JUDGMENT
K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. This appeal has been placed before us on a reference made by R. Bhaskaran, J.
2. The question that is posed for consideration is whether limited interest of a daughter would get enlarged to full right after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when a male Hindu following the Mitakshara law died before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act?
3. Suit was instituted for partition of 6/7 share in the plaint schedule property and for recovery of plaintiff’s share from defendants 1 and 2 and for mesne profits. Plaint schedule property is having only an extent of 12 cents belonged to one Madan Bhagavathy along with the adjacent property having a total extent of 20 cents. The property was self acquired property of Madan Bhagavathy as per Ext. A2 dated 19.9.1064 (M.E.). Kunjan Pillai and Chempakakuty Amma were his children. Chempakakutty Amma sold the entire 30 cents of property inclusive of the plaint schedule property to third defendant, vide Ext. B3 sale deed dated 19.9.1959. Third defendant has subsequently sold 8 3/4 cents of property as per Ext. B2 dated 17.5.1974. He also sold another 1 1/2 cents as per Ext. B2 dated 16.12.1974 in favour of the first defendant. Chempakakutty Amma and her brother Kunjan Pillai later executed settlement deed Ext. A1 dated 19.11.1959 in favour of wife and children of Kunjan Pillai as well as the children by the two daughters of Kunjan Pillai. Plaint schedule property was settled in favour of fourth defendant and her children who are the plaintiffs in the suit. Third defendant is the husband of the fourth defendant. Plaintiffs contended that by Ext. Al they got title to the property and are entitled to recover the same from defendants 1 and 2.
4. First defendant filed a written statement. Defendants 2 to 4 did not file any written statement and were set ex pane. First defendant stated that Chempakakutty Amma who had obtained 30 cents of property executed Ext. B3 dated 19.9.1959 in favour of third defendant and the third defendant sold 10 1/4 cents of property as per Exts. B1 and B2 to the first defendant and that if at all plaintiffs are having any right over the property, the same is lost by adverse possession and limitation. First defendant also denied the fact that Chempakakutty Amma had only the life interest in the property. He also contended that plaintiffs are not entitled to question the sale deed executed by defendants 3 and 4. The trial court found that possession of third respondent was for and on behalf of the plaintiffs and their mother fourth defendant and the first defendant was aware of the same as he got the document executed by defendants 3 and 4. The trial court also found that Ext. B3 is a void document and no title to the property passed to the third defendant and Chempakakutty Amma had only life estate over the properties covered by Ext. B3. Consequently first defendant had obtained no right under Exts. B1 and B2. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs and allowed the plaintiffs to recover possession and partition by metes and bounds in respect of 6/7 share in the schedule property from the first defendant.
5. First defendant took up the matter in appeal. The appellate court found that at the time of execution of Ext. B3 and Chempakakutty Amma had only right of maintenance over the property and therefore Ext. Al was found to be valid. The court directed allotment of the plaintiff’s 6/7 share from out of the remaining 11 cents in the possession of defendants 3 and 4. Appellate Court therefore ordered l/7th share to the first defendant and consequently it was held that the second defendant is entitled to that share and ordered to be marked out from the plaint schedule portion and the remaining property was ordered to be allotted to the plaintiffs. The Court also held that the share would be worked out including the entire 24 cents must be treated as the partible property. It was also found that defendants 1 and 2 have effected substantial improvements. First defendant aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the courts below has filed this appeal.
6. In this Second Appeal the following questions of law were formulated.
1. When a Hindu male following Mithakshara law died before the Hindu Succession Act leaving behind his self acquired property and the daughter was in possession of one such property will the limited interest of the daughter get enlarged to full right after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act under Section 14(1) of the Act?
2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative is not the reasoning of the courts below that the assignment of property by the daughter as full owner is invalid and void in law wrong?
3. If the assignment is valid at least to the half right in the property is the share claimed by the plaintiff correct and whether the plaintiff can restrict such shares in the 12 cents alone when they claim to have obtained 30 cents and they are admittedly in possession of 11 1/2 cents?
4. Is the suit barred by limitation and has the first defendant perfected title by adverse possession.
8. We may first examine the right of a daughter in respect of self acquired property of her father who died prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act in case where parties are followers of Mitakshara law. Answer to the above question depends upon the interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act is extracted below for easy reference.
14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.- In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after the marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-s. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confers upon female Hindu full rights of inheritance. Before the enactment of Section 14 of the Act, properties in the possession of women were either absolute properties with which they could deal in any manner they liked or properties in which they held what was called a limited estate, a peculiar kind of property almost unknown to any other law. The object of the Section is to remove the disability of a female to acquire and hold property as an absolute owner. This legal position has been well settled. Apex court has recognised most extensive interpretation of the said provision in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (AIR 1977 SC 1944) and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai (AIR 1979 SC 993). Section 14 has to be read with Section 4 which gives overriding effect of the Act. Whatever property in the possession of the female Hindu, whether it has been acquired by herself or in any other manner, it shall be regarded as her absolute property. Law is well settled that any property possessed by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or by gift shall be held by her as full owner. The question that is posed for consideration in this case is whether daughter gets limited interest in the estate of the father corresponding to widow’s estate. This question was answered in the affirmative by a learned Single Judge of this Court, Justice K.P.B. Marar, in Velayudhan v. Ithayi (1994 (1) KLT 617). Counsel on either side could not lay their hands to any other decision on the question posed. In that case court did not recognise the right of the daughter to claim full right in the property under Section 14(l) on facts. Claim was rejected by this court only for the reason that there was no evidence to show that any property had been set apart for maintenance. We are of the view, there cannot be no distinction between the rights claimed by the widow and a daughter in respect of self acquired property of a male Hindu. Section 14 uses the expression “female Hindu”. No distinction has been drawn between widow and daughter. Apex Court in Vidya v. Nand Ram (2001 (10) SCC 747) considered the expression “female Hindu” and held as follows:
“The submission that the third wife would have no right to claim maintenance hence Section 14( 1) will not apply, has no merit. The language of Section 14(1) in this respect is very clear. Sub-s. (1) of S, 14 refers to any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner. Smt. Durga is a female Hindu, who acquired her right in lieu of maintenance, under the Will dated 30.9.1932 executed by her husband Khimi Ram. The Explanation clarifies that property referred to in sub-s. (l) of Section 14 includes a property held by her in lieu of maintenance. If that be so, right of such female Hindu would be covered by sub-s. (1) making her the absolute owner. The submission for the appellant is against the very language of this sub-section. To read differently than what is referred to is contrary to all canons of interpretation. To read “female Hindu” as only “wife” is totally misconceived. Both sub-s. (1) and the Explanation refer significantly to the words “female Hindu” and not “wife”. It would not only be too limited an interpretation but an interpretation against the plain language of this sub-s. (1). The interpretation is totally misconceived.”
Therefore, the apex court has given a wider meaning to the expression “female Hindu” which takes not wife alone. In this connection we may also refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad v. Kothuri Venkateswarlu (2000(2)SCC 139). The Apex Court while dealing with Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, held as follows:
“Undisputably the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in particular Section 14 has introduced far-reaching changes having due regard to the role and place of womanhood in the country on the basis of the prevailing socio-economic perspective. It is now a well-settled principle of law that legislations having socio-economic perspective ought to be interpreted with the widest possible connotation as otherwise, the intent of the legislature would stand frustrated. Recognition of rights and protection thereof thus ought to be given its full play for which the particular legislation has been introduced in the statute book. Gender bias is being debated throughout the globe and the basic structure of the Constitution permeates equality of status and thus negates gender bias. Gender equality is one of the basic principles of our Constitution. The endeavour of the law court should thus be to give due weightage to the requirement of the Constitution in the matter of interpretation of statutes wherein specially the womenfolk would otherwise be involved. The legislation of 1956 therefore, ought to receive an interpretation which would be in consonance with the wishes and desires of the framers of our Constitution. We ourselves have given this Constitution to us and as such it is a bounden duty and an obligation to honour the mandate of the Constitution in every sphere and interpretation which would go in consonance therewith ought to be had without any departure therefrom. Tulsamma case obviously having this in mind decided the issue and attributed the widest possible connotation to the words used in Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956”.
In Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law, Eighteenth edition, at page 146, it is stated as follows:
“The daughter takes a limited interest in the estate of her father corresponding to the widows estate. On her death, the estate passes not to her heirs, but to the next heirs of her father.”
Reference may also be made to the definitions of the Calcutta High Court in Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall (6 I.A. 15), and Mutta Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar (8 I.A. 99).
9. We are of the view, the expression “female Hindu” in the heading of Section 14 of the Act as well as the expression “any property possessed by a female Hindu” have to be given a wider interpretation in consonance with the wishes and desires of the framers of the Constitution. If that is so, the expression “female Hindu” which occurs in Section 14(1) also would take in “daughter” also, consequently we hold that the limited interest of the daughter would get enlarged to full right after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when male Hindu following Mithakshara law died before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act leaving behind his self acquired property.
10. We have already declared the law that limited interest of the daughter would get enlarged to full right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The question now to be considered is whether Champakakutty Amma was in possession of the properly before the commencement of the Act. Female Hindu could come into possession of the property by various means and for various purposes. She may acquire the properties by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after the marriage, or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. The expression “in any other manner whatsoever is a wider expression to take the property acquired in any other manner whatsoever. If the father puts the daughter in possession of his self acquired property that would fall within the expression “in any other manner whatsoever”. We are of the view, there is ample evidence in this case to show that Chempakakutty Amma was enjoying the property though she was not a legal heir, along with the father and the son. Ext. B3 document specifically refers about her actual possession and the assignee also gets possession and effects subsequent sale of six cents. The trial court has made reference to the mortgage but would not indicate that Chembakakutty Amma was never in possession or that the mortgage was in possession. We are not prepared to say that Chempakakutty Amma was never in possession of the property by her father. The mere fact that she was not a legal heir does not mean that she was not in possession. She cannot be pinned down to some of the recitals in Ext. Al. Ext. B3 was executed in 1959 wherein possession of Chempakakutty Amma is recited. Chempakakutty Amma was unmarried. Evidently she was maintained by her father from the income derived from the self acquired property. There is no evidence to show that she was having any other property of her own. Father was maintaining her and that she was also in possession of the property covered by Ext. B3. There is nothing to show that Chempakakutty Amma was never in possession along with the father and never enjoyed the property. Ext. B3 would indicate that Chempakakutty Amma was in possession. In such circumstances, we are inclined to hold that Ext., B3 was validly executed by Chempakakutty Amma who had by that time had absolute right in the property in question.
11. We may in this connection point out that Ext. B3 was executed in the year 1959. Suit was instituted only in the year 1982, after more than 23 years praying for recovery of possession. Claim was resisted stating that the suit itself was barred by law of limitation. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the suit is not barred by law of limitation since first defendant obtained possession of the property only in 1974. Reference was also made to the decision in Kumara Pillai v. Velappan Pillai (1968 KLT 695). Period of limitation to file the suit starts from the date of Ext. B3. We have already held that Champakakutty Amma was in possession of the property and therefore Ext. B3 was validly executed. This is a case where first defendant and the assignee are in possession of the properties for more than two decades and have effected valuable improvable in the property. Since the property was already parted with under Ext. B3 the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date of Ext. B3, that is 19.9.1959 and hence the suit is barred by law of limitation. Further since Ext. B3 was executed by the female daughter she is incompetent to execute Ext. Al settlement deed dated 19.11.1959 and therefore to be ignored. Consequently we are of the view plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in the suit. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Court below. Parties would bear their respective costs.