JUDGMENT
K.L. Srivastava, J.
1. This appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (for short ‘the Act’) is directed against the award dated 7-3-1983 made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Jhabua in Claim Case No, 9 of 1982 whereby the appellants’ claim for compensation has been allowed but partly.
2. It is not in dispute that on 30-6-82 at about 11.00 a.m. the deceased Khelsingh aged about 15 years had sustained injuries in a motor accident and had died soon thereafter as a result thereof. The car belonging to the respondent no 2, driven by his driver respondent No. 1 and insured with respondent No. 3 against third party risk had dashed against the deceased. Mst. Jhumali aged 40 years the appellant No. 1 is the widowed mother of the deceased and the appellant No. 2 aged 8 years is his brother.
3. According to the claim petition filed on 12-7-1982 the appellant at the time of the accident was in the service of one Makna (P.W. 2) at the rate of Rs. 5/- per day and meals. The accident had occurred when Khelsingh was taking his master’s cattle to the river. The car was being driven at great speed and negligently had dashed against the deceased who was away from the road. A sum of Rs. 8,45,000/- was claimed towards pecuniary loss and Rs. 55,000/- towards mental pain.
4. The respondents had filed a joint written statement resisting the claim. According to them, the appellant was on the right side of the road and when he struck a cow she had run towards the left side of the road. For this reason the car was taken to the right side and then the deceased who was speedily running to cross the road had collided with it and had sustained injuries He was taken to the hospital by the respondent No. 1 the driver who bad also lodged a report of the occurrence at the police station. It was stated that the accident had occurred entirely due to the negligence of the deceased and, therefore no liability for any compensation could be fastened.
5. At the conclusion of the trial, learned Tribunal held that the accident was occasioned due to the negligence of the car driver. It further held that at the rate of Re. I/- per day. the annual dependency was of Rs. 360/-. Applying a multiplier of 10, it awarded Rs. 3,600/- and a further sum of Rs. 1,000/- was granted towards mental pain. Interest @ Rs. 4% pa. on the total amount of Rs. 4,600/- from the date of the application till realisation, was also awarded. Proportionate costs were also allowed.
6. The respondent No. 2 filed a cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC and assailing the correctness of the finding as to negligence characterised the award as illegal.
7. The points cropping up for consideration may be crystalised in the following terms:
(i) Whether the learned Tribunal erred in holding that the negligence of the car-driver bad occasioned the accident ?
(ii) Whether the impugned award is too inadequate and requires to be interfered with.
8. It is well settled that in a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Act for compensation for accidents involving death or bodily injury the substantive law for the determination of liability and its extent is that contained in the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 (for short the ‘Accidents Act’) and in the law of Torts. The Provisions in Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act introduced in 1956 are merely procedural and provide a new forum from the Civil Courts of general jurisdiction for a cheap and speedy remedy. Therefore, before liability for compensation may be fastened on the opposite party, it is necessary for the claimants to establish negligence on the part of the former. In this connection this Court’s D.B. decision in Shankar-rao’s case 1980 JLJ 650 may usefully be perused. Therein, it has also been pointed out that the Accidents Act enacts exception to the general rule Actio personalis moritur cum persona.
9. Any person who drives a vehicle on the highway is duty bound to use what is reasonable care under all the surrounding circumstances, to avoid causing harm or damage to others. Ordinarily a skilful driver is expected to avoid excessive speed, to keep a good look out on the road and to observe traffic rules and signals. It is the breach of duty which gives rise to liability for compensation.
10. fn order to prove negligence on the part of the car-driver the applicants have examined Mana (P.W. 3). He has stated that Khelsingh was going by the side of the road and the car coming from Jhabua side at a great speed, had dashed against him. In his cross-examination he has denied the suggestions that Khelsingh was on the right side and there was a cow nearby or that the car driver had swerved the vehicle ia order to save any cow and the collision had taken place because Khelsingh had suddenly started running. The testimony of the car driver Mangilal (D.W. 1) is that when he had first spotted the victim of the accident he was about 60 to 70 paces ahead and was at a distance of about 4 to 5 paces from the Patri on the right side. According to him, the deceased had struck a cow which had therefore, started crossing the road and then the car was at a distance of 50 to 60 paces from away. Continuing his version he has stated that he had applied brakes and the deceased while running from the right to the left had collided with the car.
11. The fact that the car-driver could not bring the vehicle under his complete control, when according to his own version, he bad spotted the victim and the cow at a distance of 60 paces clearly indicated that it was being driven at excessive speed.
12 Manglal (DW 1) has admitted that soon after accident 2 to 3 persons bad reached the sport. The report allegedly lodged at the police station has not been produced and in the totality of the circumstances of the case, we see no reason to disbelieve the evidence of Mana (PW 3) that the car was being driven at high speed and there was breach of the duty of care.
13. Damages under Section 1A of the Accidents Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries specified therein and that under Section 2 the measure of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate of the deceased. The prospects of a happy life of the deceased do enter in the assessment of compensation under this provision.
14. under Section 110-B of the Act, the Tribunal is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. The provision has a wider ambit than the words under Section 1A and 2 of the Accidents Act.
15. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by any precise mathematical calculation. It has rightly been observed that in the assessment of compensation arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master. Fall in the purchasing power of rupee has also to be kept in view in determining the amount of compensation.
16. One of the methods of assessing damages is by finding out the amount of annual dependency i.e. the multiplicant and the number of years ‘purchase i.e. the multiplier and it was adopted in this Court’s decision in State of M.P. v. Devi Rawat 1981 JLJ 42.
17. The deceased had passed the risk of uncertainties of life involved in early childhood. From the testimony of Mana (PW 3) we gather that he was the employer of the deceased aged 1 years who used to earn Rs. 5/- per day in addition to his meals. There is no reasonable basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion that the deceased could have been giving only Re. 1/- per day to his needy family. We assess the dependency at Rs. 1,200/- pa. In due course, the deceased would have married and then the dependency would have been reduced. Keeping in view the uncertainties of life and the several impoundables to us it appears that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- would be just compensation under Section 1A of the Accidents Act for the widowed mother of the deceased Mst. Jhumali aged 40 years. As pointed out in the decision in Sankar-rao’s case (supra) the appellant No. 2, the brother of the deceased is not entitled to any compensation under Section 1A of the Accidents Act.
18. This brings us to the claim for damages under Section 2A of the Accidents Act as enonomic loss to the estate of the deceased. In the aforesaid decision in Shankar-raos case in the absence of persons specified under Section 1A of the Accidents Act, the brother who was being paid @ Rs. 100/-per month by the deceased for the management of his (the deceased’s) landed property was the only claimant and an award in the some of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 2A of the Accidents Act was made in his favour by this Court. Taking into consideration the fact that on attainging majority the deceased would have earned more, we find that an amount of Rs. 5,000/-would be just compensation under the aforesaid provision. The decision in Shankar-rao’s case with reference to some other decisions including those of the Supreme Court points out that parties entitled to compensation under the two heads mentioned in Section 1A and 2 of the Accidents Act may be the same and in that event duplication of claims has to be avoided. There is of nothing the sort in the case in hand.
19. The amount of award has, for foregoing reasons, to be increased to Rs. 15,000/-. As the sum awarded is not much, we do not consider any deduction would be proper.
20. In the instant case, the appellant No. 1 is entitled to claim compensation both Under Sections 1A and 2 of the Accidents Act and there is no material to entitle the other appellant to receive any. The claim petition so far as he is concerned, is dismissed and the cross-objection to this extent is allowed.
21. In the ultimate analysis, we find that the respondent No. 1 as the defaulting driver, the respondent No. 2 as his master, under the principle of vicarious liability and the respondent No. 3 as the insurer of the vehicle against third party risk are all liable to pay to the appellant No. 1 the total amount of Rs. 15,000/- compensation. The learned Tribunal has rightly awarded interest from the date of application as is permissible under Section 100-CC of the Act. In the decision in Chameli Wati’s case 1985 ACJ 645 the Supreme Court allowed interest @ Rs. 12% pa. and we order that instead of 4% the interest shall be paid @ Rs. 12% pa. on the total amount of the award.
22. In the result, the appeal and the cross-objection are both allowed to the extent indicated above. The impugned award shall stand accordingly modified. In view of the partial success achieved by the parties, it is directed that they shall bear their own costs in this Court as incurred.