into possession or occupies the property
whereas occupation is a continuous process which starts
right from the point of time when the person enters into
possession or occupies the premises and continues until he
leaves the premises. What is germane for the purpose of
interpretation of s. 2(2)(g) is whether or not the person
concerned was in occupation of the public premises when the
503
Premises Act was passed. In the instant case, it is not
disputed that the appellant continued to occupy the property
even after the Premises Act came into force and in fact
accepted the LIC as his landlord. In these circumstances,
therefore, the case of the appellant squarely falls within
the ambit of the definition of ‘unauthorised occupation’ as
contemplated by s. 2(2)(g). There is yet another aspect of
the matter which distinguishes the present case from the
language employed in the Punjab Act. Section 2(2)(g) is an
inclusive definition and consists of two separate limbs-(1)
where a person is in occupation in relation to any public
premises without authority for such occupation, and (2) even
if the possession or occupation of the tenant continues
after the lease is determined. In the instant case, the
lease was doubtless determined by the landlord by a notice
under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act whose validity
for purposes of deciding the question of law has not been
questioned by the learned counsel for the appellant.
Therefore, there can be no doubt that the appellant was in
unauthorised occupation of the premises once the lease was
determined. The second limb mentioned in s. 2(2)(g) is
conspicuously absent from the provisions of the Punjab Act.
For these reasons, we overrule the first contention raised
by the counsel for the appellant and we hold, agreeing with
the High Court, that the appellant was undoubtedly in
unauthorised occupation of the premises.
The second contention put forward by Mr. Rao was that
in view of the provisions of the Rent Act which override the
provisions of the Premises Act, s. 14 of the Rent Act
completely bars recovery of possession of any premises
except in accordance with the procedure laid down in the
Rent Act. It was contended by Mr. Rao that although the
Premises Act was passed in 1971, it has been given
retrospective effect from 16th September 1958 and,
therefore, should be construed as a law having been passed
in 1958 and as the Rent Act was passed in 1959 it overrides
the Premises Act. We are, however, unable to agree with this
argument. In the first place, the Premises Act was passed in
1971 and came into force on the 23rd of August 1971, that is
to say, long after the Rent Act was passed in 1959. The mere
fact that by virtue of a fiction the Premises Act was given
retrospective effect from 1958 will not alter the date when
the Premises Act was actually passed, that is to say August
23, 1971. In these circumstances, therefore, the Premises
Act being subsequent to the Rent Act would naturally prevail
over and override the provisions of the Rent Act. It was
further contended by Mr. Rao that the Rent Act being a
special law as compared to the Premises Act, it will
override the Premises Act without going into the question as
to which of the two Acts were prior in point of time. In
support of his contention the
504
counsel relied on a decision of this Court in Sarwan Singh &
Anr. v. Kasturi Lal where this Court observed as follows:
“When two or more laws operate in the same field
and each contains a non-obstante clause stating that
its provisions will override those of any other law,
stimulating and incisive problems of interpretation
arise. Since statutory interpretation has no
conventional protocol, cases of such conflict have to
be decided in reference to the object and purpose of
the laws under consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is true that in both the Acts there is a non-
obstante clause but the question to be determined is whether
the non-obstante clauses operate in the same field or have
two different spheres though there may be some amount of
overlapping. The observations cited above clearly lay down
that in such cases the conflict should be resolved by
reference to the object and purpose of the laws in
consideration. In Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking &
Industrial Co. Ltd.,(2) this Court made the following
observations:-
“It is therefore, desirable to determine the
overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant
provisions in these two Acts, in a given case, on much
broader considerations of the purpose and policy
underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment
conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions
therein.”
In the light of the principles laid down in the
aforesaid cases we would test the position in the present
case. So far as the Premises Act is concerned it operates in
a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited
nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of
individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like
companies, corporations or the Central Government. Thus, the
Premises Act has a very limited application. Secondly, the
object of the Premises Act is to provide for eviction of
unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary
procedure so that the premises may be available to the
authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a
class by themselves. That the authorities to which the
Premises Act applies are a class by themselves is not
disputed by the counsel for the appellant as even in the
case of Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of
Punjab & Anr. such authorities were held to form a class
and, therefore, immune from challenge on Art. 14 of the
Constitution. Similarly, the summary procedure prescribed by
the Premises Act is also not violative of Art, 14 as held by
this Court in
505
Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay & Ors.(1).
Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the
object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of
the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than
the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private
premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions
indicated in s. 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the
Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants
or private landlords or landlords who are neither a
Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies. It would be
seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment
a special category has been carved out under s. 25B which
provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who
require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, s. 25B
itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a
parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that
the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a
very broad spectrum, is a Special Act and overrides the
provisions of the Rent Act.
It was also suggested by Mr. Rao that in view of s.
3(a) of the Rent Act, which is extracted below, it would
appear that the intention of the legislature in passing the
Rent Act was merely to exclude from its operation only
premises belonging to the Government and if the intention
was to exclude other premises belonging to corporate Bodies
or Corporations, then s. 3(a) should have been differently
worded:
“3. Nothing in this Act shall apply:-
(a) to any premises belonging to the Government."
This in our opinion, does not advance the case of the
appellant any further because once the Premises Act becomes
a special Act dealing with premises belonging to Central
Government, Corporations and other statutory Bodies, the
Rent Act stands superseded. We have to consider the
provisions of the two Acts, they having been passed by the
same legislature, viz., Parliament, and the rule of
harmonious construction would have to apply in such cases.
For these reasons, we overrule the second preliminary
objection taken by the appellant.
Lastly, it was argued that apart from the Rent Act, s.
19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Slums Act’), which also
would have to be construed as a Special Act applying only to
such places which are declared to be slums under the Act,
would override the provisions of both the
506
Rent Act and the Premises Act. This argument appears to us
to be without substance. The Slums Act was passed as far
back as 1956 and the Premises Act was subsequent to the
Slums Act and would, therefore, prevail over the Slums Act.
Relevant portion of s. 19 of the Slums Act may be extracted
thus:
“19. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, no person shall,
except with the previous permission in writing of the
competent authority,-
(a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964
any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or
order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or
land in a slum area;”
A perusal of s. 19 of the Slums Act clearly shows that
it is in direct conflict with the Premises Act which
expressly provides for the forum for evicting persons in
unauthorised occupation of premises which fell in s. 2 of
the Premises Act. The Premises Act being subsequent to the
Slums Act, as amended in 1964, and again being a special Act
having a very limited sphere, must necessarily override the
Slums Act on the same lines of reasoning as we have
indicated in the case of the Rent Act. For these reasons,
therefore, the last contention put forward by the counsel
for the appellant is also overruled. The High Court had also
overruled all these preliminary objections more or less on
the same reasons as given by us though not in such details.
It is, however, not necessary for us to remand the
matter to the trial court for decision of the case on merits
because the Solicitor General having agreed to give two
years’ time to the appellant to vacate the premises on
filing the usual undertaking, the appellant does not want to
contest the proceedings before the Estate officer, LIC and
has undertaken to give vacant and peaceful possession to the
respondent on August 1, 1982. Meanwhile, the appellant shall
keep on paying the usual rent. The appellant shall also file
an undertaking accompanied by an affidavit to the effect
that it shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession to
the respondent on or before August 1, 1982 and-shall not
induct any tenant on the premises. The undertaking shall be
filed within three weeks from today. The subject matter of
the appeal is accordingly disposed of finally.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
507