Supreme Court of India

Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. … vs Land Acquisition Collector & Anr on 13 November, 1995

Supreme Court of India
Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. … vs Land Acquisition Collector & Anr on 13 November, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996 AIR 709, 1996 SCC (1) 88
Author: K Ramaswamy
Bench: Ramaswamy, K.
           PETITIONER:
JOSE ANTONIO CRUZ DOS R. RODRIGUESES & ANR. ETC.

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/11/1995

BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:
 1996 AIR  709		  1996 SCC  (1)	 88
 JT 1995 (8)   328	  1995 SCALE  (6)506


ACT:



HEADNOTE:



JUDGMENT:

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.24584 OF 1995.
O R D E R
Sri Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners contends that Notification under Section 4(1) of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short, `the Act’] was
published on 3.10.1969 and the award under Section 11 was
made in the case of his clients on August 2, 1972
determining compensation under Section 23(1) at Rs.1.25 per
sq. mt. for plot No.23 admeasuring 24721 sq. mts.
Subsequently, successive awards for other lands acquired
under the same notification were made, on June 4, 1985 at
Rs. 5/- per sq. mt., on October 14, 1985 at Rs.9/- per sq.
mt. and another judgment and decree on August 31, 1987 by
the High Court in Appeal No.11/86 uniformly fixing the
compensation at Rs.5/- per sq. mt. Yet another reference
under Section 18 was decided on July 27, 1989 by the
Reference Court at Rs.5/- per sq. mt. Though he filed the
application on 13.5.1987, in view of the decision of this
Court in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Pradeep Kumari & Ors.,
[(1995) 2 SCC 736], any one of the awards or each successive
award including the judgment and decree of the High Court
would give right and cause of action to the petitioner-
claimant to make application under Section 28-A. So, it
cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay. The views of the
Land Acquisition Officer and the High Court wrong in law.

Section 28-A says that where in an award under this
part, the Court allowed the application under Section 18 and
awarded higher compensation, notwithstanding that the
claimant had not made an application under Section 18, he
can make an application “within three months from the date
of the award of the court” [emphasis supplied] requiring
that the amount of compensation payable to them may be
redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation
awarded by the Court. The proviso prescribes the mode of
computation of period of three months which says that:-

“the period of three months within which
an application to the Collector shall be
made under this sub-section, the day on
which the award was pronounced and the
time requisite for obtaining a copy of
the award shall be excluded.”

The contention of the learned counsel is that any one
of the successive awards including the Judgment and decree
of the High Court would give right and cause of action to
the Petitioner to make an application under Section 28-A.
Therefore, there is no bar of limitation. A Bench of two
Judges of this Court in Babua Ram vs. State of UP [(1995) 2
SCC 689], has held that the period of limitation begins to
run when the award on a reference under Section 18 was first
made by the Reference Court and the limitation of three
months requires to be computed from the date of the first
award and successive awards do not save the limitation if it
has already expired by efflux of time. The same view was
reiterated in another judgment in Union of India vs. Karnail
Singh
[(1995) 2 SCC 728]. This view was subsequently
overruled by a Bench of three judges.

In view of the contention raised by Shri Mehta, the
following questions are required to be considered :

1. Whether the award of the Court, i.e., Civil Court made
under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also
include judgment and decree of the Appellate Court under
Section 54?*

2. Whether each successive awards or judgment and decree
(if answer on question No.1 is positive) would give cause of
action to file application under Section 28-A; if so
construed, does not such a construction violate the language
used in Section 28-A when the Parliament advisedly did not
use such expressions?

These questions require examination by a larger Bench
of five Judges as the interpretation of Section
____________________________________________________________
* Union of India v. Raghubir Singh
[(1989) 2 SCC 754]; C.A. No.1697/95 [V.

Krishnamurti & Ors. v. State of Orissa]
decided on January 19, 1995 and C.A.

No.3521/95 [State of Punjab v. Raghubir
Singh & Ors.
] decided on February 28,
1995, are relevant for the point.

28-A on the limitation of three months often arises in many
a case throughout the country.

Issue notice to the respondents returnable in four
weeks. Petitioner is permitted to take out notice by dasti
service in addition.

We direct the Registry to place the cases before
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to constitute a large
Bench of five Judges. Since these questions are arising in
number of matters frequently, instead of keeping them
pending, it is desirable that they may be disposed of at an
early date.