PETITIONER: K.ASHOK REDDY Vs. RESPONDENT: GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DATE OF JUDGMENT07/02/1994 BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) KULDIP SINGH (J) BHARUCHA S.P. (J) CITATION: 1994 AIR 1207 1994 SCR (1) 662 1994 SCC (2) 303 JT 1994 (1) 401 1994 SCALE (1)377 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VERMA, J.- These matters are a sequel to the decision by a
nine-Judge Bench in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn.
v. Union of India’ (hereinafter called the “Judges’ Case-
IT’), and relate to the question of transfer of Judges of
the High Courts under Article 222 of the Constitution of
India.
2. Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1994 by special leave is
against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant, K. Ashok
Reddy. In substance, the relief claimed in the writ
petition was a declaration that Judges of the High Courts
are not liable to be transferred from one to another High
Court. It was contended that the transfers were likely to
be influenced by extraneous considerations leading to
arbitrariness resulting in erosion of the independence of
judiciary. Another contention was that the decision by the
nine-Judge Bench in the Judges’ Case-III excludes the power
of judicial review and is, therefore, in conflict with the
decision of a larger Bench in Kesavananda Bharati v. State
of
1 (1993) 4 SCC 441
307
Kerala2. The Andhra Pradesh High Court rejected these
contentions taking the view that such misapprehensions
result from a misreading of the decision of the nine-Judge
Bench in the Judges’ Case-III. Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1994
has been filed by special leave against that judgment.
3. When the aforesaid civil appeal came up for hearing, it
was reported that a writ petition raising similar questions
had been filed in the Allahabad High Court and, therefore,
it was considered appropriate to withdraw that writ petition
from the Allahabad High Court and to bear and decide the
same along with the said civil appeal. Accordingly, that
writ petition withdrawn from the Allahabad High Court is
Transferred Case No. 1 of 1994 and is also decided along
with the civil appeal. The reliefs claimed in Transferred
Case No. 1 of 1994 relate essentially to Judges of the
Allahabad High Court and their transfer.
4. Notice was issued to the Central Government as well as
the Attorney General of India in both these matters.
5. We have heard the appellant, K. Ashok Reddy, a
practising Advocate from Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner,
Harikesh Singh in Transferred Case No. 1 of 1994 is a
practising Advocate from Allahabad. In spite of sufficient
prior notice of the date of hearing, Harikesh Singh chose to
remain absent and took no steps for appearance on his
behalf. We have, therefore, examined his case with the
assistance of the learned counsel appearing in these
matters. We also heard the learned Attorney General and
Shri A.K. Ganguli on behalf of the Central Government and Ms
Indira Jaising who appeared on behalf of the Sub-Committee
on Judicial Accountability.
6. The appellant, K. Ashok Reddy submitted that Article
222 of the Constitution of India is in substance a dead
letter since the power thereunder is incapable of exercise
in the absence of guidelines provided in the Constitution
itself. He also submitted that judicial review is a basic
feature of the Constitution as held in Kesavananda Bharati2
by a larger Bench and, therefore, the holding by a nine-
Judge Bench in the Judges’ Case-HI excluding judicial review
in the matter of transfers is not good law. Shri Reddy
expressed his concern at the likely arbitrariness in the
transfer of High Court Judges emphasising the fact that his
concern was about the proper implementation of that policy
and not of its effect on any individual High Court Judge.
According to him, the Judges’ Case-III should be clarified
to prevent any arbitrariness.
7. The learned Attorney General submitted that the
misapprehensions of Shri Reddy are unfounded since the
Judges’ Case-III has dealt with these aspects and also
indicated the guidelines to exclude any arbitrariness in the
transfer of Judges. The learned Attorney General also
submitted that the Judges’ Case-HI does not conflict with
the decision in Kesavananda Bharati2 inasmuch as it does not
exclude judicial review but merely emphasises the limited
area thereof in view of the nature of that exercise, the
discretion being vested in the highest constitutional
functionaries. Shri
2 (1973) 4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1
308
Ganguli on behalf of the Central Government made the same
submission with reference to portions of the decision in the
Judges’ Case-III to indicate that these matters are covered
by that decision. Submissions of Ms Indira Jaising were
substantially to the same effect with the addition that some
more guidelines for effectuating the transfer policy could
be indicated herein to ensure uniformity in its working.
The points raised in the transferred case from Allahabad are
also covered by these submissions and do not require
separate consideration.
8. Having given our anxious consideration to the matter,
we are satisfied that the points raised in the civil appeal
as well as the transferred case are adequately covered by
the decision in the Judges’ Case-III. It would be
appropriate to advert particularly to some portions of that
decision which are material for the present purpose before
dealing with the submissions made.
9. The material portions of the majority opinion in
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India’
are as under: (SCC pp. 699701; 706-08)
“The rule of law envisages the area of
discretion to be the minimum, requiring only
the application of known principles or
guidelines to ensure non-arbitrariness, but to
that limited extent, discretion is a pragmatic
need. Conferring discretion upon high
functionaries and, whenever feasible,
introducing the element of plurality by
requiring a collective decision, are further
checks against arbitrariness. This is how
idealism and pragmatism are reconciled and
integrated, to make the system workable in a
satisfactory manner. …
The norms developed in actual practice, which
have crystallized into conventions in this
behalf, as visualised in the speech of the
President of the Constituent Assembly, are
mentioned later.
(Paras 468 and 469) Transfers
Every power vested in a public authority is to
subserve a public purpose, and must invariably
be exercised to promote public interest. This
guideline is inherent in every such provision,
and so also in Article 222. The provision
requiring exercise of this power by the
President only after consultation with the
Chief Justice of India, and the absence of the
requirement of consultation with any other
functionary, is clearly indicative of the
determinative nature, not mere primacy, of the
Chief Justice of India’s opinion in this
matter. The entire gamut in respect of the
transfer of Judges is covered by Union of
India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth 3 and S.P.
Gupta v. Union of India4. It was held by
majority in both the decisions that there is
no requirement of prior consent of the Judge
before his transfer under Article 222. This
power
3 (1977) 4 SCC 193 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 435 : (197
8) 1 SCR 423
4 1981 Supp SCC 87 :(1982) 2 SCR 365
309
has been so exercised since then, and transfer of Chief
Justices has been the ordinary rule. It is unnecessary to
repeat the same. (Para 470)
The power of transfer can be exercised only in ‘public
interest’ i.e. for promoting better administration of
justice throughout the country. After adoption of the
transfer policy, and with the clear provision for transfer
in Article 222, any transfer in accordance with the
recommendation of the Chief Justice of India cannot be
treated as punitive or an erosion in the independence of
judiciary. Such Judges as may be transferred hereafter will
have been, for the most part, initially appointed after the
transfer policy was adopted and judicially upheld by this
Court. There will be no reason for any of them to even
think that his transfer is punitive, when it is made in
accordance with the recommendation of the Chief Justice of
India. In his case, transfer was an obvious incident of his
tenure. This applies equally to all Judges appointed after
the adoption of the transfer policy, irrespective of whether
they gave an undertaking to go on transfer or not.
The Constituent Assembly Debates indicate that the High
Court judges were intended to constitute an all-India Cadre.
This position cannot now be doubted after adoption of the
policy of appointing Chief Justices from outside and the
maintenance of an all-India seniority based on the date of
initial appointment, treating all High Courts as equal. If
the transfer of a Judge on appointment as Chief Justice is
not punitive, there is no occasion to treat the transfer of
any other Judge as punitive.
There is nothing in Article 222 to require the consent of a
Judge/Chief Justice for his first or even a subsequent
transfer. Since his consent is not read as a requirement
for the first transfer there is no reason to require his
consent for any subsequent transfer, according to the same
provision. The power under Article 222 is available
throughout the tenure of a High Court Judge/Chief Justice,
and it is not exhausted after the first transfer is made.
The contrary view in S.P. Gupta4 has no basis in the
Constitution. It is reasonable to assume that the Chief
Justice of India will recommend a subsequent transfer only
in public interest, for promoting better administration of
justice throughout the country, or at the request of the
concerned Judge. As indicated, at least now, after the
lapse of more than a decade since the decision in S.P.
Gupta4 there is no reason to treat any transfer as punitive;
and therefore, the observation in S.P. Gupta4 that a
punitive transfer is impermissible has no application any
more. As indicated by us later, a transfer made in
accordance with the recommendation of the Chief Justice of
India, is not justiciable.
Promotion of public interest by proper functioning of the
High Courts and, for that reason, the transfer of any
Judge/Chief Justice from one High Court to another must be
the lodestar for the performance of this duty enjoined on
the Chief Justice of India, as the head of the Indian
Judiciary. Suitable norms, including- those indicated
hereafter, must be
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followed by the Chief Justice of India, for his guidance,
while dealing with individual cases. (Paras 472 to 475)
NORMS
The absence of specific Guidelines in the enacted provisions
appears to be deliberate, since the power is vested in high
constitutional functionaries and it was expected of them to
develop requisite norms by convention in actual working as
envisaged in the concluding speech of the President of the
Constituent Assembly. The hereinafter mentioned norms
emerging from the actual practice and crystallized into
conventions not exhaustive are expected to be observed by
the functionaries to regulate the exercise of their
discretionary power in the matters of appointments and
transfers. (Para 477)
Transfers
(1) In the formation of his opinion, the Chief Justice of
India, in the case of transfer of a Judge other than the
Chief Justice, is expected to take into account the views of
the Chief Justice of the High Court from which the Judge is
to be transferred, any Judge of the Supreme Court whose
opinion may be of significance in that case, as well as the
views of at least one other senior Chief Justice of a High
Court, or any other person whose views are considered
relevant by the Chief Justice of India. The personal
factors relating to the Judge concerned, and his response to
the proposal, including his preference of places of
transfer, should be taken into account by the Chief Justice
of India before forming his final opinion objectively, on
the available material, in the public interest for better
administration of justice.
(4) It may be desirable to transfer in advance the
seniormost Judge due for appointment as Chief Justice to the
High Court where he is likely to be appointed Chief Justice,
to enable him to take over as Chief Justice as soon as the
vacancy arises and, in the meantime, acquaint himself with
the new High Court. This would ensure a smooth transition
without any gap in filling the office of Chief Justice. In
transfer of puisne Judges, parity in proportion of
transferred Judges must be maintained between the High
Courts, as far as possible.
(5) The recommendations in the Report of tile Arrears
Committee (1989-90) mention certain factors to be kept in
view while making transfers to avoid any hardship to the
transferred Judges. These must be taken into account. (Para
479)
JUSTICIABILITY
Appointments and Transfers
The primacy of the judiciary in the matter of appointments
and its determinative nature in transfers introduces the
judicial element in the
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process, and is itself a sufficient justification for the
absence of the need for further judicial review of those
decisions, which is ordinarily needed as a check against
possible executive excess or arbitrariness. Plurality of
Judges in the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice
of India, as indicated, is another inbuilt check against the
likelihood of arbitrariness or bias, even subconsciously, of
any individual. The judicial element being predominant in
the case of appointments, and decisive in transfers, as
indicated, the need for further judicial review, as in other
executive actions, is eliminated. The reduction of the area
of discretion to the minimum, the element of plurality of
Judges in formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of
India, effective consultation in writing, and prevailing
norms to regulate the area of discretion are sufficient
checks against arbitrariness.
These guidelines in the form of norms are not to be
construed as conferring any justiciable right in the
transferred Judge. Apart from the constitutional
requirement of a transfer being made only on the
recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, the issue of
transfer is not justiciable on any other ground, including
the reasons for the transfer or their sufficiency. The
opinion of the Chief Justice of India formed in the manner
indicated is sufficient safeguard and protection against any
arbitrariness or bias, as well as any erosion of the
independence of the judiciary.
This is also in accord with the public interest of excluding
these appointments and transfers from litigative debate, to
avoid any erosion in the credibility of the decisions, and
to ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by
all the constitutional functionaries, which is essential for
effective consultation and for taking the right decision.
The growing tendency of needless intrusion by strangers and
busybodies in the functioning of the judiciary under the
garb of public interest litigation, in spite of the caution
in S.P. Gupta 4 while expanding the concept of locus standi,
was adverted to recently by a Constitution Bench in Krishna
Swami v. Union of India-. It is, therefore, necessary to
spell out clearly the limited scope of judicial review in
such matters, to avoid similar situations in future. Except
on the ground of want of consultation with the named
constitutional functionaries or lack of any condition of
eligibility in the case of an appointment, or of a transfer
being made without the recommendation of the Chief Justice
of India, these matters are not justiciable on any other
ground, including that of bias, which in any case is
excluded by the element of plurality in the process of
decision-making.” (Paras 480 to 482)
10. Pandian, J. in his separate concurring opinion has
expressed his entire agreement on this point, as under: (SCC
p. 585a-c)
5 (1992) 4 SCC 605
312
“Transfer of Judges
With regard to the interpretation of Article 222 regarding
transfer of Judges from one High Court to another, 1
entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at
by learned brother, J.S. Verma, J.
(Para 252)
Conclusions
Though I have given my reasons separately, as indicated even
at the threshold of the judgment, I am in agreement with the
conclusions of my learned brother, J.S. Verma, J. regarding
the process of appointment of Judges, initiation of the
proposal for appointments and the right of primacy to the
opinion of Chief Justice of India in the matter of
appointment of Judges, transfer of High Court Judges/Chief
Justices of the High Courts, fixation of Judge-strength, the
summary of which is given under Point Nos. (1) to (8), (10),
(12) and (13).” (Para 253)
11. One of us (Kuldip Singh, J.) while concurring with the
majority, stated thus: (SCC p. 675 and 677)
“So far- as the interpretation of Article 222 of the
Constitution regarding transfer of a Judge from one High
Court to another, we entirely agree with the reasoning and
the conclusions reached by Verma, J. We reiterate that the
power vested under Article 222 can only be exercised in
‘public interest’. It is only the Chief Justice of India
who can examine the circumstances in a given case and reach
a conclusion as to whether it is in public interest to
transfer or re-transfer a Judge from one court to another.
Concept of ‘public interest’ when read in Article 222 makes
it obligatory that the views of the Chief Justice of India
are accepted by the executive. We also agree with Verma, J.
that a transfer made in public interest on the
recommendation of the Chief Justice of India is not
justiciable. (Para 407)
On the basis of the reasoning and discussion on various
issues, we conclude and hold as under:
(10) A Chief Justice/Judge may be transferred from one High
Court to another Article 222 in public interest. A
transferred Chief Justice/Judge can be transferred again and
the power is not exhausted after the first transfer. The
consent of the Chief Justice/Judge concerned is not required
under the Constitution. S.P. Gupta case4 stands overruled
to the extent.
(11) A proposal for transfer of a Chief Justice/Judge under
Article 222 has to be initiated by the Chief Justice of
India and the ultimate recommendation in that respect is
binding on the executive.
(12) The transfer of a Chief Justice/Judge is not
Justiciable in the court of law except on the ground that
the transfer was made without the recommendation of the
Chief Justice of India. (Para 41 1)
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12. Ahmadi, J. in his separate opinion, on this point, has
taken substantially the same view by saying that a High
Court Judge can be transferred in public interest and such a
transfer is not punitive. Punchhi, J. in his opinion has
generally agreed with Ahmadi, J. In short, there is no
disagreement on this aspect in the opinion of any learned
Judge in the Judges’ Case-II1.
13. It is, therefore, clear that exercise of power of
transfer under Article 222 of the Constitution is to
subserve a public purpose and to promote ‘public interest’
for better administration of justice throughout the country,
which is the inherent guideline implicit in Article 222 as
held in the Judges’ Case-H1. The expression ‘public
interest’ has a legal connotation well known and properly
understood and so also the requirement of promoting better
administration of justice throughout the country, which is
the guideline held to be implicit in Article 222 of the
Constitution.
14. The expression ‘public interest’ in the context of the
Premature Retirement Rules was held to be an expression
having the well-settled meaning that it refers to the
interests of public administration. (See Gian Singh Mann v.
High Court of Punjab and Haryana6 and Union of India v. Col.
J.N. Sinha7.)
15. In our opinion, the guideline of ‘public interest’,
i.e., “for promoting better administration of justice
throughout the country” is sufficient guideline for proper
exercise of the power and to ensure exclusion of the
possibility of any arbitrariness in the exercise of power of
transfer under Article 222 in accordance with the
recommendation of the Chief Justice of India as indicated in
the Judges’ Case-II1′; and its application to individual
cases is a question of fact in each case. Laying down
exhaustive guidelines in this behalf is neither expedient
nor pragmatic. It has also been indicated in the Judges’
Case-11′ that “suitable norms, including those
indicated …. must be followed by the Chief Justice of
India, for his guidance, while dealing with individual
cases”. The application of the broad guidelines to
individual cases according to norms evolved in practice has
to be left to the discretion of the Chief Justice of India
which is to be exercised in consultation with his colleagues
whose opinion is required to be taken for this purpose. The
factors which may be relevant for promoting better
administration of justice throughout the country to subserve
the public interest contemplated by such transfers would
depend on the myriad situations which might have to be met.
Some such relevant factors would be shifting of a Judge
from one High Court to another for improving the functioning
of either High Court; avoiding embarrassment to the Judge on
account of close relations practising ordinarily in the same
High Court or any court subordinate thereto; the likelihood
of embarrassment to the Judge on account of any litigation
or property interest in the same State; if the Judge, for
any reason, has become
6 (1980) 4 SCC 266: 1980 SCC (L&S) 527 : (198 1) 1 SCR 507
7 (1970) 2 SCC 458:(1971) 1 SCR 791
314
controversial so that his continuance in the same High Court
is not conducive to his interest or to the image of the
Judiciary or to the proper functioning of that High Court,
or any other similar situation. The transfer of any Judge
with his consent can, of course, be always made. The
factors indicated are not an exhaustive list of all the
relevant factors in this behalf and are merely illustrative.
16. The Chief Justice of India, as the paterfamilias of the
judiciary, can be safely relied upon in his wisdom, to
ensure that transfer of a judge is so effected as to cause
him the minimum inconvenience and to take into account such
personal factors as might be involved. Indication to this
effect is also to be found in the Judges’ Case-III.
17. The myth of non-transferability of High Court Judges,
notwithstanding Article 222, was blown in Union of India v.
Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth3. Thereafter, the constitutional
validity of the transfer policy was judicially upheld in
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India4. The conferment of that power
by Article 222 and the proper manner of its exercise to
exclude any arbitrariness has then been indicated in the
Judges’ Case-III wherein the trust reposed by the President
of the Constituent Assembly in the constitutional
functionaries was recalled and adverted to. Dr Rajendra
Prasad had said:
“Many things which cannot be written in the
Constitution are done by conventions. Let me
hope that we shall show those capacities and
develop those conventions.”
18. It is for this reason, that detailed guidelines are not
to be found in the Constitution and they have to emerge in
the working of Article 222. It has been made known that
after the Judges’ Case-Hi the Chief Justice of India
constituted a Peer Committee comprising of the two
seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court and two Chief
Justices of High Courts to make suggestions for transfers
and the Chief Justice of India is to make his
recommendations on that basis and in accordance with the
broad guidelines indicated in the Judges’ Case-Ill. In our
view, this is sufficient safeguard against any likely
arbitrariness or bias. There is no room left for any
apprehension of arbitrariness or bias in the transfer of any
Judge/Chief Justice of a High Court. It is time that the
men at the apex level of the Indian Judiciary are permitted
to manage the affairs of the judicial family and look after
its welfare and interest instead of permitting repeated
intrusions by some in the guise of ‘public interest’ thereby
rendering the Judges vulnerable .to avoidable controversy
involving them. We are constrained to observe that the
Allahabad case before us is of that kind. We have no doubt
that the Chief Justice of India acting on the institutional
advice available to him is the surest and safest bet for
preservation of the independence of judiciary.
19. Judicial review of transfers of members of transferable
services Is exceptional and is made only in extraordinary
cases on limited grounds. This is so even in the case of
transfer of subordinate Judges by the High Court,
independence of subordinate Judges being equally important.
This being so,
315
the cry for a larger area of justiciability in the case of
transfer of High Court Judges is incongruous when the power
is to be exercised by the highest constitutional
functionaries of the Indian Judiciary, with the care and
circumspection indicated in the Judges’ Case-III and herein.
20. The Judges’ Case-III does not exclude judicial review
but merely limits the area of justiciability to the
constitutional requirement of recommendation of the Chief
Justice of India for exercise of the power under Article 222
by the President of India. The power under Article 222 of
the Constitution is to be exercised by the highest
constitutional functionaries in the country in the manner
indicated which provides several inbuilt checks against the
likelihood of arbitrariness or bias. In S.P. Gupta 4 even
though the concept of locus standi for challenging the
transfer policy was liberalised and the standing to sue in
public interest litigation has been considerably widened,
yet the validity of individual transfers was examined only
at the instance of the transferred Judge and not at the
instance of anyone else. The need for restricting the
standing to sue in such a matter to the affected Judge alone
has been reiterated in the Judges’ Case-III. It is,
therefore, made clear that the transfer of a High Court
Judge is justiciable only on the ground indicated in the
Judges’ Case-III and only at the instance of the transferred
Judge himself and not anyone else. This emphasis is
necessary to prevent any transferred Judge being exposed to
any litigation involving him except when he chooses to
resort to it himself in the available limited area of
justiciability.
21. A useful passage from Craig’s Administrative Law
(Second Edn., p. 29 1) is as under:
“The traditional position was that the courts
would control the existence and extent of
prerogative power, but not the manner of
exercise thereof. … The traditional position
has however now been modified by the decision
in the GCHQ case. Their Lordships emphasised
that the review ability of discretionary power
should be dependent upon the subject-matter
thereof, and not whether its source was
statute or the prerogative. Certain exercises
of prerogative power would, because of their
subject-matter, be less justiciable, with Lord
Roskill compiling the broadest list of such
forbidden territory…….
22. In Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service8 (GCHQ case),
Lord Roskill stated thus: (page 418 : All ER
p. 956)
“But I do not think that that right of
challenge can be unqualified. It must, I
think, depend upon the subject-matter of the
prerogative power which is exercised. Many
examples were given during the argument of
prerogative powers which as at present advised
I do not think could properly be made the
subject of judicial review. Prerogative
powers such as those relating to the making of
treaties, the defence of the realm, the
prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours,
the dissolution of Parliament and the
appointment of ministers as well as others are
not, I think,
8 (1985) AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935
316
susceptible to judicial review because their
nature and subject-matter are such as not to
be amenable to the judicial process.”
23. The same indication of judicial self-
restraint in such matters is to be found in De
Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative
Action, thus:
“Judicial self-restraint was still more marked
in cases where attempts were made to impugn
the exercise of discretionary powers by
alleging abuse of the discretion itself rather
than alleging non-existence of the state of
affairs on which the validity of its exercise
was predicated. Quite properly, the courts
were slow to read implied limitations into
grants of wide discretionary powers which
might have to be exercised on the basis of
broad considerations of national policy.”
(page 32)
24. It is for this reason that the reduced area of
justiciability has been indicated in the Judges’ Case-III.
When it was said in the Judges’ Case-HI that the ground of
bias also is not available for challenging a transfer, it
was to emphasise that the decision made by the collective
exercise of several Judges at the apex level or objective
criterion on which the recommendation of the Chief Justice
of India is based, is an in built check against
arbitrariness and bias indicating absence of need for
judicial review on those grounds. This is how the area of
justiciability is reduced in the sphere of judicial review
of transfer of Judges.
25. Ms Indira Jaising also submitted that any such
litigation should lie only in the Supreme Court of India and
not in any other court to prevent embarrassment to High
Court Judges. We consider it sufficient to observe that the
limited area of justiciability in this sphere being clearly
declared in the Judges’ Case-III and also herein while
making it clear that no one other than the transferred Judge
himself can question the validity of a transfer, it is
unnecessary to provide any further safeguard. We have no
doubt that if any other court in the country is called upon
to decide such a matter, it would promptly consider the
option of requesting this Court to withdraw the case to this
Court for decision to avoid any embarrassment.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, we must hold that there is
no merit in any of the points raised in these matters.
Accordingly, both matters are dismissed.
318