JUDGMENT
B. Rai, J.
1. Regular Second Appeals Nos. 1991 of 1979 and 790 of 1980 involve common questions of law and fact, therefore, both these appeals shall be decided by a common judgment.
2. Facts leading to the filing of Regular Second Appeal No. 1991 of 1979 may be, briefly, recapitulated. Land measuring 9 Bighas 9 Biswas comprised in Khasra No. 541 situated in the revenue estate of Village Khabra Kalan, Tehsil Fatehabad, District Hissar, is being cultivated by Jiwan son of Hukma. Prior to Jiwan, his predecessors-in-interest had been cultivating the said land, on a nominal rent under Moman etc. Jiwan had filed a suit for declaration of Marusi rights which was decreed by the Revenue Court, vide order dated December 7, 1962 and he was declared Marusi tenant over the land in suit. After consolidation, Jiwan plaintiff was allotted land bearing Khasra No. 25/2(4-0) of Rectangle No. 39 and Khasra Nos. 5(7-8), 6(7-8), 7/1(4-16) of Rectangle No. 64, total area measuring 23 kanals 12 Marias in lieu of his old Khasra No. 541., Jiwan was settled as tenant under Gulzar Singh son of Ram Ditta, Kunda son of Norang, Gurdial son of Bhadan Singh, and Jiwan plaintiff is in possession of those Khasra Numbers in the capacity of occupancy tenant. It is alleged that he has become absolute owner of the Khasra Numbers which were in his possession as occupancy tenant.
His case further is that Ram Sarup son of Moman got a fictitious sale deed No. 1432, dated October 24, 1996 executed and registered in his favour from said Gulzar Singh, Kunda and Gurdial Singh. On the basis of said sale deed, Ram Sarup got Mutation No.1445 sanctioned in his name. According to Jiwan plaintiff, the sale deed and the mutation have no adverse effect whatsoever on his rights. On the above said averments, Jiwan filed a suit for a decree of declaration to the effect that he was in possession of the suit land as owner and that registered sale deed No. 1432, dated October 24, 1966 and Mutation No. 1445 in favour of Ram Sarup defendant have no adverse effect whatsoever on his rights.
3. The suit was contested by Ram Sarup defendant taking preliminary objections that the suit is time barred; that he was a bona fide purchaser; that the suit is not maintainable as the vendors have not been impleaded as parties; and that the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit. All other averments contained in the plaint were denied.
4. Plaintiff filed Replication. He reiterated all the averments contained in the plaint and controverted those contained in the written statement.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following Issues were framed by the trial Court:
1) Whether the land described in the headnote of the plaint has been allotted in lieu of the land described in para No.1 of the plaint? O3PP
2) In case issue No.1 is proved in the affirmative, what are the right of plaintiff in the suit land? OPP
3) Relief.
6. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed vide judgment and decree, dated June 20, 1970. On appeal preferred by Ram Sarup defendant, the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated June 20, 1970 were set aside for non-compliance with the provisions of Order XIII Rules 4 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the case was sent back to the trial Court for fresh decision.
7. After remand, the suit was again decreed in favour of Jiwan Plaintiff The said judgment and decree was again challenged in appeal by Ram Sarup defendant. Once again, the Case was remanded to the trial Court on the joint prayer of the parties that they be allowed due opportunity to produce documentary link evidence to prove the identity of the suit land.
8. In Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1977 preferred by Ram Sarup defendant, the judgment and decree, dated November 17, 1995 of the trial Court were again set aside and once again the case was sent back to the trial Court after recasting the following Issues:
1) Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit lands? OPP
2) Whether the suit lands were allotted in consolidation of Holdings in lieu of Khasra No. 541? OPP
3) Whether the plaintiff was an occupancy tenant on the suit lands and if so whether he was become the owner thereof? OPP.
4) Whether the defendant is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and without notice of the alleged rights of the plaintiff on the suit lands? If so, to what effect? OPD
5) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD
6) If issues No.1 to 3 are proved in the affirmative, whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to bring the suit? OPP
7) Whether the suit is time barred? OPP
9. Ultimately, the trial Court after considering the entire evidence brought on record by the parties, returned the findings that plaintiff is a tenant on the suit lands on payment of Rs. 1.12 paise as chakota for the whole year. The land described in the head-note of the plaint was allotted in lieu of the land comprised in Khasra No. 541 on which Jiwan plaintiff was a tenant. Under Issue No.3, plaintiff was not held to be the owner in respect of the land in question and that he was only tenant on payment of Rs. 1.12 paise as chakota for the whole year. Under Issue No.4, the trial Court found that rights of Ram Sarup defendant in respect of the suit land are subject to the tenancy rights of Jiwan plaintiff. Under Issue No.5, it was found that previous owners were not necessary parties to the suit. Issue No.6 was not pressed, before the trial Court. Under Issue No.7, it was held that the suit was within limitation. Consequently, the suit was decreed to the effect that the plaintiff is in cultivating possession of the suit land as tenant under the defendant on payment of Rs. 1.12 paise as chakota for the whole year. The suit for declaration of Jiwan plaintiff that he is the -owner of the suit land, was dismissed.
10. Jiwan plaintiff, however, was not satisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court and he preferred appeal. Findings except on Issue No.7 were affirmed. Under Issue No. 7, it was found that the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant Jiwan was barred by limitation. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 1991 of 1979) at the instance of jiwan plaintiff.
11. In Regular Second Appeal No. 790 of 1980, facts, in brief, may also be noticed. Amar Singh and three other sons of Gobind son of Bhima, Hari Singh and. three other sons of Bhura son of Bhima filed a suit against Ram Sarup for declaration to the effect that they have become owners of the suit land measuring 19 Kanats 17 Marias fully described in the headnote of the plaint on the allegations that the suit land was made cultivable by them and they have been cultivating the same for the last 100 years; and prior to them, their forefathers had been cultivating the same. The suit land was broken and made cultivable by their forefathers on the condition that they shall be Marusis of the suit land and they shall never be ejected. Gubar Singh etc. sold the suit land in favour of Ram Sarup defendant vide sale deed, dated October 24,1966. Under Sections 5 and 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, they had become the Marusis and under Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952, the plaintiffs have become owners. Further case of the plaintiffs is that neither the previous nor the present owners of the suit land ever went to the Court for ejectment of the plaintiff and that implies that they admitted them to be the Marusis, but” Ram Sarup defendant did not admit their claim which led them to file the suit.
12. Ram Sarup pleaded that plaintiffs were cultivating the suit land from the year 1962 and not for the last 100 years as alleged by them and the plaintiffs have no cause of action. It was further pleaded that earlier also the plaintiffs had filed a suit before the Collector, Hissar, seeking the same very relief but that suit was dismissed on June 17, 1971. Therefore the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata. According to Ram Sarup defendant, the plaintiffs are not the Marusis. He also took up the objection that the suit was not properly valued for the purposes of court-fee and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit.
13. The Replication was filed by the plaintiffs reiterating the averments contained in the plaint and controverting those contained in the written statement.
14. The pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following Issues:
1) Whether the plaintiffs are owners and in possession of the land in suit as alleged? OPP
2) Whether the suit is barred by the principles of res judicatal OPD
3) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the suit as alleged? OPD
4) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit? OPD
5) Relief.
15. After appraisal of the evidence led by the parties, the trial Court held under Issue No.1 that the plaintiffs were the occupancy tenants and they have become the owners by virtue of Punjab Act VIII of 1953. Under Issue No. 2, it was held that the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata. Issue No.3 was not pressed. Under Issue No. 4, it was held that the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. Consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
16. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal. However, the same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Hissar vide judgment and decree, dated January 8, 1980. Parties were left to bear their own costs. Hence, Regular Second Appeal No. 790 of 1980 at the instance of plaintiffs.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through the records.
17. At the outset, the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the Issues and pointed out that Issue No. 3 was the effect “whether the plaintiff was an occupancy tenant on the suit land and if so whether he has become the owner thereof?” Arguments have been addressed in R.S.A. No. 1991 of 1979. It was argued that there is overwhelming evidence on record to the effect that the plaintiff-appellant was in possession of the land in dispute as an occupancy tenant. He has also heavily relied on the order dated December 7, 1962, Exhibit P13, passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation of Holdings exercising the powers of Assistant Collector First Grade, Hissar, and has argued that in the said order the appellant was declared as an occupancy tenant on the suit land. The Courts below, according to the learned counsel, failed to take into consideration the said order, dated December 7, 1962, Exhibit P13. It was pointed out that only in the heading of the order but also in the body thereof, name of the appellant is clearly mentioned. Similarly by Khasra Numbers of the suit land and the area thereof have also been mentioned. No doubt, towards the end of the order name of one Uda has been mentioned. It is only a typographical mistake. That mistake crept in because on the same day the same Officer had decided another case also against the same landlord. However, that mistake would not affect the rights of the appellant who had been declared as the occupancy tenant vide order dated December 7, 1962, Exhibit P13. It was urged that the Courts below keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case should not have ignored the said order while deciding the valuable rights of the? appellant.
18. After giving my thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised and the material on record, I find no force therein. It is not disputed that Khasra No. 541, Khewat No. 84 alongwith other land was subject-matter of consolidation proceedings in the year 1962-63. In Karwai Ishtemal Exhibit P12, land measuring 15 Kanals 16 Marias bearing Khasra No. 64/5(4-17), 6(6-1), 7(4-8), and 64/14(0-10) was allotted in lieu of Khasra No. 541.In Jamabandi for the year 1962-63 Exhibit P9 which was prepared after the consolidation, land measuring 23 Kanals 12 Marias comprised in Khasra No. 64/5(7-8), 6(7-8), 65/7/1(4-16) and 39/25 min West (4-1) is recorded in possession of Jiwanas tenant at will under Gulzar Singh at the rate of Rs. 1.12 paise Chakota for the whole year. Same position is reflected in Exhibit P10/P16 Jamabandi for the year 1964-65. In Khasra Girdawri with effect from Kharif 1962 to Rabi 1966 (Exhibit P15) also Jiwan appellant is recorded as Gair Marusi tenant at the rate; of Rs. 1.12 Paise under Gulzar Singh, in respect of the suit land. Exhibits P4, P5, P6 and P7 are Jamabandis for the year 1909-10, 1930-31, 1942-43 and 1954-55 respectively.In these Jamabandis, firstly Hukma father of Jiwan is recorded as tenant at will, under Mst. Panni at the rate of Rs. 1.12 paise for the whole year. Hukma is recorded as tenant at will at the same rate of rent under Moman and Harbans. Then Jiwan is recorded in cultivating possession as tenant at will under Kheta and Ram Ditta at the rate of Rs. 1.12 Paise for the whole year. In Khasra Girdawri Exhibit P2 from Kharif 1956 to Rabi 1959, Exhibit P3 from Kharif 1959 to Rabi 1962, Jiwan appellant is recorded in cultivating possession of the suit land as tenant at will at the rate of Rs. 1.2 Annas for the whole year. It is, therefore, clearly established from the revenue record that before the consolidation took place in the Village, Jiwan appellant and his predecessors-in-interest were in cultivating possession of Khasra No.541 as tenant at will at the rate of Rs. 1.2 Annas for the whole year. Revenue record clearly goes to show that before consolidation, the appellant and his predecessors-in-interest were tenants at will under Gulzar Singh and others. Even after consolidation, they continued cultivating the suit land as tenants at will and not as occupancy tenants.
19. A perusal of Mutation No. 145 (Exhibit P8) reveals that Gulzar Singh and Ors. had sold the suit land vide Registered Sale Deed No. 1432 dated October, 24, 1966 (Exhibit D3) in favour of Ram Sarup respondent for Rs. 5,000/-. Suit was filed by Ram Sarup seeking declaration to the effect that he was owner in possession of suit land measuring 23 Kanals 12 Marias situated in Village Khabara Kalan, Tehsil Fatehabad, District Hissar and that the Sale Deed bearing No.1432 October 24,1966 and Mutation No. 1455 on behalf of Gulzar Singh etc. had no effect on his rights. Assuming for the sake of arguments that Ram Sarup was in possession of the suit land as occupancy tenant and so also his predecessors-in-interest on payment of nominal rent; on coming into force the Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952, with effect from 15th day of June, 1952 he had automatically become owner of the suit land. The question whether the appellant was occupancy tenant or tenant at will, was to be decided by the Revenue Court only and not by the civil Court. The claim of the plaintiff-appellant that he was entitled to be declared as owner of the suit land on the basis of his being occupancy tenant is consequential to the determination of nature of his tenancy. As stated above, nature of the tenancy” was to be determined by a Revenue Court only. Possibly there cannot be any quarrel that the jurisdiction of civil Court is to try all suits of civil nature except where it is expressly barred. When jurisdiction is specifically conferred on a Tribunal and law gives finality to its judgments and orders, jurisdiction of civil Court is excluded. In this regard, reference may be made to S. Vanathan Muthuraja v. Ramalingam alias Kirshnamurthy Gumkhal and Ors., JT 1997(5) S.C. 110 wherein their Lordships of the apex Court held,”—. Obviously, therefore, the civil suits by necessary implication stand excluded unless the fundamental principles of procedure are followed by the Tribunals constituted under the land reform laws. In this case, the Act concerned extinguishes the pre-existing right, creates new rights under the Act and requires Tribunals to enquire into the rival claims and a form of appeal has been provided against the order of the primary authority. Thereby the right and remedy made conclusive under the Act are given finality by the orders passed under the Act. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil Court stands excluded.” Therefore, suit for declaration of the nature sought was not triable by the civil Court. Reference may be made to Raghbir Singh v. Beli Ram, (1967)69 P.L.R.D. 396. The facts of the said case were that Beli Ram and Ors. alleged that they had been in cultivating possession of the suit land since the time of their ancestors, extending over a period of about 200 years, had incurred considerable expense in developing and breaking the land and in erecting their houses on it and that they had been paying only a nominal rental to the original owners. They, therefore, claimed that they were occupancy tenants and as such entitled to be declared owners of the land by virtue of the provisions contained in the Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act VIII of 1953. On these grounds they filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Una for a declaration of their title as owners of the land in dispute as against the original owners. After considering the case law in Kirpa Ram v. Kirpa Ram, A.I.R. 1914 Lahore 395, Acchar Singh and Anr. v. Kartar Kaur, (1959)61 P.L.R. 231, Sham Singh v. Amarjit Singh, A.I.R. 1931 Lahore 362 and Durga Singh v. Tholu, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 361, the learned Single Judge’ held in Para 9 of the judgment as under :
“- The dispute in the present case is with regard to the nature of the plaintiffs’ tenancy i.e. whether the plaintiffs are occupancy tenants or tenants at will under the defendants-appellants. The plaintiffs’ prayer that they were entitled to be declared as owners of the land under Punjab Act VIII of 1953 is consequential upon the declaration they seek in regard to the nature of their tenancy. If the plaintiffs succeed in establishing that they are occupancy tenants and obtain a declaration of their rights through a court of competent jurisdiction, they will automatically become the owners of the land. In way, therefore, their prayer for relief of declaration of their title as owners of the land under Punjab Act VIII, 1953 is a mere surplusage. The real object of the suit is to obtain a declaration about the nature of their tenancy. That such a suit was triable by a Revenue Court alone—–”
20. I respectfully concur with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that the case in hand is fully covered by the said decision.
21. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that two cases, one filed by Uda and another by Jiwan present appellant were decided by the same Officer on the same day, orders in both the cases when read together would show that these are pari materia the same, name of Uda crept in by mistake in the order dated December 7, 1962 Exhibit P13, the mistake being typographical one cannot be taken adversely affecting the rights of the appellant; is also without any substance. Assuming for the sake of argument that the name of Uda was wrongly incorporated in the order, the remedy available to the appellant was to approach that Court for rectification of the mistake, if any. Section 10 of the Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 provides that every award or order made by the Collector, Commissioner or Financial Commissioner shall be final, and no proceeding or order taken or made under this Act, shall be called in question by any Court or before any officer or authority. Thus, the provisions of Section 10 in unambiguous terms bar the jurisdiction of any Court or before any officer or authority to go into the validity of every award or order made by the Collector, Commissioner or Financial Commissioner to which finality is attached. Under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is only that Court which passes the judgment, decree or order has the jurisdiction to rectify any accidental slip, clerical or typographical mistake and no other Court can exercise jurisdiction in that regard. In view of this legal position, civil Court has no jurisdiction to rectify any mistake in the order passed by the Authorities under the Act of 1952.
22. No other point was urged or requires consideration. For the reasons recorded above, both the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.