JUDGMENT
K.G. Shah, J.
1. Leave to add State of Gujarat as a party. Rule. Mr. S.T. Mehta, the learned A.G.P., waives service on behalf of the State which is the only vitally affected party in this revision petition. The Rule is finally heard and will stand disposed of by the following judgment:
2. The petitioner filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jamnagar, an application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short ‘the old Act’) for claiming compensation for personal injury sustained by her as a result of an automobile accident. Pending that application, she filed an interim application, Exh. 10, under Section 92-A of the old Act claiming interim compensation on the ground of no fault liability. In that application, she claimed compensation in the sum of Rs. 12,500/-. The learned District Judge, Jamnagar, who acted as the Claims Tribunal under the old Act directed the opponents to the application to deposit Rs. 7,500/- in the office of the Tribunal with 12 per cent interest thereon from the date of that application, Exh. 10. Accordingly, the opponents to the main application deposited Rs. 7,782 in the office of the Tribunal. The petitioner applied for the withdrawal of that amount. The Tribunal on that application passed the following order:
To be paid only after deduction of court fees as Account payee cheque.
3. It is the aforesaid order by which the Tribunal has directed the deduction of the court fees which hits the petitioner and she, therefore, filed this revision application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
4. On the question of maintainability of revision application, Mr. M.S. Shah, the learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the Tribunal under the old Act has all the trappings of a civil court and virtually for all purposes it is a civil court subordinate to the High Court, therefore, a revision under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code would be maintainable. To buttress his argument, Mr. Shah relied upon the decision in the case of Shardaben v. M.I. Pandya 1971 ACJ222 (Gujarat). Hon’ble J.B. Mehta, J. as a learned single Judge of this High Court in that judgment has observed as follows:
It is obvious from the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, that the jurisdiction of the civil courts is ousted and the Claims Tribunal is constituted under the Act to discharge the duties, which would have otherwise fallen on an ordinary civil court of the land. In view of Section 110 of the Act, the Tribunal possesses all the attributes of a court and it has to decide the claim on the basis of legal evidence in accordance with law by a definitive final judgment. The Tribunal is for all intents and purposes a civil court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a civil court is expected to do.
Relying upon the aforesaid observations made by the learned single Judge, Mr. Shah submitted that though under the provisions of the old Act, the civil courts jurisdiction is ousted, nontheless, the Tribunal has all the attributes of civil court and the District Judges who constitute the Tribunals in the State are, even as Tribunals, civil courts subordinate to the High Court and, therefore, their judgments and orders would be amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
5. Mr. Shah in order to further support his argument relied upon a Full Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State of Bihar 1990 ACJ 238 (Patna). The Full Bench of the Patna High Court in that case has taken into consideration the decision in the cases of State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi 1979 ACJ 205 (SC) and Bhagwati Devi v. I.S. Goel 1983 ACJ 123 (SC). In the latter of the aforesaid two judgments, which has followed the former one, it has clearly been posited by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a civil court for the purpose of Section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code. Following the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court, the Full Bench of the Patna High Court took the view that a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a civil court and that the District Judges who function as Claims Tribunals are not only within the administrative control of the High Court, but are also subordinate to it under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. This proposition enunciated by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court on the basis of the two Supreme Court judgments referred to hereinabove as also the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Hon’ble High Court in Shardaben v. M.I. Pandya 1971 ACJ 222 (Gujarat), make it abundantly clear that a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a civil court subordinate to the High Court and the orders passed by such a Tribunal, if other conditions of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code are satisfied, could be revised by this High Court under that section.
6. Coming to the merits of the revision application, I think the revision application should succeed. The learned District Judge acting as a Tribunal has ordered the deduction of the court fees from the amount of the interim compensation awarded in favour of the petitioner under Section 92-A of the old Act (the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939). That order directing the deduction of court fees cannot be sustained for, in my opinion, it is an order without jurisdiction.
7. Chapter VII-A and therein Section 92-A came to be inserted in the old Act by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1982 (47 of 1982) with effect from 1.10.1982. Before that date, there was no provision corresponding to Section 92-A enabling the claimant to claim compensation on the principle of no fault liability. Before this Section 92-A came to be introduced in the Act, the Tribunal had to pass the award only in the final analysis of the claim application. The State Government had framed Rules known as the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959. As in this case, I am concerned with the question of court fees, the rule in the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959, that would be relevant would be Rule 292. That rule makes exhaustive provisions as to how in case of a claim application under Section 110-A of the old Act court fees would be charged. The rule also makes provisions for the recovery of the deficit court fees. After Section 92-A came to be introduced in the old Act, the Government of Gujarat amended the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959, by the Bombay Motor Vehicles (Gujarat 12th Amendment) Rules, 1986 and introduced therein Rule 311-A which prescribes the procedure for an application for compensation in respect of liability without fault under Chapter VII-A of the old Act. That Rule 311-A in so far as is relevant provides that notwithstanding anything contained in rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive) in the case of claim for compensation under Chapter VII-A of the old Act, the procedure shall be as stated thereinbelow. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 311-A provides for making of an application for compensation under Chapter VII-A of the old Act. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 311-A says that an application under Sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a fee of an amount of ten rupees. Rule 311-A is a self-contained rale which provides the entire machinery for making an application for compensation on the principle of no fault liability and passing of the orders on such application. In that rule, the provision as regards the charging of court fees is Sub-rule (2) which says that an application under Sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a fee of an amount of ten rupees. The rule nowhere makes any provision for charging court fees in excess of ten rupees irrespective of the amount claimed under that provision or the amount awarded under the provision. A bare comparison of Rule 311-A with Rule 292 would show that the rule-making authority clearly intended that the claimant in an application for an award on the ground of no fault liability is not to pay anything in excess of ten rupees by way of court fees or fees, whereas Rule 292 provides for payment of court fees at the initial stage at different rates depending upon the amount claimed in the main application and whereas that rule also provides for recovery of the deficit in the payment of court fees, if in the final award, the amount awarded is that high as would attract payment of court fees in excess of the amount by way of court fees already paid. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 311-A simpliciter says that an application under Sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a fee of an amount of ten rupees and Rule 311-A, which is otherwise exhaustive, makes no provision for recovery of court fees or fees in excess of ten rupees whatever be the amount under that provision claimed or whatever be the amount under that provision awarded. If the rule-making authority intended that the claimant in such a case shall have to pay additional court fees in the event of the award in a higher sum being passed in his favour, he would certainly have made a provision on the line as contained in Rule 292, but the rule-making authority has not made any such provision.
8. This Rule 311-A excludes the operation of rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive) and that would mean that the operation of Rule 292 is also excluded. The rule applies notwithstanding anything contained in rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive). Rule 310 says that in so far as the rules make no provision or make insufficient provision, the Claims Tribunal shall follow the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code for the trial of suits. Now the said Rule 311-A excludes the operation of rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive). The operation of Rule 310 which permits the Tribunal to follow the provisions of Civil Procedure Code would also be excluded in so far as an application under Section 92-A of the Act is concerned and even by resorting to the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, the claimant cannot be asked to pay anything in excess of Rs. 10 by way of court fees in the matter of his claim under Section 92-A of the old Act.
9. The old Act came to be repealed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘the new Act’, for short). In the new Act, we have Section 140 which corresponds to Section 92-A of the old Act. Under the new Act, the Government has framed rules which are known as Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (‘new Rules’, for short). They, in so far as are relevant for the purpose of determination of the question before me, are almost identical with the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959, as they stood amended by the Bombay Motor Vehicles (Gujarat Twelfth Amendment) Rules, 1986 (‘old Rules’, for short). Rule 212 of the new Rules is inpari materia with Rule 292 of the old Rules. Rule 229 of the new Rules is in pari materia with Rule 310 of the old Rules. Rule 231 of the new Rules is in pari materia with Rule 311 -A of the old Rules. By Rule 231 of the new Rules, it is provided that the application for compensation on the ground of no fault liability shall be accompanied by a fee of rupees ten in the form of court fees stamp. Rule 231 of the new Rules also makes no provision for recovery of anything in excess of rupees ten by way of court fees in the matter of an application under Section 140 of the new Act.
10. Of course, the case before me is governed by the old Act and the Rules thereunder. However, I have referred to the new Act and the Rules thereunder only for the purpose of showing that the rule-making authority, both under the new Act as also under the old Act, has expressed its intention in a very clear manner. The intention is that an applicant who applies for compensation on the principle of no fault liability is not required to pay anything in excess of Rs. 10 by way of court fees. Therefore, merely because in the present case, the learned District Judge who acted as a Tribunal has passed an award in the sum of Rs. 7,500/-under Section 92-A of the old Act and the concerned party has deposited that sum with interest, that would not confer jurisdiction on the learned District Judge, acting as a Tribunal to direct the applicant to pay the court fees in excess of Rs. 10/-. To put it differently, the learned Judge of the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to direct the deduction of the court fees from the amount deposited. The order of the learned Judge of the Tribunal was, therefore, patently without jurisdiction and is required to be set aside in a revision application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, the revision application is allowed. The direction about the deduction of court fees from the sum of Rs. 7,782/- is hereby set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly. The learned Judge of the Tribunal is requested to pay up the amount to the claimant at the earliest.