JUDGMENT
Mukul Mudgal, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal is against the interim order dated 3rd November, 2006 passed by the learned Single Judge issuing notice in the writ petition as well as in the stay application filed by the appellant along with the writ petition challenging the amount awarded by the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, in the sum of Rs. 1,05,895 along with 6% interest from the date of accident till the date of realisation. The respondent No. 3 was working in the brick-kiln said to be owned by the appellant and an accident at the work place had resulted in breaking of her backbone leading to 100% disability.
2. The learned Single Judge passed the impugned order in the following terms:
3.11.2006
Present: Mr. Pradeep K. Arya for the petitioner.
CM No. 13380/2006
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
WP (C) No. 16337/2006 and CM No. 13379/2006 (Stay)
Issue notice of the main petition as well as of the application to the respondents, subject to deposit of compensation amount with the Registrar (general) of this Court within six weeks from today, returnable on 2nd May, 2007.
In case above said amount is deposited with the Registrar (General) of this Court within four weeks from today, no coercive action to recover the amount be taken.
In the meantime petitioner to also deposit another sum of Rs. 10,000 as litigation expenses within the same period. dusty.
The learned Counsel for the appellant has challenged the above order which in our view appears to be in his favor granting stay of coercive action to recover the amount.
3. Even though the impugned interim order is perfectly innocuous in its impact as the amount is not being released to the respondent No. 3, Mrs. Phuli Devi, the learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Pradeep Arya nevertheless attempted to argue the matter on merits and the principal plea raised by the appellant is that the appellant was not connected with Bhatta (brick-kiln) where the accident took place. The aforesaid plea of the learned Counsel for the appellant is wholly unsustainable and without substance for the following reasons:
(a) Significantly the Bhatta i.e., brick-kiln was named Jawahar Bhatta Company, the unit where the accident took place and the appellant’s name is Jawahar Singh.
(b) One of the principal pleas advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that there was acquittal by the judgment of the Criminal Court dated 3rd March, 2003, which acquitted the appellant in respect of the criminal offence said to arise from the accident which led to the death of three workmen and the injury to the respondent No. 3 Phulli Devi. The learned Counsel for the appellant thus submitted that since there is an acquittal by the Criminal Court, the appellant is entitled to be absolved of the claim arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
4. The above plea of the learned Counsel for the appellant is wholly unsustainable because the criminal acquittal on account of a finding based upon the benefit of doubt cannot ipso facto waive the civil liability of the appellant under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The standards of proof in the Criminal Court and the compensation proceedings cannot be the same. Furthermore, even certain portions of the Criminal Court judgment which are reproduced hereunder show that the appellant Jawahar Singh was deposed by witnesses to be the owner of the Bhatta – (brick-kiln). The relevant portion of the learned Metroplitan Magistrate’s judgment with respect to the ownership of Bhatta reads as follows:
…P.W. 10 is Bhuria, did not remember the date, month or year but stated that about 8 years prior to recording of his evidence, he was working at Jawahar Singh Bhatta, where one water tanky was not newly constructed by Jawahar Singh for drinking purposes…. In his cross-examination witness stated that water was filled in the tanky through tube-well, there is no way to take out the water directly from the tube-well, he further stated that police have not recorded his statement, he stated that he had not seen any document of ownership of the Bhatta but he simply knew that Jawahar Singh was the owner of the Bhatta.
P.W. 11 is Phoolo, deposed that being illiterate she did not know the date but 8-9. years prior to recording of her statement when she was working as labour in the Bhatta of Jawahar Singh and was taking out water from the recently constructed water tanky by Jawahar Singh, water tanky crumbled down as soon as the water was filled in it….
…thus the basis of the case against the accused is that, he being the owner of the water tanky failed to take care…of any owner, however, prosecution has not placed on record anything to show that accused was the owner of the said Bhatta on the relevant day of incident, where in his defense evidence, accused has proved the document Ex. D.W. 3/A showing the license in favor of M/s. Mahavir Singh & Co., therefore, the entire evidence was adduced by the prosecution against the accused falls as the first ingredient that accused being the owner of the Bhatta failed to take care of itself has not been proved by the prosecution.
5. We also cannot lose sight of the fact that the Bhatta was named in the name of the appellant and now stands in the name of his son Mahavir Singh. The Criminal Court’s judgment is based on the license in favor of Mahavir Singh & Co. However, the Criminal Court had not given any credence to the fact whether the D.W. 3/A showing the license in the name of Mahavir Singh came into being after the date of the accident on 9th June, 1993. The learned Counsel for the appellant was not able to show the date on which the license in favor of Mahavir Singh & Co. came into being but could not dispute the fact that Mahavir Singh & Co. was owned by Mahavir Singh, who is the son of the appellant Jawahar Singh. These were significant factors which do indicate that unless it is shown that the license D.W. 3/A was existing in the name of the Mahavir Singh & Sons prior to the date of the incident it could well have been secured only to avoid criminal liability of Jawahar Singh the appellant.
6. We are not entirely satisfied with the way in which the acquittal has been recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the learned Counsel for that appellant was not aware of the fact whether such judgment of acquittal was challenged or not. A bare perusal of the judgment through which we have gone through in detail, thus, shows that prima facie the judgment of the acquittal deserved a second look in appropriate proceedings, However, it is a matter for the State to consider and we direct that this order of ours be sent to the learned Single Judge as well as the NCT of Delhi/State through Counsel/Public Prosecutor. We direct the Standing Counsel for the NCT of Delhi to file affidavit within 8 weeks whether the Criminal Court judgment dated 3rd March, 2003 in FIR case No. 45/ 1993 has been challenged in appeal,
7. Thus we are satisfied that no cause for interference with the impugned order has been made out. If at all a grievance against the Single Judge’s order could have been made by the respondent No. 3, who in spite of receiving a critical injury breaking her backbone in 1993, has yet to receive the compensation.
8. The appeal and the application for stay stand dismissed in the above terms.